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
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THE

WHOLE WORKS

OF THE

RIGHT REV. EDWARD REYNOLDS, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF NORWICH;

Now first Collected,

WITH HIS FUNERAL SERMON, BY B. RIVELEY,

ONE OF HIS LORDSHIP'S CHAPLAINS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED

A MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

By ALEXANDER CHALMERS, F.S.A.

IN SIX VOLUMES.

VOL. VI.

"Oportet Ecclesiasticum, quando suadet aliquid quod agendum est, non solùm docere ut instruat, et delectare ut teneat, verùm etiam flectere ut vincat."

Aug. de Doctrina Christiana, lib. 4. cap. 13.

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A

TREATISE

OF THE

PASSIONS AND FACULTIES

OF THE

SOUL OF MAN;

WITH THE SEVERAL DIGNITIES AND CORRUPTIONS THEREUNTO BELONGING.

Quicquid agunt homines, Votum, Timor, Ira, Voluptas,
Gaudia, Discursus, nostri est farrago libelli.—*Juvenal*, Sat. 1.

TO HER

HIGHNESS

THE

PRINCESS ELIZABETH,

Princess Palatine of the Rhine, Duchess of Bavaria, &c. and eldest Daughter to Her Majesty the Queen of Bohemia.

May it please your Highness,

What the great philosopher[a] hath observed of men's bodies, is, upon so much stronger reasons, true of their minds:— By how much our intellectual maturity is more lingering and sluggish than our natural, that the too early conceptions and issues of them do, usually, prove but weak and unuseful; and we shall seldom find, but that those venturous blossoms, whose over-hasty obedience to the early spring doth anticipate their proper season, and put forth too soon, do, afterwards, for their former boldness, suffer from the injury of severer weather; except at least some happy shelter, or more benign influence, redeem them from danger. The like infelicity, I find myself obnoxious unto, at this time; for I know not out of what disposition of mind, whether out of love of learning (for love is venturous[b], and conceives difficult things easier than they are), or whether out of a resolution to take some account from myself of those few years, wherein I have been then planted in the happiest of all soils, the schools of learning; whether upon these, or any other inducement, so it hath happened, that I long since have taken boldness, in the minority of my studies, to write this ensuing treatise: that before I adventured on the endeavour of knowing other things, I might first try whether I knew myself; lest I should justly incur

[a] *Aristot.* Polit. l. 7. c. 16. *Cœl. Rhodig.* l. 16 c. 15.

[b] Amorem dixit Plato Παντὸς ἐπιχειρητήν.

the censure which that sour[c] philosopher passed upon grammarians, "That they were better acquainted with the evils of Ulysses, than with their own." This hasty resolution having produced so untimely an issue, it happened, by some accident, to be like Moses in his infancy,—exposed to the seas; where I made no other account, but that its own weakness would there have revenged my former boldness, and betrayed it unto perishing. But as he then, so this now, hath had the marvellous felicity to light on the view, and fall under the compassion, of a very gracious Princess. For so far hath your Highness vouchsafed (having happened on the sight of this tractate) to express favour thereunto, as not only to spend hours in it, and require a transcript of it, but farther to recommend it by your gracious judgement unto public view. In which particular, I was not to advise with mine own opinion, being to express my humblest acknowledgement to your Highness.

This only petition I shall accompany it withal unto your Highness' feet, that since it is a blossom which put forth so much too soon, it may, therefore, obtain the gracious influence of your Highness' favour, to protect it from that severity abroad, which it otherwise justly feareth.

God Almighty make your Highness as great a mirror of his continual mercies, as he hath both of his graces, and of learning.

Your Highness' most humble servant,

Ed. Reynolds.

[c] *Diogenes* apud Laertium, l. 6.

A PREFACE TO THE READER.

Having been moved to give way unto the publication of this Philosophical Miscellany, the fruit of my younger studies, I consider it needful to prevent one obvious prejudice under which I may labour. For it may haply seem indecent in me, having adventured to publish some few, though weak, discourses in arguments divine, that I should now suffer the blossoms of my youth to look abroad and run the hazard of public censure. Whereunto, when I shall have given a short answer, I shall rest something the more confident of a candid construction.

And here I might first allege the honour, which God himself hath been pleased to give unto inferior and natural knowledge. In the first creation, when he gave unto man the dominion over other creatures for his use, he gave him likewise the contemplation and knowledge of them, for his Maker's glory and his own delight. (For God brought them unto him to give them names.) And as the holy scriptures are all over full of the mysteries of God's wisdom in natural things, so are there some special passages thereof written[a], as it were, purposely on that argument. And we find that Moses and Solomon have therein testimony given unto them, not only of their divine, but of their human and natural knowledge likewise.

And if we look into the ancient Christian churches, or into these of latter times, we shall find that very many ecclesiastical persons have not denied unto the world their philosophical and poetical labours, either whole and alone, or mixed and directed to theological ends, as we find in the writings of Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Eusebius Cæsariensis, St. Austin's books 'De civitate Dei,' and others; Venerable Bede, Isidore Hispalensis, Synesius, Sidonius Apollinaris, Honorius Augustodunensis, &c. In

[a] Job cap. 38, 39, 40, 41. Psalm civ. 147.

the Hexamerons of St. Basil, Nyssen, Ambrose, and the books of those who have written more directly upon some parts of the argument of this present treatise, as Gregory Nyssen, Lactantius, Nemesius, Procopius, Gazæus, Damascenus, and others. And in latter times, besides the schoolmen, and those vast labours of many of that side in dialectical, physical, and metaphysical writings, we might instance in very many of the reformed churches abroad, some of whose younger labours have seen the light: as also in the oratory, logical, moral, historical, mathematical, miscellaneous writings of many learned divines of our own church: under the protection of which great examples, I shall use the apology which Quintilian[b] dictateth unto me, "Vel error honestus est magnos duces sequentibus;" that it is no uncomely, but a pardonable error, which hath great examples to excuse it. In which respect I find myself chiefly subject to the infelicity, that I am constrained to follow such examples, as little children do their fathers, non æquis passibus, at a very great distance.

And truly, when I again consider the excellent[c] use and subordination of human learning unto learning divine; (it being hardly possible, without it, to understand sundry passages of holy scripture, depending upon the propriety of words and idioms, or upon the customs, rites, proverbs, forms, usages, laws, offices, antiquities of the Assyrian, Persian, Greek, and Roman monarchies, as might be shown in sundry particulars, and were a labour most worthy the industry of some able and learned men:) when I consider that the spoils[d] of Egypt were by God allowed to enrich Israel, and[e] the spoils of the Gentiles reserved by David for the building of the temple; that a[f] Gentile, by legal purification and marriage, might become an Israelite; that the[g] crown of Rabbah was put upon the head of David, and the[h] sword of

[b] Lib. 1, cap. 6. [c] Est quidem de communibus sensibus sapere in Dei rebus, sed in testimonium veri, non in adjutorium falsi. *Tertul.* de Resur. Carnis. cap. 3. Vid. etiam Apol. cap. 47. et *Clem. Alex. Strom.* l. 1. p. 203. A. 207. A. E. 214. A. B. 218, 219, 223, 227, 233, 234, et lib. 6. p. 465, 467, 499, 500. *Justin Martyr*, Apol. 1. *Aug.* Confess. l. 1, c. 15. Christianus Domini sui esse intelligit, ubicunque invenerit veritatem. *Aug.* de Doctri. Chri. l. 2. c. 18, 39, 40. Ὅσα παρὰ πᾶσι καλῶς εἴρηται, ὑμῶν τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἐστι. *Justin.* Apol. 1. Vid. *Aug.* de Civ. Dei, l. 18. c. 52. *Greg. Nazian.* Orat. 1. [d] Exod. xii. 35. [e] 1 Chron. xxix. [f] Deut. xxi. 12. [g] 2 Sam. xii. 30. Vid. *Pet. Ærod.* decret. l. 1. Tit. 8, sect. 4. [h] 1 Sam. xvii. 21.

Goliath used to slay himself; that the[i] gold, and myrrh, and frankincense of the Wise men of the East, was offered unto the Christ; when I find the apostle[k] convincing the Jews out of their law, and the philosophers out of their maxims; and every[l] gift, as well as every creature of God, is good, and may be sanctified for the use and delight of man; I then conclude with myself, that the moral and philosophical glass of the human soul may be of some service even unto the tabernacle, as the[m] looking-glasses of the Israelitish women were unto the altar.

Nor can I but a little wonder at the melancholy fancy of St. Jerome[n], who, conceiving himself in a vision beaten by an angel, for being a Ciceronian, did, for ever after, promise to abjure the reading of secular authors; though I find[o] himself both justifying the excellent use of that learning, and acknowledging that conceited vision of his to have been but a dream.

It is true, indeed, that, in regard of the bewitching danger from human learning, and the too great aptness in the minds of men to surfeit and be intemperate in the use of it, some of the antients have sometimes interdicted the reading[p] of such authors unto Christian men. But this calleth upon us for watchfulness in our studies, not for negligence: for the apostle will tell us, that 'to the pure all things are pure;' and even of harmful things, when they are prepared, and their malignancy by art corrected, doth the skilful physician make an excellent use. If, then, we be careful to moderate and regulate our affections, to take heed of the pride and inflation of secular learning; not to admire philosophy to the prejudice of evangelical knowledge, as if, without the revealed light of the gospel, salvation might be found in the way of paganism;—if we suffer not these lean kine to devour the fat ones, nor the river Jordan to be lost in the Dead Sea,—I mean, piety to be swallowed up of profane studies, and the knowledge of the scriptures (which alone would make any man conversant in all other kind of learning with

[i] Matth. ii. 11. [k] Acts xviii. 4. xvii. 23—29. [l] Jac. i. 17. 1 Tim. iv. 4. [m] Ex. xxxviii. 8. a. 2. [n] De Custod. Virginit. ad Eustochium. [o] Epist. ad Magn. Orat. Ep. ad Pammach. de Obitu Paulinæ, Apolog. advers. *Ruffin.* l. 1. [p] Vid. Notas *Conradi Ritterhusii* in Isid. Pelus. Ep. 56. l. 1. *Tertul.* de præscript. c. 7. de Idololat. c. 10. contra *Marc.* l. 2. c. 16.

much greater felicity and success) to be undervalued, and not rather the more admired, as a rich jewel, compared with glass;—in this case, and with such care as this, there is no doubt but secular studies, prepared and corrected from pride and profaneness, may be to the church, as the Gibeonites were to the congregation of Israel, for hewers of wood and drawers of water: neither may we say of them, as Cato Major to his son of the Grecian arts and learning[r], "Quandocunque ista gens suas literas dabit, omnia corrumpet."

Nor have I, upon these considerations only, adventured on the publication of this tract; but because withal, in the receiving of it, I found very many touches upon theological arguments, and some passages wholly of that nature: yea, all the material parts of the treatise do so nearly concern the knowledge of ourselves, and the direction of our lives, as that they may be all esteemed borderers upon that profession.

In the perusing and fashioning of it for the press, I have found that true in writing which I have formerly found true in building: that it is almost as chargeable to repair and set right an old house, as to erect a new one: for I was willing, in the most material parts of it, so to lop off luxuriance of style, and to supply the defects of matter, as, with candid, favourable, and ingenuous judgements, it might receive some tolerable acceptation. In hope whereof I rest

Thine, in all Christian service,

Ed. Reynolds.

[r] *Plin.* l. 29. c. 1. Vid. Notas *Xylandri* in Plutarch. Catonem, sect. 13.

A

TREATISE

OF THE

PASSIONS AND FACULTIES

OF THE

SOUL OF MAN.

CHAP. I.

Of the dependence of the soul, in her operations upon the body.

It hath been a just complaint of learned men [a], that usually we are more curious in our enquiries after things new than excellent; and that the very nearness of worthy objects, hath at once made them both despised and unknown. Thus, like children, with an idle diligence, and fruitless curiosity, we turn over this great book of Nature, without perusing those ordinary characters, wherein is expressed the greatest power of the worker, and excellency of the work; fixing our admiration only on those pictures, and unusual novelties, which though, for their rareness, they are more strange, yet, for their nature, are less worthy. Every comet or burning meteor strikes more wonder into the beholder, than those glorious lamps of Nature, with their admirable motions and order, in which the heathen have acknowledged a divineness.[b] Let a child be born but with six fingers, or have a part more than usual, we rather wonder at one superfluous, than at all natural. 'Sol spectatorem, nisi cum deficit, non habet: nemo observat lunam nisi laborantem: adeò naturale est magis nova, quàm magna mirari[c]:' None looketh with wonder on the sun, but in an eclipse; no eye gazeth on the moon, but in

[a] *Cic.* de Div. l. 2. *Plin.* l. 1. ep. 20. [b] *Cic.* de Nat. Deor. l. 2. [c] *Sen.* Qu. Nat. l. 7. c. 1.

her travail: so natural it is with men to admire rather things new than common.—Whereas indeed things are fit for study and observation, though never so common, in regard of the perfection of their nature, and usefulness of their knowledge. In which respect, the plain counsel of the Oracle was one of the wisest which was ever given to man, to study and 'to know himself;' because, by reason of his own nearness to himself, he is usually of himself most unknown and neglected. And yet if we consider how, in him, it hath pleased God to stamp a more notable character of his own image[d], and to make him, amongst all his works, one of the most perfect models of created excellency; we cannot but acknowledge him to be one, though of the least, yet of the fittest volumes, in this great variety of Nature to be acquainted withal. Intending therefore, according to my weakness, to take some view of the inside and more noble characters of this book, it will not be needful for me to gaze upon the cover, to insist on the materials or sensitive conditions of the human nature, or to commend him in his anatomy; though even, in that respect, the Psalmist tells us, that he is "fearfully and wonderfully made:" for we commonly see, that as most kinds of plants[e] or trees exceed us in vegetation and fertility, so many sorts of beasts have a greater activity and exquisiteness in their senses than we. And the reason thereof is, because Nature, aiming at a superior and more excellent end, is, in those lower faculties, less intent and elaborate. It shall suffice, therefore, only to lay a ground-work in these lower faculties, for the better notice of man's greater perfections, which have ever some connexion and dependence on them. For whereas the principal acts of man's soul, are either of reason and discourse, proceeding from his understanding,—or of action and morality, from his will; both these, in the present condition of man's estate, have their dependence on the organs and faculties of the body, which, in the one, precede,—in the other, follow: to the one, they are as porters, to let in and convey; to the other, as messengers, to perform and execute: to the one, the whole body is as an eye, through which it seeth; to the other, a hand, by which it worketh.

[d] *Sen.* de Benef. lib. 6. c. 23. [e] *Sen.* Ep. 79.

Concerning the ministry, therefore, of the body unto the soul, we shall thus resolve, that the reasonable part of man, in that condition of subsistence which now it hath, depends, in all its ordinary and natural operations, upon the happy or disordered temperature of those vital qualities, out of whose apt and regular commixion the good estate of the body is framed and composed: for though these ministerial parts have not any over-ruling, yet they have a disturbing power, to hurt and hinder the operations of the soul.[e] Whence we find, that sundry diseases of the body do oftentimes weaken, yea, sometimes quite extirpate, the deepest impression and most fixed habits of the mind. For as wheresoever there is a locomotive faculty, though there be the principal cause of all motion and activity, yet, if the subordinate instruments, the bones and sinews be disjointed, shrunk, or any other ways indisposed for the exercise of that power, there can be no actual motion;—or as in the body politick, the prince (whom Seneca calleth[f] the Soul of the Commonwealth) receiveth either true or false intelligence from abroad, according as is the fidelity or negligence of those instruments, whom Xenophon[g] termeth the "eyes and ears of Kings;"—in like manner, the soul of man being not an absolute independent worker, but receiving all her objects by conveyance from these bodily instruments, which Cicero calleth "the Messengers to the Soul,"—if they, out of any indisposition, shall be weakened, the soul must continue like a 'rasa tabula,' without any acquired or introduced habits. The soul hath not immediately from itself that strange weakness, which is observed in many men, but only as it is disabled by earthly and sluggish organs; which being out of order, are more burdensome than serviceable thereunto.

There are observable in the souls of men, considered in themselves, and in reference one to another, two defects: an imperfection, and an inequality, of operation. The former of these, I do not so ascribe to that bodily weakness, whereby the soul is any way oppressed, as if I conceived no internal darkness in the faculties themselves; since the fall of man,

[e] Solinus de quodam refert, quod, accepto vulnere in occipitio, ad tantam devenit ignorantiam, ut nesciret se habuisse nomen.—*Honorius Augustodunens.* de Philosoph. Mundi, lib. 4. c. 24. [f] *Sen.* de Clem. lib. 1. cap 4. [g] *Xenoph.* Cyrop. lib. 8. et *Arist.* Polit. lib. 3. cap. 12.

working in him a general corruption, did, amongst the rest, infatuate the mind, and, as it were, smother the soul with ignorance; so that the outward ineptitude of bodily instruments, is only a furtherance and improvement of that native imperfection. But for the inequality and difference of men's understandings in their several operations, notwithstanding it be questioned in the schools, whether the souls of men have not originally, in their natures, degrees of perfection and weakness, whence these several degrees of operation may proceed; yet nevertheless that being granted, I suppose, that it likewise, in great part, proceeds from the variety, tempers, and dispositions in the instrumental faculties of the body;—by the help whereof, the soul in this estate worketh. For I cannot perceive it possible, that there should have been, if man had continued in his innocency, (wherein our bodies should have had an exact constitution, free from those distempers to which now, by sin, they are liable) such remarkable differences between men's apprehensions, as we now see there are: for there should have been, in all men, a great facility to apprehend the mysteries of nature, and to acquire knowledge (as we see in Adam) which now we find, in a large measure, granted to some, and to others, quite denied. And yet, in that perfect estate (according to the opinion of those who now maintain it) there would have been found a substantial and internal inequality amongst the souls of men. And therefore principally this variety comes from the sundry constitutions of men's bodies: in some, yielding enablement for quickness of apprehension; in others pressing down and entangling the understanding; in some, disposing the mind unto one object; in some, unto another, according as the impetus and force of their natural affections carrieth them. And therefore Aristotle[h], in his Politicks, ascribeth the inequality, which he observes between the Asiatic and European wits, unto the several climates and temperature of the regions in which they lived: according whereunto, the complexions and constitutions of their bodies only could be altered; the soul being, in itself, according to the same philosopher[i], impassible from any corporeal agent. And to the same purpose again he saith, "That if an old

[h] *Arist.* Pol. l. 7. [i] *Arist.* de Anima, lib. 3.

man had a young man's eye, his sight would be as sharp and as distinct as a young man's is;" implying the diversity of perception to be grounded only on the diversity of bodily instruments, by which it is exercised. And therefore he elsewhere observes (I shall not trouble myself to examine upon what ground) that "men of soft and tender skins have greatest quickness of wit[k];" and on the contrary, "Duri carne, inepti mente;" thereby intimating, that there is no more significant and lively expression of a vigorous or heavy soul, than a happy or ill-ordered body; wherein we may, sundry times, read the abilities of the mind, and the inclinations of the will. So then it is manifest, that this weakness of apprehension in the souls of men, doth not only come from an immediate and proper darkness belonging unto them, but from the co-existence which they have with a body, ill-disposed for assistance and information. For he who is carried in a coach (as the body is 'vehiculum animæ'), though he be of himself more nimble and active, must yet receive such motion as that affords: and water which is conveyed through pipes and aqueducts, though its motion by itself would have been otherwise, must yet then be limited by the posture and proportion of the vessels through which it passeth.

CHAP. II.

In what cases the dependence of the soul on the body is lessened by faith, custom, education, occasion.

But yet this dependence on the body is not so necessary and immutable, but that it may admit of variation, and the soul be, in some cases, vindicated from the impression of the body: and this, first, in extraordinary; and next, in more common actions. In actions extraordinary, as those pious and religious operations of the soul, assent, faith, invocation, and many others; wherein the soul is carried beyond the sphere of sense, and transported unto more raised operations. For to believe and know, that there are laid up for pious and holy endeavours "those joys, which eye hath not

[k] De Anima, l. 2.

seen, nor ear heard [l];" and to have some glimpses and foretaste of them, which St. Paul calleth the "earnest, and firstfruits of the Spirit;" what is this, but to leave sense behind us, and to outrun our bodies? And therefore it is, that evangelical mysteries were not, at the first, urged by disputes of secular learning, but were sacredly infused, not persuading by fleshly wisdom [m], but by a spiritual and heavenly call, drawing to the belief of them. Evangelical truths do as much transcend the natural reason, as spiritual goodness doth the natural will of man. That one nature should be in three persons, and two natures in one person; that the invisible God should be manifest in the flesh, and a pure virgin bring forth a son;—these are mysteries above the reach of human, yea, even of angelical, disquisition.[n] Sarah laughed, when Abraham believed[o]: and reason expected, that the apostle should have fallen down dead, when Faith shook the viper into the fire.[p]

There is a great difference between the manner of yielding our assent unto natural and supernatural verities. The principles of the one are ingrafted, and suitable to the native seeds, and original notions of reason natural: but the principles of the other are revealed; and, without such revelation, could never have been sifted out by our implanted light, or by any human disquisition been discovered. For the gospel being a supernatural science, the principles thereof must needs transcend the reach of natural faculties, till raised and enabled by divine grace. And then indeed reason is an excellent instrument to use those principles of faith unto our further proficiency in sacred knowledge, which, without divine revelation, proposing the object, and divine grace disposing the faculty, it could never have either known or used.

And from hence (I suppose) did arise that usual calumny

[l] 1 Cor. ii. 9, 10. Heb. iii. 1. [m] Δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς τῆς ἐκκλησίας τροφίμους μὴ λογισμοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις διευθύνειν τὰ θεῖα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βούλευμα τῆς διδασκαλίας τοῦ πνεύματος τῶν λόγων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἔκθεσιν. *Just. Mart.* Expos. Fid. [n] Eph. iii. 9. Vid. *Greg. Nyssen.* Homil. 8. in Cant. et *Sext. Senens.* Biblioth. l. 6. Annot. 165, et 299. [o] Gen. xviii. 12. [p] Acts xxviii. 5, 6.—Ubi ad profunditatem Sacramentorum perventum est, omnis Platonicorum caligavit subtilitas: *Cypr.* de Spir. Sanct. Vid. etiam *Aug.* Enchir. c. 4.

of the philosophers against the Christians, that they taught their followers nothing but an illiterate and naked belief.[q] Though indeed the revelation of divine mysteries[r] and the grace of God being presupposed, there is no such height of rational evidence and demonstration in all the writings of philosophers, as in the gospel.

But to return. This freedom from bodily restraint, has, according to the schoolmen, those raptures and extasies, which raise and ravish the soul with the sweetness of extraordinary contemplations, wherein a man is, as it were, carried out of himself, and transported 'extra connaturalem apprehensionem,[s]' beyond the usual bounds of sense and common apprehension.

Now for the exemption of the more ordinary actions of the soul from the predominancy of the body, it is chiefly wrought by these three means, education, custom, and occasion. For the rule of Aristotle[t], though in agents, purely natural, it hold true, yet in voluntary agents it is not constant, that things which proceed from nature, are unalterable by custom. For we may usually observe, that the culture of the mind, as of the earth, doth deliver it from the barrenness of its nature.[u]

And therefore when Zopyrus[x] the physiognomist did conjecture of the disposition of Socrates[y], contrary to that which men believed of him, and thereupon was derided as an ignorant pretender; Socrates himself did acquit the man from that imputation, confessing, that he had rightly judged of his natural inclinations, which only the study of philosophy had altered and over-ruled.

Thus as hard bones, being steeped in vinegar and ashes,

[q] *Greg. Naz.* 2 Orat. 3. *Euseb.* de præparat. Evang. l. 1. c. 1, 3. *Theod.* Serm. 1. Therapeut. [r] 1 Cor. ii. 7. [s] *Aquin.* 12. qu. 28. Art. 3. et 22. qu. 175. art. c. 4. [t] Ethic. lib. 2. c. 1. et l. 10. c. 9. [u] Γῆ μὲν κακὴ, Τυχοῦσα καιροῦ θεόθεν, εὖ στάχυν φέρει. *Eurip.* Hecub. 590.—Exercetque frequens tellurem, atque imperat arvis, *Virgil.* [x] *Maxim. Tyrius*, dissert. 12. [y] *Euseb.* de præp. Evang. l. 5. c. 9. *Theodoret.* Serm. 4. *Cic.* Tuscul. q. l. 4. in finem et l. de fato. *Plut.* l. an vitiositas ad felicitatem sufficiat. [z] Παραπλησία τῇ φύσει διδασκαλία. *Democrit.* apud Theodoret. Serm. 4. Therapeut.—Διαστρ'φεσθαι τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον διὰ τὰς τῶν ἔξωθεν πραγματείων πιθανότητας. *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. Ἡ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστιν, ἢ τύχης, Ἢ πλῆθος αὐτὸν πόλεος, ἢ νόμων γραφαὶ Εἴργουσι χρῆσθαι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην τρόποις. *Eurip.* Hecub. 855. Vid. *Sen.* de Ira. l. 2. c. 12.

(as Plutarch notes) do lose their nature, and grow so soft, that they may be cut with a thread; so the roughest and most unbended natures, by early and prudent discipline, may be much rectified [a]; though still indeed, like simples of a strong and predominant relish in a compounded medicine, they will give a tincture to all other super-induced qualities.

Socrates himself, notwithstanding the great mastery which he professed to have gotten over the vicious propensions of his nature, could not yet always be so faithful to his moral principles, as not to relapse, and betray the looseness of his disposition; and that not only in anger and passions, charged upon him by his best friends, Aristoxenus and Porphyrius, but also in unnatural obscenities, the usual sin (as the apostle notes [b], and as Plutarch confesseth [c]) even of their greatest philosophers. Whence that of the poet [d],

"Inter Socraticos notissima fossa cinædos."

Now for occasion, that alters the natural inclination of the will and affections: for so we see, that the bias of men's desires are often turned, by reason of some sudden or emergent occurrences, contrary to the standing temper and complexion of the body. Thus we read sometimes of men in war, who,—notwithstanding of themselves timorous and sluggish, yet being deprived of all possibility of flight, and hope of mercy,—if they should be conquered [e], have strangely gained by their despairs, and gotten great and prosperous victories by a forced and unnatural fortitude:—an example whereof we have in the Philistines, who, being sorely terrified with the ark of the Lord in the camp of Israel [f], resolved thereupon to quit themselves like men, and fight. Nor could the band of the Scythian slaves [g], who endeavoured to shake off their servile condition, be removed from that insolence, till the sight of rods, and staves, and other instruments of fear, had driven them back into their nature again.

[a] *Cyril. Alex.* cont. Julian. l. 6. *Theodoret.* Serm. 12. de virtute activa. [b] Rom. i. 25, 26. [c] *Plutarch.* περὶ παιδ. ἀγωγ. [d] *Juvenal.* Lego partem sententiæ Atticæ, Socratem corruptorem adolescentium pronunciatum. *Tertul.* Apolog. c. 4. [e] Una salus victis nullam sperare salutem. [f] 1 Sam. iv. 6, 7, 8. [g] *Justin.*

CHAP. III.

Of the Memory, and some few causes of the weakness thereof.

Now for these inward senses, which are commonly accounted three, (though extending themselves unto sundry operations of different qualities,) I take the two latter, to wit, memory, and fancy or imagination, to have a more excellent degree of perfection in man, as being indeed the principal store-houses and treasuries of the operations of the soul. Where, by 'memory,' I understand not the faculty, as it is common to beasts with men, and importeth nothing but the simple retention, and conservation of some species, formerly treasured up by the conveyance of the outward sense: but as it is 'consors et co-operatrix rationis,' as Hugo speaks, a joint-worker in the operations of reason[a]; which the Latins call 'reminiscentia,' or 'recordatio,' including some acts of the understanding: which is a reviewing, or (as we speak) 'a calling to mind' of former objects, by discourse, or rational searching for them; which is made, by Aristotle, to be the remote ground of all arts: "For" (saith he) "memory is the ground of experience, and experience the mother of art."[b] The dignity hereof in man is seen, both by perfecting the understanding in matter of learning and discourse, wherein some men have attained unto almost a miraculous felicity:—[as Seneca the Elder confesseth of himself[c], who could immediately recite two thousand words, in the same order as they had been spoken before to him; and Cyrus, of whom Xenophon testifieth, that he could salute all the soldiers in his army by their names; and Mithridates[d], who, being king over twenty-two countries, did speak so many languages without an interpreter; and Politian[e], in his epistles, telleth of Fabius Ursinus, a child but of eleven years of age, in whom there was so rare a mixture of inven-

[a] Lib. de Spirit. et Anima. [b] Metaph. lib 1. [c] *Sen.* Contio. lib. 1. in Procœmium. [d] *Plin.* l. 7. c. 24, *Quintil.* lib. 11. c. 2. [e] *Polit.* Ep. l. 12. ad Pic. Mirand.

tion and memory, that he could, unto five or six several persons, at the same time, dictate the matter and words of so many several epistles, some serious, some jocular, all of different arguments, returning after every short period from the last to the first, and so in order; and, in the conclusion, every epistle should be so close, proper, and coherent within itself, as if it alone had been intended:] as also by affording special assistance for the direction and discreet managing of our actions, conforming them either unto precepts and rules in morality, or unto principles of wisdom and public prudence, gathered from historical observations: while the mind, by the help of memory, being, as it were, conversant with ages past, and furnished with examples for any service and employment, doth, by mature application, weighing particulars, comparing times, circumstances, and passages of affairs together, enable itself, with the more hope and resolution, to pass successfully through any enterprise or difficulty: for, 'qui credit sperat,' he that believeth, and is acquainted with the happy issue of other men's resolutions, will, with the less anxiety or discouragement, go on in his own.

The principal corruptions which I conceive of the memory, are, first, too much slightness and shallowness of observation; when, out of an impatiency of staying long, or making any profound enquiry into one object, and out of a gluttonous curiosity to feed on many, the greediness of the appetite weakeneth the digestion; (for so some have called the memory, 'the belly of the soul,') and an eagerness to take in, makes uncareful to retain. And this is a reason why many men wander over all arts and sciences, without gaining real improvement or solidity in any: they make not any solemn journey to a particular coast and head of learning, but view all, as it were, 'in transitu;' having no sooner begun to settle on one, but they are in haste to visit another. But such men as these (except endowed with an incredible and more than usual felicity of despatch) are no more able to find the use, or search the bottom of any learning, than he who rides post, is to make a description and map of his journeys; who, though by much employment, he may toil and sweat more in travelling from place to place, yet he is far less able to discover the nature of the countries, temperature of the air, character of the people, commodities of the

earth, than he, who, though not so violent in the motion, is yet more constant in his abode: and though his haste be less eager, yet his observations may be more serious. "Omnis festinatio cæca est," saith Seneca; precipitancy and unstableness, as well in the motions of the wit as of the body, dazzleth and disableth the eyes. And it is true in the mind, as in the stomach, too quick digestion doth always more distemper than nourish, and breedeth nothing but crudities in learning. Nor can I call that so much study, as agitation and restlessness of the mind; which is as impatient of true settled labour, as it is of quiet. Now the reason why such a temper of mind as this, is corruptive to the memory, is, first, because memory is always joined with some measure of love; and we most of all remember that which we most respect. "Omnia quæ curant, meminerunt:" there where the treasure is, the mind will be also: there therefore where our love is most constant, our memories will be most faithful. So that sudden, vanishing, and broken desires, which, like the appetite of sick men, are for the time violent, but give presently over; as they argue an eager love for the present of that we pursue, and, by consequence, a 'fastidium' and disesteem of that which we soon forsake[f]; so do they necessarily infer weakness on the memory, by how much they make our hopes the stronger. For, as Seneca speaks, "Caduca memoria futuro imminentium[g];" men, strongly bent upon things future, have but weak memories of things past.

Secondly, The body of any one homogeneal learning, hath this excellent property in it, that all the parts of it do, by mutual service relate to, and communicate strength and lustre each to other: so that he who goes through with any science, doth, from every new branch and conclusion which he meets with, receive a greater clearness, and more strong impression of his former degrees of knowledge. Now then, that man, who, out of impatiency of that restraint, cannot endure to go through an art, to search into the root, to observe the knittings and dependencies of the parts among themselves, to see by what passages truth is derived from the principles, to this or to other branches; must needs be so

[f] *Arist.* Rhet. lib. 1. c. 12. [g] De Benef. lib. 3. c. 3.

much the more forgetful of what he knows, by how much he is ignorant of those other parts whereunto it referreth.

Other causes there are of weakness in the memory; as, namely, a distrust, and from thence an unexercise of it. Whereupon Plato tells us, that the use of letters, in gathering Adversaria and Collections, is a hindrance to the memory; because those things which we have deposited in our desks, we are the more secure and careless to retain in our minds. And on the other extreme, a too great confidence in it, and thereupon an over-burdening it with multitude of notions, whereby, as it sheds much over, so it is withal indisposed for the ready use of what it retains; it falling out in a huddle and tumultuary heap of thoughts, as in any other throng, that we can never so easily find out, or order and dispose what we desire to use, but are confounded in our own store. But I forbear to insist on these, because I hasten to the higher and more noble part of man.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Fancy: its offices to the will and reason: Volubility of thoughts, fictions, errors, levity, fixedness.

Now, for the imagination; the dignity thereof consists, either in the office, or in the latitude of it. Its office is to be assistant both to the understanding and the will: its assistance to the understanding is principally in matter of invention, readily to supply it with variety of objects whereon to work; as also to quicken and raise the mind with a kind of heat and rapture proportionable, in the inferior part of the soul, to that which, in the superior, philosophers call 'extasy[a];' whereby it is possessed with such a strong delight in its proper object, as makes the motions thereof towards it to be restless and impatient: and of this is that of the poet,

"Est Deus in nobis; agitante calescimus ipso."

By divine raptures we aspire,
And are inflam'd with noble fire.

[a] Μαρακὸς ὁ Συρακούσιος καὶ ὀμείνων ἦν ποιήτης, ὅτ' ἐκσταίη. *Arist.* Problem.

The office of the imagination to the will is, to quicken, allure, and sharpen its desire towards some convenient object. For it often cometh to pass, that some plausible fancy doth more prevail with tender wills, than a severe and sullen argument, and hath more powerful insinuation to persuade, than the peremptoriness of reason hath to command. And the reason hereof is, because liberty being natural unto man's will, that course must needs most of all gain upon it, which doth offer least force unto its liberty; which is done rather by an argument of delight, than of constraint: and best of all, when a rational and convincing argument is so sweetened and tempered, to the delight of the hearer, that he shall be content to entertain truth, for the very beauty and attire of it; so that you shall not know, whether it were the weight of the reason that overruled, or the elegancy that enticed him. A man can be well pleased to look with delight on the picture of his enemy, when it is drawn with a skilful and curious hand. And therefore in that great work of men's conversion unto God, he is said to allure them, and to speak comfortably unto them[b], to beseech, and to persuade them[c]; to set forth Christ to the soul as altogether lovely[d], as the fairest of ten thousand, as the Desire of the Nations[e], as the riches of the world[f]; that men might be inflamed to love the beauty of holiness. That which must persuade the will, must not only have a 'truth,' but a 'worthiness' in it. In which respect, the principles of knowledge are called ἀξιώματα, 'worthy,' or honourable speeches: and the gospel is not only called λόγος πιστὸς, a 'true saying,' but λόγος ἄξιος, a 'worthy saying;' and, in that respect, fitted for 'acceptation.'[g] It is true of the will, which Seneca hath observed of princes, "Apud reges, etiam quæ prosunt, ita tamen, ut delectent, suadenda sunt:" That unto them even things profitable must be represented with the face rather of delight than of necessity: even as physicians, when they minister a very wholesome potion:

——"Prius oras pocula circum
Contingunt dulci mellis flavoque liquore."

That they their patients may both please and cure,
With mixed sweets their palates they allure.[h]

[b] Hos. ii. 14. [c] 2 Cor. v. 20. [d] Cant. v. 10, 16. [e] Hag. ii. 7. [f] Rom. xi. 12. Ephes. iii. 8. [g] 1 Tim. i. 15. [h] *Lucret.* lib. 4.

And hence is that observation, that the first reformers and drawers of men into civil society, and the practice of virtue, wrought upon the will by the ministry rather of the fancy, than of rigid reason[i]: not driving them thereunto by punctual arguments, but alluring them by the sweetness of eloquence; not pressing the necessity of morality by naked inferences, but rather secretly instilling it into the will, that it might at last find itself reformed, and yet hardly perceive how it came to be so. And this was done by those musical, poetical, and mythological persuasions; whereby men, in their discourses, did, as it were, paint virtues and vices, giving unto spiritual things, bodies, and beauties, such as might best affect the imagination. Yea, God himself hath been pleased to honour this way of setting out higher notions, in that we find some room in the holy scriptures for mythologies, as that of the vine[k], the fig-tree, and the bramble; for riddles, for parables, similitudes, and poetical numbers and raptures[l], whereby heavenly doctrines are shadowed forth, and do condescend unto human frailties. And another reason hereof is, because the desires of men are fixed as well on pleasant as on profitable objects: so that those inducements must needs have most authority, which have that happy mixture of 'utile et dulce' together, not only pressing necessity upon the understanding, but pointing, as it were, and deciphering delight to the fancy. And this reason Scaliger[m] gives in his enquiry, how false things, such as Plato's elysium, Homer's fictions, Orpheus' music, should delight wise men: "Propterea quod exsuperant vulgares limites veritatis," saith he; because they are not exacted to the rigour and strictness of reason, nor grounded on the severity of truth; but are (as I may so speak) the creation of fancy, having a kind of delightful liberty in them, wherewith they refresh, and, as it were, open and unbind the thoughts; which otherwise, by a continual pressure in exacter and more massy reasonings, would easily tire.

Concerning the latitude of this faculty, it hath therein a double prerogative above others; one, in the multiplicity of operations; another, in the framing of objects. To the former of these, I reduce the thoughts; which, by reason of their

[i] *Plut.* de Educat. Liberorum. [k] Judges xviii. 12, 14. [l] Hos. xii. 10.
[m] *Scalig.* Subtil. 307, 12.

quickness and volubility, and withal their continual interchanges and successions, are the most numberless operations of the soul of man: where, by 'thoughts,' I understand those springings and glances of the heart, grounded on the sudden representations of sundry different objects: for when the mind begins once to be fixed and standing, I call that rather 'meditation' than 'thought.' This multiplicity of thoughts is grounded, first, upon the abundance of their objects; and next, upon the quickness and activity of apprehension: that, is the matter; this, the form of those thoughts, which I now speak of. The abundance of objects is seen in this, that it includes all the variety of species belonging to the faculties: as that knowledge which the schools call 'philosophia prima,' doth, within its own limits, draw in, in some sort, all the several objects of particular sciences. There are thoughts belonging unto the will, flying and pursuing thoughts, wishings, and loathings; and there are thoughts belonging to the understanding, assenting and dissenting thoughts, belief and disopinion.—There are thoughts likewise proceeding from anger, fiery and revengeful thoughts; from envy, gnawing and repining thoughts; from joy, sweet and refreshing thoughts; from conscience, comforting and affrightful thoughts; and so in all other faculties. And for the quickness of working, the motions of the thoughts show it in the concurrence of these two things, suddenness of journey, and vastness of way; while, like lightning, they are able to reach from one end of heaven unto another, and, in one light and imperceptible excursion, leave almost no part of the universe untravelled. Now, of these two grounds of multiplicity in thoughts, the former, namely, the abundance of objects, is 'ab extrinseco,' and dispersed over things; (though they are not otherwise the objects of thought, than as the mind reflecteth on the 'phantasmata,' or images of them in this faculty) but the latter, which is the quickness of apprehension, though it may seem to be the most peculiar work of reason, yet the imagination hath indeed the greatest interest in it: for, though the act of apprehending be the proper work of the understanding, yet the form and quality of that act (which properly makes it a thought in that strict sense, wherein here I take it), namely, the lightness, volubility, and suddenness thereof, proceed from the immediate restlessness

of the imagination; as is plain by the continual variety of dreams and other fancies, wherein this faculty is the principal worker. The next thing is the latitude of working[n], in framing of objects, wherein it hath a property of boldness beyond other faculties. For reason, and all other powers, have their fixed and determinate limits in nature; and therefore they always frame themselves to the truth of things, yielding assent to nothing but what they find: but imagination is a faculty boundless, and impatient of any imposed limits, save those which itself maketh. And hence it is, that in matter of persuasion and insinuation, poetry, mythology, and eloquence, (the arts of rational fancy) have ever (as was observed) been more forcible than those which have been rigorously grounded on nature and reason: it being (as Scaliger observes) the natural infiniteness of man's soul, "Aspernari certorum finium præscriptionem," to disdain any bounds and confines in her operations.

Now the liberty of the imagination in this particular is threefold; *creation*, as I may so speak, and new making of objects; *composition*, or new mixing them; and *translation*, or new placing them: unto some of which three, will be reduced all poetical fictions, fabulous transmutations, high metaphors, and rhetorical allegories, things of excellent use and ornament in speech.

Now for the corruptions and diseases of this faculty, I conceive the principal to be these three, *error*, *levity*, and dull *fixedness*[o]. The error of the imagination may be taken both actively and passively; the error which it produceth, and the error which it suffereth. That the fancy is fruitful in producing error, is as manifest as it is difficult to show the manner how it doth it. Hence those strange, and yet strong, delusions, whereby the minds of melancholy men (in whom this faculty hath the most deep and piercing operation) hath been peremptorily possessed. Hence those vanishing and shadowy assurances, hopes, fears, joys, visions, which the dreams of men (the immediate issues of this faculty) do produce. Hence those ghastly apparitions, dreadful sounds, black thoughts, tremblings and horrors, which the strong working of imagination doth present unto, or produce in

[n] *Aug.* de Civ. Dei, lib. 9, c. 4. [o] *Aug.* ep. 72. ad Nebr.

men, disquieted either with the ugliness of their sins, or heaviness of their natures, making them to fear where no fear is:—which, whether it be done by affecting only the fancy, or by the impression of such forms and shapes upon the spirits, which go unto the outward senses, as may thereby affect them with the same images, (not by reception from without, but by impression and transfusion from within) it is manifest, not only by various relations, but by continual experience, what strong and strange effects those distempers have produced.

Neither are we to conceive this impossible, when we see as admirable effects in another kind, wrought by the same faculty, and, as is probable, by the same means; I mean, the impression of likeness of an infant in the womb, unto the parents, or some other, who shall work a stronger conceit in the fancy [p]. Or if this be not ascribed unto the working of this power, but rather by a secret real virtue intrinsecal unto the seed of the parents, (as many do affirm) [q] yet that other effect of stamping on the body the images and colours of some things, which had made any strong and violent immutation on the fancy, must needs be hereunto ascribed: as we see cometh often to pass in the longing of women; and in her, who having the picture of an Ethiopian in her chamber, brought forth a black child: and in the course which Jacob took, in putting speckled rods before the cattle [r], when they were to conceive, that the fancy of them might make their lambs to be ring-streaked and speckled.

The errors which are in the fancy, are usually of the same nature with those that are wrought by it. Such was the error of that man, which would not be persuaded but that he had on his head a great pair of horns; and for that reason would not move forth, nor uncover his face to any [s]. And the causes of these errors are, by Francis Mirandula [t] ascribed, first, to the variety of tempers in the body, with the predominancy of those humours which give complexion thereunto. Secondly, to the imposture of the senses. Thirdly, to the government of the will: (though that, as is granted,

[p] *Arist.* Prob. sect. 10. Paraph. 12. *Plin.* l. 7. c. 12. [q] *Peucer.* de tenas. copia. [r] *Aug.* in Gen. qu. 93. [s] Vid. *Gifanium* in *Arist.* Eth. l. 7. c. 5. et *Wier.* de Præstig. Dæm. l. 2. c. 24, 25, 26. et l. 3. c. 21. [t] *Fran. Mirand.* l. de Imag. c. 8.

hath least power over this faculty.) And lastly, to the ministry of evil angels [u], who can easily cast into the fancy strange and false species, with such subtilty, as shall easily gain them plausible credit and admittance. And of this we find an express example (as I conceive) in that evil spirit, who promised to be a lying spirit in the mouth of Ahab's prophets. For the visions of such men being, for the most part, imaginary, the impression of that lying and deceitful persuasion was, in all probability, made upon the imagination. For notwithstanding I confess, that prophets had events, by divers means, revealed unto them, as by true voices, by real access of angels, and by immediate illapse of truth into the understanding; yet because those two ways, by visions and by dreams [x], were (for aught can be observed) the most usual means of revelation, it is not unlikely, that the devil (who, in such thing, strives for the better advancement of his own ends, to imitate God's manner of working) did, by this manner of imposture on the imagination, seek to possess the false prophets, and to delude the king.

And here, by the way, from the three former, we may take occasion to observe the misery of man's corrupted nature, wherein those faculties, which were originally ordained for mutual assistance, do now exercise a mutual imposture: and as man did join with a fellow-creature to dishonour, and, if it had been possible, to deceive his Maker; so in the faculties of man, we may discover a joint conspiracy in the working of their own overthrow and reproach, and a secret joy in one to be deluded by another.

The next corruption which I observed, is the *levity*, and too much volubility of this power, proceeding from the overhasty obtrusion of the species. For, notwithstanding I grant the quickness of its operations to be one principal part of the excellency thereof; yet I thereby understand the power, not the infirmity; the nature, not the disease of that faculty; the ability of having speedy recourse unto variety of objects treasured up in the memory; or of apprehending new with dexterity; not that floating and inconstant humour, whereby it makes many needless excursions upon impertinent things,

[u] *Aug.* de Civ. Dei, l. 18. c. 18. De divin. Dæmon. c. 5, 6. [x] Numb. xii. 6. Joel ii. 28.

and thereby interrupteth the course of the more needful and present operation of the soul. For since it may fall out, that unto the same faculty, from diversity of occasions, contrary operations may prove arguments of worth; a restraint unto one manner of working, is an argument of weakness and defect, in that it straiteneth and defraudeth the power of those advantages, which it might receive by a timely application of the other. There may be a time, when the fancy may have a liberty to expatiate; but again, some object will require a more fixed and permanent act. And therefore, to have a vanishing and lightening fancy, that knoweth not how to stay and fasten upon any particular, but, as a hanging of divers colours shall, in one view, present unto the understanding a heap of species, and so distracts its intention, argues not sufficiency, but weakness and distemper in this faculty.

The last corruption observed, is in the other extreme; I mean, that *heaviness*[y] and sluggish fixedness, whereby it is disabled from being serviceable to the understanding, in those actions which require despatch, variety, and suddenness of execution. From which peremptory adhesion, and too violent intention of the fancy on some particular objects, doth many times arise not only a dulness of mind, a syncope, and kind of benumbedness of the soul, but oftentimes madness, distraction, and torment: many examples of which kind of depravation of the phantasy in melancholy men, we every where meet withal[z]; some thinking themselves turned into wolves, horses, or other beasts; others pleasing themselves with conceits of great wealth and principalities; some framing to themselves fears, and others hopes; being all but the delusions and waking dreams of a distempered fancy.

> "His ego sæpe lupum fieri, et se condere silvis
> Mœrin, sæpe animas imis excire sepulcris,
> Atque satas alio vidi traducere messes."

Here often have I seen this Mœris work
Himself into a wolf, and in woods lurk;

[y] *Arist.* Prob. Sect. 29. [z] *Lucian*, in Lucio sive Asino. *Apul.* in Asino. *Plin.* l. 7. c. 22. *Olav. Magnus* de Region. Septentrion. l. 18. c. 45, 46, 47. *Wierus* de Præstig. l. 3. c. 21. Thrasylaus omnes, ad littus Pyræum appellentes, naves suas credidit; apud *Athen.*

Oft have I seen him raise up ghosts from hell,
And growing corn translate by magic spell.—*Virg.* Eclog. 8.

And upon this over-strong working and stay of the fancy upon some one or other object, it hath oftentimes come to pass, that some men, out of depth of contemplation on some difficulties of learning, (as is reported of Aristotle, in his meditation on the cause of the ebbing and flowing of the sea) others, out of some strong and predominant passion, as love, fear, despair, drawing all the intention of the mind unto them,—have attempted such strange practises on themselves and others, as could not proceed but from a smothered and entangled reason. And thus much briefly shall suffice, touching the honour of man's common and inferior faculties.

CHAP. V.

Of Passions, their nature, and distribution; of the motions of natural creatures guided by a knowledge without them; and of rational creatures, guided by a knowledge within them: of passions mental, sensitive, and rational.

I NOW proceed unto the soul of man: of which I must speak in a double reference, either according to its motions and impressions which it makes on the body, and receiveth from it; or according to those more eminent perfections which it hath within itself. Under the former of these, come to be considered the passions of man's mind, with the more notable perfections and corruptions (as far as my weakness can discover) which the soul and body contracteth from them.

Passions are nothing else, but those natural, perfective, and unstrained motions of the creatures unto that advancement of their natures, which they are, by the wisdom, power, and providence of their Creator, in their own several spheres, and according to the proportion of their capacities, ordained to receive, by a regular inclination to those objects, whose goodness beareth a natural convenience or virtue of satisfaction unto them;—or by an antipathy and aversation from those, which bearing a contrariety to the good they desire, must needs be noxious and destructive, and, by consequent,

odious to their natures. This being the property of all unconstrained self-motions, it followeth, that the root and ground of all passions, is principally the good; and secondarily, or by consequent, the evil of things: as one beareth with it 'rationem convenientiæ,' a quieting and satisfactory, —the other, 'rationem disconvenientiæ,' a disturbing and destroying, nature.

This being premised touching the nature and general essence of passions, the division of them must be thereon grounded: because (as philosophy teacheth us) faculties and operations receive their essential distinctions from their objects and those several respects, wherewith they, in order to the faculty, are qualified. Now since all appetite (being a blind power) is dependent upon the direction of some knowledge,—from the diversity of knowledge in or annexed unto things, may be gathered the prime distinction of passions.

Knowledge, in respect of created agents, may be considered either as disjoined and extrinsecal to the things moved, or as intrinsecal and united thereunto; both which serve as a law and rule, to regulate the inclinations of each nature, that they might not swerve into disordered and confused, or into idle and vain motions; but might ever work towards that due end, which God hath appointed them to move unto.

Passions which proceed from knowledge severed and extrinsecal, are those motions of merely natural agents, which are guided to their general or particular ends, by the wisdom and power of him that made them. And this it is which causeth that peremptory and uniform order, observed by these kind of agents in their natural course, never either swerving or desisting therefrom, so far as the condition of the matter and subject whereon they work permitteth them; because they are all governed by an immutable, most wise, and most constant law, proceeding from a will, with which there is no variableness nor shadow of changing. And therefore we find those aberrations and irregularities of nature, wherein it swerveth from this law only, or at least, principally, in these inferior things; wherein, partly, from the deficiency and languishing of secondary agents, and, partly, from the excesses, defects, mutability, and the like exigencies

of matter, we find sundry times error and enormity in their several works and ends. Which, whether it be to set forth the beauty of regular operations, which, by deformity and confusion, will appear more beautiful;—or whether the original thereof be divine malediction, which, for the sin of man, he pleaseth to lay upon his fellow-creatures, which were all created for his comfort and service, (which Saint Paul calleth the 'vanity of the creature') it proceedeth certainly from the will and power of that law-giver, (who is only able) for reasons best known to his own wisdom, to dispense sometimes with that otherwise unalterable law, which he gave all his creatures to observe. So that all the miracles which ever God hath been pleased to work, for the conversion of men unto the faith, or confirmation in it, were but so many exceptions and dispensations from that general law.

But, as I said, those irregularities and deviations, before spoken of, are seen principally in inferior things. The faith, being the principal creature that did bear the curse of man's fall, which made (if we will believe that relation, though I rather suppose it to be fictitious) the heathen philosopher, upon observation of that wonderful eclipse of the sun at the passion of our Saviour, to cry out, "Aut Deus naturæ patitur, aut mundi machina dissolvetur;" either the God of nature suffereth, or the frame of nature dissolveth; either something hindereth that universal power, which sustaineth and animateth all the creatures; or he doth at least willingly detain that virtue and the vigour of that law, without execution whereof, there cannot but follow a laxation of the whole frame:—which particular I have the rather observed, to note, that the more raised and heavenly a nature is, the more stable and constant likewise it is, to every divine law imposed on it.

Now this natural passion which I speak of, is called by sundry names amongst philosophers, "the law, the equity, the weight, the instinct, the bond, the love, the covenant and league of natural things," in order to the conservation of themselves, propagation of their kind, perfection, and order of the universe, service of man, and glory of the Creator: which are the alone ends of all natural agents.

By all which we are given to understand, that when, at

any time, the ordinary course of nature is intermitted, when any creature forsakes its native motion, and falleth into confusion and disorder; there is then admitted a breach of a law; or as Aristotle calls it, ἁμαρτία, 'an error,' which, Saint John telleth us, is ἀνομία, 'an iniquity' of nature; also a certain levity, unusefulness, and emptiness of true worth, which I call, in Saint Paul's phrase, the 'vanity of the creature:' Thirdly, looseness, decay, and dissolution; and thereupon discord and unserviceableness towards the other parts, with which it should jointly conspire for the glory of the whole.

These are the inconveniences that follow nature's; how much greater are those which follow reason's, disobedience! For all this, touching the passions of nature, I have observed only to give light unto those of reason; there being the same proportion of government in them all; saving that, what in things destitute of all knowledge, is guided by the law-giver himself, is, in the rest, performed by a knowledge conjoined, and intrinsecal to the worker. And this is either mental, or sensitive, or rational; from all which, arise sundry degrees of motions or passions. Mental passions are those high, pure, and abstracted delights, or other the like agitations of the supreme part of the understanding, which Aristotle calleth Νοῦς,—the Latins, 'mens,' or 'apex animæ;' which are most simple actions of the mind, wherein is the least intermixion or commerce with inferior and earthly faculties. Which motions are grounded first on an extraordinary knowledge, either of vision and revelation, or of an exquisite natural apprehension; both which are beyond the compass of usual industry, here to attain unto. The former of these, I call with the schoolmen, 'extasy' and 'rapture;' such as St. Paul's was, (for so himself calleth it) "novi hominem raptum:" and such as were the passions of the mind, in the prophets and holy men of God; when they were inspired with such heavenly revelations, as did slide into the soul with that lustre and abundance of light, that they could not but be ravished with ineffable and glorious delight. And such, no doubt, is that "joy unspeakable, and peace past understanding," which the apostle makes to be the 'fruit of the Spirit of God,' in those hearts, wherein he lodgeth,—whereby the purest and most abstracted part of the soul, the mind, is lifted up to some glimpses and apprehensions of

that future glory, which in heaven doth fill the spirits of men with ineffable light. And for the latter branch, Aristotle hath placed his greatest felicity in the contemplation of the highest and divinest truths; which he makes to be the object of that supreme part of the soul. And it was the speech of the philosopher Heraclitus to the same purpose, "Anima sicca est sapientissima;" (which toucheth something upon that of Aristotle, that "melancholy complexions are usually the wisest," for that temper is the driest of all the rest) that a mind, not steeped in the humours of carnal and gross affections, not drenched in the waves of a disquiet fancy; but, more raised and soaring to its original by divine contemplations, is always endued with the greater wisdom.

Another knowledge from whence the passions of this faculty are raised in man, is that light of 'natural principles,' which the schools call 'synteresis;' unto which the custody of all practical truths being committed, they therehence work in the conscience motions of joy, love, peace, fear, horror, despair, and the like spiritual passions; according as the soul, out of those general principles, shall gather unto its own particular, any either delightful, or disquieting conclusions.

Sensitive[a] passions are those motions of prosecutions or flight, which are grounded on the fancy, memory, and apprehensions of the common sense, which we see in brute beasts; as in the fear of hares or sheep, the fierceness of wolves, the anger or flattery of dogs, and the like. So Homer describeth the joy of Ulysses' dog, which, after his so long absence, remembered him at his return:

Οὐρῇ μὲν ῥ' ὅγ' ἔσηνε, καὶ οὔατα κάββαλεν ἄμφω.

For wanton joy to see his master near,
He wav'd his flattering tail, and toss'd his ear.[b]

Now these motions in brute creatures, if we will believe[c] Seneca, are not affections, but certain characters and impressions 'ad similitudinem passionum,' like unto passions in men; which he calleth 'impetus,' the risings, forces, and

[a] *Arist.* de Hist. Animal. l. 1. c. 1. l. 9. per totum.
[b] Odyss. P'. 302.
[c] De Ira, lib. 1. c. 3.

impulsions of nature, upon the view of such objects, as are apt to strike any impressions upon it.

I come therefore to those middle passions, which I called '*rational*,' not formally, as if they were in themselves acts of reason, or barely immaterial motions of the soul; but by way of participation and dependance, by reason of their immediate subordination in man unto the government of the will and understanding, and not barely of the fancy, as in other creatures. And for calling passion thus governed, '*reasonable*,' I have the warrant of Aristotle; who, though the sensitive appetite in man be of itself unreasonable, (and therefore by him contra-divided to the rational powers of the soul) yet, by reason of that obedience which it oweth to the dictates of the understanding, whereunto nature hath ordained it to be subject and conformable, (though corruption have much slackened and unknit that bond) he justly affirmeth it to be, in some sort, a reasonable faculty; not intrinsecally in itself, but by way of participation and influence from reason.

Now passion, thus considered, is divided according to the several references it hath unto its object; which is principally, the good,—and secondarily, the evil, of things; and either considered after a sundry manner; for they may be taken either barely and alone, or under the consideration of some difficulty and danger accompanying them. And both these are again to be determined, with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject: for all objects offend or delight the faculty, by virtue of their union thereunto: and therefore, according as things are united or distant, so do they occasion passions of a different nature in the mind. The object, then, may be considered simply in its own nature, as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances, including only the natural conveniency or disconveniency which it beareth to the faculty. And so the passions are, in respect of good, love; in respect of evil, hatred: which are the two radical, fundamental, and most transcendent passions of all the rest: and therefore well called 'pondera' and 'impetus animi,' the weight and force, and (as I may so speak) the first springings and outgoings of the soul.—Secondly, the object may be considered as

absent from the subject, in regard of real union, (though never without that which the schools call 'unio objectiva,' union of apprehension in the understanding) without which there can be no passion: and the object thus considered, worketh, if it be good, desire; if evil, flight and abomination.—Thirdly, it may be considered as present, by a real contract or union with the faculty; and so it worketh, if good,—delight, and pleasure; if evil,—grief, and sorrow.—Again, as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficulty and danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the natural strength of the power; which implieth, in respect of good, an impossibility to be attained, and so it worketh despair; and in respect of evil, an improbability of being avoided, and so it worketh fear:—or secondly, as not exceeding the strength of the power; or at least, those aids which it calleth in:—in which regard, good is presented as attainable, and so it worketh hope: and evil is presented, either as avoidable, if it be future, and it worketh boldness to break through it; or as requitable, if it be past, and so it worketh anger to revenge it. Thus have we the nature and distribution of those several passions, which we are to enquire after: of all which, or at least, those which are most natural, and least coincident with one another, I shall, in the proceeding of my discourse, observe some things, wherein they conduce to the honour and prejudice of man's nature: but first, I shall speak something of the generality of passions; and what dignities are therein most notable, and the most notable defects.

CHAP. VI.

Of Human Passions in general: their use, natural, moral, civil: their subordination unto, or rebellion against, right reason.

Now Passions may be the subject of a threefold discourse, *natural*, *moral*, and *civil*. In their *natural* consideration, we should observe in them, their essential properties, their ebbs and flows, their springings and decays, the manner of their several impressions, the physical effects which are wrought by them; and the like.

In their *moral* consideration, we might likewise search, how the indifferency of them is altered into good or evil, by virtue of the dominion of right reason, or of the violence of their own motions; what their ministry is in virtuous, and what their power and independence in irregular actions; how they are raised, suppressed, slackened, and governed, according to the particular nature of those things which require their motion.

In their *civil* respect, we should also observe how they may be severally wrought upon and impressed; and how, and on what occasions, it is fit to gather and fortify, or to slack and remit them; how to discover, or suppress, or nourish, or alter, or mix them, as may be most advantageous; what use may be made of each man's particular age, nature, propension; how to advance and promote our just ends, upon the observation of the character and dispositions of those whom we are to deal withal.

And this *civil* use of passion, is copiously handled in a learned and excellent discourse of Aristotle, in the second book of his Rhetoricks, unto which profession, in this respect, it properly belongeth; because in matter of action and of judicature, affection, in some sort, is an auditor or judge, as he speaks. But it seemeth strange, that a man of so vast sufficiency and judgement, and who had, as we may well conjecture, an ambition to knit every science into an entire body, which in other men's labours lay broken and scattered, should yet, in his books 'de Anima,' overpass the discovery of their nature, essence, operations, and properties, and in his books of moral philosophy should not remember to acquaint us with the indifferency, irregularity, subordination, rebellion, conspiracy, discords, causes, effects and consequences of each particular of them, being circumstances of obvious and daily use in our life, and of necessary and singular benefit to give light unto the government of right reason.

Touching passions in order unto *civil* or judiciary affairs, I shall not make any observation: either of the other I shall in part touch upon, though not distinctly and asunder, but in a brief and confused collection of some few particulars.

The order which I shall observe in setting down the honour and corruption of them in general, (which method shall

in part be kept in their particular) shall be this: first, according to the antecedent of their motion, and acts; secondly, according to the acts themselves; and thirdly, according to the consequents of them.

First, touching the antecedents to the act of passion, they are either the outward motives thereunto; as namely, the objects unto which it is carried, and the causes whereby it is produced: or the inward root and principles of the act, whereby it is wrought and governed.

For the two former, passion is then said commendable, when it is direct and natural. And the corruption is, when it is carried to an undue object, or proceedeth from an indirect cause: but these are more observable in the particulars; and therefore thither I refer their distinct handling.

For the third, the dignity of passion chiefly consists in a consonancy and obedience to the prescription of reason: for there is in man's faculties a natural subordination, whereby the actions of the inferior receive their motion and direction from the influence of the higher. Now appetite was in beasts only made to be governed by a sensitive knowledge: but in man, sense ought not to have any commanding or moving power, but only instrumental, ministerial, and conveying, in respect of the object. The action of sense, was not, from the first institution, ordained to touch the affection, but to present itself primarily to the understanding; upon whose determination and conduct, the passions[d] were to depend, to submit all their inclinations thereunto, and to be its ministers, in the execution of all such duties as it should deem any way expedient for the benefit of man's nature. So that herein consists a great part of man's infelicity by the fall; that albeit his understanding itself be blinded, and therefore not able to reach forth any perfect good to the inferior parts; yet that small portion of light which it yet retaineth for the government of our actions, is become ineffectual, as being able only to convince, but not to reform.

The corruption then of passion in this respect, is the independence thereof upon its true principle: when it stayeth not to look for, but anticipates and prevents, the discourses

[d] Λόγος ἡνιοχεῖν 'τάχθη καὶ ἄγειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄγεσθαί τε καὶ σύρεσθαι. *Theodor.* Serm. 5. de Natur. Hom.

of reason; relying only on the judgement of sense, wherewith it retains an undue correspondence. So that herein is mainly verified that complaint of the prophet, "Man, being in honour, hath no understanding, and is become as the beasts that perish."[e] For, as in the body, (to use the similitude of Aristotle[f]) if any parts thereof be out of joint, it cannot yield obedience unto the government of the motive faculty; but when it would carry it one way, it falls another; so it is in the mind of man, when that natural continuity and union of faculties, whereby one was made in operation dependant on another, is once dissolved. When affections are disjointed from reason, and cast off the reins whereby they should be guided, there cannot be that sweet harmony in the motion thereof, which is required to the weal of man's nature.[g]

It is prodigious to see an instrument (such as all appetite should be) to be the first and self-mover in its own actions: whence cannot, in the mind of man, but follow great danger: it being all one, as if a waggoner should commit himself to the wild and unswayed fancy of his horses; or, as if a blind man, who hath not the power of directing his own feet, should be permitted to run headlong, without wit or moderation, having no guide to direct him. For as fire, though it be of all other creatures, one of the most comfortable and useful, while it abides in the place ordained for it; yet, when it once exceeds those limits, and gets to the house-top, it is most merciless and overrunning; so passions, though of excellent service in man, for the heating and enlivening of virtue, for adding spirits and edge to all good undertakings, and blessing them with a happier issue than they could alone have attained unto; yet if once they fly out beyond their bounds, and become subject only to their own laws, and encroach upon reason's right,—there is nothing more tumultuous and tyrannical. As Bias said of the tongue[h]; that "it was the best and the worst part of the sacrifice;" so may we of the affections, "Nec meliores unquam servos, nec dominos sentit natura deteriores; they are the best ser-

[e] Psalm xlix. 20. Θηρία μᾶλλον ἢ ἄνθρωποι, &c. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. lib. 4. Ἀργαλεώτατα θηρία in Protrep. et *Tatian.* orat. ad Græc. [f] Ethic. l. 1. c. 13.
[g] Vid. *Plutarch.* lib. de Virtute morali. [h] *Plutarch.* de Audit.

vants, but the worst masters which our nature can have."—Like the winds, which being moderate, carry the ship; but drown it, being tempestuous. And it is true as well in man's little commonwealth, as in greater states, that there are no more pestilent and pernicious disturbers of the public good, than those who are best qualified for service and employment,—if once they grow turbulent and mutinous, neglecting the common end, for their own private respects, and desirous to raise themselves upon public ruins. And, indeed, it is universally true, things most useful and excellent in their regularity, are most dangerous in their abuse.

CHAP. VII.

Of the exercise of Passion: of stoical apathy: of permanency, defect, excess, with the cure thereof.

The next consideration of Passions was according to the exercise of their act; which we may consider, either according to the general substance, or according to some particular accidents, in the manner of its being. For the first, it is altogether good, as being nothing else but natural motion, ordained for the perfection and conversation of the creature. For notwithstanding natural motion may haply argue some kind of imperfection in the state of the thing moving, as supposing it some way deprived of that wherein it should rest itself (which makes Aristotle conclude, that the noblest act of the understanding, knowledge and clear vision, is rather the rest than the motion of that faculty[i]) yet I say, it always implieth more natural perfection in those things whereunto it belongeth. For as fire, the perfectest of elements, and heaven, the perfectest of bodies; so the soul of man, the perfectest of forms, hath the most vehement motion.

And in this consideration (so it be always motion natural,

[i] Intellectio quies intellectus: *Arist.* Physic. l. 7. c. 4. Ethic. l. 10. c. 7. Ἐπιστήμη ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως, &c. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. lib. 4. Ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὅτι τὴν ψυχὴν ἵστησι. Κινουμένης γὰρ καὶ φερομένης, οὔτε αἰσθέσθαι, οὔτε διανοηθῆναι δυνατόν. *Arist.* Probl. sect. 30. qu. 14. Animi commotio aversa à recta ratione et contra naturam. Cic. Ὁρμὴ πλέον ἔχουσα, καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις. *Zen.* apud Laertium.

governed and dependent on right reason) I find not any corruption, though I find an error and abuse; that I mean, which maketh passion in general to be 'ægritudo animi,' a sickness and perturbation; and would therefore reduce the mind to a senseless apathy, condemning all life of passion, as waves, which serve only to toss and trouble reason. An opinion, which while it goeth about to give unto man an absolute government over himself, leaveth scarce any thing in him, which he may command and govern.

For although there be in the will, over the body, an 'imperium,' yet in rigour, this is not so much to be termed 'command,' as 'employment;' the body being rather the instrument than the servant of the soul; and the power which the will hath over it, is not so much the command of a master over his workman, as of a workman over his tools. The chief subjects to the will are the affections, in the right governing whereof is manifested its great power.

The strength of every thing is exercised by opposition. We see not the violence of a river, till it meet with a bridge: and the force of the wind showeth itself most, when it is most resisted. So the power of the will is most seen in repairing the breaches, and settling the mutinies, wherewith untamed affections disquiet the peace of man's nature; since excess and disorder in things, otherwise of so great use, requireth amendment, not extirpation; and we make straight a crooked thing, we do not break it. And therefore, as he, in Tacitus, spake well to Otho [k], when he was about to kill himself, 'Majore animo tolerari adversa quam relinqui,' that it was more valour to bear, than put off, afflictions with courage; so there is more honour in having the affections subdued, than in having none at all; the business of a wise man is not to be without them, but to be above them. And therefore our Saviour himself sometimes loved, sometimes rejoiced, sometimes wept, sometimes desired, sometimes mourned and grieved.[l] But these were not passions that violently and immoderately troubled him, but he, as he saw fit, did with them trouble himself: his reason excited, directed, moderated, repressed them, according to the rule of

[k] Hist. l. 2. [l] Heb. ii. 17. iv. 15. v. 2. Mark x. 21. Luke x. 21. John xi. 35. Luke xxii. 15. Mark iii. 5. Matth. xxvi. 37, 38.

perfect, clear, and undisturbed judgement. In which respect, the passions of Christ are by divines called 'Propassions [m],' that is to say, beginnings of passions, than passions themselves; inasmuch as they never proceeded beyond their due measure, nor transported the mind to indecency or excess, but had both their rising and original from reason, and also that measure, bounds, continuance limited by reason. The passions of sinful men are, many times, like the tossings of the sea, which bringeth up mire and dirt [n]: but the passions of Christ were like the shaking of pure water in a clean vessel, which though it be thereby troubled, yet it is not fouled at all.

The stoicks themselves confessed, that wise men might be affected with sudden perturbations of fear or sorrow;[o] but did not, like weak men, yield unto them, or sink under them; but were still unshaken in their resolutions and judgements: like Æneas in Virgil,

> Mens immota manet; lacrimæ volvuntur inanes.
>
> He wept indeed; but in his stable mind
> You could no shakings or distempers find.

And therefore indeed, this controversy between the peripateticks and stoicks [p], was rather a strife of words, than a difference of judgements because they did not agree in the subject of the question; the one, making passions to be natural,—the other, preternatural [q] and disorderly, motions. For the peripateticks confessed, that wise men ought to be fixed and immovable in their virtuous resolutions, and not to be at all by hopes or fears deterred [r] or diverted from them; but as a dye, to be four-square [s], and which way ever they be cast, to fall upon a sure and firm bottom. Which is the same with that severe and immovable constancy of mind in virtue, in defence whereof the stoicks banished affections from wise men; not intending thereby to make men, like

[m] *Hier.* in Matth. 26. *Magis. Sent.* l. 3. dist. 15. *Aquin.* par. 3. q. 15. art. 4. [n] Isai lvii. 20. [o] *Lactant.* l. 6. c. 14. *Aug.* de Civ. Dei, l. 9. c. 4. l. 14. c. 9. *Aul. Gell.* l. 19. c. 1. *Cic.* Tusc. q. l. 4. *Sen.* ep. 85. et de Ira, l. 2. c. 3. [p] *Aq.* 12. q. 24. Art. 2, 3. *Cic.* de fin. l. 4. [q] Τὰ πάθη πάντα ἐναπερείσματα τῆς ψυχῆς, τῆς μαλθακῆς καὶ εἰκούσης, *Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 2. et vid. in Pædag. l. 2. c. 13. Vid. *Sen.* ep. 57, 85. et 116. *Diog. Laert.* in Zen. l. 7. [r] *Arist.* Ethic. l. 2. c. 1. [s] Εὐδαίμων τετράγωνος. Eth. l. 1. c. 10. et *Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 6.

Cæneus[s] in the poet, such as could not be violated with any force (for they acknowledge subjection to the first motions of passion) but only to show, that the wisdom of virtue should so compose and consolidate the mind, and settle it in such stability, that it should not at all be bended from the right, by any sensitive perturbations or impulsions.[t] As they then who pull down houses adjoining unto temples, do yet suffer that part of them to stand still, which are contiguous to the temple; so in the demolishing of inordinate passions, we must take heed, that we offer not violence to so much of them as is contiguous unto right reason: whereunto so long as they are conformable, they are the most vigorous instruments, both for the expression, improvement, and derivation of virtue on others, of any in man's nature.

Now concerning the accidents, or manner of these acts, which are from passion, it may be considered either in regard of the quantity and extention, or of the quality and intention, of the act. And both these may be considered two manner of ways: for the quantity of passions, we may consider that, as the quantity of bodies, which is either continued or severed. By 'quantity continued,' I understand the manner of a passion's permanency and durance; by 'severed,' I mean the manner of its multiplicity and reiteration; from both which, it hath the denomination of good or bad, as the object whereunto it is carried hath a greater or less relation to the faculty. For some objects are simple, and, without any limitation, convenient or noxious; and towards these, may be allowed both a more durable and a more multiplied passion; others are good or evil only, with some circumstances of time, place, person, occasion, or the like; which therefore require both fewer and less habitual motions. The same may be said of the quality of them, wherein they are sometimes too remiss, sometimes again too excessive and exorbitant, according to variety of conditions.

Concerning all these, I shall observe this one general rule: the permanency or vanishing, the multiplicity or rareness, the excess or defect of any passion, is to be grounded on, and regulated by the nature only of its object, as it bears

[s] *Plut.* contr. Stoicos. [t] *Plut.* lib. de vitioso pudore.

reference to such or such a person; but never by the private humour, complexion, habit, custom, or other like qualifications of the mind itself. To see a man of a soft and gentle nature overpass some small indignity without notice or feeling; or to see a man of a hot and eager temper transported with an extreme and more during passion, upon the sense of some greater injury, more notably touching him in his honesty or good name, is not, in either of these, any great matter of commendation; because, though the nature of the object did in both warrant the quality of the passion, yet in those persons, they both proceeded out of humour and complexion, and not out of serious consideration of the injuries themselves, by which only the passion is to be regulated.

Of these two extremes, the defect is not so commonly seen as that which is in the excess. And therefore we will here a little observe, what course may be taken for the allaying of this vehemency of our affections, whereby they disturb the quiet, and darken the serenity of man's mind. And this is done either by opposing contrary passion to contrary; which is Aristotle's rule[u], who adviseth, in the bringing of passions from an extreme to a mediocrity, to incline and bend them towards the other extreme; as husbandmen use to do those trees which are crooked, or as dim and weak eyes do see the light best, when it is broken in a shadow.—Or else it is done by scattering and distracting of them; and that not only by the power of reason, but sometimes also by a cautelous admixture of passions amongst themselves, thereby interrupting their free current. For as usually the affections of the mind are bred one of another, (as the powder in the pan of a gun will quickly set on fire that in the barrel) as grief by anger, ('circumspexit eos cum ira condolescens,' he looked on them with anger, being grieved) and fear by love[x];

(Res est solliciti plena timoris amor.

The things to which our heart love bears,
Are objects of our careful fears.)

and desire by fear; (as in him of whom Tacitus speaks[y], "Fingebat et metum, quo magis concupisceret, that to justify

[u] *Eth.* l. 2. c. 9. l. 10. c. 1. [x] Mark iii. 3. [y] Hist. lib. 1.

his desires, he pretended his fears:") so likewise are some passions stopped, or at least bridled and moderated, by others. "Amor foras mittit timorem;" perfect love casts out fear.[z] It faring in this, as Plutarch[a] hath noted in the hunting of beasts, that they are then easiest taken, when they who hunt them, put on the skins of beasts. As we see, the light and heat of the sun, shining upon fire, is apt to discourage it, and put it out. And this was that which made Saul, when he was possessed with those strong fits of melancholy, working in him fury, grief, and horror, to have recourse unto such a remedy, as is most forcible for the producing of other passions of a lighter nature, and so by consequence for expelling those. Thus, as we see in the body military, (as Tacitus[b] hath observed) "Unus tumultus est alterius remedium, that one tumult is the cure of another;"—and in the body natural, some diseases are expelled by others;—so likewise in the mind, passions, as they mutually generate, so they mutually weaken each other. It often falleth out, that the voluntary admission of one loss, is the prevention of a greater; as when a merchant casteth out his ware to prevent a shipwreck; and in a public fire, men pull down some houses untouched, to prevent the spreading of the flame. Thus it is in the passion of the mind; when any of them are excessive, the way to remit them, is by admitting some further perturbation from others, and so distracting the forces of the former: whether the passions we admit, be contrary, as when a dead palsy is cured with a burning fever; and soldiers suppress the fear of death by the shame of baseness:

——'Αλλ' ἐν φρεσὶ θέσθε ἕκαστος
Αἰδῶ καὶ νέμεσιν.

O fearful Grecians, in your minds recount
To what great shame this baseness will amount:[c]

and the hatred of their general by the love of their country; as Ulysses persuaded Achilles:

Εἰ δέ τοι 'Ατρεϊδης μὲν ἀπήχθετο κηρόθι μᾶλλον,
Αὐτὸς, καὶ τοῦ δῶρα· σὺ δ' ἄλλους περ πανάχαιοὺς
Τειρομένους ἐλέαιρε κατὰ στρατὸν, &c.

[z] John iv. 18. [a] *Plut.* Orat. I. de fortitud. Alexandri. [b] Hist. lib. 1. [c] Iliad. v. 1, 2.

Though Agamemnon and his gifts you hate,
Yet look with pity on that doleful state
Of all the other Grecians in the camp,
Who on your name will divine honour stamp,
When you this glory shall to them afford,
To save them from the rage of Hector's sword.[d]

Or whether they be passions of a different, but not of a repugnant nature; and then the effect is wrought by revoking some of the spirits, which were otherwise all employed in the service of one passion to attend on them; and by that means also, by diverting the intentions of the mind from one deep channel into many cross and broken streams: as men are wont to stop one flux of blood [e], by making of another; and to use frictions to the feet, to call away and divert the humours which pain the head.

Which dissipation and scattering of passion, as it is wrought principally by this mutual confounding of them amongst themselves, so in some particular cases likewise, two other ways, namely, by communion in divers subjects, and extention on divers objects. For the first we see in matter of grief, the mind doth receive (as it were) some lightness and comfort, when it finds itself generative unto others, and produces sympathy in them: for hereby it is (as it were) disburthened, and cannot but find that easier, to the sustaining whereof it hath the assistance of another's shoulders. And therefore they were good (though common) observations:

Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent. And,
Ille dolet verè, qui sine teste dolet.

Our tongues can lighter cares repeat,
When silence swallows up the great.—
He grieves indeed, who, on his friend,
Untestified tears doth spend.

That grief commonly is the most heavy, which hath fewest vents by which to diffuse itself: which, I take it, will be one occasion of the heaviness of infernal torment, because their grief shall not be any whit transient, to work commiseration

[d] Iliad. I'. 300. [e] Calores caloribus onerando deprimimus, et sanguinis fluxum defusa venula revocamus. *Tert.* [f] *Clem. Alex.* Pædag. l. 2. c. 8.

in any spectator, but altogether immanent and reflexive upon itself.

Thus likewise we see (to instance in that other particular branch, of diffusing the passions on divers objects) how the multitude of these, if they be heterogeneal and insubordinate, doth oftentimes remit a passion. For example, in love; I take it, that that man who hath a more general love, hath a less vehement love; and the spreading of affection is the weakening of it (I mean still in things not absolute subordinate; for a man may love a wife more with children, than without them, because they are the seals and pledges of that love;) as a river, when it is cut into many lesser streams, runs weaker and shallower. And this, I conceive, is the reason why Solomon, when he commendeth a strong love, giveth it but a single object; "There is a friend nearer than a brother," one in whom the rays of this affection, like the sun-beams in a glass, being more united, might withal be the more fervent. I remember not that I ever read of wonderful love amongst men, which went beyond couples; which also Aristotle and Plutarch[f] have observed. And therefore we see, in that state there is, or should be, greater affection, wherein is the least community. Conjugal love, as it is most single, so it is usually the strongest; and in the issues and blessing thereof, there is scarce any more powerful epithet to win love, than 'Unigenitus,' an only son.

Καί με φίλησ', ὡσεί τε πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φιλήσῃ
Μοῦνον, τηλύγετον.

He lov'd me as one loves the only son
Of 's old age, born to great possession.[g]

Insomuch that even in God himself (to whom these passions are but by an anthropopathy attributed) that more general love of his providence and preservation (which is common to all his creatures) is (if I may so speak) of a lower degree (though not in respect of any intention or remission in his will, but only the effects thereof towards the things themselves) than that more special love of adoption, which he extendeth only to those, whom he vouchsafeth to make one in him, who was 'unigenitus' and 'dilectus' from everlasting.

[f] Φιλίαι ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. *Plut.* de Amic. multitud.—*Anacharsis* apud. Laert. l. 1.

[g] Iliad. ι'. 477.—*Plut.* de multit. Amic.

I do not then (by the way) condemn all strong and united passions; but only I observe how those, which hereby grow exorbitant, and work prejudice to the soul, may, by a seasonable distracting of them, be reduced to a wholesome temper. For, as it is noted, that, amongst men, those who have bodies most obnoxious to daily maladies, are commonly more secure from any mortal danger, than those who, though free from any general distempers, do yet find the surprise of one more violent; so is it with men's passions. Those who have a nature ready, upon sundry occasions, to break forth into them, do commonly find them less virulent and morose, than those who have not their passions so voluble, and ready to spread themselves on divers objects, but exercising their intentions more earnestly upon one.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the effects of Passions, how they sharpen virtue: Of vicious concupiscence: Of their blinding, diverting, distracting, and precipitating of reason, and of their distempering the body.

The last consideration of Passions, was according to the consequents of their act, which are the ends and effects thereof; both which I conclude in one, because the natural end of all operative qualities, is the effects which they are appointed by their own, or a superior virtue, to produce. Now, though in the particulars there be several perfections conferred both on the operations of the will and of the understanding, from passions; yet I cannot think on any other general effect which belongeth equally unto them all, but that only which Tully[h] hath observed, out of the peripateticks, of anger, that they are the sharpeners, and (to keep his phrase) 'the whetstones' of virtue, which make it more operative and fruitful. For[i] passion, stirring up the spirits, and quickening the fancy, hath thereby a direct influence upon the habits and manners of the mind; which being in this estate constrained to fetch all her motions from imagination, produceth them with the same clearness and vigour

[h] Acad. qu. l. 4. Tusc. qu. l. 4. [i] *Plut.* lib. de virt. mor.

as they are there represented. And therefore Aristotle[i], speaking of these two elements and principles of all passion, pleasure and grief (one of which all others whatsoever partake of) makes them the rules of all our actions, by which they are all governed, and according to the measure whereof they retain their several portions of goodness. Thus anger, zeal, shame, grief, love, are, in their several orders, the whetstones whereon true fortitude sharpeneth its sword: for men are never more neglectful and prodigal of their blood, than when they are thoroughly pierced with a sense of injuries, or grieved with a loss of their own or their country's honour. So the poet saith of Mezentius, when Æneas had slain Lausus his son:

———Æstuat ingens
Imo in corde pudor, mixtoque insania luctu,
Et furiis agitatus amor, et conscia virtus.

A noble shame boil'd in his lowest breast;
Rage, mix'd with grief, suffer'd him not to rest;
Love and a conscious valour set him on,
And kindled furious resolution. [k]

So love and compassion are the inciters of bounty; hope, the stay and anchor of patience, keeping the mind, amidst perils and casualties, from floating and sinking; fear, the sharpener of industry; and caution, an antidote in all our actions against violence, rashness, and indiscretion. As Latinus said unto Turnus, when in rage he hasteneth to combat with Æneas:

———Quantum ipse feroci
Virtute exsuperas, tanto me impensius æquum est
Consulere, atque omnes metuentem expendere casus.

The more undaunted courage doth you move;
'Tis fit my serious fears show thee more love,
In mature counsels, and in weighing all
The various dangers and events may fall.[l]

Those imputations, which Tully and Seneca, and other stoical philosophers, make against passions, are but light and empty, when they call them 'diseases and perturbations

[i] Eth. l. 2. c. 3. [k] Æneid. l. 10. [l] Æneid. l. 12.

of the mind,' which requireth in all its actions both health and serenity, a strong and a clear judgement; both which properties, they say, are impaired by the distempers of passion. For it is absurd to think, that all manner of rest is either healthful and clear; or, on the other side, all motion, diseased and troublesome. For, what water more sweet than that of a spring? or what more thick or loathsome than that which standeth in a puddle, corrupting itself? As, in the wind or seas (to which two, passions are commonly compared), a middle temper, between a quiet calm and a violent, is most serviceable for the passage between countries; so the agitation of passions, as long as they serve only to drive forward, but not to drown virtue,—as long as they keep their dependence on reason, and run only in that channel wherewith they are thereby bounded,—are of excellent service in all the travel of man's life; and such as, without which, the growth, success, and despatch of virtue would be much impaired.

For the corrupt effects of passion in general, they are many more, because there may be a multiplicity as well of evil as of error, when there is but a unity of goodness or of truth. And those effects may be either in respect of themselves, one amongst another; or in reference to the understanding, will, or body. The effects of them amongst themselves, is in their mutual generating and nourishing of each other: as fear is wrought by love; and anger, by grief. "Dolor excitat iras:" as a lion, when wounded, is most raging.

> ———Fixumque latronis
> Impavidum frangit telum, et fremit ore cruento.
>
> With bloody mouth, and an undaunted heart,
> Breaks and tears from his wound the fastened dart.

Which effect of passions I have before touched upon. Neither is it always a corrupt effect; but only then, when there is in the passion generative some distemper. Secondly, In respect of the understanding and will, (both which I comprise under one name of reason) I conceive the corruptions to be principally these four; imposture, or seduction, alien-

[a] Æneid. l. 12.

ation or withdrawing; distraction, or confounding; and precipitancy, or a headlong transporting of reason.[b]

Now concerning these, we are, first, to remember, that there is in every man a native and original struggling between appetite and reason; which yet proceedeth from corruption, and the fall of man, not from nature entire: for, from the law of creation, there was no formal opposition, but a subordination between spirit and sense; man having it in his own power[c] to excite, continue, remit, lay down his passions, as reason should dictate unto him. And therefore (notwithstanding the operations of appetite are common unto men and beasts) yet may we not grant, that they have the same manner of being educed and governed in both these.

For as the operations of the vegetative soul, though common to beasts, men, and plants, are yet, in either of these, severally so restrained, as that they are truly said to be the proper and peculiar works of that specifical form unto which they are annexed;—so likewise the sensitive appetite, though generally it be common to men and beasts, yet, in man, it was ordained to proceed naturally from the government of reason; and therefore may properly be called a 'human appetite,' as being determined, restrained, and made conformable unto man's nature. So that as long as man continued entire and incorrupt, there was a sweet harmony between all his faculties, and such a happy subordination of them each to other, as that every motion of the inferior power was directed and governed; and, therefore, might truly and properly be attributed to the superior. But, when once man had tasted of that murdering fruit, and poisoned him and all his posterity, then began those swellings and inward rebellions, which made him as lame in his natural, as dead in his spiritual, condition. Whence passions are become, now in the state of corruption, beastly and sensual, which were, before, by creation, reasonable and human:

[b] Vide *Aquin.* 12. qu. 77. Art. 1, 2. [c] *Plutarch.* de virtute Moral.—*Arist.* Eth. l. 1. c. 13.—*Plato* apud Theodor. Serm. S. de Nat. Hom. Imperat animus corpori et paretur: imperat animus sibi et resistitur. *Aug.* Conf. l. 8. c. 9, 10. *Aug.* Civ. Dei, l. 14. 264. 23, 24, 26. Affectus in homine erant in potestate ejus tripliciter; quantum ad excitationem, durationem, intentionem, et remissionem. *Per.* in Gen. l. 4.

for, "man, being in honour, was without understanding; and is become as the beasts that perish."

But to return. We are (as I said) to remember, that there is in man, by reason of his general corruption, such a distemper wrought, as that there is not only crookedness in, but dissension also, and fighting between, his parts. And though the light of our reason be, by man's fall, much dimmed and decayed; yet the remainders thereof are so adverse to our unruly appetite, as that it laboureth against us, as the Philistines against Samson, (or rather indeed, as Dalilah; for Samson's eyes were truly put out, before ever the Philistines were upon him) it laboureth, I say, to deprive us of those reliques of sight which we yet retain.

And this is that first corrupt effect which I call 'Imposture[d],' or Occæcation; whereby passion, reigning in the lower parts, and being impatient altogether of resistance or control, laboureth to muffle reason, and to obliterate those principles and original truths, whereby their unruliness might be restrained. And hence it is, that every man, when he hath given place to the violence of appetite, laboureth next to incline and prepare his mind for assent, and to get reason on the same side with passion. Disobedience[e] is ever cavilling, and contentious: and he who will not work the righteousness of God, will be sure to dispute against it, and to stumble at it. And therefore the apostle telleth us, that 'repentance,' and putting away of lusts, is the only preparation 'to acknowledge the truth:' for, so long as any man resolves to hold fast his sin, he will ever reject the truth that opposeth it, and bribe reason to say something for it.

And the reasons hereof are these two; a love of our passions, and a love of our ease. For the former, it is the speech of Aristotle, Κακία ἐστι φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς, that evil and inordinate motions have a power in them to corrupt principles of reason; and to make a man commit that, which, in rhetorick, is, with Aristotle, 'absurd;' but in divinity, with St. Peter, 'damnable;' τὸν κανόνα στρεβλὸν ποιεῖν, to 'pervert

[d] Tanta est vis voluptatum, ut et ignorantiam protelet in occasionem, et conscientiam corrumpat in dissimulationem: *Tert.* de Spectac. cap. 1.—*Arist.* Rhet. l. 1. c. 3.—*Quint.* l. c. 2. Τὸ γὰρ δάκνον σου τὴν διάγνωσιν κρατεῖ. *Eurip.* Hipp. 693. [e] Rom. ii. 8. Prov. x. 8. Eccles. v. 2. 2 Tim. ii. 25. James i. 19, 20, 21. 1 Pet. ii. 8. John iii. 20.

and make crooked[b] that, which should be the rule and judge in our actions: for passion, in opposition to reason, is like a humour, which falling from the head to the eyes, darkeneth the sight thereof; or as some concave glasses, which present the species of things to the eye, not as they are in themselves, but with those inversions, depressions, and other the like deformities, which the indisposition of the glass frameth them unto: or, as it is said of the Polypus, that he changeth himself always into the colour of the rock in which he hides; and as they feign of Proteus,

———Πρῶτιστα λέων γένετ' ἠϋγένειος,
Αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα δράκων, καὶ πάρδαλις, ἠδὲ μέγας σῦς.

He made himself a lion, and anon
Became a boar, a panther, a dragon.[d]

So likewise, the understanding, being once invaded by passion, is brought to change into divers shapes; and to judge of things, not according to their naked and natural truth, but according as it finds them bear in the fancy those impressions of pleasure, which are most agreeable to corrupted nature.[e]

And another reason why we seek to warrant and to maintain a passion, when we have given way unto it, is the love of our ease: for every man, though he can be content to delight in the pleasure of a corrupt passion, yet that part of it which hath the sting in it, is unpleasant. And therefore there is required the hand of reason, by apologies, pleadings, and blandishments, either to mollify the passion, that it shall not pierce, or to harden and arm the subject, that it may not be sensible of it.

And that this deceit and excæcation is a proper work of passion, (besides our own daily experience) this one argument might sufficiently prove; namely, the practice of hereticks[f], who proposing to themselves either gain, or any other carnal and corrupt end, did hereupon presently (as the apostle[g] notes) vent the perverse disputes of their own corrupt minds, and make all truth a hand-

[d] *Hom.* Odyss. l. 4. 456.
[e] Ægrotantes medici alios medicos ad se vocant, et magistri palæstræ alios magistros. Ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς, διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. *Arist.* Polit. lib. 3. cap. 16.
[f] *Tertul.* contra Valent. cap. 4.
[g] 1 Tim vi. 5.

maid and lackey to their own lusts. And proportionably thereunto, their custom hath been, 'Prius persuadere quam docere [h],' to creep upon the affections of men, and get footing there, before ever they would adventure the entertainment of their false doctrines. And as it is said of God, that 'he first accepted Abel, and then his sacrifice,' so do they labour first, to work an approbation of their persons in the hearts of men; whence, in the second place, their perverse conceits do find the easier access to their understandings.

For, when silly and unstable minds shall once be brought to such a prejudice, as to have the persons of men in admiration; when they shall see an impostor come unto them, as a man that had wholly renounced the world; like Zopyrus [i] or Sinon [k], clothed and deformed with seeming poverty and repentance,—drawing in and out his breath with no other motions than sighs,—pretending to bring nothing but the plentiful promises of salvation,—tears in his eyes, oil and honey in his mouth, and the most exquisite picture of true holiness, which it is possible for the art or hypocrisy of man's invention to draw out:—how can the understanding of weak and simple people choose (especially being before framed unto belief by those two credulous qualities, ignorance and fear) but be made inclinable to receive, not only willingly, but with greediness also, whatsoever poisonous doctrine, under pretence of wholesome and saving physic, such a subtile impostor shall administer unto them? Such a great force there is in voluntary humility, neglecting of the body, and other the like pretended pious frauds,—to insinuate and take possession of weak and credulous natures; with whom haply, more real, serious, and spiritual arguments, coming with less pomp and ostentation, would not prevail.

——Captique dolis, lacrimisque coactis,
Quos neque Tydides, nec Larissæus Achilles,
Non anni domuere decem, non mille carinæ.

They are surpris'd by frauds and forced tears,
In whom their greatest foes could work no fears;
Whom ten years' war not won, nor thousand ships,
Are snar'd and conquer'd by perjurious lips.

[h] *Tertul.* de Fuga.—*Isid. Pelus.* l. 1, ep. 102. [i] *Herod.* Thalia.
[k] Æneid. lib. 2.

The second manner of corruption, which passion useth on the understanding and will, was alienating or withdrawing of reason from the serious examination of those pleasures, wherewith it desireth to possess the mind, without control; that when it cannot so far prevail as to blind and seduce reason, getting the allowance and affirmative consent thereof, it may yet, at least, so far inveigle it, as to withhold it from any negative determination, and to keep off the mind from a serious and impartial consideration of what appetite desireth, for fear lest it should be convinced of sin, and so find the less sweetness in it.

And this is the reason of that affected and voluntary ignorance, which St. Peter[a] speaks of; whereby minds, prepossessed with a love of inordinate courses, do withhold and divert reason, and do forbear to examine that truth, which indeed they know; as fearing lest thereby they should be deterred from those vices which they resolve to follow: which is the same with that excellent metaphor in St. Paul[b], who saith, "The wrath of God was revealed from heaven on all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, *τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων*, which hold (or detain) the truth in unrighteousness:" that is, which imprison and keep in that *τὸ γνωστὸν Θεοῦ*, (as the apostle interpreteth himself, in the next verse,) all those notions of divine truth, touching the omnipotency and justice of God, which were by the finger of Nature written within them, to deter them from, or (if not) to make them inexcusable in, those unnatural pollutions wherein they wallowed. Thus Medea in the Poet:[c]

> Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν, οἷα δρᾷν μέλλω κακά·
> Θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων.
>
> I know 'tis wicked that I go about,
> But passion hath put all my reason out.

And therefore that maxim of the stoical philosopher out of Plato, is false, *Πάσα ψυχὴ ἄκουσα στερεῖται τῆς ἀληθείας*[d], "That all men are unwillingly deprived of truth;" since, as Aristotle[e] hath observed, directly agreeable to the phrase of St.

[a] 2 Pet. iii. 5. [b] Rom. i. 18. [c] *Eurip.* Med.-Vid. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 2. p. 284. Edit. Heins. [d] *Arrian.* Epictet. lib. i. cap. 1. [e] *Aristot.* Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 1.—Malunt nescire, quia jam oderunt. *Tertul.* Apol. cap. 1.—*Βουλητὴ ὄγνοια. Justin.* lib. Qu. et Rep. Qu. 140.—*Ψεῦδος ἑκούσιον. Clem.* Alex.

Peter, there is Ἄγνοια ἐκ προαιρέσεως, an elected, or voluntary ignorance, which, for their security's sake, men nourish themselves in.

And that there should be such an alienation of the mind from truth, when the fancy and heart are hot with passion, cannot be any great wonder: for the soul is of a limited and determined activity in the body; insomuch that it cannot, with perspicuity and diligence, give attendance unto divers objects. And therefore when a passion, in its fulness both of violence and delight, doth take it up, the more clear and naked brightness of truth is suspended and changed: so that as the sun and moon, at their rising and setting, seem far greater than at other times, by reason of thick vapours which are then interposed; so the mind, looking upon things through the mists and troubles of passion, cannot possibly judge of them, in their own proper and immediate truth, but according to that magnitude or colour, which they are framed into, by prejudice and distemper.

But then, thirdly, If reason will neither be deluded, nor won over to the patronage of evil, nor diverted from the knowledge and notice of good; then doth passion strive to confound and distract the apprehension thereof, that they may not, with any firmness and efficacy of discourse, interrupt the current of such irregular and headstrong motions. And this is a most inward and proper effect of passion: for, as things, presented to the mind in the nakedness and simplicity of their own truth, do gain a more firm assent unto them, and a more fixed intuition on them; so, on the contrary, those things which come mixed and troubled, dividing the intention of the mind between truth and passion, cannot obtain any settled or satisfactory resolution from the discourses of reason.

And this is the cause of that reluctancy between the knowledge and desires of incontinent men, and others of the like nature: for, as Aristotle[f] observes of them, they are but ἡμιπόνηροι, 'half evil,' as not sinning with that full and plenary consent of will, but 'præter electionem,' as he speaks; so I may more truly say of them, that they have but half

[f] Eth. l. 7. c. 10. In confinio concupiscentiæ et pœnitentiæ, aspera et tumultuosa gaudia. *Plut.* lib. Philosoph. cum princip.

knowledge, not any distinct and applicative apprehension of truth, but a confused and broken conceit of things in their generality; not much unlike unto night-talkers, who cannot be said to be thoroughly asleep, nor perfectly awaked, but to be in a middle kind of inordinate temper between both; or (as Aristotle [g] himself gives the similitude) it is like a stage-player, whose knowledge is express and clear enough, but the things which it is conversant about, are not personal and particular to those men, but belonging unto others whom they personate: so, the principles of such men are, in the general, good and true; but they are never brought down so low, as if they did concern a man's own particular weal or woe; not thoroughly weighed with an assuming, applying, concluding conscience; but, like the notion of a drunken or sleeping man, are choked and smothered with the mists of passion.

And this third corruption is that, which Aristotle [h], in the particular of incontinency, calleth Ἀσθένεια, the weakness and disability of reason, to keep close to her own principles and resolutions. Whereunto exactly agreeth that of the prophet [i], "How weak is thy heart, seeing thou dost all these things, the works of an imperious whorish woman." And elsewhere [k], whoredom and wine are said to take away the heart. So Hector describes lascivious Paris: [l]

——— Καλὸν
Εἶδος ἔπ'· αλλ' οὐκ ἔστι βίη φρεσὶν, οὐδέ τις ἀλκή.

Thy face hath beauty in't, but in thy breast
There doth no strength nor resolution rest.

The last effect (which I shall but name) is that which Aristotle calleth Προπέτεια, 'rashness,' or 'precipitancy;' which is the most tyrannical violence which passion useth, when, in spite of all the dictates of reason, it furiously overruleth the will, to determine and allow of any thing which it pleaseth to put in practice; and, like a torrent, carrieth all before it; or, as the prophet speaks [m], rusheth like a horse into the battle. So lust and anger are sometimes in the scripture called 'madness [n],' because it transporteth the soul

[g] Eth. l. 7. c. 3. [h] Eth. l. 7. c. 7. [i] Ezek. xvi. 30. [k] Hos. iv. 11. [l] Iliad. γ. 45. [m] Jer. l. 38. [n] Psalm cxxxii. 8. Eccles. ix. 3. Luke vi. 11.

beyond all bounds of wisdom or counsel; and by the dictates of reason, takes occasion to become more outrageous. 'Ipsaque præsidia occupat;' feeds like wild-fire upon those remedies which should remove it. As She said in the Poet:°

> Levis est dolor, qui capere consilium potest;
> Libet ire contra.
>
> That 's but light grief which counsel can abate;
> Mine swells, and all advice resolves to hate.

The corrupt effects which passion worketh, in the last place, on the body, are divers, according to the particular nature of the passions: sometimes too sudden and violent; sometimes, too heavy oppression of the heart, or other sudden perturbation of the spirits. Thus old Eli died with sudden grief; Diodorus, with shame; Sophocles, Chilo the Lacedæmonian, and others, with joy; nature being not able to bear that great and sudden immutation, which these passions made in the body. The causes and manner of which concitation, I refer (as being enquiries not so directly pertinent to the present purpose) unto natural philosophers and physicians. And from the generality of passions, I proceed unto the consideration of some particulars, according to the order of their former division: in all which, I shall forbear this long method of the antecedents, concomitants, and consequents of their acts (many particulars whereof, being in the same nature in all passions, will require to be observed only in one or two, and so proportionally conceived in the rest), and shall insist principally in those particulars which I handle, on the cases and effects of them, as being considerations, wherein commonly they are most serviceable or prejudicial to our nature.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Affection of Love; of love natural; of general communion; of love rational; the object and general cause thereof.

Now the two first and fundamental passions of all the rest, are love and hatred. Concerning the passion of love, we will therein consider, first, its object, and its causes; both

° *Senec.* Medea.

which being of a like nature, (for every moral object is a cause, though not every cause an object) will fall into one.

Love then consists in a kind of expansion or egress of the heart and spirits to the object loved, or to that whereby it is drawn and attracted: whatsoever therefore hath such an attractive power, is, in that respect, the object and general cause of love. Now, as in nature, so in the affections likewise, we may observe from their objects a double attraction: the first, is that natural or impressed sympathy of things, whereby one doth inwardly incline to a union with the other, by reason of some secret virtues and occult qualities disposing either subject to that mutual friendship, as between iron and the loadstone: the other, is that common and more discernible attraction which every thing receives from those natures or places, whereon they are ordained and directed, by the wisdom and providence of the First Cause, to depend, both in respect of the perfection and conservation of their being. For, as God is in his temple, the church,—so is he in his palace, (if I may so call it) the world,—a God of order, disposing every thing in number, weight, and measure; so sweetly, as that all is harmonious, (from which harmony the philosophers[a] have concluded a divine providence,) and so powerfully, as that all things depend on his government, without violence, breach, or variation.

And this order and wisdom is seen chiefly in that sweet subordination of things each to other, and haply inclination of all to their particular ends, till all be reduced finally unto him who is the fountain, whence issue all the streams of their limited being, and the fulness of which, all his creatures have received: which the poet, though something too poetically, seemeth to have expressed:

> Principio, cœlum, ac terras, camposque liquentes,
> Lucentemque globum lunæ, Titaniaque astra
> Spiritus intus alit; totamque infusa per artus
> Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.[b]

> Heaven, earth, and seas, with all those glorious lights,
> Which beautify the day, and rule the nights,
> A divine inward vigour, like a soul,
> Diffus'd through ev'ry joint of this great whole,[c]

[a] *Arrian.* Epist. lib. 1. c. 6.

[b] Æneid. lib. 6.—*Pet. Crinit.* lib. 6. c. 12.

[c] Græci enim τὸ πᾶν vocant.

Doth vegetate, and with a constant force,
Guideth each nature through its fixed course.

And such is the natural motion of each thing to its own sphere and centre; where is both the most proper place of its abode, and withal the greatest freedom from foreign injury or violence.

But we must herewithal take notice of the general care of the Creator, whereby he hath fastened on all creatures, not only this private desire to satisfy the demands of their own nature, but hath also stamped upon them a general charity and feeling of communion, as they are sociable parts of the universe or common body: wherein cannot possibly be admitted (by reason of that necessary mutual connexion between the parts thereof) any confusion or divulsion, without immediate danger to all the members. And therefore God hath inclined the nature of these necessary agents, so to work, out of their discords, the perfect harmony of the whole, that,—if by any casualty it falls out, that the body of Nature be like to suffer any rupture, deformity, or any other contumely, though haply occasioned by the uniform and natural motions of the particulars,—they then must prevent such damage and reproach, by a relinquishing and forgetting of their own natures, and by acquainting themselves with motions, whereunto considered in their own determinate qualities, they have an essential reluctancy: which property and sense of nature in common, the apostle hath excellently set down, 1 *Cor.* xii.; where he renders this reason of all, that there might be "no schism in the body;" which likewise he divinely applieth in the mystical sense, that all the several "gifts of the Spirit[d]" to the church, should drive to one common end, as they were all derived from one common fountain; and should never be used, without that knitting quality of love, to which he elsewhere[e] properly ascribeth "the building, concinnation, and perfecting of the saints."

Now, as it hath pleased the infinite wisdom of God to guide and moderate, by his own immediate direction, the motions of necessary agents, after the manner declared to their particular, or to the general end, (which motion may

[d] 1 Cor. viii. 1. [e] Ephes. iv. 12.

therefore, as I before observed, be called the 'natural passion' of things) so hath it given unto man a reasonable soul, to be (as it were) his vicegerent in all the motions of man's little world.

To apply, then, these proportions in nature to the affection of love in man, we shall find first a secret, which I will call 'natural,'—and next, a manifest, which I call a 'moral' and more discursive, attraction. The first of these, is that natural sympathy wrought between the affection and the object, in the first meeting of them, without any suspension of the passion, till farther enquiry after the disposition of the object: which comes immediately from the outward, natural, and sensitive virtues thereof, whether in shape, feature, beauty, motion, speech, behaviour; all which coming under the sphere of sense, I include under the name of 'judiciary physiognomy:' which is not a bare delight in the outward qualities, but a farther presumption of the judgement; concluding thence, a lovely disposition of that soul, which animateth and quickeneth these outward graces.

And indeed, if it be true which Aristotle[f] in his ethicks tells us, that 'similitude is the ground of love;' and if there be no natural love stronger than that which is between the body and the soul, we may well ground some good presumption of similitude in the qualities of the soul, with those lovely impressions of nature which we find in the body; and may, by the same reason, collect a mutual discovery, by which we acknowledge a mutual sympathy between them. And therefore it was no ill counsel, (though not always to be heeded) "Cave tibi ab iis, quos natura signavit;" to take heed of such, who, like Cain, have any mark of notorious deformity set upon them by nature. And therefore Homer, speaking of the garrulous, impudent, envious, and reviling qualities of Thersites, fits him with a body answerable to such a mind:

——Αἴσχιστος δὲ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθε·
Φολκὸς ἔην, χωλὸς δ' ἕτερον ποδα· τὼ δέ οἱ ὦμω
Κυρτὼ, ἐπὶ στῆθος συνοχωκότε· αὐτὰρ ὕπερθε
Φοξὸς ἔην κεφαλὴν, ψεδνὴ δ' ἐπενήνοθε λάχνη.[g]

[f] Lib. 8. [g] Iliad β. 217.

> The most ill-shapen man that to Troy came,
> With eye distorted, and in each foot lame,
> His shoulders crooked, to his breast shrunk down
> A sharp wry head, here and there patch'd with down.

But yet therein, though it be injurious for a man, out of too much austerity of mind, to reject the judgements of sense, and to quarrel with this natural instinct; yet it is fit, that, in this case, considering the deceitfulness of things, and what a diverse habit, education, or hypocrisy hath wrought in many, between the out and inside of their natures, that we should, I say, bring a fearful judgement: like the love of Bias the philosopher, which may easily, upon good warrant and assurance, alter itself: otherwise, when a thing is thoroughly known to be lovely, our hearts may boldly quiet and repose themselves in it.

But here likewise we must observe that proportion of nature, that if our affection cannot stand in private toward one particular, without damage and inconveniency to the public body, politick or ecclesiastical, whereof we are members; the general must ever be esteemed more dear and precious. A scandal to the body, and a schism from the whole, is more dangerous and unnatural, than any private divisions: for, if there be a wound or swelling in one part of the body, the parts adjoining will be content to submit themselves unto pain, for the recovery of that; and rather than it shall perish, suffer any trouble, which may conduce to the relief thereof.

And this is the love of fellow-members among themselves. But then, if any part be so far corrupted, as that it doth more easily derive its contagion upon others, than admit of any succour from them, so that by the continuance thereof in the body, the whole is endangered; or if the whole body be ready to perish by famine; then doth the sense of community so swallow up that other more private respect, as that the members will be even cruel among themselves, to the cutting and devouring of each other, that thereby the safety of the whole may be procured. And therefore, the fable of the faction between the belly and the members, was wisely applied by Menenius Agrippa, in a rebellion, against the people of Rome, to show how unnatural a thing it is, and how pernicious to the parts themselves, to nourish their own

private discontents, when the weal-publick is together therewithal endangered.

And therefore Plutarch[h] commendeth the wisdom of Themistocles and Aristides, that when they were joined in commission for any publick service of their country, they laid down their private enmities, and unanimously concurred to promote the interest of their country. And the like he noteth of Cratinas, and Hermeias, and Cato, and others; commending that as a noble resolution of him that said, φιλῶ τέκν' ἀλλὰ πατρίδ' ἐμὴν μᾶλλον φιλῶ· "I love my children; but I prefer my country."

CHAP. X.

Of the Rule of true Love, the love of God and ourselves: similitude to these, the cause of love in other things: of love of concupiscence: how love begetteth love; and how presence with, and absence from, the object, doth, upon different respects, exercise and increase love.

From this general and fundamental cause of love, proceed some others, special and particular; whereof the first and principal, is a similitude and resemblance between the thing loved, and that which is the natural rule of love.

Now, the rule of all love, is, by divine truth, prescribed to be God, and a man's self; so that, what beareth similitude to these, is the proper and right object of our affection[i]. To speak therefore a word or two of these.

The master-wheel, or first mover in all the regular motions of this passion, is the love of God, grounded on the right knowledge of him: whereby the soul, being ravished with the apprehension of his infinite goodness, is earnestly drawn and[k] 'called out,' as it were, to desire a union, vision, and participation of his glory and presence; yielding up itself unto him, (for by[l] love a man giveth himself to the thing which he loves) and conforming all its affections and actions to his will.

[h] *Plutarch.* Πολιτ. παραγέγλμ.

[i] *Arist.* Probl. sect. 10. 51.

[k] Καλὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ καλεῖν.

[l] Amor non nisi donum amantis in amatum, *Guil. Paris.* de legibus, c. 19.

And this love is then regular, when it takes up all the kinds of love, and all the degrees of love. For we love God, 'Amore amicitiæ,' for the goodness and excellency which is in himself, as being most lovely; and, 'Amore desiderii,' with a desire of being united unto him, as the fountain of all our blessedness; and 'Amore complacentiæ,' with a love of joy and delight in him; when the soul goes up to God, like Noah's dove to the ark, and with infinite sweetness and security reposeth itself in him; and lastly, 'Amore benevolentiæ,' with an endeavour (so far as a poor creature can to an infinite Creator; for "our good extendeth not unto him") to bring all praise, service, and honour unto him.

And thus we are to love him above all things; first, 'appretiativè,' setting a higher price upon his glory and command, than upon any other thing besides; all, dung in comparison. Secondly, 'intensivè,' with the greatest force and intention of our spirit, setting no bounds or measure of our love to him. Thirdly, 'adæquatè,' as the complete, perfect, and adequate object of all our love, in whom it must begin, and in whom it must end. And therefore the Wise man, speaking of the love and fear of God, tells us, that it is "totum hominis," the whole of man. Other objects are severally fitted unto several faculties; beauty, to the eye; musick, to the ear; meat, to the palate; learning, to the mind: none of those can satisfy the faculty, unto which it belongs not. And even to their proper faculties, they bring "vanity and vexation" with them; vanity, because they are empty, and do deceive,—and because they are mortal, and will decay: vexation in the getting, for that it is with labour; in the keeping, for that it is with fear; in the multiplying, for that it is with care; in the enjoying, for if we but taste, we are vexed with desiring it; if we surfeit, we are vexed with loathing it. God only is "totum hominis," fitted to all the wants of an immortal soul; fulness, to make us perfectly happy; immortality, to make us perpetually happy; after whom we hunger with desire, and are not griped; on whom we feast with delight, and are not cloyed. He therefore is to be loved, not with a divided, but a whole heart[m]. To love any creature either without God, or above

[m] Matth. xxii. 37.

God [n], is 'Cupiditas,' lust; (which is the 'formale' of every sin, whereby we turn from God to other things) but to love the creatures under God, in their right order,—and for God, to their right end; (for "he made all things for himself") this is 'caritas,' true and regular love.

Now the image and likeness of God (not to speak of that eternal and essential 'character of his Father's brightness') is in his word, and in his works; the one being the manifestation of his will; and the other, of his power and wisdom. Our love to his word is our search of it, as being the only glass, wherein we see the wonders and deep things of God; our belief of it, all, and only; acknowledging in it the fulness of its truth, and of its sufficiency; and our obedience to it, submitting ourselves, with purpose of heart, unto the rule and guidance of it.

Touching the works of God, there are two chief things whereunto the affection of man is by the creatures attracted, and wherewith it desires a union, namely, the truth and goodness of them: for by these only, may all the diverse faculties of man's soul be exercised and delighted. The love of both which, is then only regular, when it is limited, in regard of the quantity and quality of the act: humble, in the manner of pursuance, without swelling and curiosity: and lastly, subordinate unto that great love of God, whose image we can no further truly love in the creature, than as we are thereby directed to a farther love of him.

I come now unto that other rule of love, wherein Aristotle [o] hath placed the nature thereof, "a man's self;" or that unity and proportion which the thing loved beareth unto the party loving; which, in one place, he calleth ἰσότης 'equality;' in another, ταυτότης 'identity;' in another, ὁμοιότης 'similitude;' in another, κοινωνία, 'communion:' all relative terms, which refer unto the party loving.

The root of every man's love unto himself, is that unity and identity which he hath with himself; it being natural to every thing to take delight in the simplicity of its own being; because the more simple and one it is, the more it is like the fountain of its being; and therefore hath the more

[n] Vid. *Aug.* de Doct. Christ. l. 1. c. 22. et l. 2. c. 10. et de Trin. l. 8. c. 3. et l. 9. c. 8.

[o] "Ετερος αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος, *Arist.* lib. 9. cap. 9.—Ethic. lib. 8. cap. 9, 12. lib. 9. cap. 39.

perfection in it. And this love of man unto himself, is subordinate unto the love of God, and governed thereby: is 'debitum naturæ,' a necessary debt, and such, as the neglect whereof is a trespass against nature.

Now then, as we love ourselves, for the unity which we have in ourselves; so wheresoever we find any similitude [p] to ourselves, or character of ourselves, either in nature or habits, upon that also do the beams of this affection extend. Now, a thing may represent ourselves [q], First, in substance, as the husband and wife are said to be one flesh, and children are branches and portions of their parents. Secondly, in qualities or accidents; as one man resembleth another in natural, and one friend another in habitual, qualities: "As face answereth to face in water, so the heart of man to man."

With respect unto this double similitude, there is a double love; the one natural; the other, acquired, or habitual: the former is common unto men with other creatures. Thus in Ælian [r], Plutarch [s], and others, we read of the natural affection of elephants, which, seeing their young fallen into a deep pit, will leap down after them, though it be present death; and of the marvellous cunning and valour which many other birds and beasts use to provide for the safety of their brood, exposing and offering themselves to danger, that they may be delivered: yea, the pelican [t] (if we believe the story) doth feed her young ones, when they have been bitten with serpents, with her own blood to recover them again:—which emblem [u], John the Second, king of Portugal, is said to have chosen, whereby to express his love to his subjects. And Homer [x] elegantly expresseth the care of a bird feeding her young ones:

> Ὡς δ' ὄρνις ἀπίῃσι νεοσσοῖσι προφέρῃσι
> Μάστακ', ἐπεί κε λάβῃσι, κακῶς δ' ἄρα οἱ πέλει αὐτῇ.
>
> She brings her young ones what meat she can find,
> When she herself with hunger's almost pin'd.

And the like affection, another poet [y] hath expressed in the most cruel of all the beasts, the tiger.

[p] *Aristot.* Ethic. lib. 9. cap. 4, 8. [q] *Arist.* Magnor. Mor. l. 1. c. 34. [r] *Ælian.* l. 1. de Anim. 2. c. 25. lib. 2. c. 25. lib. 6. c. 9. lib. 9. c. 8. lib. 11. c. 38. [s] *Plutarch.* de Solert. Anim. et de Amore. [t] *Aristot.* Hist. Anim. lib. 9. c. 4. 8. *Sophocles* in Electra et ibi Scholiast. p. 127. [u] *Tholos.* de Repub. lib. 8. c. 1. sect. 19. [x] Iliad. Γ'. 324.

——"Sic aspera tigris,
Fœtibus abreptis, Scythico deserta sub antro
Accubat, et tepidi lambit vestigia lecti."

——The tiger (which most thirsts for blood)
Seeing herself robb'd of her tender brood,
Lies down lamenting in her Scythian den,
And licks the prints, where her lost whelps had lain.

And this kind of piety we find reciprocal, returning from the young ones upward: so the young lions are said to feed and provide for their old ones; which is also observed of eagles, storks, and other creatures. And hence we read [z] of νόμοι πελαργικοί, laws, which receive their denomination from the stork, providing that children should nourish and take care of their parents in their distress. And for men, so great is the power of natural affection, that parents desire nothing more, than to be excelled by their children. Even vicious men (as Seneca somewhere speaketh) desire that their sons may be virtuous; and virtuous men, that they may be more worthy and happy than themselves: as Hector prayed for his son [a];

Καί ποτέ τις εἴπῃσι, Πατρὸς δ' ὅγε πολλὸν ἀμείνων.

Let it be said, Here's a brave son indeed,
Who doth his noble father far exceed.

And Æneas to Ascanius [b],

"Disce, puer, virtutem ex me, verosque labores;
Fortunam ex aliis."

Virtue and patience learn, my son, of me;
But may thy fortunes better patterns see!

And therefore unnaturalness of affection is reckoned up by the apostle [c] amongst the foulest of sins, when men grow wild and brutish; as the philosopher [d] calleth such men, θηριώδεις, men of savage and fierce dispositions. And therefore in the scripture an unnatural man is called 'Onager homo,' a wild-ass-man; (*Gen.* xvi. 12. *Job* xi. 12) but a meek and tender-spirited man is called 'Ovis-homo,' a sheep-man, or a man of a sociable and calm disposition. (*Ezek.*

[z] *Ælian.* de Anim. l. 2. c. 40. et l. 3. c. 23. et. l. 9. c. 1. et l. 10. c. 16. *Plut.* de solert. animal. *Aristoph.* in Avibus.—*Plin.* l. 10. c. 23. et l. 8. c. 57. [a] Iliad. ζ. 480. [b] Æneid. l. 12. [c] 2 Tim. iii. 3. [d] *Ælian.* var. hist. l. 2. c. 7.

xxxvi. 37, 38) And amongst the Thebans there was a law made, which appointed a capital penalty upon those unnatural men, who should cast out and expose their children unto ruin.

And as this kind of love ariseth from propinquity of nature, so another there is growing out of similitude of manners. All flesh, as Siracides [e] speaks, will "resort to their like, and every man will keep company with such as he is himself;" as we see learned men hold correspondency with those that are learned, and good with those that are good. No man that excelleth in any quality, shall ever want friends; because every man that either hath or liketh that quality, will love it in any other man, and him for it. For by the same reason that a man, by the study or practice of any good thing, laboureth to commend himself to his own judgement, and to the love of others; he is engaged (unless he will be false to his own grounds) to love any other whom he observeth to study and practise the same thing. For how can I expect, that that in me should reap love from others, which, in others, reapeth nothing but envy from me? And upon this reason it is, that a man can hardly permit another to love that, which he himself hateth: because we are too apt to make our judgements and passions the rule of another man's, and to dislike that in him, which we do not allow in ourselves. Which unruly affection, the poet hath excellently described in Achilles, when his friend mediated a reconciliation between him and Agamemnon [f];

———Οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ
Τὸν φιλέειν, ἵνα μὴ μοὶ ἀπέχθηαι φιλέοντι·
Καλόν τοι σὺν ἐμοὶ τὸν κήδειν, ὅς κέ με κήδῃ.

It is not courteous, that where I hate, you
Should love, except you 'd have me hate you too:
But take this rule, if you 'll be thought my friend,
The man that offends me, do you offend.

So much naturally are men in love with their own like-

[e] Eccles. xiii. 17. Ἀνὴρ δὲ χρηστὸς χρηστὸν οὐ μισεῖ ποτέ. *Menand.*—Thersitis vitia non aliter incitat Homerus, quàm quòd esset viris præstantissimis Achilli et Ulyssi invisus. Il. 2. Vid. *Aristot.* Prob. 10. q. 51. Τέτλιξ μὲν τέτλιγι φίλος, μύρμακι δὲ μύρμαξ, &c. *Theoc.* Idyl. 9. Φιλία ἐν μόνοις σπουδαίοις διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα. Stoici apud Diog. Laert. in Zenon. l. 7.—*Maxim. Tyrius*, dissert. 4. [f] Iliad. l. 610.

ness, that many time they can be content to have their very deformities imitated: and therefore the chief art of flatterers is to commend and imitate every thing of him, of whom they would make a prey.[g]

It is true, that in some cases, similitude is the cause of envy: but this is only then, when first the quality wherein men agree, is a litigating and contentious quality: in which case, the meeting of such men in one disposition, is but like the meeting of two rough streams, which makes them run with the more noise. Therefore a wise and a meek-tempered man shall sooner win and hold the love of an angry man, than he who is like unto him in that distemper; because such a man (though indeed he be conqueror, in regard of his wisdom) yet, by his patience he seemeth to yield; and there is nothing which a man's passion loves so much as victory. Whereas, between anger and anger, there must needs be fighting; which is the remotest temper from love.

Secondly, when, by accident, the quality wherein men agree, doth any other way inconvenience them, either in point of credit, usefulness, or profit. For as the stars, though they agree in light, yet[i] 'validiorum exortu exilia obscurantur,' those that are small, suffer loss by the brightness of others; so amongst men, agreeing in the same abilities, one many times proveth a prejudice and disadvantage unto the other; as the poet said[k],

Καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει, καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων.

The potter 's often angry with his mates.
One neighbour-architect the other hates.

And therefore as the sun and moon agree best in their light, when they are farthest asunder; so in these arts which maintain life or credit, men usually agree best at a distance, because thereby the one doth the less damage or darken the other.

Now this natural and habitual love is then regular, when subordinate to that greater, our love of God, and when governed by the dictates of a rightly-informed reason; which, amongst many others, are these three:

First, That our love carry its right respect, and no sinis-

[g] *Plut.* de Adulat. et Amicit. [i] *Plin.* Paneg. [k] *Hesiod.*

ter or by-end with it[k]:—That we love a friend for himself, and not with indirect ends, only for our own benefit: for, as the philosopher[l] speaks, "true love is a benevolent affection," willing good unto another for his own sake.—'Hominum caritas,' saith Cicero[m], 'gratuita est;' true love is free, and without self-respect; whereas to shroud our own private aims under the name of friendship, 'non est amicitia, sed mercatura,' is only to make a trade and merchandise of one another.

Secondly, That our love be serene, not mudded with error and prejudice.[a] In the most able men that are, God is pleased to leave some wants and weaknesses[b], that they may the better know themselves, be acquainted with divine bounty in what they have, and their necessary use of others in what they want. And therefore it was a seasonable increpation of Polydamas to Hector:[c]

Οὕνεκά τοι πέρι δῶκε Θεὸς πολεμήϊα ἔργα,
Τοὔνεκα καὶ βουλῇ ἐθέλεις περιίδμεναι ἄλλων;
Ἀλλ' οὔπως ἅμα πάντα δυνήσεαι, &c.

Because thou canst in war all men outdo,
Wilt thou presume thou canst in counsel too?
One breast's too narrow to contain all arts;
God distributes his gifts in several parts.

In this case, therefore, our care must be, to discern between the abilities and infirmities of men; that our honour and love of the person render not his weaknesses beautiful to us, nor work in us an unhappy diligence in the imitation of them. 'Vix enim dici potest, quanto libentius imitamur eos, quibus favemus.'[d] Love is very apt to transport us so far, as to make us imitate the errors of whom we love. Like unskilful painters, who, not being able to reach the beauty of the face, express only the wrinkles and blemishes of it.[e]

Thirdly, that our love keep, in all the kinds thereof, its due proportion, both for the nature of them,—being, towards some, a love of reverence; towards others, of friend-

[k] Δεῖ με συμπράτειν, ἀλλὰ μέχρι βωμῶν. Vid. *A. Gell.* l. 1. c. 3. [l] Rhet. l. 4. c. 4. [m] De Nat. Deor. l. 1. [a] *Sen.* ep. 9. [b] Ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸς πάντ' ἐπίστασθαι βροτῶν πέφυκεν, &c. *Eurip.* Rhes. 106. [c] Iliad N. 727. Vid. *Plut.* de Anim. Tranquil.—*Cic.* ad Atticum, l. 14. ep. 13. [d] *Quint.* l. 1. c. 2. et l. 10. c. 2. [e] *Plut.* de Adulat.

ship; towards others, of compassion; towards others, of counsel and bounty; as also for their several degrees of intention, which are to be more or less according to the natural, moral, or divine obligations, which we find in the persons loved. For though we must love all men as ourselves, yet that infers not an equality, but a fidelity and sincerity of love: since even within ourselves, there is no man but loves his head and his heart, and other vital parts, with a closer affection, than those which are but fleshly and integral, and more easily repairable. And therefore the apostle[f] limiteth the μάλιστα, the greatest degree of our love, upon two objects; those of our 'own house,' and those of the 'household of faith;' not excluding others, but preferring these.

I shall end this particular with naming one species of love more; (for all this hitherto hath been 'Amor amicitiæ,' a love of a person for himself) and it is that which the schools call 'Amor concupiscentiæ,' a love of concupiscence, or a circular love; that which begins and ends in a man's self; when his affection, having gone forth to some object, doth again return home, and loves it not directly for any absolute goodness which it hath in itself, but as it is conducible, and bears a relation of convenience to him that loves it. For though all affection of love, as Aristotle observeth, be circular, inasmuch as the object first moves the appetite, and then the appetite moves to the object, and so the motion ceaseth where it began, which is a circle; (which also, by the way, shows us, in an emblem, the firmness and strength which love works amongst men; because of all forms and fabricks, those which are circular, are the strongest; as we see in arches, wherein every part doth mutually touch and clasp in that which is next it) yet in this love which I here speak of, there is a greater circle, in that, after all this, there is another regress from the object to the appetite, applying the goodness thereof unto the same, and loving it only for the commodity and benefit, which the mind is likely to receive from it.

Another subordinate and less principal cause of love, may be love itself, I mean, in another man: for as it is natural, according to Aristotle,[g] to praise, so sure it is to love,

[f] 1 Tim. v. 8. Gal. vi. 10. [g] Eth. l. 8. c. 1. l. 9. c. 1.

φιλανθρώπους, men of loving and good natures; and so he maketh just, beneficent, and pleasant, καὶ ὅλως τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους, men that are true lovers of their own friends, to be the proper objects of love. And herein is that partly verified, that "love is strong as death:"—for as that grave which buries a dead man, doth likewise bury all his enemies, (it being unnatural to hate the dead, whom we cannot hurt; for the utmost harm that malice can do, is to kill. And therefore it is noted as a prodigious hatred between the two emulous brothers of Thebes, Eteocles and Polynices,

> "Nec furiis post fata modus, flammæque rebelles
> Seditione rogi"——— [h]
>
> The furies were not bounded by their fate;
> One's funeral flame the other's flame did hate)

Even so likewise a man's love hath a power to bury his enemies, and to draw unto itself the most backward and differing affections. For being of a transient nature, and carrying forth itself into the person beloved, it usually (according to the condition of other natural agents) worketh semblable and like affection unto itself. For besides [i] that hereby an adversary is convinced of nourishing an injurious and undeserved enmity, he is moreover mollified and shamed by his own witness; his conscience telling him, that it is odious and inhuman to repay love with hatred. Insomuch that upon this inducement, Saul, the pattern of raging and unreasonable envy, was sometimes brought to relent and accuse himself. And this is the occasion (as I take it) of that speech of Solomon [k]: "If thine enemy hunger, give him bread to eat; if he thirst, give him water to drink; for thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head." [l] Which though perhaps with earthly and base minds, it hath a property of hardening and confirming them in their hatred; yet with minds ingenuous and noble, it hath a clean contrary effect, to melt and purge them. And so the apostle telleth us [m], that "we love God, because he loved us first;" and Mary Magdalen, having had much forgiven her, did therefore

[h] Statius Theb. [i] Pessimam causam meam Hodierna pietas fecit: est prorsus nocens, Quicunque visus tam bono fratri est nocens. *Sen.* in Thyeste. [k] Prov. xxv. 21. [l] Nimis durus est animus, qui dilectionem si nolebat impendere, nolit rependere. *Aug.* de Catech. Rudib. c. 4. [m] 1 John iv. 19.

love Christ much. [m] And therefore the poet's counsel is good [n],

Στέργετε τοὺς φιλέοντας· ἵν', ἢν φιλέητε, φιλῆσθε.

If, for thy love, thyself wouldst loved be,
Show love to those that do show love to thee.

The next two causes which I conceive of love, I will join in one, namely, the absence from, and, contrarily, the presence with, the thing loved: both which, in a different respect, do exercise love. And therefore, first, I like not that speech of Aristotle, That "though distance of place do not dissolve the root and habit, yet it doth the exercise and acts of love [o];" except he meant it (as I suppose he doth) of the transient acts thereof, whereby each friend doth the office of love and beneficence to another. For as, in natural bodies, there is not only a complacency or delight in their proper place, when they enjoy it, but an innate propension and motion thereunto, when they are absent from it; so in the mind of man (whose love is his weight [p]) there is not only a love of delight in the fruition, but a love likewise of desire in the privation of a good; which the more it wanteth, the more it fixeth itself upon it; as some things do naturally attract fire at a distance. [q] Thus the poet expresseth the love of Dido to Æneas [r]:

"Illum absens absentem auditque videtque."

When night had severed them apart,
She heard and saw him in her heart.

And it is the wonder of love (as St. Chrysostom speaketh [s]) to collect and knit together in one things far separated from each other. Wherein stands the mystery of the communion of the church on earth, both with itself, and in all the dispersed members of it, and with Christ the head, and that other part of it which triumpheth in heaven. So that herein divine love hath the same kind of virtue with divine faith; that as this is the being and subsisting of things to

[m] Luke vii. 37. [n] *Moschus.* [o] Eth. l. 8. c. 5. [p] Animus amore fertur, sicut corpus pondere. *Aug.* de Civ. Dei. l. 11. c. 28. Pondus meum amor meus; eo feror, quocunque feror. Conf. l. 13. c. 9. ep. 89. [q] *Plut.* sympos. l. 7. q. 7. [r] Æneid. l. 4. [s] Τοὺς ἐκ πολλοῦ διαστήμαλος ὄντας συναγαγεῖν καὶ συνδεῖν. In 1 Cor. x. 30.

come, and distant in time, so that is the union and knitting of things absent, and distant in place.

But then, much more doth presence to the goodness of an object loved, increase and exercise our love; because it gives us a more complete sight of it, and union unto it. And therefore St. John speaks of a perfection [t], and St. Paul of a perpetuity of our love unto God [u], and grounded on the fulness of the beatifical vision, when we shall be 'for ever with the Lord:' Whereas now, 'seeing only in a glass darkly,' as we 'know,' so likewise we love but 'in part.' And Aristotle [x] makes mutual conversation and society, one of the greatest bonds of love; because thereby is a more immediate exercise, and from thence, a greater increase of affection.

As living creatures [y], so affections, are nourished after the same manner as they are produced. Now it is necessary, for the first working of love, that the object have some manner of presence with the affection, either by a knowledge of vision, or of faith. And therefore St. Paul saith, "If they had known, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory [z]:" their ignorance and hatred of him went both together, "Simul ut desinunt ignorare, cessant et odisse:" as soon, saith Tertullian, as they ceased to be ignorant of Christ, they ceased to hate him.[a] And usually, in the phrase of Scripture, knowledge and love are identical.[b] So then, all love proceeding from knowledge, and all knowledge presupposing some presence of the thing known, it appeareth that the presence of the object begetteth, and therefore, by proportion, it nourisheth, this affection.

The last cause or inducement to this passion (which I will but name) is an aggregate of divers beautiful and amiable qualities in the object, as, namely, sympathy, justice, industry, temperance, ingenuity, facility, pleasantness, and innocency of wit, meekness, yieldingness, patience, sweetness of behaviour and disposition, without closeness, suspicion, intermeddling, inquisitiveness, morosity, contempt, dissension: in all which, men are either 'injusti,' or 'pugnaces,' do

[t] 1 John iv. 18. [u] 1 Cor. xiii. 8. [x] Eth. l. 8. c. 5. [y] *Plut.* de Invidia et Odio. *Arist.* Polit. l. 1. c. 7. [z] 1 Cor. ii. 8. [a] Apol. l. c. 2. [b] 2 Tim. ii. 19. Mar. vii. 23. John ix. 21. Psalm i. 6. xxxvii. 18. Rom. viii. 29.

either wrong us, or cross us; which two, the philosopher makes the general opposites of love.[c] On which I shall forbear to insist, as also upon the circumstances of the act of this passion itself, in the quantity and quality thereof; and shall proceed, in brief, to the consequents or effects of this passion.

CHAP. XI.

Of the effects of Love, union to the object, stay and immoration of the mind upon it, rest in it, zeal, strength, and tenderness towards it, condescension unto it, liquefaction and languishing for it.

The first which I shall observe is *union*, occasioned both by the love which we have to a thing for its own sake, and likewise for the love of ourselves, that there may be a greater mutual interest each in other. Wherever love is, it stirreth up an endeavour to carry the heart unto the thing which it loveth. "Where the treasure is, there will the heart be." Hence none are said to love God, but those that are some way united to him. And therefore, as God's first love to man was, in making man like himself; so his second great love was, in making himself like man. Hence we read so often of that mystical inhabitation of Christ in his church; of that more peculiar union and presence with his people; of a spiritual implantation into him by faith; of those near relations of filiation and fraternity, of mutual interest each in other. "I am my beloved's, and my beloved is mine;" importing an inseparable union of the church to Christ. And this may be the reason of that order in St. Paul's solemn benediction, "The grace of Christ, the love of God, and the communion of the Spirit:" for as the grace of Christ only taketh away that enmity which was between sinners and God, and is the only means of our reconciliation unto him; so the love of God is the only bond of that communion, which we have with him and his Holy Spirit.

Union is of divers sorts. One, such whereby divers things

[c] Rhet. l. 1. c. 4.

are made simply one, either by the conversion of one into the other, or by the composition or constitution of a third out of the things united; as of mixed bodies out of united elements, or of the whole substance out of the essential parts. Another, such whereby things united are made one after a sort, either by an accidental aggregation, as divers stones make one heap; or by an orderly and artificial distribution, as divers materials make one house. Or by either a natural or moral inclination and sympathy which one thing beareth unto another. And of this sort is that union which ariseth out of love, tending first unto a mutual similitude and conformity in the same desires[a]; and next unto a mutual possession, fruition, and propriety, whereby the mind loving, longeth to be seized of the thing which it loveth, and cannot endure to be deprived of it. So Moses prayed, "I beseech thee, show me thy glory:" for the vision of God is the possession of him: And so David, "My soul thirsteth for God: when shall I come and appear before him?" And this is the foundation of all sorrow, when the soul is dispossessed of that which it loved, and wherein it rested. And this desire of possession is so great, that love contenteth itself not with the presence[b], but even then putteth out its endeavour unto a nearer, and more real union, as if it would become really one with the thing which it loveth; which is seen in embracings, kisses, in the exiliency and egress of the spirits, in the expansion of the heart, in the simplicity and naturalness of all mutual carriages, as if a present friend were not yet present enough. Which kind of expressions of love are thus elegantly described by Homer[c], when Eumæus saw Telemachus safely returned home from sea:

——Ταφὼν δ' ἀνόρουσε συβώτης·
Ἐκ δ' ἄρα οἱ χειρῶν πέσεν ἄγγεα, τοῖς ἐπονεῖτο,
Κιρνὰς αἴθοπα οἶνον· ὁ δ' ἄντιος ἤλυθ' ἄνακτος·
Κύσσε δέ μιν κεφαλήν τε, καὶ ἄμφω φάεα καλὰ,
Χεῖράς τ' ἀμφοτέρας· θαλερὸν δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε δάκρυ.

Eumæus, all amaz'd, sprang to the door;
The pots of wine, which his hands mixt before,

[a] *Arist.* Rhetor. lib. 2. cap. 4. *Diog. Laert.* in Zenon. l. 7. [b] Hedera Amor. *Plutarch.* de Aud.—*Scal.* de subtilitate.—*Arist.* Polit. lib. 2. c. 4.—Vel Præsentem desideramus. *Plin.* Paneg. [c] Odyss. Π. 12.

Did both fall from them: he ran on to meet,
And with full welcomes his young master greet:
He kiss'd his head, hands, eyes; and his tears kept
Time with his kisses; as he kiss'd, he wept.

The like elegant description we have of the love of Penelope, when Ulysses, after his return, was perfectly known unto her:[d]

Δακρύσασα δ' ἔπειτ' ἰθὺς δράμεν, ἀμφὶ δὲ χεῖρας
Δειρῇ βάλλ' 'Οδυσῆϊ, κάρη δ' ἔκυσ,'

She wept and ran straight on; her hands she spread,
And clasp'd about his neck, and kiss'd his head.

Love hath, in moral and divine things, the same effect, which fire hath in natural,—to congregate homogeneal, or things of the same kind, and to separate heterogeneal, or things differing: as we see in the love of God; the deeper that is, the more is the spiritual part of man collected together, and raised from the earth. And therefore in heaven, where love shall be perfect, all things shall be harmonious and homogeneal; not in regard of natural properties, but in a pure and unmixed spiritualness of affection, in a perfect unity of minds and motions.

From the union of love proceeds another secret effect, namely, a *resting* of the mind in the thing loved. In which respect the philosopher calleth knowledge 'the rest of the understanding.' And this can only be total and perfect in the union of the soul with God, the chiefest good thereof. Whence some[e] have made the threefold appetite in man, concupiscible, rational, and irascible, to have their final perfection and quiet by a distinct union to the Three Persons in the Trinity: for the concupiscible power is carried 'ad bonum,' to good, which, they say, is the attribute of the Holy Spirit; the rational, 'ad verum,' to that which is true, which is the attribute of the Son; and the irascible, 'ad arduum,' to power, which is the attribute of the Father. But to let that pass for a spider's web, (curious, but thin) certain it is, that God only is that end, who can fully accomplish the perfection, and terminate the desires of those creatures, whom he made, after a peculiar manner, to know and

[d] Odys. ψ. 208. [e] *Gerson.* de Myster. Theol.

enjoy him. But proportionably there ariseth from the union unto any other object of love, a satiating and quieting of the faculty; which, in a word, is then only (in objects of inferior order and goodness) regular, when the object is natural, and the action limited. Disproportion and enormity are the two corruptions in this particular.

A third effect, which I shall observe of love, is *stay*, and immoration of the mind upon the object loved, and a diverting of it from all others; as we observe in Eumæus, when he saw Telemachus, he threw away the business which he was about before. And the woman of Samaria, being transported with the love of Christ, left her pitcher, which she brought to the well, that she might go and call others unto his doctrine. And Mary left the thought of entertaining Christ at the table, out of an extraordinary desire to entertain him in her heart. And this effect the poet hath excellently described in Dido, who having before showed a marvellous princely wisdom and sedulity in fortifying her new kingdom, and viewing the works herself (as he had before described) as soon as she was once transported with the love of Æneas, then all stood still on a sudden:

> "Non cœptæ assurgunt turres; non arma juventus
> Exercet, portusve aut propugnacula bello
> Tuta parant; pendent opera interrupta."[f]
>
> The towers, long since begun, rose up no more,
> And arms did rust, which erewhile brave youth bore;
> No ports, no sconces, no defence went on,
> But all their works hang broken, and half done.

Thus, as Plutarch hath observed, the images of things in the fancies of other men, are like words written in water, which suddenly vanish: but the impressions which love makes, are, as it were, written with a hot iron, which leaveth fixed and abiding prints in the memory.

Love and knowledge have mutual sharpening and causality each on other: for as knowledge doth generate love, so love doth nourish and exercise knowledge. The reason whereof, is that unseparable union, which is in all things between the truth and goodness of them. For it being the property of

[f] Æneid. l. 4.

truth to unite and apply goodness (nothing being apprehended as good, unless that goodness be apprehended as true) the more appetite it enjoyeth of this, the deeper enquiry doth it make, and the more complete union doth it seek with that: the heart and treasure can seldom be severed; the eagles will always resort to the body. David's love gave length and perpetuity to his meditation, even all the day.

And herein, methinks, may consist another proportion between the strength of love and death: for as, in death, nature doth collect and draw in those spirits, which before lay scattered in the outward parts, to guard and arm the heart in its greatest conflict, uniting all those languishing forces which are left, to testify the natural love which each living creature beareth to its own conservation;—so doth love draw and unite those spirits, which administer either to the fancy or appetite, to serve only for the nourishing of that affection, and for gazing upon that treasure, whereunto the heart is wholly attracted. Which spirits, being of a limited power and influence, do therefore with the same force, whereby they carry the mind to the consideration of one thing, withdraw it from all other that are heterogeneal; no determined power of the soul being able to impart a sufficient activity unto divers independing operations, when the force of it is exhausted by one so strong; and there being a sympathy, and, as it were, a league between the faculties of the soul, all covenanting not to obscure or hinder the predominant impressions of one another. And therefore as in Rome, when a dictator was created, all other authority was for that time suspended; so when any strong love hath taken possession of the soul [g], it gives a 'supersedeas' and stop unto all other employments. It is therefore prescribed as a remedy against inordinate love,

> ———"Pabula amoris
> Absterrere sibi, atque alio convertere mentem." [h]
>
> To draw away the fuel from this fire,
> And turn the mind upon some new desire.

[g] *Plutarch.* in Amatorio.

[h] *Lucret.* apud Petr. Crinit. lib. 16. cap. 4.

For love is 'otiosorum negotium,' as Diogenes spake[i], the business oftentimes of men that want employments.

Another effect of love is *jealousy* or *zeal;* whereby is not meant that suspicious, inquisitive, quick-sighted quality of finding out the blemishes, and discovering the imperfections of one another, (for it is the property of true love to think none evil) but only a provident and solicitous fear, lest some or other evil should either disturb the peace, or violate the purity of what we love: like that of Job towards his sons[k], and of the apostle towards his Corinthians, "I am jealous over you with a godly jealousy."[l] So Penelope in the poet was jealous of the safety of Ulysses:

> "In te fingebam violentos Troas ituros:
> Nomine in Hectoreo pallida semper eram."[m]
>
> How oft, my dear Ulysses, did I see,
> In my sad thoughts, proud Trojans rush on thee!
> And when great Hector's name but touch'd mine ears,
> My cheeks drew paleness from my paler fears.

Zeal is a compounded affection, or a mixture of love and anger; so that it ever putteth forth itself to remove any thing which is contrary to the thing we love. As we see in Christ, whose zeal or holy anger whipped away the buyers and sellers out of the temple: In which respect it is said, that "the zeal of God's house did consume him[n]:"—as water, when it boileth, (from which metaphor the word zeal is borrowed[o]) doth in the boiling consume, or as the candle wasteth itself with burning. In which respect likewise it is said, that "much water cannot quench love."[p] It is like lime, the more water you cast upon it, the hotter it grows. And therefore the sin of Laodicea, which was contrary to zeal, is compared unto 'lukewarm' water[q], which doth not boil; and so cannot work out the scum or corruption which is in it.

And from hence it is, that love makes weak things strong, and turneth cowardice into valour, and meekness into anger, and shame into boldness, and will not conceive any thing too hard to undertake. The fearful hen, which hath nothing but flight to defend herself from the dog or the serpent, will

[i] Σχολαζόντων ἀσχολία, *Diog.* apud Laert. l. 6. [k] Job i. 5. [l] 2 Cor. xi. 2. [m] *Ovid.* Epist. [n] John ii. 17. [o] Ἀπὸ τοῦ ζέειν λέγειν. [p] Cant. i. 8. [q] Rev. iii. 15.

venture with courage against the strongest creatures to defend her little chickens.[r] Thus zeal and love of God made Moses forget his meekness[s], and his anger was so strong, that it brake the tables of the law, and made the people drink the idol which they had made. And this is wittily expressed by Seneca[t], that "Magnus dolor, iratus amor est;" a great grief is nothing else but love displeased, and made angry. It transporteth nature beyond its bounds or abilities, putteth such a force and vigour into it, as that it will venture on any difficulties[u]: as Mary Magdalen would, in the strength of her love, undertake to carry away the dead body of Christ, (as she conceived of him) not considering the weight of that, or her own weakness. It hath a constraining virtue in it, and makes a man do that which is beyond his power; as the Corinthians, when they were poor in estate, were yet rich in liberality. It makes a man impatient to be unacquainted with the estate of an absent friend, whom we therefore suspect not sufficiently guarded from danger[x], because destitute of the help which our presence might afford him. In one word, it makes the wounds and stains of the thing loved, to redound to the grief and trouble of him that loveth it.[y] He that is not jealous for the credit, security, and honour of what he pretendeth affection to, loves nothing but himself in those pretences.

Another effect of love is *condescension* to things below us, that we may please or profit those whom we love. It teacheth a man to deny his own judgement, and to do that which a looker on might happily esteem weakness or indecency, out of a fervent desire to express affection to the thing beloved. Thus David's great love to the ark of God's presence, did transport him to leaping and dancing, and other such familiar expressions of joy, for which Michal, out of pride, despised him in her heart; and was contented by that which she esteemed baseness, to honour God;—herein expressing the love of him to mankind, who was both his Lord and his Son; who emptied, and humbled, and denied himself for our sakes, not considering his own worthiness, but

[r] *Plutarch.* de Amore prolis. [s] Numb. xii. 11. Exod. xxxii. 19. [t] *Senec.* Herc. Oetæ. [u] Vid. Plutarch. Amatorium. [x] Non patiar me quicquam nescire de eo, quem amem. *Plin.* Epist. [y] Πόθος δέ τις τὰ τῶν φίλων φίλα-σιν αἰσθέσθαι κακά. *Eurip.* Helen. 763.

our want; nor what was honourable for him to do, but what was necessary for us to be done. "Quicquid Deo indignum, mihi expedit[z];" whatsoever was unworthy of him, was expedient for us. Thus parents, out of love to their children, do lisp, and play, and fit their speech and dalliances to the age and infirmities of their children. Therefore Agesilaus, being found playing and riding on a reed with his little boy, desired his friend not to censure him for it, till he himself was a father of children.[a]

The last effect which I shall observe of this passion, is that which I call *liquefaction*, or *languor*[b]; a melting, as it were, of the heart, to receive the more easy impressions from the thing which it loveth; and a decay of the spirits, by reason of that intensive fixing of them thereon, and of the painful and lingering expectation of the heart to enjoy it. Love is of all other the inmost and most visceral affection; and therefore called, by the apostle, 'bowels of love.' And we read of the yearning of Joseph's bowels over Benjamin[c], his mother's son, and of the true mother over her child.[d] "Incaluerunt viscera;" they felt a fervour and agitation of their bowels, which the more vehement it is, doth work the more sudden and sensible decay and languishing of spirits. So Amnon, out of wanton and incestuous love, is said to 'grow lean from day to day,' and to have been 'sick' with vexation for his sister Tamar.[e]

And in spiritual love, we find the like expression of the spouse; "Stay me with flaggons; comfort me with apples; for I am sick with love:"[f]—wine to exhilarate, apples to refresh those spirits, which were, as it were, melted away, and wasted by an extreme outlet of love. And for this reason, the object of our love is said to 'overcome us[g],' and to 'burn the heart,' as with 'coals of juniper.' And the like expressions of wounding and burning, the poet useth:

———"Est mollis flamma medullas
Interea, et tacitum vivit sub pectore vulnus."[h]

A welcome soft flame in her bones did rest,
And a close wound liv'd in her bleeding breast.

[z] *Tertull.* [a] *Plutarch.* Apophthegm. Lacon. [b] Vid. *Plutarch.* symposiac. l. 5. q. 7. Ὡς τοῦτον τὸν καρὸν ἐγὼ σὺν δαίμονι τάκω, Ὡς τάκοιθ' ὑπ' ἔρωλος, &c. *Theoc.* Idyl. 2. [c] Gen. xliii. [d] 1 Kings iii. 26. [e] 2 Sam. xiii. [f] Cant. ii. 5. [g] Cant. vi. 9. viii. 6. [h] Æneid. 4.

Now the cause of this languor, which love worketh, is, in sensitive objects, an earnest desire to enjoy them; in spiritual objects, an earnest desire to increase them. In the former, want kindleth love, but fruition worketh weariness and satiety: in the other, fruition increaseth love, and makes us the more greedy for those things, which when we wanted, we did not desire. In earthly things, the desire at a distance promiseth much pleasure; but taste and experience disappointeth expectation. In heavenly things, eating and drinking doth renew the appetite, and the greater the experience, the stronger the desire: as the more acquaintance Moses had with God, the more he did desire to see his glory. And so much may suffice for the first of the passions, *love*, which is the fountain and foundation of all the rest.

CHAP. XII.

Of the passion of Hatred, the fundamental cause or object thereof, Evil; how far forth evils are willed by God, may be declined by men: Of God's secret and revealed Will.

The next in order is *Hatred;* of which the school-men make two kinds; a hatred of *abomination*, or loathing; which consists in a pure aversion, or flight of the appetite from something apprehended as evil, arising from a dissonancy and repugnancy between their natures; and a hatred of *enmity*, which is not a flying, but rather a pursuing hatred, and hath ever some love joined with it; namely, a love of any evil, which we desire may befal the person or thing which we hate.

I shall not distinctly handle these asunder, but shall observe the dignities and corruptions of all the passion in general, as it implies a common disconvenience, and natural unconformity between the object and the appetite.

The object then of all hatred is *evil;* and all evil, implying an opposition to good, admits of so many several respects, as there are kinds of opposition.

And there is first an evil of *contrariety;* such as is in the qualities of water unto fire, or a wolf unto a sheep, occa-

sioned by that destructive efficiency which one hath upon the other.

Secondly, an evil of *privation;* which we hate formally and for itself, as implying nothing but a defect and absence of good.

Thirdly, an evil of *contradiction*, in the not being of any creature, opposed to its being. For being and immortality is that which Aristotle makes one of the principal objects of love: annihilation, then, or not being, is the chiefest evil of things, and that which Nature most abhorreth.

Lastly, an evil of *relation:* for as things, in their own simple natures evil, may have in them a relative goodness, and so to be desired; as the killing of beasts for the service, and the death of malefactors for the security, of men; so things, in their absolute being good, may have in them a relative or comparative evil, and, in that sense, be by consequence hated: as our Saviour intimates, "He that hateth not father and mother, and his own life for me, is not worthy of me:" when they prove snares and temptations to draw us from the love of Christ, they are then to be undervalued in comparison of him. And therefore we find in the law, if a man's dearest brother, or child, or wife, or friend should entice him from God unto idolatry, he was not to conceal, pity, or spare him, but his own hand was to be first upon him. And thus the poet hath elegantly expressed the behaviour of Æneas toward Dido, who, being inflamed with love of him, would have kept him from the expedition, unto which, by divine guidance, he supposeth himself to be directed.

> ——— "Quanquam lenire dolorem
> Solando cupit, et dictis avertere curas;
> Multa gemens, magnoque animum labefactus amore;
> Jussa tamen Divom exsequitur.
>
> Though he desir'd with solace to appease,
> And on her pensive soul to breathe some ease,
> (Himself with mutual love made faint) yet still
> His purposes were fixt t'obey God's will.

So then we see what qualifications are required in the object of a just hatred, that it be evil, and some way or other offensive, either by defiling or destroying nature; and the

passion is ever then irregular, when it declineth from this rule.

But here, inasmuch as it is evident that the being of some evil comes under the will of God; (" Is there any evil in the city, and the Lord hath not done it?") and our will is to be conformable unto his; it may seem, that it ought to fall under our will too, and by consequence to be rather loved than hated by us, since we pray for the fulfilling of God's will.

For resolution of this, we must first consider, that God doth not love those evils which he thus willeth, as formally and precisely considered in themselves. And next we will observe, how far the will of God is to be the rule of our will; whence will arise the clear apprehension of that truth which is now set down, that the unalterable object of man's hatred is all manner of evil, not only that of deformity and sin, but that also of destruction and misery.

First, then, for the will of God, we may boldly say what himself hath sworn, that he wills not the death or destruction of a sinner; and, by consequence, neither any other evil of his creature, as being a thing infinitely remote from his mercy. He is not delighted in the ruin, neither doth he find pleasure or harmony in the groans, of any thing which himself created: but he is said to will those evils as good and just, for the manifestation of his glorious power over all the creatures, and of his glorious justice on those who are voluntarily fallen from him. But now because it is left only to the wisdom of God himself, to know and ordain the best means for glorifying of himself in and by his creatures, we are not hence to assume any warrant for willing evil unto ourselves or others, but then only when the honour of the Creator is therein advanced. And so the apostle did conditionally wish evil unto himself, if thereby the glory of God's mercy towards his countrymen, the Jews, might be the more advanced.

Secondly, it is no good argument, 'God willeth the inflicting of such an evil, therefore it is unlawful for my will to decline it:'—for, first, the will of God, whereby he determineth to work this or that evil on particular subjects, is a part of his secret counsel. Now the revealed, and not the hidden will of God, is the rule of our wills and actions. Whence it

cometh to pass, that it is made a part of our necessary obedience unto God, in our wishes or aversations, to go a cross way to his unrevealed purpose. Peradventure, in my sickbed, it is the purpose of God to cast my body into the earth, from whence it was taken: yet for me herein to second the will of God by an execution thereof upon myself, or by a neglect of those ordinary means of recovery which he affords, were to despise his mercy, that I might fulfil his will. Peradventure, in my flight, a sword will overtake me: yet I have the warrant of my Saviour's example and precept, to turn my back rather than my conscience in persecution; always reserved, that though I will that which God willeth, yet my will be ever subordinated unto his. We owe submission to the will of God's purpose and counsel, and we owe conformity to the will of his precept and command: we must submit to the will, whereby God is pleased to work himself; and we must conform to the will, whereby he is pleased to command us to work. And therefore,

Secondly, Though the will of God were in this case known, yet is not our will constrained to a necessary inclination, though it be to an humble submission and patience in bearing that which the wisdom and purpose of God hath made inevitable: for as the promises and decrees of good things from God do not warrant our slackness in neglecting, or our profaneness in turning from them; so neither doth the certainty and unavoidableness of a future evil (as death intended upon us by God), put any necessity on our nature to deny itself, or to love its own distresses.

Of which that we may be the more sure, we may observe it in him; who, as he was wholly like us in nature, and therefore had the same natural inclinations and aversations with us; so was he of the same infinite essence with his Father, and therefore did will the same things with him;—yet even in him we may observe (in regard of that, which the scripture saith, was, by 'the hand and counsel of God, before determined') a seeming reluctancy and withdrawing from the divine decree. He knew it was not his Father's will; and yet, "Father, if thou be willing, let this cup pass from me:"—he was not ignorant that he was to suffer, and that there was an 'oportet,' a necessity upon it; and yet a second and a third time again, "Father, if it be possible,

let this cup pass from me." Consider it as the destruction of his Temple, and anguish of Nature, which he could not being in all things like unto us) but love; and then 'transeat,' let it pass: but consider it as the necessary means of procuring precious blessings for mankind, and of fulfilling the eternal decree of his Father's love, and then, "Not as I, but as thou wilt."

The same may be applied in any manner of human evils, notwithstanding we are, with an armed patience, to sustain them, or, with an obedient submission unto divine pleasure, to wait for them;—yet in regard of that pressure of nature, which they bring with them, (on which the God of Nature hath imprinted a natural desire of its own quiet and integrity,) so far forth all evil, not only may, but must, be hated by every regular will, upon pain of violating the law of its creation.

And indeed, in all this there is not any deviation from the will of God, intending that which we abhor: for as it stands not with the nature of man to hate himself, or any good thing of his own making, so neither doth it stand with the goodness of God to hate his creature, or to delight barely in the misery or afflictions thereof; but only in that end of manifesting his glory and righteousness, whereunto he, in the dispensation of his wisdom and justice, hath wonderfully directed them. And therefore, as to murmur at the wisdom of God in thus ordering evils unto a good end, were a presumptuous repining; so on the other side, not to entertain those natural desires of a straitened mind after deliverance from those evils, were to be, in Solomon's phrase, "too righteous," and, out of a purpose to answer the ends of God's wisdom, to cross the law of his creation.

So then it is evident, that the object and fundamental cause of hatred, is all and only evil, which however in respect of the existence of it, it be, in some cases, good;—(for as it is in the power of God to bring order out of confusion, light out of darkness, his own honour out of man's shame; so is it his providence likewise to turn unto the great good of many men those things, which in themselves do only hurt them) yet I say, notwithstanding this, as it worketh the deformity and disquiet of nature, it is against the created

law and inbred love, which each thing beareth to its own perfection; and therefore cannot but be necessarily hated.

As on the other side, those ordinary and common goods, which we call, in respect of God, 'blessings,' as health, peace, prosperity, good success, and the like; notwithstanding they commonly prove unto men, unfurnished with those habits of wisdom and sobriety, whereby they should be moderated, occasions of much evil and dangers; so that their table is become their snare; (as the experience of those latter Roman ages proveth, wherein their victories over men had made them in luxury and vileness so prodigious, as if they meant to attempt war with God) notwithstanding, I say, all this, yet forasmuch as these things are such as do quiet, satisfy, and bear convenience unto man's nature, they are therefore justly, with thankfulness, by ourselves received, and, out of love, desired unto our friends.

I now proceed from the object, or general fundamental cause of hatred, unto some few which are more particular, and which do arise from it.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the other causes of Hatred; secret antipathy, difficulty of procuring a good commanded, injury, base fears, disparity of desires, a fixed jealous fancy.

The first which I shall note, is a secret and hidden *antipathy*[a], which is in the natures of some things one against another: as vultures are killed with sweet smells, and horse-flies with ointments. The locust will die at the sight of the polypus; and the serpent will rather fly into the fire, than come near the boughs of a wild ash. Some plants will not grow, nor the blood of some creatures mingle, together. The feathers of the eagle will not mix with the feathers of other fowls. So Homer noteth of the lion, that he feareth fire; and the elephant nauseates his meat, if a mouse hath touched

[a] *Arist.* Hist. Anim. l. 9. c. 44. See *Plin.* Nat. Hist. l. 8, c. 4. 9, 10. l. 9. c. 62. l. 16. c. 37. 74. l. 16. c. 13. l. 20. in procem. l. 22. c. 20. l. 24 c. 1. *Ælian.* de Animal. l. 3. c. 7. l. 4. c. 5. l. 5. c. 48, 50. l. 6. c. 22. 45, 46. *Plutarch.* Symp. l. 2. 47. *Plutarch.* de Odio et Invid.

it. A world more of particulars there are, which naturalists have observed of this kind: from which natural antipathy it cometh, that things which never before saw that which is contrary to them, do, at the very first sight, fly from it, as from an enemy to their nature, nor will they ever be brought by discipline to trust one another.

——Οὐκ ἔστι λέουσι καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὅρκια πιστὰ,
Οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν,
Ἀλλὰ κακὰ φρονέουσι διαμπερὲς ἀλλήλοισιν.[b]

Lions with men will ne'er make faithful truce,
Nor can you any way the wolf induce
To love the lamb; they study with fixt hate,
The one the other how to violate.

And the like kind of strange hatred, we may sometimes find amongst men; one man's disposition so much disagreeing from another's, that though there never passed any injuries or occasions of difference between them, yet they cannot but have minds averse from one another;—which the epigrammatist hath wittily expressed[c];

"Non amo te, Sabidi; nec possum dicere quare;
Hoc tantum possum dicere, Non amo te."

I love thee not, yet cannot say for what;
This only I can say, I love thee not.

Another cause working hatred of a thing in the minds of men, is the *difficulty* and conceited impossibility of obtaining it, if it be a good thing which we either do or ought to desire: which the casuists call 'acedia,' being a grief of the appetite looking on a difficult good, as if it were evil, because difficult; from whence ariseth a torpor and supine neglect of the means, which might help us to it. Thus wicked and resolved sinners, conceiving happiness as unacquirable by them, do grow to the hating of it; to entertain rancorous affections against those which persuade them to seek it; to envy and malign all such as they find careful to obtain it; to proceed unto licentious resolutions of rejecting all hopes or thoughts of it, and to divert their minds towards such more obvious and easy delights, as will be gotten with less

[b] Iliad. X. 262. [c] *Martial.*

labour. This difficulty rendereth good things hateful[d]; as Israel in the wilderness despised the pleasant land, because there were sons of Anak in it.

And this is one great cause of the different affections of men toward several courses of life. One man, being of dull and sluggish apprehensions, hateth learning; another, by nature quick, and of noble intellectuals, wholly applieth himself unto it: the difficulty persuading the one to despise the goodness, and the goodness inducing the other to conquer the difficulties, of it. So one man, looking unto the pain of a virtuous life, contemns the reward; and another, looking unto the reward, endures the pain. And we shall usually find it true, that either laziness, fearing disappointment, or love being disappointed and meeting with difficulties which it cannot conquer, do both beget a kind of hatred and dislike of that which did either deter them from seeking it, or deceive them when they sought it. As She, who, while there was any hope, did solicit Æneas with her tears and importunities[e], when he was quite gone, did follow him with her imprecations.

There is no malice which grows ranker than that which ariseth out of the corruption of love; as no darkness is more formidable than that of an eclipse, which assaults the very vessels of light; nor any taste more unsavoury, than of sweet things when they are corrupted. The more natural the union, the more impossible the re-union. Things joined by art, being broken asunder, may possibly be glued again; but if a man's arm be broken off, it can never be joined on again: so those hatreds are most incurable, which arise out of the greatest and most natural love.[f]

Δεινή τις ὀργὴ καὶ δυσίαλος πέλει,
Ὅταν φίλοι φίλοισι συμβάλωσ' ἔριν.[g]

When love of friends is turn'd to wrath, be sure
That wrath is deep, and scarce admits a cure.

Another very usual, but most evil cause of hatred is *injury;* when a man, because he hath done another wrong, doth from thence resolve to hate him. Too many examples

[d] Vid. *Arist.* Eth. l. 9. c. 4. [e] Æneid. 4. [f] *Arist.* polit. l. 7. c. 7.—Fraterno primi maduerunt sanguine muri: *Lucan.* l. 1.—*Plut.* de Amore frat. [g] *Eurip.* Medea. 520.

whereof there are in writings, both sacred and profane. Joseph's mistress first wronged him in assaulting his chastity; and then hated him, and caused him to be cast into prison. Amnon first abused his sister Tamar; and then hated her worse than before he loved her. Phædra, having solicited Hippolytus her husband's son unto incest, being denied, did after accuse him to his father, and procure his ruin. And Aristotle proposeth it as a problem[h], Why they who corrupt and violate the chastity of any, do after hate them? and gives this reason of it, Because they ever after look on them, as guilty of that shame and sadness, which in the sin they contracted. This cause of hatred, Seneca and Tacitus have both observed as a thing usual with proud and insolent men, first, to hurt,—then, to hate.[i]

And the reason is, first, because injury is the way to make a man, who is wronged, an enemy; and the proper affection which respecteth an enemy, is hatred. Again, he who is wronged, if equal or above him that hath done the wrong, is then feared; and 'oderunt quos metuunt,' it is usual to hate those whom we fear: if inferior, yet the memory and sight of him doth upbraid with guilt, and affect with an unwilling and unwelcome review of the sin, whereby he was wronged; and pride scorns reproof, and loves not to be under him in guilt, whom it overtops in power: for innocence doth always give a kind of superiority unto the person that is wronged. Besides, hatred is a kind of apology for wrong: for if a man can persuade himself to hate him whom he hath injured, he will begin to believe that he deserved the injury which was offered unto him; every man being naturally willing to find the first inducement unto his sin, rather in another than in himself.

The next cause (which I shall observe) is fear, I mean *slavish fear:* for as love excludeth fear, so fear begetteth hatred. And it is ever seen, 'Qui terribiles sunt, timent;' they that terrify others, do fear them; as well knowing that they are themselves hated. For, as Aristotle speaketh, "Nemo quem metuit, amat," no man loves him whom he fears:—which is the same with that of Saint John, "Love

[h] Prob. sect. 41. sect. 11. [i] Proprium humani ingenii odisse quos læseris. *Tacit.* Vit. Agri. et *Senec.* de Ira, l. 1, c. 33.

casteth out fear:" not a reverend, submissive, awful fear; not a cautelous, vigilant, and obedient fear; not a fear of admiration; not a fear of subjection;—but a fear of slavery and of rebellion; all flashes of horror, all the tossings and shipwrecks of a torn mind, all the tremblings of a tormented spirit; briefly, all evil and hurtful fear. And this, I believe, is one principal reason of that malice and contempt of godliness, which shows itself in the lives of atheistical and desperately wicked men; which as it ariseth out of the corruption of nature, so it is marvellously enraged by the fearful expectation of that fiery vengeance, which their pale and guilty consciences do already pre-occupate: for as their conscience dictates, that they deserve to be hated by God, so their stubbornness and malice concludes that they will hate him again. "Let us eat and drink; for to-morrow we shall die."

There may be a double root of this fear, outward and inward. The outward is the cruelty and oppression which we suffer from the potent, and thereupon the less avoidable malice of the person hated:—as it was the speech of Caligula, "Oderint dum metuant." And herein our aversation (if it observe that general rule of goodness in passion's subordination to reason and piety) is not only allowable, but natural, while it extends itself no further than the evil which we wrongfully suffer. For I cannot but think, that the spittle and scourges, the thorns and buffets, the reed and knees, of those mocking and blasphemous Jews, were so many drops of that full cup, which He, who knew no sin, was so deeply desirous to have pass from him.

But the next, the inward root of fear, is the guilt and burthen of an unclean and uncovered conscience; for pollution and weakness when it is naked, must needs be fearful. And therefore that inference of Adam had truth in it, "I was afraid, because I was naked:" for having disrobed himself of original righteousness, he was thereupon afraid of the curse and summons of an offended justice. Now from this fear may arise a double hatred; a hatred of a man's own conscience: for an evil man Οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἔχει, as the philosopher speaks[k], 'is not a friend unto himself;' but

[k] Ethic lib. 9. c. 4. δίκαιον ἐστι τοὺς κακοὺς μὴ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν μισεῖσθαι. *Scholiast.* in Sophocl. Oedip. Tyr.

flies and labours to run away from himself; and is never in so bad company, as when he is alone, because then he keeps company with his own conscience.

Which is the reason, why some men's hatred of themselves hath proceeded so far, as to make themselves the instruments of that small measure of annihilation, which they are capable of. Wherein notwithstanding they discover, how far their fury should extend against themselves, if they were as omnipotent to effect, as they are ready to desire it: for he that hates a thing would, if he were able, pursue it even unto not being. There is no man but hath a natural hatred of toads, serpents, vipers, and the like venomous creatures; and yet that man which hates them most, if his conscience be naked and let loose to fly upon him, if that worm that never dies, (unless killed with our Saviour's blood) begin thoroughly to sting and gnaw him, would think himself a wise merchant, if he could exchange beings with the worst of these. The worm and viper of conscience is, of all the creatures, the most ugly and hateful. A wicked man, when he doth distinctly know himself, doth love every thing, save God, better than himself.

———" Diri conscia facti,
Mens habet attonitos, et surdo verbere cædit,
Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum.[1]"

The mind, being conscious of some dire offence,
Fills them with fears; a torturer from thence
Shaketh, and, with redoubled blows, doth urge
The unheard lashes of an hidden scourge.

Nor can I esteem this a corrupt, though it be a miserable passion: for as a bad man is to himself the worst, so is he, by consequence, the hatefullest of all creatures.

The second hatred, which may arise from that fear which is caused by a secret guilt of mind, is of all other most corrupt and rancorous, namely, a hatred of the authors or executioners of justice, of the equity and justness of whose proceeding, we are from within convinced;—such as is the malice and blasphemy of malefactors against the judge, and of devils and damned men against God and his righteous

[1] *Juvenal.*

judgements; which yet they cannot but acknowledge that they most worthily do endure: for it is the nature of proud and stubborn creatures, (as was before observed) 'odisse quos læserint,' first to wrong God, and then to hate him.

Another particular cause of this passion may be a disparity of affections and desires: for notwithstanding there be, many times, hatred, where there is similitude; (as those beasts and birds commonly hate one another, which feed upon the same common meat, as the philosopher observeth[m]) and sundry men hate their own vices in others, as if they had not the trade of sin enough to themselves, except they had gotten a monopoly, and might engross it; yet this ever proceeds from an apprehension of some ensuing inconveniences, which are likely to follow therefrom; as hath been formerly noted. So that, in that very similitude of natures, there is a disagreement of ends, each one respecting his own private benefit.

Now the corruptions herein are to be attended according to the nature of that disparity, whereon the passion is grounded; which sometimes is *moral;* wherein it is laudable to hate the vicious courses, in which any mandiffers from us, or we ourselves from the right rule of life; so that the passion redound not from the quality to the person, nor break out into an endeavour of his disgrace and ruin; except it be in such a case, when our own dignity or safety, which we are bound more to regard, being assaulted, is in danger to be betrayed, unless prevented by such a speedy remedy. Sometimes, this disparity may be in actions *civil*, and with respect to society: and then as the opposition which hatred discovereth, may be principally seen in two things, opposition of a man's hopes, and of his parts and abilities, by crossing the one, and undervaluing the other; so corruption may easily proceed from two violent and unreasonable grounds, ambition and self-love, the one pursuing its hopes, the other reflecting upon its worth. And to this particular may be reduced that hatred, which ariseth out of a parity of desire; as amongst competitors for the same dignity, or corrivals for the same love, or professors of the same art, either by reason of covetousness, or envy, or ambition, a

[m] Hist. Animal.

greedy desire of their own, or a discontented sight of another's good.

> " Nec quenquam jam ferre potest Cæsarve priorem,
> Pompeiusve parem "———
>
> Thus two great rulers do each other hate,
> Cæsar no better brooks [n], Pompey no mate.

And these are very unfit affections for society, when private love of men to themselves shall devour the love which they owe unto their country. More noble was the behaviour of Themistocles and Aristides [o], who when they were ever employed in the public service of State, left all their private enmities in the borders of their own country, and did not resume them till they returned, and became private men again.

The last cause which I shall observe of hatred, may be a settled and permanent intuition of the object, a penetrating, jealous, and interpreting fancy: because, by this means, a redoubled search and review doth generate a kind of habitual detestation; it being the nature of evil commonly to show worse at the second or third view. And that, first, because the former act doth work a prejudice, and thereby the after-apprehension comes not naked, but with a forestalled resolution of finding evil therein: and next, because from a serious and fastened search into the object, the faculty gaineth a greater acquaintance with it, and by consequence a more vehement dislike of it, the former knowledge being a master and light unto the latter. But light and wandering fancies, (though they may be more sudden in the apprehension of evil, and by consequence liable to an oftener anger, yet by reason of the volubility of the mind joined with an infirmity and unexercise of memory, they) are for this cause the less subject to deep and rooted hatred.

Unto this head may be referred that hatred which ariseth from excessive melancholy, which maketh men sullen, morose, solitary, averse from all society, and haters of the light; delighting only like the shriek-owl [p], or the bittern, in desolate places, and monuments of the dead. [q] This is that which is called λυκανθρωπία [r], when men fancy themselves trans-

[n] 'Mallem hic primus esse quàm Romæ secundus:' Cæsar de oppidulo quodam, dum Alpes transiret. *Plut.* [o] *Plut.* de gerend. Rep. [p] Zeph. ii. 14. Isai. xxxiv. 11, 14, 15. [q] Matth. xviii. 28. [r] *Herodot.* de

formed into wolves and dogs, and accordingly hate all human society. Which seemeth to have been the distemper of Nebuchadnezzar [s], when he was thrust out from men, and did eat grass with the beasts. Timon the Athenian was, upon this ground, branded with the name of μισάνθρωπος, 'the man-hater [t],' because he kept company with no man, but only with Alcibiades; whereof he gave this only account, Because he thought that man was born to do a great deal of mischief. And we read, even in the histories of the church [u], of men so marvellously averse from all converse or correspondence with men, that they have, for their whole lives long, some of sixty, others of ninety years, immured themselves in cells and silence, not affording to look on the faces of their nearest kindred, when they travelled far to visit them. So far can the opinion of the mind, actuated and furthered by the melancholy of the body, transport men even out of human disposition, which, the philosopher telleth us, is naturally a lover of society [x]; and therefore he saith, that 'such men are usually given to contention, the sign and the fruit of hatred.'

CHAP. XIV.

Of the quality and quantity of Hatred, and how, in either respects, it is to be regulated.

I PROCEED now unto the consideration of this passion in the quantity and quality of its acts; which must be observed according to the evil of the object: for if that be unchangeable, there is required a continual permanency of the passion in regard of the disposition of the mind: or if it be importunate and assaulting, there is required a more frequent repetition of the act. The same likewise is to be said of the quality of it: for if the evil be of an intense and more

Neuris in Melpom.—*Plin.* l. 8. c. 22. *Virgil.* Eclog.—*Pompon. Mela.* de situ orbis l. 2.—*Wierus* de Præstig. dæmon. l. 3. c. 21.—*Aug.* de Civ. Dei, l. 18. c. 17.—*Olaus Mag.* de Reg. Septentr. l. 18. c. 45, 46, 47.—*Lucian* in Asino. [s] Dan. v. 21. [t] *Cic.* de Amicit. et l. 4. Tusc. quæst.—*Suidas* in Timon.—*Plut.* in Alcibiade et Antonio.—*Laert.* in Timone.—*Turneb.* Advers. l. 24. c. 33. [u] *Socr.* l. 4. c. 18. *Theod.* l. 4. c. 26. *Sozom.* l. 5. c. 29. [x] *Arist.* Polit. l. 1. c. 2.

invincible nature, our hatred must arm us the more; if more low and remiss, the passion may be the more negligent.

Here then is a fourfold direction of the quantities and qualities of our hatred, and it will hold proportion in the other passions. First, the unalterableness of the evil, warrants the continuance of our hatred. Secondly, the importunity and insinuation of it, warrants the reiteration of our hatred. Thirdly, and fourthly, the greatness, and the remission of it requires a proportionable intention and moderation of hatred. We may instance for the three former in sin, so much the worst of evils, by how much it is a remotion from the best of goods.

First then, sin is, in its own formal and abstracted nature, unchangeable, though not in respect of the subject in whom it dwelleth: for a creature now bad, may, by the mercy of God, be repaired and restored again: but this is not by a changing, but by a forsaking of evil; by a removing of it, not by a new moulding it into another frame. Sin then remaineth in its own nature unchangeable and always evil: and the reason is, because it is a transgression of a perpetual law, and a remotion from an unalterable will; sin then is to be hated with a continual and peremptory hatred. But in other things there is, according to the nature of their evils, required a conditional and more flexible dislike; they being evils that have, either some good annexed unto them, or such as are of a mutable nature. And therefore we see, that, in most things, the variety of circumstances doth alter the good or evil of them, and so makes the passions, thereabout conversant, alterable likewise. Otherwise men may naturally deprive themselves of those contents and advantages, which they might receive by a seasonable use of such indifferent things as they formerly, for inconveniences now removed, did dislike. And, in morality likewise, much damage might be inferred, both to private persons and to the public, by nourishing such private enmities, and being peremptory in continuing those former differences; which, though happily then entertained upon reasonable grounds, may yet afterwards prove so much the more harmful, by how much the more danger is to be feared from the distemper of a grown and strong, than of a vanishing and lighter passion.

Secondly; Again, as no evil is altogether so unchange-

able as sin, so is there nothing so much to be opposed with a multiplicity and reiteration of our hatred in regard of its importunity and insinuation: that as there is an impudence in the assault, so there may be a proportionable resolution in the withstanding of it. Some evils there may be, which require only a present, and not a customary exercise of this passion: *present*, I say, when the object is offensive, and not customary; because as the object, so the passion likewise may be unusual. Sin only is of all other evils the most urging and active, furnished with an infinite number of stratagems and plausible impostures to insinuate into natures, though best armed against such assaults: and therefore here only are necessary such reiterated acts, as may keep us ever on our guard, that we be not unprepared for a surprise.

Thirdly, Then for the quantity of an evil, because that is not in any thing so intense as in sin, whether we consider it in its own nature, as a rebellion against the highest good; or in its effects, either in regard of the diffusion of it, it being an overspreading pollution; or of the vastness of it, both in guilt and punishment. In these respects our hatred of it cannot be too deep or rooted: whereas other evils are not so intense in their nature, nor so diffusive in their extension, nor so destructive in their consequents: and therefore do not require an unlimited passion,—but one, governed according to the exigence of circumstances.

And here I shall take notice of one or two particulars, touching the manner of corruption in this particular. As first, when a man shall apply his hatred of prosecution, or ill-willing against that evil, which is the proper object only of aversation: for some things there are only of conditional evil, which hurt not by their own absolute being, but by their particular use or presence; which being offensive only in their application, requires a particular forbearance, not any further violence to their natures.

Secondly [a], A corruption in regard of intension, is either when the passion admits not of any admixtion of love, when yet the object admits of an admixtion of good; or when the hatred is absolute against only relative evils. There is

[a] Μήδ' ἡ βία σε μηδαμῶς νικησάτω Τοσόνδε μισεῖν, ὥστε τὴν δίκην πατεῖν. *Soph.* Ajax, 1351.

not any man, betwixt whose natural faculties and some particular courses or objects, there is not some manner of antipathy and disproportion, (it being the Providence of divine dispensations so variously to frame and order men's fancies) as that no man shall have an independence or self-sufficiency, nor say unto the other members, 'I have no need of you:' —but there should be such a mutual ministry and assistance amongst men, as whereby might be ever upheld those essential virtues of human society, unity and charity; no man being able to live without the aid of others, nor to upbraid others with his own service. Now, in this case, if any man, who either out of the narrowness and incapacity, or out of the reluctancy and antipathy, of his own mind, is indisposed for some courses of life and study, shall presently fall to a professed vilifying of them,—or to an undervaluing of persons, who, with a more particular affection, delight in them, —or to a desire of the not-being of them, as things utterly unuseful, because he sees not what use himself can have of them; he doth herein discover as much absurdity in so peremptory a dislike, as a blind man should do in wishing the sun put out; not considering that he himself receiveth benefit at the second hand from that very light, the beauty whereof he hath no immediate acquaintance withal.

For as too excessively to doat on the fancy of any particular thing, may prove harmful, as appeareth in the poetical fable of Midas, whose unsatiable desire to have every thing that he touched, turned to gold, starved him with hunger; and so what he, out of too excessive love, made his idol, became his ruin; (as many men need none other enemy to undo them than their own desires,) so, on the other side, the extreme hatred of any thing may be equally inconvenient: as we see intimated in that other fable of the servants, who when they had, out of an extreme malice against the poor cock, at whose early crow their covetous master every day roused them unto their labour, killed him, and so (as they thought) gotten a good advantage to their laziness, were, every day, by the vigilancy of their master, whose covetousness now began to crow earlier than his cock, called from their sleep sooner than they were before; till at length they began to wish for that, which the rashness and indiscretion of their hatred had made away. And therefore when we go

about any thing out of the dictates of passion, it is a great point of wisdom, first, to consider whether we ourselves may not afterwards be the first men, who shall wish it undone again.

CHAP. XV.

Of the good and evil effects of Hatred. Cautelousness and wisdom to profit by that we hate, with confidence, victory, reformation. Hatred in general against the whole kind, cunning, dissimulation, cruelty, running over to persons innocent, violating religion. Envy, rejoicing at evil, crooked suspicion, contempt, contumely.

I NOW proceed to the consequents or effects of this passion: and first, for the useful and profitable effects thereof, which may be these:

First, a cautelousness and fruitful wisdom for our own welfare, to prevent danger, and to reap benefit from that, which is at enmity with us. For we shall observe in many evils, that no man is brought within the danger, who is not at first drawn into the love of them. All inordinate corruptions then most desperately wound the soul, when they beguile and entangle it. But the greatest use of this caution is, to learn how to benefit by the hatred of others; and, as learned physicians do, to make an antidote of poison[a]. For as many venomous creatures are, by art, used to cure the wounds, and repair the injuries which themselves had made, (natural attraction, as it were, calling home that poison, which injury and violence had misplaced) so the malice and venom of an enemy may, by wisdom, be converted into a medicine, and, by managing, become a benefit, which was by him intended for an injury. Or, to use the excellent similitude of Plutarch[b], "As healthy and strong beasts do eat and concoct serpents, whereas weak stomachs do nauseate at delicates; so wise men do exceedingly profit by the hatred of their enemies, whereas fools are corrupted with the love of their friends; and an injury doth one man more good, than a courtesy doth another." As wind and thunder, when

[a] Quod de Cantharide observavit *Plut.* lib. de sera numinis vindicta.—Venenum aliquando pro remedio fuit: *Sen.* de Benef. l. 2. c. 18. [b] *Plut.* de capiend. ex hostibus util.—*Cæl. Rhodigin.* Antiq. lect. l. 5. c. 17.

they trouble the air, do withal purge it, whereas a long calm doth dispose it to putrefaction;—or as the same whetstone that takes away from a weapon, doth likewise sharpen it;—so a wise man can make use of the detraction of an enemy, to grow the brighter and the better by it. And therefore when Cato advised, that Carthage should be utterly destroyed, Scipio Nasica persuaded the contrary upon these reasons, that it was needful for Rome to have always some enemies, which, by a kind of antiperistasis, might strengthen and keep alive its virtue; which otherwise, by security, might be in danger of languishing, and degenerate into luxury[c]. For as the Israelites[d], when there was no smith among them, did sharpen their instruments with the Philistines; so indeed an enemy doth serve to quicken and put an edge upon those virtues, which, by lying unexercised, might contract rust and dulness; and, many times, when the reasons of the thing itself will not persuade the giving advantage to an enemy, or of gratifying him, will over-rule a man, lest hereby he give his foes matter of insultation.

"Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ."

This makes our foes rejoice; they would have bought,
With a great price, those crimes we do for nought.

Thus as a sink by a house makes all the house the cleaner, because the *sordes* are cast into that;—or as they observe, that roses and violets are sweetest, which grow near unto garlick and other strong-scented herbs, because they draw away any fetid or obnoxious nourishment; so the eye and nearness of an enemy serveth, by exciting caution and diligence, to make a man's life more fruitful and orderly than otherwise it would have been, that we may take away occasion from them that would speak reproachfully. And thus Hector, sharply reproving the cowardice of his brother Paris (who had been the only cause of the war and calamity) when he fled from Menelaus, draweth his rebuke from hence and telleth him that he was,

Πατρὶ μέγα πῆμα, πολήϊτε, παντί τε δήμῳ,
Δυσμενέσιν μὲν χάρμα.

[c] *Florus*, l. 2. [d] 1 Sam. xiii. 20.

To father, city, people, loss and blame;
Joy to his foes, and to himself a shame.[e]

Secondly, hatred worketh confidence, and some presumption and good assurance of our own, or some assisting strength against evils. Which ariseth first out of the former; for cautelousness, or furniture against the onset of evil, cannot but make the mind more resolute in its own defence, than if it were left naked without assistance. Again; of all others, this is one of the most confident passions, because it moves not out of sudden perturbations, but is usually seconded and backed with reason, as philosophers observe[f]; and ever the more counsel, the more confidence. Besides, being a deep and severe passion, it proportionably calleth out the more strength to execute its purposes. There is no passion that intendeth so much evil to another, as hatred: anger would only bring trouble, but hatred mischief: anger would only punish and retaliate, but hatred would destroy: for as the philosopher notes, it seeketh the not-being of what it hates. A man may be angry with his friend, but he hates none but an enemy: and no man can will so much hurt to his friend, as to his enemy. Now the more hurt a passion doth intend, the more strength it must call out to execute that intention; and ever the more strength, the more confidence.

Thirdly, it worketh some manner of victory over the evil hatred: For, "Odium semper sequitur ex animi elatione," as Scaliger out of Aristotle hath observed; it ever ariseth out of pride and height of mind, ὑπερέχειν οἴονται ὑβρίζοντες, injury ever comes from some strength, and is a kind of victory. For so far forth as one is able to hurt another, he is above him. And this effect holds principally true in moral and practick courses, wherein (I think) it is a general rule. He in some measure loves an evil, who is overcome by it: for conquest, in this nature, is on the will, which never chooseth an object till it love it. There only we can have perfect conquest of sin, where will be a perfect hatred of it. Here, in the best, there is but an incomplete restoration of God's image; the body of nature and the body of sin are born and must die together.

[e] Iliad γ. 51. [f] Rhet. l. 2. c. 4.

Fourthly, it hath a good effect in regard of the evil hated in reasonable creatures, namely, the reformation of the person in whom the evil was. For as countenance and encouragement is the fosterer of, so hatred and contempt serveth sometimes as physick to purge out, an evil. And the reason is, because a great part of that goodness, which is apprehended to be sin, by those that pursue it, is other men's approbation. Opinion puts value upon many uncurrent coins, which pass rather because they are received, than because they are warrantable. And therefore if a man, naturally desirous of credit, see his courses generally disliked, he can hardly so unnaturate himself, as still to feed on those vanities, which he seeth do provoke others unto loathing:—though, I confess, it is not a persuasion of men's, but of God's hatred of sin, which doth work a genuine and thorough reformation.

I now proceed to observe those effects which are corrupt and hurtful: and here we may observe,

First, the rule of Aristotle, whose maxim it is, That hatred is always πρὸς τὰ γένη, against the whole kind of its object:—so then, all the actions and effects of this passion are corrupt, which are not general, but admit of private reservations and indulgences. For since the nature and extent of the passion is ever considered with reference to its object, there must needs be irregularity in that affection, when it is conversant about a uniform object with a various and differing motion. And this is manifestly true in that, which I made the principal object of a right hatred, sin. In which, though there is no man which finds not himself more obnoxious and open to one kind than another (it being the long experienced policy of the Devil to observe the divers conditions of men's natures, constitutions, callings, and employments; and, from them, to proportion the quality of his insinuations upon the will) insomuch that a man may herein haply deceive himself with an opinion of loathing some evils, with which either his other occasions suffer him not to take acquaintance, or the difficulty in compassing, disgrace in practising, or other prejudices persuade to a casual dislike thereof;—yet, I say, it is certain, that if a man's hatred of sin be not, πρὸς τὰ γένη, a universal and transcendent hatred against all sin, even those which his personal relations make

more proper unto him, if he doth still retain some privy exceptions, some reserved and covered delights,—be his pretences to others, or his persuasions to himself what they will; this is rather a personated than a true hatred, a meteor of the brain, than an affection of the soul. For as in good, so in the ill of things, notwithstanding there seem to be many contrarieties and dissimilitudes, as Seneca saith, 'Scelera dissident,' that sins do disagree; yet indeed there is in that very contrariety such an agreement against God, (as in Herod and Pilate against Christ) as admits not of any, in order unto God, but a gathered and united passion. And hence is that of St. James, "He that offendeth in one, is guilty of all;" because in that one, he contemneth that original authority which forbade all. There are no terms of consistence between love and hatred, divided upon the same uniform object. It is not the material and blind performance of some good work, or a servile and constrained obedience to the more bright and convicting parts of the law, that can any more argue either our true love to the precept, or our hatred to the sin, than a voluntary patience under the hand of a chirurgeon can prove, either that we delight in our own pain, or abhor our own flesh. It is not God's witness within us, but his word without us; not the tyranny of conscience, but the goodness of the law, that doth kindly and genuinely restrain the violence, and stop the eruptions of our defiled nature. Or though perhaps fear may prevent the exercise and sproutings, nothing but love can pluck up the root, of sin. A Lacedæmonian [z], endeavouring to make a dead carcase stand upright as formerly it had done while it was alive, and not effecting it, concluded, that outward means would avail little, except there were something within to support it. It is certainly so in actions as it is in bodies: fear, as an outward prop, may help awhile to keep them up; but love is the inward form and life of them, without which they will quickly faint and fall again.

Secondly, another evil effect of hatred is a close and cunning dissimulation in suppressing of it, and palliating it with pretences of fairness and plausibility, till it have a full advantage to put forth itself. For by this means is the passion

[z] *Plut.* Apophtheg. Lacon.

strengthened [h], and the person whom it respects, weakened; this, by incautelousness and credulity; (for common charity, when it sees no signs of malice, will not easily suspect it) that, by restraint and suppression:—for any thing, the more united, the more weighty it is; and as wind, so passions, the closer it is pent, the more strength it gathereth. Plutarch compareth it unto fire raked under ashes, and reserved until another day, when we have some use of it. Which disposition the historian hath often observed in Tiberius, (whose principal virtue was dissimulation) who being offended in the senate with some words, spoken by Haterius and Scaurus, the historian's observation upon it is this, "In Haterium statim invectus est; Scaurum, cui implacabilius irascebatur, silentio tramisit:" the one he rebuked; but the other, whom he more implacably hated, he passed by with silence. [i] And elsewhere upon a like occasion, "Quæ in præsens civiliter habuit: sed in animo, revolvente iras, etiamsi impetus offensionis languerat, memoria valebat [k]:" Though he seemed to take what was spoken, courteously, yet he laid it up in his mind; and though the heat of passion, by being suppressed, did languish, the memory and grudge remained strong still. In which words the historian hath expressed that excellent description of the same quality in Homer [l],

> Κρείσσων γὰρ βασιλεὺς, ὅτε χώσεται ἀνδρὶ χέρηϊ·
> Εἴπερ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ καταπέψῃ,
> Ἀλλά γε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον, ὄφρα τελέσσῃ,
> Ἐν στήθεσσιν ἑοῖσι.
>
> Low men with a king's wrath are quite opprest;
> For though he seem the same day to digest
> The heat of 's passion; yet he still reserves
> Close anger in his breast, till fit time serves.

Whereunto agreeth that of the Tragedian [m]:

> "Ira quæ tegitur, nocet.
> Professa perdunt odia vindictæ locum."
>
> Anger that 's hid, gives surer blows;
> But profess'd hate doth revenge lose.

[h] Vide *Senec.* ep. 103. [i] *Tac.* Annal. l. 1. [k] Annal. l. 4. 'Statuit reponere odium, donec impetus famæ et favor exercitûs languescceret:" De Domitian. in vit. Agric. [l] Iliad. A. 81.—*Diog. Laert.* l. 7. Μῆνις ὀργὴ ἐπίκοτος.—Δεινὰ τυράννων λήματα. [m] *Senec.* Tragœd. Medæa.

And therefore Hannibal was wont to say, That "he was more afraid of Fabius when he did nothing, than of Marcellus when he did fight;" of the one man's closeness, than of the other's boldness.

And the reason why of all the passions, this of hatred can thus smother and suppress itself, is, because it doth not affect the heart with trouble or sadness, (which affection the soul loves not long to hold fast) but with a perverse joy and delight, in pondering the contrivances of revenge; which the philosopher and the poet have placed among the objects of delight. [n]

Now of all the ways whereby this passion is supprest, the most hateful to God and man is, when men do palliate and shroud their malice under pretences of love, and praise men unto ruin. Like the panther, which with his sweet breath allureth other creatures to come unto him, and when they are come, devoureth them. [o] 'Pessimum inimicorum genus laudantes [p];' of all kind of enemies, those are the worst, which, as the prophet speaks, do 'break men's heads with oil,' and make a poison of their own merits to kill them with praises. As Achilles spake in the poet, [q]

> Ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος, ὁμῶς ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν,
> Ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθει ἐνὶ φρεσὶν, ἄλλο δὲ βάζει.
>
> That man's as odious to me as hell-gates,
> Who with his mouth speaks fair, with his heart hates.

And it was wicked counsel which Theognis gave to his Cyrnus [r], amongst so many sage and moral precepts, like a dead fly in a pot of ointment,

> Εὖ κώτιλλε τὸν ἐχθρόν· ὅταν δ' ὑποχείριος ἔλθῃ,
> Τίσαί νιν, προφάσιν μηδεμίαν δέμενος.
>
> Fawn on thy foe, till he be in thy will;
> Then, without reasons, give revenge her fill.

It is a quality, of all others, most distant from nobleness and ingenuity of mind: for generous spirits will acknowledge with honour, and love the virtues of their enemies. [s]

[n] *Aristot.* et *Juvenal.* Vindicta malum quo non jucundius ullum. [o] *Ælian.* de Animal. l. 5. c. 40. [p] *Tacit.* Vit. Agric.—Ἐχθρῶν ὕδωρ δῶρα, κ' οὐκ ὀνήσιμα. *Soph.* in Ajac. [q] Iliad. I. 312.—*Sallust.* in Catil. [r] V. 363. [s] Ἐχθρὸς ὅδ' Ἀνὴρ, ἀλλὰ γενναῖος. *Soph.* ib.

As [q] Fabricius Luscinus, when many were competitors for the consulship, gave his suffiage to Cornelius Rufinus, the worthiest of the company, though he were his bitter enemy: And Cæsar [r] caused the demolished statues of Pompey to be erected again, not suffering the honour of so brave a commander (though his enemy) to bleed and languish under his eye. Whereupon Cicero told him, That "in restoring the statues of Pompey, he had fastened and made sure his own." And Publius Scipio [s] made none other use of his enmity with Tiberius Gracchus, than to dispose his daughter to him in marriage; because at that time, when he was sure to judge with least favour and partiality, he found him to be a virtuous and deserving man. And the emperor Adrian, to show how he esteemed hatred retained a base and unprincely disposition [t], as soon as he came to the empire, he laid aside all his former enmities; insomuch as then meeting one who had been his capital enemy, he said unto him, 'Evasisti,' thou art now escaped from my displeasure.

Thirdly, another evil effect of hatred is cruelty: for it seeketh (as I noted out of the philosopher) the not-being of that which it hates. [u] And therefore among the Egyptians, a fish was the hieroglyphick of hatred, because of all creatures, they do most devour one another. [x] And thus Achilles, in the poet, expresseth his hatred of Hector [y], when he besought him to bestow upon his dead body an honourable burial:

Αἴ γάρ πως αὐτόν με μένος καὶ θυμὸς ἀνείη
Ὠμ' ἀποταμνόμενον κρέα ἔδμεναι·

I would my mind would give me leave to gnaw
Thy flesh in morsels, and to eat it raw.

And the like expressions we find of the cruelty of Tiberius, a man full of rancour [z];

"Fastidit vinum, quia jam sitit iste cruorem;
Tam bibit hunc avidè, quam bibit ante merum."

He loaths all wine for blood; and now with more
Greedy delight drinks this, than that before.

[q] *A. Gellius*. l. 4. c. 8. [r] *Plut.* de capiend. ex host. util.—Οὐδένα τῶν ἐχθρῶν μωμήσομαι ἐσθλὸν ἐόντα, *Theogn.* *A. Gell.* l. 12. c. 8. *Liv* lib. 38. [t] *Ælius Spartian.* in Hadrian. [u] Μῖσος ἐπιθυμία τὶς τοῦ κακῶς εἶναι τινὶ, μετὰ προκοπῆς τινος καὶ παραπάσεως. *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. [x] *Clem. Alex.* Pædag. l. 1. c. 8. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 5. et l. 1. [y] Iliad. χ. 346. [z] *Suet.* Tiber. c. 59.

Hatred contenteth not itself with the death of an enemy; but is, many times, prodigious in the manner of it, and after outlives that which it hateth; insulting with pride and indignities over the dead bodies which cannot complain, nor otherwise, but by its own loathsomeness, revenge itself. Caligula, that monster of men, when he commanded any to be slain, gave this charge with it, "Ita feri, ut se mori sentiat," That he should perish with such lingering blows, as that he might feel himself to die.[a] And he often commanded aged men to stand by, and look upon the slaughter of their children; and after would force[b] them unto mirth and feasting, for fear of their other children which were left alive; for, to have mourned for one, would have forfeited the others. And for indignities[c] offered unto dead bodies, there is nothing which more frequently occurreth. The Philistines cut off the head of Saul, and sent it in triumph up and down their country. And the historian notes of Otho, that he never looked with more insatiable delight upon any spectacle, than the head of Piso his enemy. So when the Grecians saw the dead body of Hector, every man (as the poet describes it) did bestow a stab and a contempt upon it. But above all, most hateful was the cruelty of Marcus Antonius, and his wife Fulvia, showed on the dead body of Cicero, the glory of the Roman eloquence; they cut off his head and his hands, setting them, in contempt, where he was wont to deliver those excellent orations; from whence they took it to their table, and Fulvia cursing it, and spitting upon it, pulled out the tongue (which all ages have admired) out of the mouth, and pricked it full of holes with her needle or bodkin, to show that malice would ever do mischief to a man in his noblest aud highest treasure.[d] As we have in that desperate Italian, who, having his enemy in his mercy, first made him (in hope to escape) to renounce his religion and salvation; and then presently slew him, that, as far as was in his power, he might kill his soul as well as his body.

But yet further, hatred doth not content itself to be cruel

[a] *Suet.* de Calig. et in Tiber. c. 61. et in Calig. [b] *Sen.* de Ira. l. 2. c. 33. Οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ θάνοι, Βλάπλειν τὸν ἐσθλὸν, οὐδ' ἐὰν μισῶν κυρῇς. *Soph.* Ajax.—*Tacit.* hist. l. 1. Capita hostium in conto præfigi solita, apud *Just.* lib. 14. et *Virg.* Æneid.—Ἔχει ἡδονὰς θνήσκων ἀνὴρ ἐχθρὸς, &c. *Eurip.* Hercul. Furens. [d] *Pet. Crinit.* l. 1. c. 8. *Plutarch.* in Cicerone.

to the person hated, but runneth over from him unto others that have any relation to him, though never so innocent[d]. As we see in Haman, who though only displeased with the neglect of Mordecai, thought scorn to lay hands on him alone, and therefore plotted the ruin of all the Jews. And it is noted by historians, that when Sejanus fell, the storm lighted on his family and friends, as well as on himself.[e] As is also observed in the punishment of the conspiracy against Nero, detected by Milichus. And Themistocles (though innocent) was like to have suffered in a crimination of treason, only for being a friend unto Pausanias.[f] Yea, so overflowing is this quality, that it will sometimes strike a friend, rather than not reach an enemy. It was a wicked profession of Darius, "Pereat cum inimico amicus," let my friend rather perish with mine enemy, than mine enemy escape by my friend.[g] And hence it is observed of Aristides, that he was wont to propose such devices as he knew did conduce unto publick weal, by some other men, and not from himself[h]; lest Themistocles, out of hatred to his person, should have withstood and impedimented a general good. But Ajax, in the poet, went yet higher[i];

Ἐχθρὸν ὀλέσσας———
Τέλος θάνοιμι κἀὐτός.

So I may slay mine enemy,
Let the same ruin swallow me.

And the principal reasons of this overflowing of hatred, are fear and cowardice: for he who hateth the father, and showeth cruelty unto him, doth usually fear the son, lest he rise up in his father's quarrel.[k] And hence is that maxim of cruel policy,

Νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνων, παῖδας καταλείπει.

That man's unwise, who doth the father slay,
And leaves the sons his quarrel to repay.

[d] Sext. Titius quod habuit imaginem L. Saturnini domi suæ, condemnatus. *Cic.* pro Rabinio. [e] *Tacit.* Annal. lib. 5, 6.—*Suet.* Tib. c. 61. Annal. l. 15. [f] *Plut.* de cap. ex host. util. [g] *Q. Curt.* l. 7. [h] *Plut.* de Adulat. et Amic. *Plutarc.* in Aristid. [i] *Soph.* in Ajax. 391. [k] Forsan futurus ultor extincti patris. *Sen.* Troas.—*Stasianus* apud Clem. Alex. Strom. 6.—*Hom.* Odyss. γ. 307.—Odium etiam timor spirat. *Tert.* Apol. c. 26.—Ulcus animi ex mollitie nasci consuetum.

For we know Orestes revenged his father's quarrel and blood upon Ægisthus.

And besides, cruelty doth usually proceed from cowardice, as Ammianus Marcellinus hath observed[l]: and fearful men, when they have any advantage to be cruel, do seldom hold any measure therein, as being ever in doubt, if they leave any fire unquenched, that themselves shall be burned with it. And therefore we never read of any emperors which were more cruel than those who were most fearful and effeminate; as Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Commodus, &c. As they say, that wounded beasts, when they die, bite hardest, their fear and despair making them furious[m]; so there is no wrath or cruelty to that which proceeds from weakness, when it hath either jealousy, or advantage, or despair to set it on. Yea, so violent it is, that it hath transported men unto profaneness, and made them violate nature and religion. As we see in the cruelty of Tiberius towards the family of Sejanus[n], who, because it was an unheard and prodigious thing for a little tender virgin to be strangled, gave command, that the daughter of that late favourite should first be deflowered, that so she might be the fitter to be slain. And Boniface[o], the eighth pope of that name, being, according to the ceremony of that church, on Ash-Wednesday, to sprinkle ashes on the heads of such bishops as kneeled at his feet, and in some serious manner to mind them of their mortalities; when Prochetus, bishop of Geneva, whom he bitterly hated, tendered himself at his feet to receive this ceremony, he threw the ashes in his eyes, with this benediction, "A Ghibeline thou art, and as a Ghibeline thou shalt die;" so powerful was his malice to profane the rites of his religion! Yea, so far will hatred proceed in this desperate contempt of God, that, if we may believe so prodigious a villany, it hath sometimes turned the very cup of the Lord into a cup of poison; as it is reported of Pope Victor the Third[p], that he was poisoned in the chalice at the communion. Neither have there been wanting examples of desperate men, who have made the most holy parts of religion, vows, and sacraments, the seals

[l] *Ammianus Marc.* l. 27. et *Arist.* Rhet. l. 2. c. 13. Maxime mortiferi esse solent morsus morientium bestiarum: *Florus*, l. 2. c. 15.

[m] *Senec.* de Ira. lib. 1. c. 13.

[n] *Suet.* Tib. c. 61.—*Tacit.* Annal. l. 5.

[o] *Pet. Crinit.* l. 7.

[p] *Martin.* apud Plotin. in vit. Pont. 3.

and pledges of their conspiracies in malice; as once Catiline and his associates did animate themselves in their bloody purposes with drinking the blood of a slain child.[q]

Now of all hatreds, there are none more furious and unnatural, than those which arise out of contrarieties in religion. Because as a stone, the higher the place is from whence it falls, doth give the more dangerous blow; no wound so mortal, as that of a thunderbolt; so of all other, those hatreds which make pretences unto heaven, and which arise from motives of the highest nature, are ever most desperate and mortal. And therefore our Saviour tells us, that in this case, men would forget all the bonds of natural obligation, insomuch that "the father would deliver his own child, and the children their parents, unto death." As we find, that the bloody hatred of Cain against Abel, arose from the different acceptance of their sacrifices. Neither is it any wonder if that enmity grow excessive, which hath zeal to kindle it, and pretence of religion to warrant it. For when that which should refrain and set limits to a passion, is made a party to engage it, and fuel to foment it; no wonder if a passion which hath no bounds from religion, do impose none upon itself.[r] And this occasion of mutual hatred, we find observed even in the ridiculous superstitions of Egypt, when one town would kill and eat the flesh of another, in zeal to the sheep, or calves, or dragons, which they did severally worship.

——— "Summus utrinque
Inde furor vulgo, quòd Numina vicinorum
Odit uterque locus.[s]

This caus'd their rage, this made their great debate;
One town did worship what the next did hate.

Another dangerous effect of hatred is envy and malignity at the sight of another's happiness[t]: and therefore envy is called an 'evil eye,' because all the diseases of the eye make it offended with any thing that is light and shineth. As vermin do ever devour the purest corn, and moths eat into the finest cloth, and the cantharides blast the sweetest flowers[u];

[q] *Sallust.* in Cat.—*Florus*, lib. 4.—*Dion.* lib. 37.—*Plut.* in Publicola. [r] Modum tenere in eo difficile est, quod bonum esse crediderunt. *Sen.* ep. 23.—*Plut.* de Isid. et Osirid. [s] *Juvenal.* [t] *Arist.* Rhet. l. 2. c. 10. [u] *Plut.* de Odio et Invidia.

so doth envy ever gnaw that which is most beautiful in another whom it hateth, and, as the vulture [x], draweth sickness from a perfume. For such is the condition of a rancorous nature, as of a raw and angry wound, which feels as great pain in the good of a chirurgeon's, as in the ill offices of an enemy's, hand. It can equally draw nourishment unto this passion from the good and ill of whom it hates; yea, and commonly greater too from the good than from the ill. For "Odiorum acriores causæ, quando iniquæ:" when hatred is built upon a bad foundation, it commonly raiseth itself the higher. And the reason is, because in passions of this nature, the less we have from the object, the more we have from ourselves; and what is defective to make up our malice in the demerit of him whom we hate, is supplied by the rising of our own stomach. As we see in the body, that thin and empty nourishment will more often swell it, than that which is substantial.

And therefore I think there are not any examples of more implacable hatred, than those that are by envy grounded on merit. As Tacitus observes between the passages of Domitian and Agricola [y], that nothing did so much strengthen the emperor's hatred against that worthy man, as the general report of his honourable behaviour and actions in those military services, wherein he had been employed: and the same likewise he intimates in the affections of Tiberius and Piso towards Germanicus.

It is wisely therefore observed by the historian, that men of vast and various employments have usually the unhappiness of envy attending them [z]; which therefore they have sometimes declined by retiring and withdrawing themselves from continual addresses, as a wise mariner, who (as he speaks) doth 'aliquantulum remittere clavum ob magnam fluctus vim.' And thus we find the honour David's merits procured him, was the foundation of that implacable hatred of Saul towards him. For as in natural motion, that which comes from the farthest extreme, is most swift and violent; so in the motions of the mind, the further off we fetch the reason of our hatred, the more venomous and implacable it is.

[x] *Ælian* de Anim. l. 3. c. 7. Rhet. l. 4. c. 18. [y] *Tacitus*. [z] *Plut.* lib. de Rep. gerenda.

And here we may observe the mutual and interchangeable services, which corrupt affections exercise amongst themselves. For as philosophy observes in the generation of those cold meteors which are drawn to the middle region of the air, they are first, by the coldness of the place, congealed,—and, afterward, do, by the like impressions, fortify and intend the same quality in the region;—so here, hatred first generates envy; and this again doth reciprocally increase hatred; and both join in mischief, so much the more hurtful to the soul wherein they are, than to the enemy whom they respect, by how much they are more near and inward thereunto: for certainly, a malignant humour doth most hurt, where it harboureth.

From this followeth another evil effect, which I will but name, being of the same nature with envy; and it is that which philosophers call ἐπιχαιρεκακία[a], 'a rejoicing at the calamity' of him whom we hate; a quality like that of those, who are reported to have been nourished with poison.[b] For as in love, there is a mutual partaking of the same joys and sorrows (for where the will and affections are one, the senses are in some sort likewise) so hatred ever worketh contrariety of affections; that which worketh grief unto the one, doth work joy unto the other. And therefore Thales being asked, How a man might be cheerful, and bear up in afflictions, answered, "If he can see his enemies in worse case than himself."[c] The poet hath given us the character of such kind of men:

> "Pectora felle virent; lingua est suffusa veneno:
> Risus abest, nisi quem visi fecere dolores."
>
> Their breasts with gall, their tongues with venom, flow;
> They laugh not, till they see men brought to woe.

And therefore they are elegantly compared by the philosopher unto cupping-glasses, which draw only the vicious humours of the body unto them; and unto flies, that are overcome with the spirits of wine, but nourished with the froth. Like those worms which receive their life from the corruption of the dead; and surely the prince of devils may

[a] Ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἡδονὴ ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· *Laert.* in Zen. lib. 7.—*Plutarch.* de Curiosit.—*Arist.* Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 7.—Mag. Mor. cap. 28.—Prov. xvii. 5. xxiv. 17. [b] *Cælius Rhod.* Antiq. lect. lib. 6. c. 35. [c] *Diog. Laert.* l. 1.

well have his name given him from 'flies[d],' because he taketh most pleasure in the ulcers and wounds of men, as flies ever resort unto sores.

Another corrupt effect of hatred is a sinister and crooked suspicion, whereby with an envious and critical eye we search into the actions and purposes of another; and according as is the sharpness of our own wits, or the course of our own behaviour and practices, we attribute unto them such ends, as were haply never framed but in the forge of our own brains;—evil men being herein like vultures, which can receive none but a foul scent. It is numbered amongst one of the noble attributes of love, that it 'thinketh none evil;' and certainly there is not a fouler quality against brotherly love, than that which (for the satisfying of itself with but the imaginary evil of him whom it disliketh) will venture to find out in every action some close impiety, and pierce into the reserved and hidden passages of the heart: like him in the philosopher, who thought, wherever he went, that he saw his own picture walk before him. And therefore we see, how Agrippina, when she would not discover any show of fear or hatred towards her son Nero,—who at first plotted her death on the sea, and that failing, sent the second time Anicetus the centurion to make sure work,—did, in both these practices, decline all show of suspicion, and not acknowledge either the engine or the murder to be directed by him; "solum insidiarum remedium aspiciens, si non intelligerentur[e]," supposing the only remedies of these plots to be, if she seemed not to understand them: for ill meanings do not love to be found out. As the same historian telleth of Tiberius, "Acrius accepit recludi quæ premeret:" he hated that man, who would venture to dive into his thoughts. And certainly there is not any crooked suspicion, which is not rooted in hatred. For as to think the worst of our own actions, is a sign of hatred to our sins, (for, I think, no man loves his sins who dares search them), so, contrariwise, to have a humour of casting the worst glosses upon the actions of another man, where there is no palpable dissimu-

[d] Beelzebub. Matth. xii. 14. Βάαλ μυῖαν vertunt LXX, 2 Kings i. 3.—Ἀπόμυιος apud Pausan. lib. 5. et Clem. Alex. in Protrept.—Myiodem vocat *Plin.* l. 29. cap. 6. [e] *Tacit.* Annal. lib. 14.

lation, argues as great a want of love. We search for evil in ourselves to expel it, but we search for evil in another to find it. There is scarce a more hateful quality in the eyes of God or man, than that of the Herodians, to lie in wait to catch an innocent man, and then to accuse him.

Another effect which proceedeth from corrupt hatred, is proud and insolent carriage; whereby we contemn the quality, or undervalue and vilify the merit, of a person. For though the apostle hath, in this respect of pride and swelling, opposed knowledge unto love, "Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth." Yet the opposition holdeth not there only; for there is 'tumor cordis,' as well as 'tumor cerebri;' as well a stubborn as a learned pride; a pride against the person, as against the weakness of our brother; a pride whereby we will not stoop to a yielding and reconciliation with him, as whereby we will not stoop to the capacity and edification of him: that is the swelling of malice, and this of knowledge. And hence it is, that hatred (as Aristotle hath excellently observed [f]), when it is simple and alone (though that seldom fall out), is without the admixtion of any grief. And the reason, I take it, is, because grief is either for the evil of another, and so it is ever the effect of love; or for the evil which lieth upon ourselves, and so is the cause of humility: neither of which is agreeable with hatred, whose property ever it is to conceive in itself some worth and excellency, by which it is drawn to a contempt and insolence towards another man. And therefore as it was pride in men and angels, which wrought the first hatred between God and them, so the most proper and inseparable effect of this hatred ever since is pride.

The last corruption of this passion is impatience, contention, and fury, as the Wise man telleth us, "Hatred stirreth up strife." [g] And therefore that worthy effect of love, which is contrary to this of hatred, is called μακροθυμία, and 'longanimitas,' long-suffering; to signify some length, distance, and remotion between a man's mind and his passion. But hatred, being of a fierce nature, is so far from admitting any peace, or yielding to conditions of parley, that (as hath been ob-

[f] Rhet. l. 2. c. 4. [g] Prov. x. 12.

served out of Aristotle) it rests not satisfied with the misery, but desires (if it be possible) the utter overthrow of an enemy.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the affection of Desire: What it is. The several kinds of it, natural, rational, spiritual. Intemperate, unnatural, morbid desires. The object of them good, pleasant, as possible, as absent either in whole, or in degrees of perfection or continuance. The most general internal cause, vacuity, indigence. Other causes, admiration, greatness of mind, curiosity.

The next passions in order of nature to these two, are Desire and Abomination; which, because they differ not much otherwise from love and hatred, than the act from the habit, or than a man sitting from himself walking,—desire being but the motion and exercise, as delight is the quiet and repose, of our love,—I shall therefore the more briefly pass it over. Desire is the wing of the soul, whereby it moveth, and is carried to the thing which it loveth, as the 'eagle to the carcase,' in the scripture-proverb [a], to feed itself upon it, and to be satisfied with it. For as the appetite of the eagle is attended with sharpness of sight to discover its prey, with swiftness of wing to hasten unto it, and with strength to seize upon it;—so, according to the proportion of the soul's love unto its object, doth it command and call together both the wisdom and powers of the whole man to direct unto, and to promote, the procuring of it. And the very best characters, and truest lineaments which can be drawn of the minds of men, are to be taken from their desires, rather than from their practices [b]: as physicians often judge of the diseases of sick men by their appetites. Ill men dare not do so much evil as they desire, for fear of shame or punishment; good men cannot do so much good as they desire, for want of power and provisions of virtue. Besides, practices may be overruled by ends; but desires are always genuine and natural: for no man can be constrained to will that which he

[a] Job xxxix. 30. Matth. xxiv. 28. Hab. xviii. [b] *Plut.* Nat. Quæst. c. 26.

doth not love. And therefore, in the scripture, good men have had most confidence in approving themselves unto God by their affections, and the inward longings of their souls after him, as being the purest and most unfeigned issues of love, and such as have least proximity and danger of infection from foreign and secular ends. St. Paul himself was much better at willing, than at performing [c]; and St. Peter, who failed in his promise of doing, dares appeal to Christ's own omniscience for the truth of his loving.[d] Whatever other defects may attend our actions, this is an inseparable character of a pious soul, that it 'desires to fear God's name[e];' and according to the prevalency of that affection hath its conversation in heaven too.[f] In which regard Christ is called 'the desire of all nations[g],' both because where he is, he draweth all the hearts and desires of his people unto him[h], and also doth, by his grace, most fully answer and satisfy all the desires that are presented before him: as it is said of one of the Roman emperors, 'Neminem unquam dimisit tristem,' he never sends any discontented out of his presence.

The desires of the soul are of three sorts, according to the three degrees of perfection, which belong unto man, natural, rational, spiritual.

Natural desires respect τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, things of simple necessity[i] to the being, preservation, and integrity of nature, as the desires, which things have to their proper nourishment and place, 'ad conservationem individui,' for preserving themselves; and to propagation and increase, 'ad conservationem speciei,' for preserving of their kind.

Rational desires are such as respect αἱρετὰ καθ' αὑτὰ, such things as are eligible in themselves, and the proper objects of right reason; such as felicity, the common end of all rational appetitions; virtue, the way, and eternal good things; as health, strength, credit, dignity, prosperity, the ornaments of human life.

Spiritual desires respect τὰ ἐπουράνια, τὰ πνευματικὰ, τὰ ἄνω τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, heavenly and spiritual things, the things of God, things which are above. The knowledge whereof we have

[c] Rom. vii. 18, 19. [d] John xxi. 17. [e] Nehem. i. 11. Isai. xxvi. 8. [f] Phil. iii. 20. [g] Hag. ii. 9. [h] John xii. 32. Psalm cvii. 6. [i] *Arist.* Eth. l. 7. c. 6.

not by philosophical, but by apostolical discovery, by the "Spirit of God, who only searcheth the deep things of God."[k]

The corrupt desires, contrary unto these, are either vicious or morbid. Vicious are again of two sorts: first, intemperate and incontinent desires, which err not in the substance, or nature of the thing desired; but only ἐν τῷ πῶς, as the philosopher speaks, in the measure and manner of desiring them. It is lawful to drink wine[l], and a man may err (as Timothy did) in an over-rigorous severity to nature[m], when health or needful refreshment requireth it: for our flesh is to be subdued to reason, not to infirmities, that it may be a servant to the soul, but not a burden. But if we let wine be ἐλευθέριος, as the heathen call it, to take a freedom against us, like Cham, to mock us, and discover our nakedness, and make us servants unto it; if we do not only eat honey, but surfeit on it; if we must have meat, like Israel in the wilderness, not only for our need, but for our lust; if we eat and drink so long, that we are good for nothing but to lie down and sleep, or to rise up and play, to live to-day, and die to-morrow[n]; if we make our belly the grave of our soul, and the dungeon of our reason, and let our *intestina*, as well morally as naturally, far exceed the length of the whole man besides: this is, in the apostle's phrase, to be "lovers of pleasure, rather than lovers of God;" and it is an intemperate excess against natural desires, which will ever end in pain. It was a witty speech of Anacharsis the philosopher, that the vine beareth three sorts of grapes; the first, of delight; the second, of excess; the third, of sorrow[o]. If we let our delight steal us into excess, and become a mocker[p], our excess will quickly betray us unto sorrow, (as Dalilah did Samson to the Philistines) and let us know, that after wine hath mocked, it can rage too. Like the head of the polypus, which is sweet to the palate; but, after, causeth troublesome sleeps and frightful dreams.[q]

[k] Heb. ix. 23. 1 Cor. iii. 13. Col. iii. 1. [l] Prov. xxxi. 6. 1 Tim. v. 13. Psalm civ. 15. [m] Vid. *Socr.* l. 4. c. 18.—*Euseb.* l. 4. c. 38. l. 5. c. 17. *Iren.* l. 1. c. 34.—*Tert.* advers. Psychich. 15.—*Epiph.* To. 2. l. 1. Vid. *Gul. Stuck.* Antiq. Conviv. l. 3. c. 7, 8.—*Clem. Al.* Pæd. l. 2. c. 12. *Hier.* 2. adv. Jovin. [n] Megarenses obsonant, quasi crastina die morituri. *Tert.* Apol. c. 39. [o] *Diog. Laert.* l. 1. [p] Prov. xx. 1. [q] *Plut.* de Auditione.

Secondly, there are brutish and unnatural desires, which the philosopher calleth θηριώδεις[r], ferine, and inhuman, instancing in those barbarous countries, where they use to eat man's flesh, and raw meat: and in the woman, who ripped up women with child, that she might eat their young ones. Unto which head I refer those which the apostle calls πάθη ἀτιμίας, and πάθη ἐπιθυμίας, "vile and dishonourable affections and passions of lust[s]," wherein, forsaking the guidance of nature, they dishonour their bodies amongst themselves, and give themselves over, as St. Jude speaketh, "unto strange flesh[t]:" also incestuous and promiscuous lusts; going with naked and painted bodies, as the ancient Britons; offering of men and children in sacrifices; eating of the bodies of friends that died; burning of the living with the dead; and other like savage and barbarous practices, wherein we find how far natural corruption, improved with ignorance and want of education or religion, can imbrute the manners of men[u].

Lastly, there are morbid desires, growing out of some distemper of mind or body, called by the philosopher νοσηματώδεις, as those of children, which eat coals or dirt[v]; and the strange and depraved longings of women with child[x], called κίττη, or 'pica,' from the bird of that name; because the inconstant and various appetences of nature, so misguided by vicious humours, are well resembled by the strange mixture of white and black feathers in that bird.

Having considered the several kinds both of regular and corrupt desires, I shall content myself with a very brief enquiry into the causes and effects of this passion.

The causes moving it are external, 'ex parte objecti,' in the object; or internal, 'ex parte subjecti,' in the mind. The object is any thing apprehended 'sub ratione boni et jucundi,' as good and pleasant[y]. For upon those inducements did Satan first stir the desire of Eve towards the forbidden fruit; "She saw that it was good for food, and pleasant to the eye[z]."

[r] Eth. l. 7. c. 5. [s] Rom. i. 26. 1 Thess. iv. 5. [t] Jude v. 7. [u] Vid. *Euseb.* de præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 4.—*Hier.* l. 2. cont. Jovin.—*Theod.* Ser. 9. de legib.—*Cæl. Rhodig.* Antiq. l. 13. c. 21, 28.—*Plin.* l. 5. c. 17, 30. et l. 7. c. 2. [v] Eth. l. 7. c. 6. [x] *Cæl. Rodig.* l. 3. c. 15. Vid. *Stephan.* et *Gorræum* in voce κίσσα. [y] De bono et jucundo, vid. Philos. Rhet. l. 1. [z] Gen. iii. 6.

Now the qualification of these, to distinguish the formal reason of their being objects to our desires, from that wherein they are objects of our love, is first, that they be possible. For desire being the motion and endeavour of the soul towards that good which it loveth, and wherein it seeketh to delight, take away the possibility of such delight, and this would be 'motus in vacuo,' like that of Noah's dove, that found no place for her feet to rest on. Hope is the whetstone and wheel of industry: if that fail, however a man may waste and pine away his thoughts in empty velleities and imaginary wishes, he can never put forth nor address his endeavours towards an impossible good[b]. Though an old man may wish himself young again, yet no man was ever so besotted as to endeavour it. And this distinction between vanishing wishes and serious desires is of great consequence to be attended in all the motions of the soul, moral or sacred; inasmuch as those desires only which are active and industrious, purposely addressing themselves to the prosecution of that which they apprehend as acquirable, do commend the soul from whence they issue, for virtuous and pious.

Secondly, the object of the desires, 'quà tale,' is apprehended as absent and distant; inasmuch as presence worketh delight rather than desire. The things we have, we enjoy, we do not covet; we rest in them, we do not move toward them. Yet not always absent 'quoad totum,' but 'quoad gradus,' not in the whole, but in the parts and degrees of it: for the presence of a good thing doth, in some sort, quicken the desires toward the same thing so far forth, as it is capable of improvement and augmentation.

As we see in the external riches of the body, none desires them more eagerly than those that possess them; and the more virtuous the soul of man is, the more is the heart enlarged in the appetition of a greater measure; as the putting in of some water into a pump doth draw forth more[c]. No

[a] Ὑπόληψις τοῦ καλοῦ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν κινεῖ. *Damasc.* de Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 22. Concupiscunt etiam et quæ non possunt. *Sen.* de Ira, l. 1. c. 3. [b] Προαίρεσις οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων. *Arist.* Eth. l. 3. c. 2. Vid. de volitione et velleitate, *Aquin.* 1. 2. qu. 13. art. 5. et *Valent.* Tom. 2. disp. qu. 8. p. 2. [c] Crescit amor nummi, quantum ipsa pecunia crescit: Et minus hanc optat, qui non habet. *Juvenal.* Sat. 14.—*Arist.* lib. 1. Polit. c. 6.—*Plut.* lib. de Cupid. divitiar. *Sen.* ep. 73.

man is so importunate in praying, 'Lord, help mine unbelief,' as he that can say, 'Lord, I believe[d].' Thus even present things may be desired in order to improvement, and further degrees of them; as many times a man hath a better stomach to his meat after he hath begun to eat, than when he first sat down unto it. Again; things present may be the object of our desires unto continuance; as he that delighteth in a good which he hath, desireth the continuance of that delight. And therefore life, even while it is possessed, is desired; because the possession of it doth not cause the appetite to nauseate or surfeit upon it. Few men there are who desire not old age, not as it is old age, and importeth decay, decrepidness, and defects of nature,—for a young man doth not desire to be old now;—but as it implieth the longer and fuller possession of life: for a man being conscious to himself, first, of his own insufficiency to make himself happy from and within himself; and next, of the immortality of his nature: as upon the former reason he is busied in sending abroad his desires (as the purveyors and caterers of the soul) to bring in such things as may promote perfection[e]; so those very desires having succeeded, do farther endeavour the satisfaction of nature, by moving towards the perpetuity of what they have procured. It was a sordid and brutish will of Philoxenus in the philosopher, who wished, that "he had the throat of a crane or vulture, that the pleasure of his taste might last the longer[f]"—it being the wisdom of nature, intending the chief perfections of man to his soul, to make his bodily pleasures the shorter. But surely the soul of man, having a reach as far as immortality, may justly desire, as well the perpetuity as the presence of those good things, wherein standeth her proper perfection. And therefore it was excellent counsel of Antisthenes the philosopher, that "a man should lay up such provisions, as in a shipwreck might swim out with him[g];" such treasure as will pass and be current in another world, and will follow us thither; which, as the Apostle speaks, is, "to lay up a good foundation against the time to come."

The internal causes moving desire, in regard of the subject

[d] Mar. ix. 24. [e] *Arist.* Eth. l. 3. c. 13.—*Id.* l. 3. c. 3. Probl. sect. 28. quæst. 7. [f] *Suidas* in Philoxen.—*Ælian.* Var. Hist. l. 10. c. 9. [g] Τοιαῦτα δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι ἐφόδια, ἃ καὶ ναυαγήσαντι συνκολυμβήσει. *Diog. Laert.* in Antisthen. l. 6.

or mind of man, may be different according to the different kinds of desires spoken of before. The most general which respecteth them all is a vacuity, indigence, and self-insufficiency of the soul[h]: for having not within itself enough either to preserve it, or to content it, it is forced to go out of itself for supplies. For wheresoever God hath implanted sensitive and rational affections, he hath been pleased to carry them from themselves, and to direct them abroad for their satisfaction; by that means preserving the soul in humility, and leading it, as by degrees, up unto himself. Every creature, though it have its life in its own possession, yet the preservation of it it fetched from some things without. The excellent creatures are beholding to the meaner, both for their nourishment, and for their knowledge. And therefore, of all graces, God hath chosen faith and repentance, as the chief means of carrying us to him; because these two do most carry us out of ourselves, and most acquaint us with our insufficiencies; repentance teaching a man to abhor himself, and faith to deny himself.

Now because emptiness is the cause of appetence[i], we shall hereupon find, that the fullest and most contented men are ever freest from vast desires. The more the mind of any man is in weight, the more it is in rest too. As they say, that, in rivers, ships go slower in the winter, but withal they carry the greater burdens[k]; so, many times, men of less urgent and importunate appetitions and motions of mind, are more furnished, and better balanced within. In Jotham's parable[l], the bramble was more ambitious than the vine or the olive. And the vine, we see, which is, of all other, 'arbor desiderii,' the tree of desire, is weakest, and cannot stand without another to support it. Therefore we shall find, that men's desires are strongest, when their constitutions are weakest, and their condition lowest; as we see in servants that labour[m], women that breed, and sick men that long, whose whole life in that time is but a change and miscellany of desires. Thus we see little children will reach at every thing which is before them, being wholly destitute of

[h] Ἀναπλήρωσις τῆς ἐνδείας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. *Arist.* Eth. l. 3. c. 11.—Ἐκ τῆς ἐνδείας ἐπιθυμία. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 17. [i] Si quid deerit, id à nobis petierimus. *Sen.* ep. 119.—Vid. *Plut.* de Curios. [k] *Cælius Rhod.* l. 14. cap. 7. [l] Judg. ix. 15. [m] Job vii. 1, 2, 3.

internal furniture. Vacuity is ever sucking and attractive, and will make even dull and heavy things rise upward. Eager and greedy, various and swarming appetitions, are usually the signs either of a childish or a sick temper of mind: as the naturalists observe [n], that the least creatures are the greatest breeders; a mouse bringeth more young ones than an elephant.

Only here we must distinguish both of contentment and of desires. There may be a double contentment; the one, arising out of sluggishness and narrowness of mind; when men, out of an unwillingness to put themselves to the pains of gaining more, rest satisfied with what they have; and had rather have a poor quiet, than a treasure with labour. [o] As they say of the fig-tree, though it be least beautiful of other trees (for it alone beareth no flowers) yet withal it is free from thunder. And as the historian said of some men, that they are 'sola socordia innocentes [p],' do men no hurt, only because it would cost them pains to do it;—so may we of these, that they are beholding to their torpid and sluggish constitution, for the contentment which they profess to have. And this doth not regulate inordinate desires, but only lay them asleep; as even a hungry man, when he sleepeth, hath his hunger-sleep with him.

Another contentment there is, arising out of wisdom and practical learning; (as the apostle tells us, that it is a matter of learning to be contented [q]) when the heart, being established, and made steady with grace and solid materials within [r], (as a ship with ballast [s],) is less tossed with lower affections; as Saul cared not for his asses, when he heard of a kingdom.

> ———" Gratæ post munus aristæ,
> Contingunt homini veteris fastidia quercus."
>
> When men had once discover'd better corn,
> They loath'd their mast, and oaken bread did scorn. [g]

And this kind of contentment doth not stupify loose

[n] Τὰ μέγιστα ὀλιγοτόκα· τὰ δὲ μικρὰ, πολυτόκα. *Arist.* de Generatio. Animal. l. 4. c. 4. [o] Vivunt, non quomodo volunt; sed quomodo cœperunt. *Sen.* de Tran. c. 2. *Plut.* Sympos. l. 5. quæst. 9. [p] Tacit. [q] Phil. iv. 11, 12. [r] Heb. xiii. 9. [s] Namque labant curvæ justo sine pondere naves; Perque mare instabiles nimia levitate feruntur. *Ov.* Met. l. 2. [g] *Juven.* Sat. 14. *Plin.* l. 7. cap. 56.—*Stuck.* l. c. 8. fol. 165.

desires, but change them: as the cat's 'unum magnum' was more worth to her, than all the variety of shifts which the fox did boast of; and one sun doth more comfort us in the day, than many thousand stars in the night[h].

Again; desires are either of things excellent, as the virtuous and spiritual desires of the soul, whereby men move towards God[i]; and these do neither load the heart, nor cloy it, but much rather open and enlarge it for more. No man was so well acquainted with God as Moses[k], who yet was the more importunate to know him better: "I beseech thee, show me thy glory:"—nor any man more acquainted with Christ than St. Paul, who yet desired 'to be dissolved, and to be with Christ' nearer[l].

Other desires are of middle things, τὰ μεταξὺ, as the philosopher calls them[m]; such as wealth, profit, victory, honour, which are not good in themselves, but as they are managed. And these desires, though not extinguished, yet are very much assuaged and moderated by the weight and wisdom of solid contentment. He was a wise man, and knew all the quintessence, and whatever was desirable in the creature, who said, "Da mihi panem statuti mei," "Give me the bread of my allowance[n];" ὅσον ἡ τῆς χρείας ἀνάγκη παρ' ἡμῶν ἀπαιτεῖ (*Theophyl.*) so much as the quality of my place and state requireth;—which is that, which our Saviour limiteth our desires unto, ἀρτὸς ἐπιούσιος and σιτομέτριον, our portion and 'dimensum'[p]; ἐφήμερος τροφὴ, in St. James, 'daily food';[q] and was pleased to answer that Wise King in that his request, and to give us a record and catalogue of his daily bread[r].

Another cause of desire may be admiration: a strange thing, though monstrous and deformed, calleth the eyes of every man unto it. Rarity is a marvellous 'lenocinium,' and enticer of desire. 'Æstivæ nives, hybernæ rosæ,' as the panegyrist spake; snow in the summer, and roses in the winter;—the birds of this country, and the root of another; dainties hardly procured without the shipwrecks of men, to

[h] *Plut.* de Solert. Animal. acerrimus. *Sen.* ep. 225. [i] Sapiens est divitiarum naturalium quæsitor [k] Exod. xxxiii. 18. [l] Phil. i. 23. [m] *Arist.* Ethic. lib. 7. cap. 6. [n] Prov. xxx. 8. [o] Ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἡμῶν ἁρμόζων, ἢ ὁ καθημέραν. *Suidas.* [p] Luke xii. 42. [q] James ii. 15. [r] 1 Kings iv. 22. Vide *Waser.* de mensuris, l. 2. c. 3. et *Angel. Caninium* de pane quotid. ad calcem Instit. Syria. *Stuck.* Conviv. l. 1. cap. 22.

feed the gluttony rather of the eye than of the belly;—these are the delights of the curiosities of men. The same fruits when they are worse, but rarer, have a far greater value set upon them, than when exposed by their commonness unto every man's purchase. And it was a wise complaint of old Cato, that 'it went ill with the city, when a fish was sold for more than an ox.'[s] We see desires do not put forth themselves more freely in any than in children. I think, the chief reason of it is the same, which the philosopher giveth of their memories[t], 'because every thing to them is new and strange:' for strange things, as they make stronger impressions upon the retentive, so they do upon the appetitive faculties. And therefore we find Herod[u], who cared nothing at all for the doctrine of Christ, because it was holy and divine,—yet had a great desire to have seen his miracles, because they were wonderful. And men have travelled far to see those persons and things, the fame whereof they have before admired[w]; strange learning, strange birds and beasts, strange flowers and roots, strange fashions; yea, strange sins too, (which are the curiosity and corruption of nature) are marvellous attractive, and beget emulation amongst men. Nero gave rewards to the inventors of strange lusts. Even Solomon's ships (besides substantial treasure) did bring home apes and peacocks[x]. Athens, which was the eye, the flower, and the epitome of Greece (to show that this curiosity is the disease as well of wits as of childhood) spent all their time and study in enquiring after new things.[y] And for this cause it is (as I conceive) that wise men have made laws to interdict the transporting of their country fruits into other places, lest the sight of them should kindle in strangers a desire to be masters of the countries where they grew; as we see the grapes and figs of Canaan were used as incentives unto the expedition of Israel. And hence[z] Plutarch telleth us, that the word sycophant is derived, to note originally such as detected those, who surreptitiously transported

[s] *Plut.* Apoph. [t] Rhet. lib. 2. [u] Luke xxiii. 8. [w] Aristippus Athenas navigavit, Socratem invisurus. *Plutarch.* de Curios. [x] 1 Kings 13. Plato Ægyptum, Italiam, Siciliam petiit, philosophiæ causa.—Vid. *Theod.* Orat. 1. de fide.—Zeph. i. 8. *Arist.* Tom. 2. Orat. de pace. Vid. *Cæl. Rho.* l. 10. c. 25. [y] Acts xvii. 21. [z] *Plut.* in Solon. et de Curiosit. et lib. 1. Cod. quæ res exportari non debeant.

figs into other countries. As, on the other side, we read, that the Athenians set up a pillar, wherein they published him to be an enemy of the city [a], who should bring gold out of Media, as an instrument to corrupt them. And the Roman governor commanded his soldiers, that they should not carry any gold or silver into the field with them, lest thereby they should be looked on by the adversary, as the Persians by Alexander, rather as a prey than a foe [b].

A third cause which I shall touch on of exciting desires, is height and greatness of mind, which cannot well set bounds of measure unto itself; as Seneca said in another sense, 'magnitudo non habet certum modum [c].' Great minds have great ends, and those can never be advanced but with vast and various desires. A great ship will not be carried with the sail of a lighter; nor can an eagle fly with the wings of a sparrow. Alexander was not so great in his victories, as in his desires, whom one world could not satisfy [d]; nor Pompey in his triumphs, as in his ambition, to whom it was not enough to be great, except he might be the greatest [e].

Another cause of desires may be curiosity; which is nothing else but a desire of prying into, and lusting after the businesses of other men; which is called by Solomon, 'ambulatio animæ,' the walking up and down of the soul [f]; as he elsewhere telleth us, that 'the eyes of a fool are in the ends of the earth [g]:'—such a man being like the witches which Plutarch speaks of [h], that wear eyes when they went abroad, but put them in a box when they came home:—or like the falconer's hawks, that are hooded in the house, and never suffered to use their eyes, but to the hurt of other birds: like a man in a dungeon, that sees nothing where he is, but can see a great deal of light abroad at a little passage. So these kind of men have vast desires of foreign knowledge, but wonderfully shun the acquaintance of themselves [i]. As they say of a swine, that he looks every way but upward;

[a] *Arist.* Tom. 3. Orat. 2. [b] *Ælius Spart.* in Pescen. Nig. [c] Epist. 43. [d] Æstuat infœlix angusto limite mundi, Ut Gyaræ inclusus scopulis, &c. *Juv.* Satir. 10. [e] *Sen.* de Benef. l. 7. c. 7. p. 94. et 119. [f] Eccles. vi. 9. [g] Prov. xvii. 24. [h] *Plut.* de Cur. [i] Hoc se quisque modo semper fugit. *Lucret.* apud Sen. de Tranquil. c. 2. Non horam tecum esse potes, non otia recte Ponere, &c. *Horat.*

so we may of pragmatists, that their eyes look all ways but inward. Whereas the minds of prudent men are like the windows of Solomon's temple [k], broader inward than outward. As the pillar that went before Israel in the sea, whose light side was towards Israel, but the dark towards Pharaoh: or as the sun in an eclipse, whose light is perfect inwards, though towards us it be darkened. A wise man's eyes are in his head; whereas a fool hath νοῦν ἐπὶ πλέρναις: as it is in the Proverbs, his 'mind is in his heels' only, to wander and gad abroad.

CHAP. XVII.

Of other causes of Desire, infirmity, temerity, mutability of mind, knowledge, repentance, hope. Of the effects of it in general, labour, languor: in special, of rational desires, bounty, grief, weariness, indignation against that which withstands it. Of vicious desires, ingratitude, envy, greediness, baseness of resolution.

Other causes of desires are infirmity, rashness, and mutability of mind; which three I put in one, as having a near relation and dependence within themselves. For, commonly [a], impotent appetitions, as those of children, of sick, of incontinent persons,—are both temerarious in precipitating the mind, and anticipating the dictates of reason which should regulate or restrain them: as also mutable and wandering, like the bee from one flower unto another; *infirmity* not suffering a man to hold fast his decrees, and *temerity* not suffering him to resolve on any; and lastly, *mutability* making him weary of those things which weakness and rashness had unadvisedly transported him unto. 'Omnium imperitorum animus in lubrico est:' Weak minds have ever wavering and unfixed resolutions. Like fickle and nauseating stomachs, which long for many things, and can eat none: like sick bodies, 'quæ mutationibus, ut remediis, utuntur,' as Seneca speaks; which toss from side to side, and think, by chang-

[k] 1 Kings vi. 4. [a] Ἀκρασίας δὲ, τὸ μὲν προπέτεια, τὸ δὲ ἀσθένεια· οἱ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι, &c. *Arist.* Eth. H'. cap. 7.

ing of their place they can leave their pain behind them.[b] Like Achilles in the poet: (Il. ώ.)

Ἄλλοῖ' ἐπὶ πλευρὰς κατακείμενος, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε
Ὕπτιος, ἄλλοτε δὲ πρηνής· τότε δ' ὀρθὸς ἀναστὰς,

Now he leans on his side, now supine lies;
Then grov'leth on his face, and straight doth rise.

The sickness and inconstancy of desires is thus elegantly described by the old poet Lucretius[c]:

——" Ut nunc plerumque videmus:
Quid sibi quisque velit, nescire, et quærere semper;
Commutare locum, quasi onus deponere possit.
Exit sæpe foras magnis ex ædibus ille,
Esse domi quem pertæsum est, subitoque reventat.
Currit, agens mannos, ad villam præcipitanter,
Auxilium tectis quasi ferre ardentibus instans:
Oscitat extemplo, tetigit cum limina villæ;
Aut abit in somnum gravis, atque oblivia quærit:
Aut etiam properans urbem petit, atque revisit.
Hoc se quisque modo fugit: at, quem scilicet, ut fit,
Effugere haud potis est, ingratiis hæret, et obit."

We see how troubled mortals still enquire,
Yet ne'er can find what 'tis which they desire.
One changeth place, as if he could unload,
And leave his weights behind him. Runs abroad,
Weary of a great palace; straight turns back,
And hath not found the thing which he did lack.
Wearied both here and there, he mounts his steed;
And runs to the neighbour town with swifter speed
Than if he went to quench a fire. Being set,
He gapes and sleeps, and studies to forget

[b] Maximum indicium est malæ mentis fluctuatio, *Sen.* Ep. 120. vid. ep. 10. et de Tranq. cap. 2. Ὥσπερ παῖδας, ῥᾳδίως ἐπιθυμοῦντας, προχείρως δὲ καταλείποντας. *Aristid.* Tom. 2. Orat. 1. Vid. etiam *Plutarch.* de Tranq. [c] *Lucret.* lib. 3. 1080.—Jactor, crucior, agitor, stimulor, versor in amoris rota miser. Exanimor, feror, differor, distrahor, diripior: ita nubilam mentem Animi habeo: ubi sum, ibi non sum; ubi non sum, ibi est animus. Ita mihi omnia ingenia sunt; quod lubet, non lubet jam id continuo, &c. *Plaut.* Cistell. [d] Nihil tam occupatum, tam multiforme, tot actum variis motibus, concisum ac laceratum, quàm mala mens, *Quint.* l. 12. c. 1. Non horam tecum 'esse potes, non otia recte Ponere; atque ipsum vitas fugitivus et erro, *Horat.*—Vid. *Plut.* de Tranquil.

Why he came thither, haply turns his rein,
And to the city posteth back again.
Thus guilty man doth study how to shun,
And scape himself; but ne'er can get it done.
He bears the thing he flies. What he would leave
Unwelcome self unto, itself doth cleave,
And cleaving doth torment.———

The more simple, one, and perfect nature is, (as the philosopher divinely noteth) [e] the more it delighteth in one and the same uniform operation. Mutability is not pleasant in itself; but the delight of it ariseth out of the pravity and defect of nature.

I might here insist on other more obvious causes of desire. As,

1. Knowledge and experience of the goodness of that which we desire: as the apostle also telleth us, that "experience worketh hope." And we use to say, 'Ignoti nulla cupido;' a man cannot desire that of which he hath no apprehension. Knowledge is appetite's taster.

2. Sorrow and repentance for the evils we feel, the contrary whereunto we are the more induced to desire. We never desire health so eagerly, as when sickness teacheth us to value it. [f] For as in colours, so in actions or affections, contraries do set forth and sharpen one another. And as labour natural doth make man earnestly desire the shadow, as Job speaks; so sorrow, which is labour mental, doth make a man earnestly thirst after that, which can remove the thing which begets that sorrow. The apostle telleth us, that "desire and zeal are the fruits of godly sorrow." [g] David never panted so earnestly after God's favour and presence, as when he felt what a grief it was to be without it. For, in this case, there is an apprehension of a double goodness in the thing we desire, both as perfective unto nature indigent, and as medicinal unto nature wronged.

Lastly, hope of speeding in our desires: for the stronger any man's persuasions are, the more cheerful and vigorous will be his endeavours to succeed. But I shall content my-

[e] Ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, αἰεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται· διὸ ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν. *Arist.* Eth. l. 7. c. ult. [f] Tum denique omnes nostra intelligimus bona, quum quæ in potestate habuimus, ea amisimus. *Plaut.* Captiv. 1, 2, 39. [g] 2 Cor. vii. 11.

self with the intimation of these things. And in the next, very briefly to run over some effects and consequents of this affection. Which are,

1. In regard of desires at large, labour and pains: for they are only velleities, and not volitions: half and broken wishes, not whole desires, which are not industrious; but waste away in sluggish and empty speculations. The fisherman that will take the fish, must be contented to be dashed with the water. [h] And he that will expect to have his desires answered, must put as well his hands as his prayers unto them. [i]

> Αργὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς Θεὸν ἔχων ἀνὰ στόμα,
> Βίον δύναιτ' ἂν συλλέγειν ἄνευ πόνου.
>
> Who takes God in his mouth, but takes no pain,
> By devout sloth shall never gather gain.

It was the just reproof of him in the poet who was upbraided with coming to the feasts [k], but withdrew himself from the labour of other men. Nature hath often made the roots of those plants bitter, whose fruits are sweet, to teach us that delight is the fruit of labour. And therefore the philosopher telleth us, that 'desire is usually accompanied with sorrow.' [l]

Again, desires do commonly work a languor and fainting towards the thing desired [m], if they be either strong or hasty: for "hope deferred maketh the heart sick." [n] As Ahab's eager desire of Naboth's vineyard, cast him upon his bed. [o] And David expresseth his longings towards God's law, by the breaking and fainting of his soul. [p] 'Cum expectatio longior est, consenescit animus, et debilitatur mens.' Delayed expectation weakeneth and withereth the minds of men. And therefore the apostle expresseth strength of desire by groaning [q]; which is the language of sickness.

2. In regard of reasonable and spiritual desires. The effects of this affection are:

[h] Οἱ ἁλιεῖς ὑπομένουσι ῥαίνεσθαι τῇ θαλάττῃ. *Arist.* apud. Laert. l. 2. [i] *Eurip.* Elect. *Plut.* Instit. Lacon. Ἐπειδὴ τοὐμὸν εὐτυχεῖ δόρυ Καὶ Ζεὺς πρὸς ἡμῶν, &c. *Eur.* Rhes. 319. [k] *Homer.* Il. δ. 341, 348. *Eur.* Rhes. 325. [l] *Arist.* apud Laert. l. 5. [m] *Arist.* Eudemi. l. 2. c. 10. [n] Prov. xiii. 12. [o] 1 Kings xxi. 4. [p] Psalm cxix. 20, 81. Usque ad ægritudinem desideravit. *Æl. Lamprid.* in Com. [q] Rom. viii. 22. 2 Cor. v. 2.

1. Large heartedness and liberality. That which a man earnestly desireth, he will give much for, and bestow much upon.[r] As when Christ became the Desire of all Nations[s], they did dedicate all their desirable things unto him[t], as the ἀναθήμαλα, and trophies of his merciful triumph over them. One man adorns the gospel with his power; another, with his wit; another, with his wealth; another, with his wisdom. Those abilities of nature, art, or industry, which were before the armour of sin, are then become the spoils of Christ. Antonius, out of the strength of his desires towards Cleopatra, bestowed many countries upon her.[u]

2. Grief for any loss or hazard of the thing desired. As the seaman's needle, which is jogged and troubled, never leaves moving, till it find the North point again. 'Flagrantia sunt animorum desideria, cum solatia perdiderunt,' as the orator spake: Desires burn hottest when they are in danger of disappointment.[x]

3. Weariness and indignation against any thing which standeth between desire and the fruition of that which is desired, 'Vehementior per metus et pericula exibit[y]:' That which resisteth, increaseth it. As a river goes with more strength, where it is hindered and withstood.[z] The church did venture blows, when she sought her love; and like the palm-tree, rose up above her pressures. "Plures efficimur, quoties metimur à vobis," as Tertullian speaks to the heathen: 'The more you mow us down, the thicker we grow.'[a] The more we suffer for him, the more we love and desire him.—St. Paul careth not for dissolution, that he may go to Christ; as a stone is contented to be broken in pieces, that it may move to its place.

Thirdly, For corrupt and vicious desires; their effects are first, deception, and haling of reason[b] (as it were) captive from determining, advising, or duly weighing the pravity and obliquity of them. So that the things which a man knows

[r] Phil. iii. 8, 9, 10. Matth. xiii. 45. [s] Hag. ii. 6, 7. [t] Matth. ii. 11. Isai. lx. 5, 17. Psalm lxviii. 29. [u] *Plut.* in Anton. [x] *Naz.* Orat. Paneg. [y] *Sen.* Ep. [z] Ab obice sævior ibit.—*Plut.* Symp. l. 4.—*A. Gell.* l. 3. c. 6. [a] *Tert.* Apol. c. ult. [b] James i. 14. Ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ, εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος. Eth. l. 7. c. 2. Ἐκλεψε νόον. Ib. cap. 7. ult. Hos. iv. 11.—Περιέλκει ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. c. 3.—Vid. c. 59.—Vid. *Plaut.* Asinar. Act I. Scen. 3.—*Cic.* de Senectut.

in 'thesi,' and at large in 'hypothesi;' and as to his own particular interest or inconvenience, he doth not at all attend. He can say them; he cannot apply them: as he who acteth a part on a stage, knows the things which he speaks, but is not a whit affected with them. And the philosopher giveth the reason of it, the very same with St. James, Δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦναι, that reason which overcomes lust, must be λόγος ἔμφυτος, 'reason [c] engrafted;' or, as is the phrase of another apostle [d], συγκεκραμένος, 'immixed' and contempered with the soul, and not only extrinsecally irradiating it. And these kind of men are elegantly called by Julius Pollux ἐθελόδουλοι, men 'willingly slavish [e],' and ἡττημένοι, 'subdued' and brought under by their own affections. As Plutarch saith of Agesilaus, that 'he was ruled by Lysander his servant [f];' he having only the name, but the other, the execution of his power. This slavery of men's minds under the tyranny of lustful desires, is thus described by the satirist:

> Mane piger stertis: 'Surge,' inquit Avaritia; 'eja
> Surge.' Negas. Instat, 'Surge,' inquit. 'Non queo.' 'Surge.'
> 'Et quid agam?' 'Rogitas? Saperdas advehe Ponto,
> Castoreum, stuppas, ebenum, thus, lubrica Coa' [g].

> What, sluggard, snore so long? says Lust, up rise,
> Awake, get out. Dar'st thou say nay? it cries
> The same again, Up rise? I cannot. No?
> Rise though you cannot, when I'll have it so.
> What must I do? What do? up, wipe your eyes:
> See, here 's a goodly ship of merchandise:
> Shell-fish, castoreum, flax, black Indian woods,
> Frankincense, wines of Cos and other goods.

Thus sordidly do vain men sell themselves, and, as it were, render up their reason into the hands of vicious and greedy affections; giving leave to their souls to suffer a shipwreck in that vessel, which bringeth goods into their cellars, and trafficking their own judgement in exchange for a ship of wares.

Secondly, These kind of desires make men ungrateful and forgetful of any kindness, which hath already been done them. [h] 'Memoriæ minimum tribuit, quisquis

[c] James i. 21. [d] Heb. iv. 2. [e] Onomast. l. 3. c. 7. [f] *Plut.* in Lysandr. [g] *Persius* Sat. 5. Vid. *Arrian.* Epict. l. 3. c. 24. [h] *Sen.* de Benef. l. 3. c. 3. et l. 2. c. 27. Nam fere maxima pars morem hunc homines ha-

spei plurimum.' As in buckets at a well, the longer the line of the one is, which moves downward, the shorter is the line of the other which riseth upward; so the larger our desires are towards the future, the narrower our memories of things past. And usually men's valuations of things are more in the performance, than when they are performed. And the reason is, because as nature hath set our eyes forward, and not behind us, so the appetites of men, for which the eyes are the principal factors, look naturally before them, not to what they *have*, but to what they *hope*. The eye whereby we look backward into our lives, is the eye of repentance; we there either see ourselves bad, or little; and a man is an unwelcome object unto himself in both these relations. But the eye whereby we look forward, is an eye of *hope*, and *desire;* and by that we are represented to ourselves better and greater than we are already. Iron moves not upward, except the loadstone be very near it; but it moveth downward, though the centre be never so remote. So much stronger are the motions of *desire*, than those of acknowledgement and retribution.

Besides the apprehensions of goodness in a thing are much other in the *desire* than in the *review*: as usually the sun and the moon look bigger at their rising, than when they are come over our heads. *Desire* looks on nothing in them, but that which pleaseth; *review* finds that in them which displeaseth. When we desire wine, we think only on the sweetness; when we review it, we remember the head-ache. Besides; what we desire, is apprehended as the matter of our life; what is past, men apprehend as in the hand of death. 'Quicquid retro est, mors tenet[i].' As in our life, so in our delights, so much of them is dead, as is over and gone. We love our food, when it is meat; we loath it, when it is excrement: when it goes into us, we desire it; when it passeth through us, we despise it: and the secret work of concoction, (which is, as it were, the review of our meat) doth distinguish that in them which the first appetite took in a lump, and together.

bent; quod sibi volunt, Dum id impetrant, boni sunt: sed id ubi jam penes sese habeant, Ex bonis pessumi et fraudulentissimi Sunt. *Plaut.* Captiv. 2. 2. 36. —Nihil æquè est gratum adeptis et concupiscentibus, *Plin.* l. 2. ep. 15. [i] *Sen.* de Brevit. vitæ, et Ep. 120.

And, in truth, in all secular and sublunary desires, we shall ever find that they are like the apples of Sodom, 'quæ contacta cinerescunt[k], which have ashes hidden with their beauty, and death lurking under them. All the matter of our secular or sensitive desires, are just like the meats we eat,—which go much more into excrement, than into nourishment and substance. Like the cypress tree, which they say is very fair, but bears no fruit[l]. Like the Egyptian temples, which are beautiful in 'frontispicio,' but ridiculous in 'penetrali.' And if we look well on them, we shall find, that as they are mortal themselves, so they come to us through mortality. It was a bold, but true ὀξύμωρον of Seneca, 'Mortibus vivimus;' we live by the deaths of other things: our fullest tables furnished with death, nothing but 'feretra,' the biers of birds and beasts: our richest garments the bowels and skins of other creatures, which work out their own lives to preserve ours. Silk is a grave to the worm, that weaves it, before it is a garment for us. Our offices and honours seldom come to us, but by the mortality of those that prepossessed them; and our mortality makes them the fitter objects of other men's desires.

3. These desires as they are forgetful, so they are envious[m], and look with an evil eye upon others' competition, accounting their success our own damage. If a man should draw the genealogy of all the injuries and emulations of the world, we should find the root of that great tree to be nothing but lust. It was desire and inordinate appetite, by which the devil persuaded our first parents to pick a quarrel with their Maker. "Whence come wars and fightings," saith Saint James, "but from lusts which war in your members? When a man hath war within, no wonder if he have no peace without. He that cannot agree with himself, will disagree with all the world besides. The sea tosseth every thing which comes into it, not because it is wronged, but because it is unquiet; and a lustful man will contend with every innocent man that prospers, not because this man doth him injury, but because he grudgeth this man's pro-

[k] *Tert.* Apol. c. 40. [l] Phocion apud Plut. Apophth. *Clem. Alex.* Pæd. l. 3. c. 3. [m] Vid. *Sen.* de Ira, l. 3. c. 31.—Alienis gemitibus libenter emolumenta conquirit. *Ammian. Marcel.* l. 31.—Egregium exemplum invidiæ, etiam Ecclesiasticæ, ex cupiditatibus ortæ, apud eundem Marcellinum inter Damascum et Urcisinum, l. 27.

sperity. As the sea representeth every straight thing that is put into it crooked, so lust every harmless thing perverse; and as Seneca speaks[n], hath 'odium sine inimico,' hatred without an enemy. Greedy desires are like a swollen and envious spleen, which sucks away substance from all the rest of the body.

4. These desires are hydropical, and like a Βουλιμία in the stomach, which is not quenched, but enraged with that which feeds it[o]. Unnatural desires being herein very like unto natural motions; the further they proceed, the stronger and swifter they are: like wind in a bladder, they never fill the heart, but enlarge it. The Grecians began their drinkings in little cups, but proceeded unto flaggons[p]. And, many times, those appetitions which begin in modesty, go on unto impudence; and the more our lives hasten to leave the world, the more our lusts hasten to possess it. As it is noted of the Parthians[a], that the more they drink, the more they thirst. And, which is a marvellous illogical stupidity, the more continual experience men have of the vanity of the world, the more greedy experiments they make to find out solidity in it. Like your melancholy searchers after the philosopher's stone, that never dote so much upon their project, as then when it hath deluded them; and never flatter themselves with stronger hopes to be enriched by their art, than when it hath brought them to beggary.

Lastly, from hence it comes to pass, that these kinds of desires are base, and deject the mind unto sordid and ignoble resolutions. For, "cui nihil satis, nihil turpe:" He that hath never enough, will count nothing base whereby he may get more. As the historian[b] saith of Otho, that he did "Adorare vulgus, jacere oscula, et omnia serviliter pro imperio;" adore the people, dispense and scatter abroad his courtesies, crouch unto any servile expressions to advance his ambitious designs. Like Antæus in the Poets, fall to the earth, so he may grow the stronger by it. As Zopyrus[c] and Pisistratus[d], who wounded, mangled, deformed themselves, that they might thereby insinuate, and gain their ends. As the scripture noteth of Absalom, and the historian of

[n] Epist. 105. [o] *Cœlius Rhodig.* l. c. 39. l. 14. c. 1. [p] *Laert.* in Anacharsi, l. 1.—*Sen.* de Benef. l. 2. c. 27. Nihil satis morituris, imò morientibus. Ep. c. 120. [a] *Plin.* l. 15. c. 22. [b] *Tacit.* Hist. l. 1. [c] *Herodot.* Thalia. [d] *Plut.* in Solone.

Julian [e], that out of affectation of popularity, they stooped and delighted to converse with the lowest of the people. Which cunning humility, or rather sordidness of ambition, Menelaus in the Tragedian [f], hath thus elegantly objected in a contentious debate unto Agamemnon,

Οἶσθ', ὅτ' ἐσπούδαζες ἄρχειν Δαναΐδαις πρὸς Ἴλιον,
Τῷ δοκεῖν μὲν οὐχὶ χρῄζων, τῷ δὲ βούλεσθαι θέλων,
Ὡς ταπεινὸς ἦς, ἁπάσης δεξιᾶς προσθιγγάνων,
Καὶ θύρας ἔχων ἀκλείστους τῷ θέλοντι δημοτῶν,
Καὶ διδοὺς πρόσρησιν ἐξῆς πᾶσι, κεἰ μή τις θέλοι,
Τοῖς τρόποις ζητῶν πρίασθαι τὸ φιλότιμον ἐκ μέσου; &c.

You know, how you the rule o'er Grecians got,
In show declining what in truth you sought.
How low, how plausible you apprehended
The hands of meanest men: how then you bended
To all you met: how your gates open flew,
And spake large welcome to the pop'lar crew:
What sweetened words you gave even unto those
Who did decline, and hate to see you gloze.
How thus with serpentine and guileful arts,
You screw'd and wound yourself into the hearts
O' th' vulgar: and thus bought the power, which now
Makes you forget, how then you us'd to bow.

CHAP. XVIII.

Rules touching our Desires. Desires of lower objects must not be either hasty, or unbounded: such are unnatural, turbid, unfruitful, unthankful: desires of heavenly objects fixed, permanent, industrious: connexion of virtues, sluggish desires.

Unto the things already delivered touching this affection, I shall here add two or three rules, pertaining to the moral use, and managing of it. And they are, first, concerning objects of an inferior and transitory nature, that our desires be neither hasty and precipitate, nor vast and unlimited. And in matters more high and noble, that they be not either

[e] *Am. Marcel.* l. 25. [f] *Eurip.* Iphig. Aul. 337.

wavering and interrupted desires, or lazy and negligent desires.

1. For the first of these, we have a rule in Solomon [a], concerning riches, which will hold in all other objects of an immoderate desire: "He that maketh haste to be rich, shall not be without sin:" I may add, "Not without cares neither:" for we know the nature of all earthly things;—they have something of the serpent in them, 'to deceive.' The way of riches and profit, is a thorny way; the way of honour and ambition, a slippery and giddy way; the way of carnal pleasures, a deep and a foul way; the way of learning itself, (the noblest of all sublunary things) an involved and intricate way. And certainly he had need have better eyes than a blind passion, who, in so ill ground, will make good haste and good speed together." [b] In labyrintho properantes ipsa velocitas implicat; He is not the likeliest man to get first out of a maze, who runs fastest. An over-nimble desire is like the stomach of a sick man newly recovered; more greedy than strong, and fuller of appetite than digestion. Whence arise immature and unconcocted counsels, blind and ungoverned resolutions: like those monstrous people whom Pliny speaks of, whose feet go backward, and behind their eyes. For when the mind of man is once possessed with conceit of contentment to be found in worldly glories; when the insinuations and sweet enchantments of honour, profit, pleasure, power, and Satan's 'Hæc omnia,' hath once crept upon the affection, and lulled reason asleep; it is then sufficient that we know the end, which we desire: we have not the patience to enquire after the right way unto it, because it is the suspicion of our greedy desires, that the true means are commonly the most tedious; and that honesty, for the most part, goes the farthest way about. And hence withal it usually cometh to pass, that these hasty and preposterous appetitions do hinder ends, and intercept advantages which slowness with maturity might have made use of. As the Roman soldiers, by their greediness on their prey, missed of taking Mithridates, who otherwise could not have escaped them [c]; and therefore it was wise counsel of Nestor in the Poet [d],

[a] Prov. xxviii. 20, 21.
[b] Ἐν ὁδῷ μὴ σπεύδειν. *Chilo* apud Laert. lib. 1.
[c] *Plutarch.* in Lucullo.
[d] Iliad. ξ'. 70.

Μήτις νῦν ἐνάρων ἐπισθαλλόμενος, μελόπισθε
Μιμνέτω, ὥς κεν ωλεῖστα φέρων ἐπὶ νῆας ἵκηται·
Ἀλλ' ἄνδρας κλείνωμεν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἕκηλοι
Νεκροὺς ἀμπεδίον συλήσετε τεθνειῶτας.

Let none go ling'ring after spoil, and stay
To load himself with a too hasty prey.
But first let 's kill: w' are sure after such fight,
Carcasses being rifled cannot bite.

2. The next rule to keep this passion in order with reference unto inferior objects, is, that it be not an infinite and unlimited desire. Appetite should answer our power to procure, and our strength to bear and to digest. [e] We should not go about to swallow a camel, when a gnat doth make us strain. Immoderate desires can neither be satisfied, nor concocted. And this unboundedness of desires we are to take heed of, for these reasons:—

1. First, for the unnaturalness of it: for all unnatural and unnecessary desires are infinite, as the philosopher hath observed [f]: as he that is out of his way, may wander infinitely. An unlimited desire is only there requisite, where the object thereof is infinite, and ordained to perfect man's nature; but not where it is only a means appointed for his benefit and comfort. Wherein he ought therefore then to enjoy his contentment, when it is sufficient, not to fill his mind which is immortal [g]; and therefore not able to be replenished with any perishing happiness, nor to out-reach the vastness of his opinion, which being erroneous, is likewise infinite [h], (for, 'Omnis error immensus,' as Seneca speaks) but then only when it affords such conveniences, as wherewithal the seasonable and virtuous employments of nature may, with content, be exercised. It is then a corrupt desire, which proceeds not from our want, but from our vice: as that is not a natural thirst, but a disease and distemper of the body, which can never be satisfied.

Now the miseries of unnatural desires are, First, that [i] they

[e] *Senec.* de Tranq. l. 2. *Arrian.* Epict. lib. 1. c. 26. [f] *Arist.* Polit. lib. 1. cap. 6.—*Senec.* Ep. 16, 39. de Benef. l. 2. c. 27. [g] Extranea non augent bonum, sed condiunt, *Sen.* Epist. 66. [h] Nunquam finem invenit libido. *Cicer.* Tusc. Malum infinitum. *Arist.* Ethic. lib. 2. cap. 6. Polit. l. 3. c. 5. Exiguum natura, opinio immensum, *Epic.* apud Sen. [i] *Plutarch.* in Gryllo, et de Sanit. tuenda.

corrupt and expel those which are natural: as multitudes of strangers in a city, do eat out the natives: thus in luxurious men, strange love doth extinguish that which is conjugal.

Secondly, They ever bring vexation to the mind with them.[k] As immoderate laughter, so immoderate lusts are never without pain and convulsions of nature. Morbid desires of the mind are like an itch or ulcer in the body, which is with the same nails both angered and delighted, and hath no pleasure but with vexation.

Thirdly, They are ever attended with repentance; both because, in promises, they disappoint, and in performances, they deceive[l]: and when they make offers of pleasure, do expire in pains: as those delicates which are sweet in the mouth, are many times heavy in the stomach; and after they have pleased the palate, do torment the bowels. The mind surfeits on nothing sooner than on unnatural desires.

Fourthly, For this reason they are ever changing and making new experiments[m]; as weak and wanton stomachs, which are presently cloyed with a uniform diet, and must have not only a painful, but a witty cook, whose inventions may be able with new varieties to gratify and humour the niceness of their appetite. As Nero had an officer who was called 'Elegantiæ Arbiter,' the inventor of new lusts for him.

Lastly, Unlimited desires are, for the most part, envious and malignant: for he who desires every thing, cannot choose but repine to see another have that, which himself wanteth.[n] And therefore Dionysius, the tyrant, did punish Philoxenus the musician, because he could sing,—and Plato the philosopher, because he could dispute, better than himself.[o] In which respect he did wisely, who was contented not to be esteemed a better orator than he, who could command thirty legions.[p]

Secondly, Unbounded desires do work anxiety and perturbation of mind; and by that means disappoint nature of

[k] *Plut.* de Sanit. tuenda.—*Sen.* de Tranq. cap. 2. [l] Alternæ inter cupiditatem nostram et pœnitentiam vices sunt. *Sen.* de Orig. Sap. cap. 27. [m] *Sen.* de Benef. l. 3. c. 3. Quod ministerium fuerat, ars haberi cœpta, *Liv.* l. 39. [n] Ἄπληστος ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις, Eth. l. c. 12. [n] *Tacit.* Annal. lib. 16. [o] *Plut.* de Tranq. [p] *Favorinus* apud Ælium Spart. in Adr.

that proper end, which this passion was ordained unto; namely,—to be a means of obtaining some farther good; whereas those desires which are in their executions turbid, or in their continuance permanent, are no more likely to lead unto some farther end, than either a misty and dark, or a winding and circular way is to bring a man at last unto his journey's end; whereof the one is dangerous,—the other, vain. And together with this, they do distract our noble cares, and quite avert our thoughts from more high and holy desires. Martha her many things, and Mary's one thing, will very hardly consist together.

Lastly, There is one corruption more in these unlimited desires; they make a man unthankful for former benefits: as first, because 'Caduca memoria futuro imminentium.'[q] It is a strong presumption that he seldom looks back upon what is past, who is earnest in pursuing something to come. It is St. Paul's profession and argument in a matter of greater consequence, "I forget those things which are behind, and reach forth unto those things which are before." And secondly, though a man should look back, yet the thoughts of such a benefit would be but slight and vanishing; because the mind, finding present content in the liberty of a roving desire, is marvellous unwilling to give permanent entertainment unto thoughts of another nature; which likewise (were they entertained) would be rather thoughts of murmuring than of thankfulness;—every such man being willing rather to conceive the benefit small, than to acknowledge the vice and vastness of his own desires.

The next rule which I observed for the government of those passions, doth respect those higher and more glorious objects of man's felicity: and herein,

1. Our desires are not to be wavering and inconstant, but resolute and full of quickness and perseverance. First, because though we be poor and shallow vessels, yet so narrow and almost shut up are those passages, by which we should give admittance unto the matter of our true happiness; yea, so full are we already of contrary qualities, as that our greatest vehemency will not be enough, either to empty ourselves of the one, or to fill ourselves with the other. And, therefore, the true desires of this nature are, in the scripture, set

q *Sen.* de Benef. lib. 3.

forth by the most pathetical and strong similitudes of 'hunger and thirst;' and those not common neither; but the panting of a tired hart after the rivers of water, and the gaping of the dry ground after a seasonable shower. Secondly; every desirable object the higher it goes, is ever the more united within itself, and drives the faster unto a unity. It is the property of errors to be at variance: whereas truth is one, and all parts thereof do mutually strengthen and give light unto each other. So likewise in things good, the more noble, the more knit they are: 'Scelera dissident:' it is for sins to be at variance amongst themselves.[r] And those lower goods of riches, pleasure, nobility, beauty, though they are not incompatible, yet they have no natural connection to each other; and have therefore the less power to draw a constant and continued desire. But for nobler and immaterial goods, we see how the philosopher hath observed a connection between all his moral virtues[s], whereby a man that hath one, is naturally drawn to a desire of all the rest: for the mind, being once acquainted with the sweetness of one, doth not only apprehend the same sweetness in the other; but, besides, findeth itself not sufficiently possest of that which it hath, unless it be thereby drawn to procure the rest: all whose properties it is, by an excellent mutual service, to give light and lustre, strength and validity, and, in some sort, greater unity unto each other.

And lastly, For the highest and divinest good; the truth of religion, that is in itself most of all other, one; as being a beam of that light and revelation of that will, which is unity itself. And therefore though we distinguish the creed into twelve articles, yet St. Paul calleth them all but Μία πίστις, one faith[t], as having but one Lord for the object and end of them. Now then where the parts of good are so united, as that the one draweth on the other, there is manifestly required united desire to carry the soul thereunto.

II. The last rule which I observed, was, that our desires ought not to be faint and sluggish, but industrious and painful; both for the arming us to avoid and withstand all oppositions and difficulties, which we are every where likely to meet withal in the pursuit of our happiness; and also for the wise and discreet applying of the several furtherances

[r] Εὐμελάβολος ὁ πονηρός. [s] Ethic. l. 6. c. 12. [t] Ephes. iv. 5.

requisite thereunto. And indeed that is no true, which is not an operative desire: a velleity it may be, but a will it is not: for whatever a man will have, he will seek in the use of such means, as are proper to procure it. Children may wish for mountains of gold, and Balaam may wish for a happy death, and an atheist may wish for a soul as earthly in substance as in affection; but these are all the ejaculations rather of a speculative fancy, than of an industrious affection. True desires as they are right in regard of their object, so are they laborious in respect of their motion. And, therefore, those which are idle and impatient of any pains, which stand like the carman in the fable, crying to Hercules, when his wain stuck in the mud, to help it out, without stretching out his own hands to touch it,—are, first, unnatural desires; it being the formal property of this passion to put the soul upon some motion or other:—and therefore we see wheresoever nature hath given it, she hath given likewise some manner of motion or other to serve it. And, secondly, they are, by consequence, undutiful and disobedient desires; in that they submit not themselves unto that law which requireth, that we manifest the life and strength of our love by the quickness and operation of it in our desires. And lastly, such desires are unuseful and fruitless: for how can an object which standeth in a fixed distance from the nature, which it should perfect, be procured by idle and standing affections? "The desires of the sluggard," (saith Solomon)[u] "slay him, because his hands refuse to labour."—Those affections must have life in them, which bring life after them; Dead desires are deadly desires.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the affection of Joy or Delight: the several objects thereof, corporal, moral, intellectual, divine.

The next passions, in order, belonging to the concupiscible faculty, are those two, which are wrought by the presence of, and union to, an object: and that is, when either we, by

[u] Prov. xxi. 15. xiii. 4.

our desire, have reached the object, which worketh joy and delight;—or when, in our flight, the object hath overtaken us, which worketh grief and sorrow. And these two do bear the most inward relation unto, and influence upon, all our actions. Whereupon Aristotle[a], in his Ethicks, hath made them the foundation of our virtues, and rules of our working. And the reason is natural; because the end of our motion is to attain rest, and avoid perturbation. Now delight is nothing else but the sabbath of our thoughts[b], and that sweet tranquillity of mind which we receive from the presence and fruition of that good, whereunto our desires have carried us. And therefore the philosopher in one place calls it 'a motion of the soul with a sensible and felt instauration of nature;' yet elsewhere he as truly telleth us, that it standeth rather in rest than motion[c]; as on the other side grief is the straitening and anguish of our minds, wrought out of the sense and burden of some present evil oppressing our nature. Now these passions are divers, according to the diversity of the objects, which are either sensitive and bodily; and then delight is called 'voluptas,' pleasure, being a medicine and supply against bodily indigence and defects:—or intellectual and divine, and then it is called 'gaudium,' joy, being a sweet and delightful tranquillity of mind, resting in the fruition and possession of a good.[d] So also is the other passion of sadness considered; which in respect of the body is called a sense of pain; in respect of the soul, a sense of grief.

First then for the object of our delight: it is only that which can yield some manner of satisfaction unto our nature, not as it is a corrupt and erring, but as it is an empty and perfectible, nature. Whatsoever then is either medicinal for the repairing, or natural for the conserving, or any way helpful for the advancing, of a creature,—is the only true and allowable object of its delight. Other pleasures which eat out and undermine nature, as water which, by little and

[a] Κανονίζομεν καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. Ethic. l. 2. c. 3. [b] *Cicer.* Tusc. l. 4. εὔλογος ἔπαρσις, *Zeno* apud Laert. l. 7.—*Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 2. κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. [c] Ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστιν ἢ ἐν κινήσει, Eth. l. 7. c. ult. [d] Gaudere in sinu. *Cic.* Ἐν ϑυμῷ χαίρειν, Hom. Qui sapit, in tacito gaudeat ille sinu. *Tibul.*—Vid. *Damascen.* de Orthodox. fide, lib. 2. cap. 13. et *Nemes.* de Anima, c. 18.

little, insensibly consumeth the bank against which it beateth; or as ivy which seemeth to adorn the tree unto which it cleaveth, but indeed sucketh out and stealeth away the sap thereof[e];—may, haply, yield some measure of vanishing content to minds, which taste every thing with a corrupted palate: but certainly such sophistical premises can never infer in the conclusion any other than a perfunctory and tottering content. And therefore Seneca[f] is bold to find an impropriety in Virgil's epithet, 'Mala gaudia,' joys which issue from a polluted fountain, as not having in them that inseparable attribute of absolute delight, which is to be unvariable. For how can a mind (unless blinded with its own impostures, and entangled in the errors of a misled affection) receive any nourishing and solid content in that, which is in itself vanishing, and unto its subject destructive? Whatsoever then may be delighted in, must have some one of the forenamed conditions, tending either to the restitution of decayed nature, to the preservation of entire nature, or to the perfection of empty nature. And to the former and imperfecter sort of these, Aristotle refers all corporal and sensitive pleasures; (unto which he therefore granteth a secondary and accidental goodness) which he calleth ἰατρεῖαι the medicines of an indigent nature[g]; whereby the defects thereof are made up, and itself disburdened of those cares which, for the most part, use to follow the want of them.

Herein then I observe a double corruption; an unnatural and unlimited delight. *Unnatural,* I mean those accursed pleasures, which were exercised by men given over to vile affections, and greedy in the pursuing of lusts, whose very names abhor the light. *Unlimited* delights are those which exceed the bounds of nature, and the prime institution of lawful and indifferent things. For such is the condition of those, that if they repair not and strengthen nature, they weaken and disenable it[h]: as, in the body, luxury breeds diseases; and, in the mind, curiosity breeds errors.

Other objects there are of a wider nature than those, which

[e] Arbores necat omnem succum auferendo, &c. *Plin.* l. 16. c. 34. [f] Epist. 59.—*Aug.* de Civit. Dei, l. 14. c. 8. [g] Ἀναπλήρωσίς τις καὶ ἰατρεία τῆς σωμᾶικῆς ἐνδείας. Nemes. c. 18. Ethic. l. 7. c. 14. ἀγαθαὶ μέχρι τοῦ. [h] Unde factum, ut quæ ad funera pertinerent, in Templo Veneris venderentur. Vid. Plut. Quæs. Rom q. 23.

concern the body; and they are both the moral and contemplative actions of the mind: to both which Aristotle hath attributed principally this passion[i]; but more especially to the latter, whose object is more pure, and whose acts less laborious, as residing in that part of the soul, which is most elevate from sense: and, therefore, most of all capable of the purest, simplest, and unmixed delights. Now every thing is the more free, clear, independent, spiritual, by how much it is the more unmixed: and these are the choicest perfections, whereby the soul may be filled with joy. It is true indeed, that oftentimes the contemplations of the mind have annexed unto them both grief and anxiety: but this is never natural to the act of knowledge, which is always in its own virtue an impression of pleasure: but it ariseth either out of the sublimity of the object, which dazzleth the power; or out of the weakness and doubtings of the understanding, which hath not a clear light thereof; or out of the admixion and steeping them in the humours of the affections, whereby men minister unto themselves desperate thoughts, or weak fears, or guilty griefs, or unlimited desires, according as is the property of the object joined with their own private distempers. Thus we see the intuition of divine truth in minds of defiled affections, worketh not that sweet effect which is natural unto it to produce; but doubtings, terrors, and disquietings of conscience; it being the property of the workers of darkness to be afraid of the word of light[k]. But of all these former objects of man's delight, (because they are amongst Solomon's catalogue of things under the sun[l]) none are here without vexation and vanities: for to let pass the lightning of an idle mirth, which indeed is madness and not joy, (for Seneca telleth us, that 'true joy is a serious and severe thing[m]') and not to meddle with riches and other secular delights, which have wings to fly from us, and thorns to prick us,—even that highest natural delight of the mind, knowledge, and the heavenly eloquence of the tongues of angels, (which a man would think were above the sun, and therefore not obnoxious to Solomon's vanity) would be in man, without the right corrective thereof, but a tinkling

[i] Eth. l. 10. c. 7. [k] John iii. 20. Job xxi. 14. Isai. xxx. 11. 2 Pet. iii. 5. [l] Eccles. ii. 2, 3. Ἠνίκ' ἦν ἐν τῇ νόσῳ, Αὐτὸς μὲν ἥδεθ' οἷσιν εἶχετ' ἐν κακοῖς. *Sophoc.* Ajax. 271. [m] *Senec.* Epist. 23.

noise, yielding rather a windy pleasure than a true delight. The properties whereof is not to puff up, but to replenish; and therefore it is the prayer of Saint Paul, "The God of peace fill you with all joy."[n] True heavenly joy, is a filling, a satiating joy, a 'joy unspeakable,' with Saint Peter; 'a peace past understanding,' with Saint Paul. Nor doth this property of overflowing and swallowing the mind, add any degrees of offence or anxiety thereunto: for it is not the weakness of the soul, as it is of the body, to receive hurt from the excellency of that which it delighteth in; nor doth the mind desire to subdue or conquer, but only to be united with its object.

And here the only corruption of our delight is, the deficiency and imperfections of it: for though this blessed light leaves not any man in the shadow of death, yet it takes him not quite out of the shadow of sin, by the darkness whereof he is without much of that lustre and glory, which he shall then have, when the righteous shall shine like the sun in the firmament. Yet, at the least, our endeavours must be, that though our joy cannot be here a replenishing joy, yet it may be an operative joy, and so work out the measure of its own fulness. I have done with the several objects of man's delight, corporal, moral, intellectual, and divine.

CHAP. XX.

Of the causes of Joy. The union of the object to the faculty, by contemplation, hope, fruition, changes, by accident, a cause of delight.

I NOW proceed to speak of the more particular causes and effects of this passion. Touching the former, not to meddle with those which are unnatural, belluine, and morbid, (which the philosopher[a] hath given some instances of) the general cause is the natural goodness of the object; and the particulars under that, any thing which hath a power to unite, and make the object present with the faculty. And that is

[n] Rom. xv. 13. [a] *Arist.* Ethic. l. 7. c. 6.

done (to speak only of intellectual powers) three manner of ways; by contemplation, by confidence, and by fruition; by thinking of it in the mind, by expecting of it in the heart, and by enjoying of it in the whole man.[b]

Contemplation adds unto a soul a double delight: First, from its own property, it being the proper and natural agitation of man's mind; insomuch that those things which we abhor to know experimentally, our curious and contemplative nature desires to know speculatively. And therefore the devil's first temptation was drawn from the knowledge as well of evil as good: for he knew that the mind of man would receive content in the understanding of that, which, in its own nature, had no perfection in it.

But then, secondly, in the object of true delight, contemplation ministereth a farther joy, in that it doth in some sort pre-unite our souls and our blessedness together: and this is partly the reason why Aristotle so much advanceth his contemplative before his practick felicity: for though this, in regard of its immediate reference unto communion, be of a more spreading and diffusive nature; yet certainly in that sweetness of content, that serenity of soul, that exaltation of thoughts, which we receive from those noble motions of the higher mind, the other doth far, in pleasure and satisfaction, surpass all active happiness. And hence we see in the parts of man's body, those which are (if I may so speak) more contemplative, have precedence to those that are more practick. The parts of vision are before the parts of action; the right eye is preferred before the right hand. Thus we may observe in God himself (notwithstanding in him there can be neither accession nor intermission of delight) yet by way of expression to us-ward, he did not, in the creation of the world, so much joy in his 'fiat,' as in his 'vidit;'—not so much when he gave his creatures their nature, as when he saw their goodness; nature being the object of power, but goodness the object of delight:—and, therefore, the day of his rest was more holy than the days of his working; *that* being appointed for the contemplation, as *these* were for the production, of his creatures.

And as contemplation, by way of prescience, when it

[b] *Arist.* Rhet. l. 1. c. 1.

looketh forward on good things hoped; so also by way of memory, when it looketh backward, and revieweth evil things escaped, doth minister matter of renewed joy[c]. No man looketh on the sea with more comfort, than he who hath escaped a shipwreck. And therefore when Israel saw the Egyptians dead on the sea-shore, the fear of whom had so much affrighted them before, they then sang a song of triumph. Past troubles do season, and (as it were) ballast present comforts; as the snow in winter encreaseth the beauty of the spring.

But in this particular of contemplation, notwithstanding the excellency of it, there may be corruption in the excess; (for in these matters of delight, except they be such as are disproportioned to our corrupt nature, I mean divine things, we seldom err in the other extreme) and that is, when we do not divide ourselves between our parts, and let every one execute his proper function. So to attend upon mere mental notions, as to neglect the practical part of our life, and withdraw ourselves from the fellowship and regard of human society, is as wicked in religion,—as it would be, in nature, monstrous to see a fire burn without light, or shine without heat;—aberrations from the supreme law being, in divine things, impious, as they are, in natural, prodigious.

And therefore that vowed sequestration, and voluntary banishment of hermits and votaries from human society, under pretence of devoting themselves to contemplation, and a fore-enjoying of the light of God, is towards him as unpleasing, as it is in itself uncomfortable: for their very Pattern which they pretend in such cases to imitate, was not only a burning lamp by the heat of his own contemplations, but a shining lamp too, by the diffusing of his own comforts to the refreshing of others.

A second cause of delight is the sure confidence of the mind, whereby, upon strong and unerring grounds, it waiteth for the accomplishment of its desires: so that whatever doth encourage our hope, doth therewithal strengthen and enlarge our delight. 'Spe gaudent,' saith St. Paul[d]; 'Sperantes gaudent,' saith the philosopher[e]. Hope and joy go

[c] *Arist.* Rhet. l. 1. c. 10. [d] Rom. xii. 12. [e] *Arist* Rhet. l. 1. c. 11, 12.

both together: for where hope is strong, it doth first divert and take off the mind from poring upon our present wants; and withal ministereth tranquillity unto it, from the evidence of a future better estate.

But here we must take heed of a deep corruption. For though I incline not to that opinion, which denieth hope all assuaging and mitigating force in respect of evils, or any power to settle a floating mind; yet to have an ungrounded confidence, and either out of presumption, or security, to resolve upon uncertain and casual events, there-hence to deduce arguments of comfort, works but an empty and imaginary delight; like his in the Poet [f],

> ———" Petit ille dapes sub imagine somni,
> Oraque vana movet, dentemque in dente fatigat."
>
> Who, dreaming that he was a guest,
> At his imaginary feast,
> Did vainly glut upon a thought,
> Tiring each jaw and tooth for nought:
> And when he fancied dainty meat,
> Had nothing but a dream to eat.

Or like the musician in Plutarch [g], who having pleased Dionysius with a little vanishing musick, was rewarded with a short and deceived hope of a great reward. A presumptuous delight, though it seem for the time to minister as good content as that which is raised on a sounder bottom; yet, in the end, will work such inconveniences, as shall altogether countervail and overweigh the deceit of its former joys: for the mind, being mollified and puffed up with windy and unnourishing comfort, is quite disabled to bear the assault of some sudden evil; as having its forces scattered by security, which caution and fear would have collected. For we know, in bodies, union strengtheneth natural motion, and weakeneth violent: and, in the mind, the collecting and uniting of it doth both enable it for prosecution of its own ends, and for resisting all opposite force. It is therefore no comforting, but a weakening confidence, which is not provident and operative.

[f] *Ovid.* Met.—Isai. xxix. 8. Μὴ τὸ θάνῃς λιμῷ, καίτοι χρυσοῖσιν ὀνείροις. *Theoc.* Idyl. 21. [g] *Plut.* de Aud.

The third and most effectual cause of delight, is the fruition of good, and the real union thereof unto the mind: for all other things work delight no farther than either as they look towards, or work towards this. And therefore if we mark it in all matter of pleasure and joy, the more the union is, the more is the delight:—and union is the highest degree of fruition that can be. Thus we see the presence of a friend yields more content than the absence, and the embraces more than the presence;—so in other outward delights, those of incorporation are greater than those of adhesion:—as it is more natural to delight in our meats, than in our garments, the one being for a union inward, to increase our strength; the other outward only, to protect it. In the understanding, likewise, those assents which are most clear, are most pleasant; and perspicuity argues the perfecter union of the object to the faculty. And therefore we have 'speculum' and 'ænigma' put together by St. Paul; "We see as in a glass darkly;" where the weakness of our knowledge of God is attributed to this, that we see him not face to face with an immediate union unto his glory, but at a distance in the creature, and in the word, the glass of nature and of faith; both which are, in their kind, evidences of things not seen. We shall only there have a perfection of joy, where we shall have a consummate union: "In his presence only, is the fulness of joy."

Now three things there are which belong unto a perfect fruition of a good thing; First, *propriety* unto it[h]: for a sick man doth not feel the joy of a sound man's health,—nor a poor man, of a rich man's money. Propriety is that which makes all the emulation and contention amongst men, one man being aggrieved to see another to have that, which he either claimeth or coveteth. Secondly, *possession:* for a man can reap little comfort from that which is his own, if it be any way detained and withheld from him;—which was the cause of that great contention between Agamemnon and Achilles, and between the Greeks and Trojans, because the one took away and detained that which was the other's.[i] Thirdly, *accommodation*, to the end for which a thing was

h Τὰ αὑτῶν πᾶσιν ἡδέα· διὸ καὶ φιλότεκνοι. *Arist* Rhet. l. 2.—Polit. l. 2. c. 3.—Eth. l. 8. c. 12.

i *Arrian.* Epict. l. 1. c 22.

appointed: for a man may have a thing in his custody, and yet receive no comfort, nor real delight from it, except he apply it unto those purposes for which it was instituted. It is not then the having of a good, but the using of it, which makes it beneficial.

Now besides those natural causes of delight, there is, by accident, one more, to wit, the change and variety of good things [k], which the diversity of our natures and inclinations, and the emptiness of such things as we seek delight from, doth occasion. Where nature is simple and uncompounded, there one and the same operation is always pleasant: but where there is a mixed and various nature, and diversity of faculties, unto which do belong diversity of inclinations, there changes do minister delight:—as amongst learned men, variety of studies; and with luxurious men, variety of pleasures.

And this the rather, because there are no sublunary contentments, which bring not a satiety along with them [l], as hath been before observed. And therefore the same resolution which the philosopher gives for the walking of the body [m]; when he enquireth the reason why, in a journey, the inequality of the ways do less weary a man, than when they are all plain and alike,—we may give for the walking and 'wandering of the desire,' (as Solomon calls it) to wit, that change and variety do refresh nature, and are instead of a rest unto it. [n] And therefore, as I have before observed of Nero, the same hath Tully observed of Xerxes, that 'he propounded rewards to the inventors of new and changeable pleasures.'

Hereunto may be added, as a further cause of pleasure, whatsoever serveth to let out and to lessen grief, as words, tears, anger, revenge [o]: because all these are a kind of victory, than which nothing bringeth greater pleasure. And therefore Homer saith of revenge, that it is sweeter than the dropping honey.

[k] Eth. l. 7. c. ult. l. 10. c. 4. [l] Gustata magis quam potata delectant *Cic. Tusc.* l. 2. [m] Prob. sect. 5. qu. 1. Vid. *Sen.* de Tranq. c. 2, 3. [n] Quod etiam de Tiberio notavit *Suet.* c. 43. Qui hoc officio fungebantur, dicti (ut videtur) ab Ælio Lampridio 'Voluptarii;' in Alex. Sev. [o] Κοινόν τι χαρᾷ καὶ λύπῃ δάκρυα. *Xenoph.* Hellenic. l. 7. Est quædam etiam flendi voluptas. *Plin.* et Cic. de fine, l. 1.—*Arist.* Rhet. l. 1. c. 11.

CHAP. XXI.

Of other causes of Delight. Unexpectedness of good. Strength of desire. Imagination. Imitation. Fitness and accommodation of the effects of this passion. Reparation of nature. Dilatation. Thirst in noble objects. Satiety in baser. Whetting of industry. A timorous unbelief.

Unto these more principal causes of this affection, I shall briefly add these few which follow.

1. The suddenness and unexpectedness of a good thing, causeth the greater delight in it[a]. For expectation of a thing makes the mind feed upon it beforehand; as young gallants, who spend upon their estates before they come to them, and by that means make them the less when they come. As sometimes it happeneth with choice and delicate stomachs, that the sight and smell of their meat doth half cloy and satiate them, before they have at all tasted any of it; so the long gazing upon that which we desire by expectation, doth, as it were, deflower the delight of it before fruition. Whereas, on the other side, as the poet expresseth it[b],

> —— Ἡ ἐκτὸς καὶ πάρ' ἐλπίδας χαρὰ
> Ἔοικεν ἄλλῃ μῆκος οὐδὲν ἡδονῇ.
>
> No joy in greatness can compare with that,
> Which doth our hopes and thoughts anticipate.

So strong and violent hath been the immutation which sudden joy hath wrought in the body, that many (as I have formerly noted) have been quite overwhelmed by it[c], and been made partakers of Augustus's wish, to enjoy an εὐθανασία[d], and to die presently. And for this reason it is, that new things[e], and such as we admire[f] and were not

[a] Vix sum apud me; ita animus commotus est metu, Spe, gaudio, mirando hoc tanto, tam repentino bono. *Terent.* Andr. 945. Tacitus querebar animo meo tam repentinum tamque magnum non concipiente gaudium. *Apul.* Asin. Aur. l. 11. [b] *Sophoc.* Antig. [c] Multis mortem attulit gaudium ingens, insperatum, interclusa anima, et vim magni novique motus non sustinente. *A. Gell.* l. 3. c. 1. et c. 15. [d] *Suet.* in Aug. c. 99. [e] *Arist.* Eth. l. 10. c. 4. [f] Delectat quicquid est admirabile. *Cic.* orat. partit.

before acquainted withal, do usually delight us[g], because they surprise us, representing a kind of strangeness unto the mind, whereby it is enlarged and enriched: for strange and new things have ever the greatest price set upon them;—as I noted before of the Roman luxury, that it gloried in no delicates but those which were brought out of strange countries, and did first pose nature, before either feed or adorn it.

2. Strength of desire doth, on the other side, enlarge the pleasure of fruition; because nature ever delighteth most in those things which cost us dearest; and strong desires are ever painful. When Darius[h], in his flight, drank muddy water, and Ptolemy did eat dry bread, they both professed, that they never felt greater pleasure; strength of appetite marvellously increasing the delight in that which satisfied it: for want and difficulty are great preparations to a more feeling fruition. As bees gather excellent honey out of the bitterest herbs[i]; and as we say, "Nulla sunt firmiora, quam quæ ex dubiis facta sunt certa;" those evidences are surest, which are made clear out of doubtful; so those pleasures are sweetest, "Quæ suaves fiunt ex tristibus," which have had wants, and fears, and difficulties, to provide a welcome for them. And therefore[k] wrestlers, and fencers, and such like masters of game[l], were wont to use their hands unto heavy weights; that when, in their games, they were to use them empty and naked, they might do it with the more expediteness and pleasure.

3. Imagination and fancy, either in ourselves or other men, is many times the foundation of delight. Diogenes' sullen and melancholy fancy took as much pleasure in his tub, and staff, and water, as other men in their palaces, and amplest provisions. And he in the Poet[m],

> Qui se credebat miros audire tragœdos
> In vacuo lætus sessor plausorque theatro;—

[g] Proximorum incuriosi, longinqua sectamur. *Plin.* l. 8. ep. 20. Vid. *Clem. Alex.* Pæd. l. 2. c. 1. *Plin.* l. 9. c. 34. et l. 22. c. 2. *Plut.* de tuenda sanitate. [h] Vid. *Cic.* Tusc. Qu. l. 5. [i] *Plutarch* de Tranquil. [k] *Quintil.* l. 5. cap. 12. [l] *Quintil.* lib. 11. cap. 2.—Si mihi tranquilla et placata omnia fuissent, incredibili, quæ nunc fruor, lætitiæ voluptate caruissem. *Cic.* Orat. post Reditum.—*Max. Tyrius* Dissert. 33.—*Plut.* de profect. virtutum. [m] Horat. Epist. lib. 2. Ep. 2.

Cum redit ad sese, ' Pol, me occidistis, amici,
Non servastis,' ait ; ' cui sic extorta voluptas,
Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error.'

Who thought he heard rare tragedies of wit,
And in an empty theatre did sit,
And gave applauses : but being heal'd, complain,
' Friends, I 'm not sav'd by this your love, but slain :
Robb'd of that sweet delight I then did find
In the so grateful error of my mind.'

Hence likewise it is, that men are delighted with mythologies and poetical fables [n], with elegancies, jests, urbanity, and flowers of wit; with pageants, pomps, triumphs, and public celebrities ; because all these, and other the like, are either the fruit or food of the imagination.

4. Upon the same reason, we are marvellously delighted with lively imitation [o], as with those arts, which do curiously express the works and lineaments of Nature. Insomuch that the similitudes of those things do wonderfully content us, whose natural deformities we abhor. We are well pleased with Homer's description of Thersites ; and with Sophocles' expression of the ulcer of Philoctetes ; with Parmenio's imitation of the grunting of a hog ; and Theodorus's of the rattling of wheels ; with Plautus's description of a chargeable wife [p], and Horace's of a garrulous companion [q] ; though the things themselves we should willingly decline.

5. Those things delight every man which are οἰκεῖα τῇ φύσει, as the philosopher speaks [r], suitably fitted and accommodated to his genius and frame of nature. As in the same plant, the bee feedeth on the flower, the bird on the seed, the sheep on the blade, the swine on the root ; so in the same author, one man observeth the rational, another the historical, a third the elegant and more rhetorical passages, with special delight, according as they are best accommodated unto the complexion of each mind. And I find it observed out of Hippocrates [s], that even in the body, many times, that kind of meat which nature receiveth with complacency, and with a more

[n] Fictas fabulas cum voluptate legimus. *Cic.* de fin. l. 5. [o] Vid. *Plutarch.* de Aud. Poet. et *Quintil.* lib. 2. cap. 23. Hinc encomium stultitiæ, pediculi, febrium, &c. [p] *Plaut.* in Aulul. [q] *Horat.* l. 1. Sat. 9. [r] *Ethic.* l. 10. c. 7.—*Plutarch.* de Aud. Poetis. [s] Cœl. Rhod. l. 5. c. 34. Ἡδονή ἐστιν ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως. *Nemes.* ex Arist. c. 18.

particular delight, though in itself it may be worse; yet proveth better nourishment unto that body, than such, as though better in itself, findeth yet a reluctancy and backwardness of nature to close or correspond with it. The same seeds are not proper for the sand and for the clay; nor the same employments of mind for men of various and different constitutions. Nor is there, I believe, any thing, which would more conduce to the general advancement of arts and learning, than if every man's studies were fixed and limited to that proper course, which his natural abilities did more particularly lead him unto. For hereupon would grow a double delight, and, by consequence, improvement, (for every thing grows most, when it is best pleased) the one, from nature,—the other, from custom and acquaintance [t], which conquereth and digesteth the difficulties of every thing we set about, and maketh them yet more natural unto us. And therefore the philosopher [u], reckoning up many things that are pleasant to the mind, putteth these two in the first place; those things that are natural, and those that we are accustomed unto, wherein there is least violence offered unto the inclinations and impressions of nature.

Touching the effects of this passion, I shall name but these few: First, the effects of corporal delights are only (as I observed out of Aristotle) medicinal, for repairing the breaches and ruins of our decayed natures; for animating and refreshing our languishing spirits; for preserving ourselves in a good ability to execute offices of a higher nature; for furnishing the world with a succession of men, which otherwise the greediness of mortality would in short time devour. These are true and intended ends of those delights; and when they once transgress these bounds, they begin to oppress nature [x]; weaken and distemper the body; clog the mind; and fill the whole man with satiety and loathing; which is the reason (as was even now noted) why men, too violently carried away with them, are presently over-cloyed with one kind, and must have variety to keep out loathing [y]; which Tacitus observes in that monster of women, Messallina,

[t] Eth. l. 10. c. 9. [u] Τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ εἰθισμένον· τὸ μὴ θίαιον, καὶ οὗ ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ. Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. [x] Τὰς γὰρ ἡδονὰς Ὅταν προδῶσιν ἄνδρες, οὐ τίθημ' ἐγὼ Ζῆν τοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἔμψυχον ἡγοῦμαι νεκρόν. *Sophoc.* Antig. [y] *Plut.* in Gryllo.

" Facilitate adulterorum, in fastidium versa, ad incognitas libidines profluebat[y];" that loathing more easy and common sins, she betook herself to unnatural lusts: and I verily think is particularly intended by St. Paul, *Rom.* i. 26.

A second effect of joy is opening and dilatation of the heart and countenance, expressing the serenity of the mind; whence it hath the name of 'Lætitia,' as it were a 'broad' and spreading passion.[z] Now the reason of this motion, occasioned by joy, is the natural desire which man hath to be united to the thing wherein he delights, to make way and passage for its entrance into him. And hence we find in this passion an exultation and egress of the spirits, discovering a kind of looseness of nature in her security; doing many things, not out of resolution, but instinct and power; transporting both mind and body to sudden and unpremeditated expressions of its own content: for of all passions, joy can be the least dissembled or suppressed. " Nam gaudio cogendi vis inest," saith Pliny.[a] It exerciseth a kind of welcome violence and tyranny upon a man; as we see in David's dancing before the ark; and the lame man's walking, and leaping, and praising God, after he had been cured of his lameness. And this diffusion of the spirits showed both the haste and forwardness of Nature, in striving, as it were, to meet her object, and make large room for its entertainment, —as also to dispel and scatter all adverse humours that would hinder the ingress of it; and lastly, to send forth news, as it were, through the whole province of Nature, that all the parts might bear a share in the common comfort.

Thirdly; those noble delights which arise from heavenly causes, do withal cause a sweet thirst and longing in the soul after more[b]; as some colours do both delight the sight and strengthen it. For while God is the object, there cannot be either satiety to cloy the soul, nor such a full comprehension, as will leave no room for more.

Thus they who delight in the fruition of God by grace, do desire a more plentiful fruition of him in glory; and they that delight in the sight of God's glory, do still desire to be for ever so delighted. So that their desire is without anxiety, because they are satiated with the thing which they

[y] Annal. l. 11. [z] Lætitia à mentis latitudine. [a] Paneg. ad Trajan. [b] *Plut.* in Peric.

do desire; and their satiety is without loathing, because still they desire the thing wherewith they are satiated:—they desire without grief, because they are replenished; and they are replenished without weariness, because they desire still:—they see God, and still they desire to see him; they enjoy God, and still they desire for ever to enjoy him; they love and praise God, and make it their immortal business still to love and praise him:

"Et quem semper habent, semper habere volunt."

Whom they for ever have, with love yet higher
To have for ever they do still desire.

Divine joy is like the water of Æsculapius' well[c]; which, they say, is not capable of putrefaction.

Fourthly; Delight wetteth and intendeth the actions of the soul towards the thing wherein it delighteth: it putteth forth more force, and more exactness in the doing of them; because it exonerateth the mind of all those dulling indispositions which unfitted it for action.[d] And for this reason happily it is, that the Lacedemonians[e] used music in their wars, to refresh and delight nature: for joy is instead of recreation to the soul; it wonderfully disposeth for business. And those actions which nature hath made necessary, it hath put pleasure in them, that thereby men might be quickened and excited unto them. And therefore wise men have told us, that pleasure is 'Sal et condimentum vitæ[f],' the sauce which seasoneth the actions of life.

Lastly; because the nature of man is usually more acquainted with sorrows than with pleasures: therefore whether out of conscience of guilt, which deserves no joy; or out of experience, which useth to find but little joy in the world; or out of fear of our own aptness to mistake; or out of a provident care not to close or feed upon a delight, till we are fully assured of our possession of it, and because usually the mind, after shaking, is more settled;—whether for these, or any other reasons, we see it usually come to pass, that vehement joy doth breed a kind of jealousy and unbelief, that sure the thing we have, is too good to be true; and that then

[c] *Arist.* Tom. 1. Orat. de Puteo Æscul. [d] *Arist.* Eth. l. 10. c. 5. Pol. l. 8. c. 5. [e] *Plut.* de Hom. *A. Gell.* l. 1. c. 1. [f] *Cic.* Offic. l. 1.—*Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 2.—*Plaut.* Casin. Act. 2. Sc. 4.—*Quint.* l. 5. c. 14.

when our eyes tell us, that they see it, they do but dazzle and deceive us; as,

"Quod nimis volumus, haud facile credimus."

The thing which we desire should be,
We scarce believe when we do see.

So Jacob, when he heard that his son Joseph was alive, fainted, being astonished at so good news, and could not believe it. [f] And when God restored the Jews out of captivity, they could think no otherwise of it than as a dream. [g] And Peter, when he was by the angel delivered out of prison, took it for a vision only, and an apparition, and not for a truth. [h]

And lastly, of the disciples after Christ's resurrection, when he manifested himself to them, it is said, that "for very joy they believed not [i];" their fears, keeping back, as it were, and questioning the truth of their joys; 'omnia tuta timens,' not suffering them too hastily to believe what their eyes did see. As in the sea, when a storm is over, there remains still an inward working and volutation; which the poet thus expresseth:

"Ut si quando ruit, debellatasque reliquit
Eurus aquas, pax ipsa tumet, pontumque jacentem
Exanimis jam volvit hyems."

As when a mighty tempest doth now cease
To toss the roaring billows, even that peace
Doth swell and murmur, and the dying wind
On the calm'd sea leaves his own prints behind.

Even so in the mind of man, when its fears are blown over, and there is a calm upon it, there is still a 'metus trepidationis,' and a kind of solicitous jealousy of what it enjoys. [k]

And this unbelief of joy is admirably set forth in the carriages of Penelope [l], when her nurse and her son endeavoured to assure her of the truth of Ulysses' return, after so many years' absence, by the poet: in which doubting she still persisted, till, by certain signs, Ulysses himself made it

[f] Gen. xlv. 26. [g] Psalm cxxvi. 1. [h] Acts xi. 9. [i] Luke xxiv. 41. [k] Majus gaudium fuit, quam quod universum homines caperent. Vix satis credere se quisque audisse: alii alios intueri mirabundi, velut somni vanam speciem. *Liv.* l. 33. [l] Odys. ψ, 213.

appear unto her; whereupon she excused it after this manner,

Αὐτὰρ μὴ νῦν μοι τόδε χώεο, μηδὲ νεμέσσα, &c.

My dear Ulysses, let it not offend,
That when I saw you first, I did suspend
My love with my belief; since my faint breast,
When first with those glad tidings it was blest,
Trembled with doubts, lest, by such forged lies,
Some crafty false pretender might devise
To have ensnar'd me, and, with these false sounds,
Defil'd my love, and multiplied my wounds.

CHAP. XXII.

Of the affection of Sorrow, the object of it evil, sensitive, intellectual, as present in itself, or to the mind, by memory, or suspicion, particular causes, effects of it: Fear, care, experience, erudition, irresolution, despair, execration, distempers of body.

The opposite passion to this of delight, is grief and sorrow; which is nothing but a perturbation and unquietness, wrought by the pressure of some present evil, which the mind, in vain, struggleth with, as finding itself, alone, too impotent for the conflict: *Evil*, I say, either formally, as in sin, or pain, present, or feared; or privately, such as is any good thing which we have lost, or whereof we do despair, or have been disappointed. And this is, in respect of its object, as the former passion, either *sensitive* or *intellectual*. *Sensitive* is that anguish and distress of nature, which lieth upon the body. A passion, in this sense, little conducing to the advancement of nature, being always joined with some measure of its decay, but only as it serves sometimes for the better fortifying it against the same or greater evils; it being the condition, as of corporal delights, by custom to grow burthensome and distasteful; so of pains, to become easy and familiar.

The other and greater grief is *intellectual*, which in Solomon's phrase is, "a wounded spirit:"—so much certainly the more quick and piercing, by how much a spirit is more

vital than a body. Besides,—the anguish of the soul finds always, or works the same sympathy in the body; but outward sorrows reach not ever so far, as the spiritual and higher part of the soul. And therefore we see many men, out of a mistake that the distress of their souls hath been wrought by a union to their bodies, have voluntarily spoiled this, to deliver and quiet that.

The causes of this passion are, as in the former, whatsoever hath in it power to disturb the mind by its union thereunto. There are then two conditions in respect of the object, that it be evil and present. Evil first, and that not only formally in itself, but apprehensively to the understanding. And therefore we see, that many things which are, in their nature, evil,—yet, out of the particular distemper of the mind, and deceitfulness in them, may prove pleasant thereunto. And this is the chief corruption of this passion; I mean, the misplacing, or the undue suspending of it: for although strictly, in its own property, it be not an advancement of nature, nor adds any perfection, but rather weakens it; yet in regard of the reference which it bears, either to a superior law, as testifying our love unto the obedience, by our grief for the breach thereof;—or to our consequent carriage and actions, as governing them with greater wisdom and providence; it may be said to add much perfection to the mind of man, because it serves as an inducement to more cautelous living.

The next condition, in respect of the object, is, that it be present: which may fall out either by memory, and then our grief is called 'repentance;'—or fancy and suspicion, and so it may be called 'anxiety of mind;'—or by sense and present union, which is the principal kind, and so I call it 'anguish.'

For the first, nothing can properly and truly work grief by ministry of memory, when the object or evil is long since past, but those things, which do withal stain our nature, and work impressions of permanent deformity. For as it falleth out, that many things in their exercise pleasant, prove after, in their operations, offensive and burthensome;—so on the other side, many things which, for the time of their continuance, are irksome and heavy, prove yet, after, occasions of

greater joy[a]; whether they be means used for the procuring of further good:

"Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum,
Tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi, &c."[b]

Through various great mishaps, and danger's store,
We hasten to our home and wished shore:
Where fates do promise rest, where Troy revives;
Only reserve yourselves for better lives.

Or whether they be evils which, by our wisdom, we have broken through and avoided:

——"Sed et hæc olim meminisse juvabit."

When we are arriv'd at ease,
Remembrance of a storm doth please.

The objects, then, of repentance are not our passive, but our active evils: not the evils of suffering, but the evils of doing: for the memory of afflictions past, represents unto us nature loosed and delivered; and should so much the more increase our joy, by how much redemption is, for the most part, a more felt blessing than immunity. But the memory of sins past represents nature obliged, guilty, and imprisoned; and so leaves a double ground for grief, the stain or pollution, and the guilt or malediction, a deformity to the law, and a curse from it. It would be improper here to wander into a digression touching repentance; only in a word, it is then a 'godly sorrow,' when it proceeds from the memory of evil, not so much in respect of the punishment, as of the stain: when we grieve more, because our sin hath made us unholy, than because it hath made us unhappy; and not only because we are run into the danger of the law, but because we are run out of the way of the law:—when it teacheth us to cry, not only with Pharaoh, 'Take away this *plague*;' but with Israel in the Prophet, 'Take away *iniquity*.'

Concerning grief of pre-occupation, arising out of suspicious fear and expectation of evil, I know not what worth it can have in it, unless haply thus,—that by fore-accustoming the mind to evil, it is the better strengthened to

[a] Heb. xii. 11. [b] Æneid l. 1.—Iliad. 4.

stand under it: for evils, by premeditation, are either prevented or mitigated; the mind gathering strength and wisdom together to meet it. And therefore it is prudent advice of Plutarch [a], that we should have a prepared mind, which, when any evil falleth [b] out, might not be surprised by it. To say as Anaxagoras [c] did, when he heard of the death of his son, 'Scio me genuisse mortalem, I know that I begat a mortal son.' I know that my riches had wings, and that my comforts were mutable. Preparedness composeth the mind to patience. Ulysses wept when he saw his dog; which he did not, when he saw his wife: he came prepared for the one; but was surprised by the other.

> "Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem,
> Et perferre, soror, potero."
>
> Had I foreseen this grief, or could but fear it,
> I then should have compos'd myself to bear it.

Which is the reason, why philosophers prescribe the whole course of man's life, to be only a meditation upon death; because that being so great an evil in itself, and so sure to us, it ought to be expected, that it may not come sudden, and find us unprepared to meet the King of Terrors. For it is the property of custom and acquaintance, not only to alleviate and assuage evils; (to which purpose Seneca [d] speaks 'Perdidisti tot mala, si nondum misera esse didicisti, Thou hast lost thy affections if they have not yet taught thee to be miserable') but further, as Aristotle [e] notes, to work some manner of delight in things, at first troublesome and tedious: and therefore he reckoneth mourning amongst pleasant things; and tears are, by nature, made the witnesses as well of joy as of grief [f]:

> Καὶ κύνει ἀπῖόμενος ἦν πατρίδα· πολλὰ δ' ἀπ' αὐτου
> Δακρυα θερμὰ χέονΐ, ἐπεὶ ἀσπασίως ἴδε γαῖαν.
>
> He kiss'd the shore, fast tears ran from his eyes,
> When he his native country first espies.

And Seneca (whether philosophically or rhetorically) observes, that obstinacy and resolvedness in grief doth so

[a] *Plut.* de Aud. [b] Præcogitati mali mollis ictus. *Sen.* Epist. 77. [c] *Cic.* Tusc. Qu. l. 3.—*Plut.* de Tranq. [d] Consolatio ad Helviam. [e] Rhet. l. 1. [f] Odyss. δ. 522.

alter the nature of it, "ut fiat tandem infelicis animi prava voluptas dolor," that at length it turns into a kind of pleasant pain[g]. Sure I am, the apostle biddeth us "count it joy, when we fall into temptation."

The last presence of grief was real, when some ponderous evil, either of affliction or of sin,—the loss of some good wherein we delighted,—the disappointment of some hope whereon we relied, meeting with impotency in ourselves to remove what we suffer, to recover what we lose, to supply what we want,—doth bruise and lie with a heavy weight upon the tenderest part of man, his soul and spirit. And in this, I cannot find, considered merely in itself, any worth at all, it being nothing else but the violation and wounding of nature: but in order to the effects which it produceth, it may have sundry denominations, either of a serviceable or of a corrupt affection. I shall but briefly name them, and pass over to the next.

The profitable effects are principally these: First, as it is an instrument[h] of public administration and discipline. It is, as it were, both a schoolmaster and a physician, to teach and to cure. So the philosopher[i] telleth us, that, 'by pleasure and pain, children are trained up unto arts and sciences, the rod being unto the mind, as a rudder unto a ship.' So the prophet[k] David putteth chastisement and instruction together: "Blessed is the man whom thou chastenest, and teachest out of thy law;" and again, "It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learn thy commandments." Therefore God gave the law in the wilderness, where the people were in want and under discipline; to note that grief is a good instrument[l] unto learning; for after, in their prosperity, they would not hear.

And as it is a means to teach, so it is a means to cure too: for therefore pain is usually made the matter of punishment, that as men offend by sinful pleasure, so they may be amended by wholesome sorrow[m]. *Αἱ γὰρ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων*: cures are usually wrought by contraries.

[g] Est quædam etiam dolendi voluptas: *Plin.* l. 8. ep. 6. [h] *Clem. Alex.* Pædag. l. 1. c. 8. [i] Ethic. l. 10. c. 1. Calamitatcs remedia. *Sen.* de Tranq. l. 1. c. 9. [k] Psalm xciv. 12. cxix. 71. Jer. xxii. 21. [l] Grande doloris Ingenium, miserisque venit solertia rebus. [m] Ethic. l. 2. c. 3.

Again; it doth, by experience, strengthen and harden [n], making both wise and able for enduring further calamities. "Quos Deus amat, indurat et exercet:" God exerciseth and traineth those whom he loves, bringing them up [o], "non in deliciis, sed in castris," not in paradise, but in a wilderness. Now as the philosopher [p] speaketh, δοκεῖ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρία τις εἶναι. Experience is a kind of fortitude and armour, whereby a man contemneth τὰ κενὰ τῶν κακῶν, many things which are indeed but 'terriculamenta,' scare-crows to ignorant and weak minds. Whereas, many times, pains have wrought patience,—and patience, experience of an issue and escape,—and that experience arms the soul unto more patience [q] in new assaults. For if gold were a rational creature, having passed through the fire, and kept its own nature inviolate, it would ever after be the less afraid of the fire. And, as Plutarch [r] excellently speaketh, 'A wise man should be like gold, to keep his nature in the fire.' Strangers dislike many things in a place, which those that are home-born and used unto, do easily digest. Thus the apostle [s] argueth "God hath delivered, and doth deliver;"—therefore he will deliver.—So Ulysses [t] in Homer:

> Τλήσομαι, ἐν στήθεσσιν ἔχων ταλαπενθέα θυμόν·
> Ἤδη γὰρ μάλα πολλ' ἔπαθον.
>
> I 'll bear with a firm mind, whate'er comes more,
> Having endur'd so many griefs before.

And elsewhere [u], on the same manner, he encouraged his companions on the sea:

> Ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γάρ πω τί κακῶν ἀδαήμονες εἰμέν· &c.
>
> Sirs, w' are not now to learn what sorrows are,
> Having felt so many; and this now by far
> Comes short of that which we endured then,
> When the proud Cyclops shut us in his den:
> Yet that we scap'd, he of his prey did miss;
> Hereafter we shall joy to think of this.

[n] *Sen.* de otio Sap. c. 4. [o] Epist. 6, 7. [p] Ethic. 3. c. 8.
[q] Ὁ δ' ἐσθλὸς ἐσθλὸς, οὐδὲ συμφορᾶς ὕπο φύσιν διέφθειρ', &c. *Eurip.* Hec. 595.
[r] Vid. *Plut.* l. de Adulat. et Amic. Consol. ad Apollonium. *Plut.* de Aud.
[s] 2 Cor. i. 9, 10. [t] Odyss. ε. 222. [u] Odyss. μ. 208.

Thus as iron [x], which hath passed through the fire, being quenched, is harder than it was before; so the mind, having passed through troubles, is the more hardened to endure them again. And, therefore, it is wise advice which learned men give,—to let griefs have a time to breathe, and not to endeavour the stopping of them, while they are in 'impetu,' and in their first rising: as physicians suffer humours to ripen, and gather to some head, before they apply medicines unto them. When time hath a little concocted grief, and experience hardened and instructed nature to stand under it; it doth then willingly admit of those remedies [y], which being unreasonably applied, it rejecteth and resisteth.

"Quis matrem, nisi mentis inops, in funere nati
Flere vetat? non hoc illa monenda loco est.
Cum dederit lachrymas, animumque expleverit ægrum,
Ille dolor verbis emoderandus erit." [z]

Who would forbid a mother then to mourn,
When her son's ashes are warm in his urn?
But when she 's cloy'd with tears, and sorrow's rage
Is over, counsel then may grief assuage.

Whereas before [a], it doth rather exasperate than allay. For of all passions, this of grief doth least admit of a simple cure from the dictates of reason, except it have a time given it too, wherein it may, like unto new [b] wine, 'defervescere,' slack, and come to its just temper again.

The last profitable effect is fear and suspicion, care or solicitousness to avoid those evils which oppress our nature; a cautelous discourse and consultation of reason, how it may either escape or prevent the evils, which experience hath taught it to decline, as a burnt child the fire. For all passions, so long as they collect reason, and set that on work, are of good use in the minds of men: and indeed, the counsels and communion of right reason alone, grounded on,

[x] *Plut.* de Ad. et Amic. et de Sanit. tuenda. [y] Ut enim crudum adhuc vulnus medentium manus reformidat, deinde patitur, atque ultro requirit; sic recens animi dolor consolationes rejicit ac refugit, mox desiderat, et clementer admotis acquiescit, *Plin.* Ep. lib. 5. ep. 16.—Vid. *Plut.* Cons. ad Apoll. [z] *Ovid.* de Remed. Amor. lib. 1. [a] Ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῦ λέγοντος, ἣν φόβους λεγῃ. Ὅτ' οὖν παραινοῦσ' οὐδὲν ἐς πλέον ποιῶ, *Soph.* Oed. T. [b] Τὸν γὰρ οἶνον τὸν νέον Πολλή γ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ἄνδρ' ἀποζέσαι, Πρέπιστον ἀπαφρίσαι κ' ἀπανθῆσαι, &c. *Alex.*

and guided by religion, are only that Nepenthes [c] and medicine against grief, which who so mixeth and applieth aright, shall not spend nor load himself with unuseful sorrow. Thus as bees do poise themselves with little gravel stones, that they may not be carried away with the wind, which the poet [d] hath elegantly expressed:

> ———" Sæpe lapillos,
> Ut cymbæ instabiles fluctu jactante saburram,
> Tollunt: his sese per inania nubila librant."
>
> As ships with ballast, so the little bee
> With gravel 's pois'd, that he may steady flee.

So patience and wisdom in the bearing of one sorrow, doth keep the mind in a stable condition against any other. A man doth never over-grieve, that keeps his ears open to counsel, and his reason to judgement above his passion [e].

The evil effects of grief commonly follow the excess of it, and they respect the reason, the will, and the body. In the reason, it works distractions [f], irresolutions, and weakness, by drawing the main strain of it, rather to a fearful contemplation of its own misery, than to a fruitful discourse how to avoid it: for as the motions of a wounded body, so the discourses of a wounded mind, are faint, uncertain, and tottering.

Secondly, in the will, it worketh, first, despair; for it being the property of grief to condensate, and, as it were, on all sides besiege the mind,—the more violent the passion is, the less apparent are the passages out of it. So that, in an extremity of anguish, where the passages are in themselves narrow, and the reason also blind and weak to find them out,—the mind is constrained, having no object but its own pain to reflect upon, to fall into a dark and fearful contemplation of its own sad estate, and marvellous high and pathetical aggravations of it; as if it were the greatest which any man felt: not considering, that it feels its own sorrow,

[c] *Hom.* Odyss. δ. 221.—*Plin.* l. 21. c 21.—*Plut.* Sympos. l. 1. c. 1.—*Macrob.* l. 7. c. 1.—*Clem. Alex.* in Protrep.—*Nazian.* Carm. in ob. patris ad filium.
[d] Georg. l. 4.—*Plutarch.* lib. de Solert. Animal. [e] Iliad. τ. 65. [f] Οὐκ οἶδ' εἰς ὅτ: βλέψω κακῶν Πολλῶν παρόντων. ἦν γὰρ ἄψωμαι τινὸς, Τόδ' οὐκ ἐᾷ με· παρακαλεῖ δ' ἐκεῖθεν αὖ Λύπη τις ἄλλη, &c. *Eurip.* Hecub. 585.

but knows not the weight of other men's. Whereas, if all the calamities of mortal men were heaped into one storehouse, and from thence every man were to take an equal portion; Socrates was wont to say, that "each man would rather choose to go away with his own pain."

And from hence it proceedeth to many other effects, fury, sinful wishes, and execrations both against itself, and any thing that concurreth to its being in misery;—as we see in Israel [g] in the wilderness, and that mirror of patience [h], Job himself. And thus Homer [i] bringeth in Ulysses in despair, under a sore tempest, bewailing himself;

Τρὶς μάκαρες Δαναοὶ καὶ τετράκις, οἳ τότ' ὄλοντο, &c.

Thrice four times happy Grecians, who did fall,
To gratify their friends, under Troy wall.
Oh that I there had render'd my last breath,
When Trojan darts made me a mark for death;
Then glorious rites my fun'ral had attended,
But now my life will be ignobly ended.

Another evil effect, is to indispose and disable for duty; both because grief doth refrigerate, (as the philosopher [j] telleth us) and that is the worst temper for action; and also diverts the mind from any thing but that which feeds it: and therefore David in his sorrow forgot to eat his bread [k], because eating and refreshing of nature is a mitigating of grief, as Pliny [l] telleth us. And lastly, because it weakeneth, distracteth and discourageth the mind, making it soft and timorous, apt to bode evils unto itself.

———"Crudelis ubique
Luctus: ubique pavor."

Grief and fear go usually together.

And therefore when Æneas [m] was to encourage his friends unto patience and action, he was forced to dissemble his own sorrow.

———"Curisque ingentibus æger
Spem vultu simulat; premit altum corde dolorem."

[g] Numb. xiv. 2. [h] Job iii. 1. Jer. xx. 14. Isai. viii. 21. [i] Odyss. ε. 306. [j] *Arist.* Probl. l. 11. Quæst. 13. [k] Μεμνημένος οὐδέ τι σίτου, Οὔτ' ἐὐνῆς. Iliad. ω. 130. [l] Dolor cibo lenitur, *Plin.* l. 22. c. 14. [m] Æneid. 1. Consilium vultu tegit, et spem fronte serenat, Æn. 4.

Although with heavy cares and doubts distress'd,
His looks feign'd hopes, and his heart griefs suppress'd.

And it is an excellent description in Homer, of the fidelity of Antilochus, when he was commanded to relate unto Achilles the sad news of Patroclus' death:

———'Αντίλοχος δὲ κατέστυγε μῦθον ἀκούσας, &c.

When Menelaus gave him this command,
Antilochus astonished did stand.
Smitten with dumbness through his grief and fears,
His voice was stopp'd, and his eyes swam in tears.
Yet none of all this grief did duty stay:
He left his arms, whose weight might cause delay,
And went, and wept, and ran, with doleful word,
That great Patroclus fell by Hector's sword.

In a tempest[n], saith Seneca, that pilot is to be commended, whom the shipwreck swalloweth up at the stern, with the rudder in his hand.

And it was the great honour of Mary Magdalen, that when above all other she wept for the loss of Christ, yet then of all other she was most diligent to seek him.

Lastly, in the body there is no other passion, that doth produce stronger, or more lasting inconveniences by pressure of heart, obstruction of spirit, wasting of strength, dryness of bones, exhausting of nature. Grief in the heart, is like a moth in a garment; which biteth asunder, as it were, the strings and the strength thereof; stoppeth the voice; looseth the joints; withereth the flesh; shrivelleth the skin; dimmeth the eyes; cloudeth the countenance; deflowereth the beauty; troubleth the bowels; in one word, disordereth the whole frame.

Now this passion of grief is distributed into many inferior kinds, as grief of sympathy for the evils and calamities of other men[o], as if they were our own, considering that they may likewise befal us or ours, which is called '*Mercy*:'[p] Grief of repining at the good of another man, as if his hap-

[n] In naufragio rector laudandus, quem obruit mare clavum tenentem, *Sen.* ad Petil. c. 6.—*Aristid.* To. 2. Orat. Rhodiaca.—Vide Odyss. δ. 703, 716.—Iliad. χ. 460.—*Damascen.* de Orthodox. fid. l. 2. c. 14.

[o] Ἐποικτείρω δέ νιν Δυστηνὸν ἔμπης, καίπερ ὄνία δυσμενῆ, Οὐδὲν τὸ τούτου μᾶλλον, ἢ τοὐμὸν σκοπῶν· *Sophoc.* Ajax. 121.

[p] Sed videt ingratos, intabescitque vivendo,

piness were our misery: as that pillar which was light unto Israel, to guide them, was darkness unto the Egyptians, to trouble and amaze them; which is called *Envy*. Grief of fretfulness at the prosperity of evil and unworthy men; which is called *Indignation;* Grief of indigence, when we find ourselves want those good things which others enjoy, which we envy not unto them, but desire to enjoy them ourselves too, which is called *Emulation; Grief of guilt*, for evil committed, which is called *Repentance;*—and Grief of fear for evil expected, which is called *Despair:* of which to discourse would be over tedious, and many of them are most learnedly handled by Aristotle in his Rhetoricks;—and, therefore, I shall here put an end to this passion.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the affections of Hope, the object of it, good future, possible, difficult: Of regular and inordinate Despair.

The next rank and series, is of irascible passions, namely, those which respect their object, as annexed unto some degree of difficulty, in the obtaining, or avoiding of it: the first of which is *Hope;* whereby I understand an earnest and strong inclination and expectation of some great good apprehended as possible to be obtained, though not by our own strength, nor without some intervenient difficulties. I shall not collect those praises [a], which are commonly bestowed upon it; nor examine the contrary extremes of those who declaim against it, making it a means either of augmenting an unexpected evil, before not sufficiently prevented; or of deflouring a future good too hastily pre-occupated;—but shall only

Successus hominum; carpitque et carpitur una, Suppliciumque suum est, *Ovid.* Met. 2.—Insita mortalibus natura, recentem aliorum felicitatem ægris oculis introspicere, *Tac.* Hist. l. 2.—Aut tibi malum quid, aut alteri bonum, evenit. *Bion* ad malevolum quendam, quem tristem aspexit. Apud Laert.—Prov. xxx. 21, 22. Psalm lxxiii. 12, 13. Job xxi. 7. Eccles. x. 5, 6, 7. Marmoreo Licinus tumulo jacet, et Cato parvo, Pompeius nullo.—Patricios omnes opibus cum provocet unus, Quo tondente gravis juveni mihi barba sonabat, &c. Difficile est satiram non scribere, *Juvenal.* Satir. 1.—Vid. *Aristot.* Ethic. l. 2. et Mag. Moral. l. 1.—Vid. *Suidam* in Voc. Ζηλός. [a] Iliad. ξ. 794. προσδοκία ἀγαθῶι. *Suidas.*—Προσδοκία κτήσεως ἀγαθοῦ. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. lib. 2.—Spes quasi pes animi. *Isid. Hispal.* Orig. lib. 7. cap. 2.

touch that dignity and corruption which I shall observe to arise from it, with references to its objects, causes, and effects.

Concerning the object or fundamental cause of hope, it hath these three conditions in it, that it be a future, a possible, a difficult good.

First [b], Future; for good present is the object of our sense, but 'hope is [c] of things not seen.' For herein is one principal difference between divine faith and divine hope, that faith being ὑπόστασις τῶν ἐλπιζομένων, that 'substance [d] of things hoped for,' hath ever respect to its object, as, in some manner, present and subsisting in the promises and first fruits which we have of it; so that the first effect of faith is a present interest and title; but the operation of hope is waiting and expectation. But yet it will not from hence follow, that the more a man hath of the presence of an object, the less he hath of hope towards it: for though hope be swallowed up in the complete presence of its object, yet it is not at all diminished, but encreased rather by a partial presence. And as in massy bodies, though violent motions be in the end weakest, as being furthest from the strength that impelled them, yet natural are ever swiftest towards the center, as nearest approaching unto the place that draws them:—so in the hopes of men, though such as are violent and groundless, prove weaker and weaker, and so break out at last into emptiness and vapour; in which respect philosophers [e] have called 'hope the dreams of waking men;' (like that of the musician, whom Dionysius deceived with an empty promise, of which I spake before;) yet those that are stayed and natural, are ever more strong, when they have procured a larger measure of presence and union to their object. "Quo propius accedimus ad spem fruendi, eo impatientius caremus:" the nearer we come to the fruition of a good, the more impatient we are to want it. [f]

And the reason is, because goodness is better known, when it is in a nearer view of the understanding, and more united thereunto: and the more we have of the knowledge

[b] Contemplatio est spei in hoc spatio per fidem, non representatio: nec possessio, sed expectatio, *Tertul.* de Resur. cap. 23. [c] Rom. viii. 24. [d] Heb. xi. [e] *Arist.* apud Laertium l. 5.—*Plato* apud Cœl. Rhod. l. 12. c 2. *Arist.* Ethic. lib. 9. et *Plutarch* de Audit. [f] *Plin.* Epist. l. 6. Epist. l. προσδοκῶνλας καὶ σπεύδοντας.—2 Pet. iii. 12.

of goodness, the more we have of the desire of it, if any part be absent. Besides; all greediness is attractive; and therefore the more we know it, the faster we hasten unto it: and it is the nature of good to increase the sense of the remainders of evil. So that though the number of our defects be lessened by the degrees of that good we have attained unto; yet the burthen and molestation of them is increased; and, therefore, the more possession we have of good, the greater is our weariness of evil: and the more Nature feeleth her defects, the more doth she desire her restauration.

The next condition in the object of our hope, is possibility. For though the will sometimes, being inordinate, may be tickled with a desire of impossibilities, under an implicit condition if they were not so; yet no hope, whether regular or corrupt, can respect its object under that apprehension. It worketh two passions most repugnant to this, hatred and despair; the one being a proud opposition; the other, a dreadful flight from that good, in which the mind perceiveth an impossibility of attaining it. Now the apprehension of possibility is nothing else but a conceit of the convenience and proportion, between the true means unto an end hoped, and the strength of those powers which are to work or bestow them: or if they be such ends, as are wrought without any such means, by the bare and immediate hand of the worker, it is an apprehension of convenience, betwixt the will and power of him that bestoweth it.

Here, then, because I find not any arguments of large discourse in the opposite passion, (unless we would pass from natural or moral, unto theological handling thereof) we may observe what manner of despair is only regular and allowable. I mean that which, in matters of importance, drives us out of ourselves, or any presumption and opinion of our own insufficiency. But that despair which riseth out of groundless unbelief of the power, or distrust of the goodness of a superior agent, (especially in those things, which depend upon the will and omnipotency of God) hath a double corruption in it, both in that it defiles, and in that it ruins Nature: *defiles*, in that it conceives basely of God himself, in making our guilt more omnipotent than his power, and sin more hurtful than he is good: *ruins*, in that the mind is

thereby driven to a flight and damnable contempt of all the proper means of recovery.

Of this kind of despair, there are three sorts: The one sensual, arising out of an excessive love of good, carnal, and present: and out of a secure contempt of good, spiritual, and future; like that of the Epicures[a], "Let us eat and drink," while we may; "to-morrow we shall die:" The other sluggish, which dishearteneth and indisposeth for action, causing men to refuse to make experiments about that wherein they conclude beforehand[b] that they shall not succeed. The third sorrowful, arising from deep and strong apprehensions of fear, which betrayeth and hideth the succours upon which hope should be sustained: as in the great tempest wherein Saint Paul suffered shipwreck; when the sun and stars were hid, and nothing but terror to be seen; "all hope that they should be saved, was taken away."[c]

The last condition of the object of hope, was difficulty;—I mean, in respect of our own abilities, for the procuring of the good we hoped for; and therefore hope hath not only an eye to 'Bonum,' the good desired; but to 'Auxilium' too, the help which confers it. No man waiteth for that which is absolutely in his own power to bestow on himself; 'Omnis expectatio est ab extrinseco;' all hope is an attendant passion, and doth ever rely upon the will and power of some superior causes, by dependance whereupon it hath some good warrant to attain its desires.[d]

And thus in divine hope, God is in both respects the object of it, both 'per modum Boni,' as the good desired; and 'per modum Auxilii,' as the aid whereby we enjoy him. So that herein all those hopes are corrupt and foolish, which are grounded either on an error concerning the power to help in some assistants; or concerning will in others; as indeed generally a blind and misled judgement doth nourish passion. Of the former sort[e], are the hopes of base and degenerous minds in their dependance upon second and subordinate means, without having recourse to the first supreme

[a] 1 Cor. xv. [b] Desperatione debilitati, experiri nolunt, quod se assequi posse diffidunt. *Cic.* In Orat. ad Bru. [c] Acts xxvii. 20. [d] Spe perficiendi, si vires, pecunia, consilium, scientia, apparatio videbitur esse. *Cic.* de Invent. ad Heren. li. 4. [e] Job xxxi. 24. Jer. xvii. 5. Psalm lxii. 9. Rom. iii. 4. Job vi. 15, 16.

Cause; which is to trust in lying vanities; for every man is a liar, either by impotency, whereby he may fail us: or by imposture, whereby he may delude us.

Of the other sort, are the hopes of those, who presume on the helps and wills of others, without ground and warrant of such a confidence:—whence ariseth a sluggish and careless security, blindly reposing itself upon such helps, without endeavouring to procure them to themselves.

And this is the difference between despair and presumption; hope looketh on a good future, as possible indeed in itself; but withal, as difficult to us, and not to be procured but by industry and labour. Now despair leaveth out the apprehension of possibility, and looketh only on the hardness: on the other side, presumption never regardeth the hardness, but buildeth only upon the possibility. And this is 'spes mortua,' that dead hope, which by the rule of opposition, we may gather from the life of hope, spoken of by Saint Peter. For a lively hope worketh such a tranquillity of mind, as is grounded on some certainty and knowledge; it is 'Pax Luminosa,' a peace springing out of light: but dead hope worketh a rest, grounded only on ignorance; such as is the security of a dreaming prisoner, which is rather senseless than peace: and this is 'Tenebrosa Pax,' a peace springing out of darkness. For a true peace is 'quies ex fide,' a believing rest: but counterfeit is only 'quies ex somno,' a sleeping or dreaming rest. The peace which comes from a living hope, must have these two properties in it,—tranquillity, and serenity: otherwise it is but like the rest of 'Mare Mortuum,' whose immovableness is not nature, but a curse.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the causes of Hope, want, and weakness together, experience and knowledge. In what sense ignorance may be said to strengthen, and knowledge to weaken hope: examples quicken more than precept. Provision of aid. The uncertainty of outward means, to establish hope, goodness of nature, faith and credulity, wise confidence.

The next things to be considered, are the causes of this passion: The first impulsive cause of hope is our want and

our weakness put together :—the one driving us 'ad Bonum,' to the object; the other, 'ad Auxilium,' to the aid;—and wheresoever there is indigence, there is impotence likewise. Now in what man soever we find these two unsupplied, there is the root and fundamental ground of hope; notwithstanding for the defect of other conditions, the creature may be carried to the quite opposite passion, out of an apprehension of an inevitable subjection unto evil, and utter banishment from the fountain of good. So then of those three estates of man; the estate of fruition, which is their Sabbath and rest; the estate of travail, which is the day of work; and the estate of damnation, which is the night of despair;—in the first, we have the accomplishment; in the third, the final overthrow; in the second, the exercise of, our hopes: because, in that alone our indigence may, by God's fulness, be filled,—and our impotence, by his will and power, be supplied. In which respect, all men have room for hope to enjoy God their last good; though not a hope of confidence, assurance, and expectation, which is peculiar only to the godly, (who alone have a present interest in his promises) yet such a general hope as may well suffice to stop the mouth of any temptation, whereby we are solicited to undervalue the power, or to conclude the unwillingness, of God to help us.

The next cause of hope is experience and knowledge, both in the nature of the thing hoped for, and of the means conducing to the attainment thereof. For notwithstanding it may often fall out, that ignorance of things, and the not trial of our strength, or others' opposition, or of the difficulties of the object, may, with hot and eager minds, work presumptions of success, and an empty and ungrounded hope,—(which is the reason why young men and drunken men are both observed by Aristotle [a] to be εὐέλπιδες, men of strong hopes) being naturally or by distemper bold and opinionative :—even as on the other side, strength and acuteness of understanding, because it sees so far into the object, works often diffidence, slowness and irresolution in our hopes: as Pliny [b] out of Thucydides observes; and the philosopher [c] likewise of old men, that they are δυσέλπιδες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν, men slow in their

[a] Rhet. l. 2. c. 12. Eth. l. 3. c. 8. [b] Lib. 4. Ep. 7. [c] Rhet. l. 2. c. 13.

hopes because of great experience;—yet for all this, if we do observe it, both the former of these proceeds from some opinion of knowledge, as the latter doth from some opinion of ignorance. For of drunken men, and those whom in the same place he compares unto them, Aristotle saith, they are therefore confident, 'quia se putant superiores,' because they believe much in their own strength. And of a young man he saith in the same place of his Rhetoricks, πάνλα εἰδέναι οἴονται καὶ διϊσχυρίζονλαι, they are peremptory in the opinion of their own knowledge. Whereas, on the other side, as a lame man, placed upon some high tower, can over-view with his eyes more ground, than he hath hope to over-run with his feet in a whole day; so men that have attained unto the same good pitch of knowledge, and are withal not insensible of their own weakness, out of the vastness of distance which they discover between themselves and their end, do easily frame unto themselves as narrow hopes, as they do large desires: but then this proceeds not from that knowledge which we have properly, but only it serves to discover unto us, how much knowledge we want.

So then, properly, knowledge and experience is the cause of hope; experience, I say, either of the conquerableness of the object by our own means, or of the sufficiency of the power, and readiness of the will of him, from whom we expect further assistance. For as there is less casualty, and, by consequence, more presumption to be had, of an event of art than of fortune, (the one proceeding from a governed,—the other, from a blind and contingent cause) so consequently there is greater [a] hope and confidence to be given to the success of an enterprise, grounded on experience, than of one ignorantly and rashly adventured on:—experience being, as the [b] philosopher observeth, the root of art, as unexperience is of fortune.

Now this experience may be such, either as ourselves have had, or such as we have observed other men to have. That which we have from ourselves, is the most forcible to induce this affection, because every man is the best measure of his own abilities; and it is that which puts forth influence and force into all our actions. Nothing could more assure the

[a] Πεπαιδευμένοι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων διαφέρουσιν ἀλπίσιν ἀγαθαῖς. *Chilo*, apud Laert. l. [b] Met. l. 1. c. 1.

hopes of David in his encounter with Goliath, than an experience, formerly had against creatures every way as formidable, a lion and a bear; wherein, notwithstanding, they were the sheep of Jesse, and not of God, that were endangered. Thus the eye of faith and hope looketh both backward upon the memory of actions past, and forward with courage and resolution on second enterprizes. For though in some cases it be requisite, with St. Paul, to 'forget that which is past,' when the remembrance of it may be an occasion of sloth, weariness, and distrust; yet there may a happy use be made of a seasonable memory in matters of difficulty, wherein haply our former successful resolutions and patience may upbraid our present fears, and sharpen our languishing and sluggish hopes. "O passi graviora," was the best argument which He could have used, to put his fellows in confidence of that which he added:

——"Dabit Deus his quoque finem."

Since that in greater griefs you have found ease,
Doubt not but God will put an end to these.

And in that great battle, between Scipio and Hannibal, 'ad amnem Ticinum,' though the victory, by reason of the excellency of the general, fell to the adverse part; yet the Roman general could not have used a more effectual persuasion unto hope, than when he told his soldiers, that "they were to enter on a war with those men, who were as much their slaves as their enemies, as being such, whom they had formerly themselves overcome; 'Cum iis est vobis pugnandum, quos priore bello, terra marique, vicistis:' 'you are to join battle with those whom, in the former war, you conquered both by land and sea.'—A strong inducement, though that in such a case, the fear of a second overthrow would more necessitate the one, than the hope of a second victory persuade the other, to courage and resolution. As we see in the hot battle between the Greeks and the Trojans, when Hector had driven the Grecians into their ships, and set some of them on fire, which is thus elegantly described by Homer[c]:

[c] Iliad. o. 699.

Τοῖσι δὲ μαρναμένοισιν ὅδ' ἦν νόος· ἦτοι Ἀχαιοὶ
Οὐκ ἔφασαν φεύξεσθαι ὑπ' ἐκ κακοῦ, ἀλλ' ὀλέεσθαι·
Τρωσὶν δ' ἤλπετο θυμὸς, &c.

These were the mutual motions did engage
The minds of Greeks and Trojans in this rage.
The Grecians all despair'd t' escape the blow,
Deeming themselves near to an overthrow:
But former victory in those of Troy,
Kindled a hope another to enjoy;
They boldly promis'd to themselves the day,
The Grecian ships to burn, and then to slay.
Thus hope of victory enflam'd the one;
Th' other were more enflam'd, 'cause they had none.[d]

That experience from others, which may enliven and perfect our hope, is the applying their examples and successes to our own encouragements. For the nature of most men is like that of flocks, to tread in one another's steps:—precedents having the same precedence to reason, in vulgar judgements, which a living and accompanying guide hath to a Mercury's finger in a traveller's conceit, the one only pointing to, but the other leading the way. And as I find it observed, that running metal will sooner melt other of its own kind, than fire alone; so the examples of virtue will sooner allure and prevail with the minds of men, to frame them to the like resolutions, than a naked and empty speculation of precepts. It hath pleased Nature to make man, not only a moral, but a sociable creature; that so when his hopes towards good should languish and grow slack by any conceived prejudices against the reason of precepts, they may again be strengthened by the common and more obvious sense of example.

"Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures,
Quam quæ sunt oculis commissa fidelibus."[e]

Those things more sluggishly our minds excite,
Which enter at the ears, than at the sight.

Sight, which is the sense of example, is oftener employed in the government of our passions, than hearing, which is

[d] Quondam etiam victis redit in præcordia virtus: Victoresque cadunt. Æneid. 2.—Forsan miseros meliora sequentur. Æneid. 12.—Etiam si spes non subesset, necessitas tamen stimulare deberet. *Qu. Cur.* l. 4. [e] *Horat.*—Magnos viros, non schola Epicuri, sed contubernium fecit. *Sen.* ep. 6.

the sense of precept. And therefore when the poet would fit an advice for the person of Ascanius, he doth not bring any tedious, thorny, moral discourse; but he works upon that affection, which is most predominant in ingenuous and noble natures.

> ———" Te animo repetentem exempla tuorum,
> Et pater Æneas et avunculus excitet Hector."
>
> Recount the brave examples of thy blood;
> And what thou hast in them seen great and good,
> Let be thy pattern; that the world may see
> Father and uncle both alive in thee.

For though an argument from example [b], to prop a fainting hope, be weakest in respect of convincing demonstration; yet it is strongest, in respect of moral and persuasive insinuation, as inferring greater discredit upon a sluggish and unnecessary despair. And therefore they were brave instructions, which Agamemnon gave unto Menelaus, when he commanded him to go into the army of the Grecians, and animate them unto the battle [c]:

> Φθέγξεο δ', ἦ κεν ἴησθα, καὶ ἐγρήγορθαι ἀνωχθι,
> Πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων ἄνδρα ἕκαστον,
> Πάντας κυδαίνων, &c.
>
> Run through the army, cry, encourage all,
> Mind them of their progenitors, and call
> Each by his name; praise them; and let us too,
> What we command to others, ourselves do.[d]

It is true, indeed, that some men are blessed with a greater excellency of gifts than others. Yet we are not to think, that any man was ever made, as Seneca speaks of Cato, 'In convitium humani generis,' for a reproach of men's weakness, rather than for an example and encouragement of their actions; or for astonishment rather than emulation unto others:—this being one end of Nature, in framing men of great virtues, not only that we might wonder and believe, but know that the same things which, for the greatness of them, are the

[b] Non convenit qui illum ad laborem impulerim, nunc me ipsum fugere. *Terent.* Heaut.—Quo major fuero, tanto plus laborabo. *Maximinus* apud Jul. Capitolinum. [c] Il. κ. 67. [d] Si quid injungere inferiori velis, id prius in te ac tuos si ipse statueris, facilius omnes obedientes habeas. *Liv.* l. 26.

objects of our admiration, may as well, for their possibility, be the objects of our hope, and the encouragements of our industry.

The third cause of hope, may be large furniture with, or strong dependance upon, the assistant means of what is hoped for. Helps, in any enterprise, are instead of heads and hands, to advance a man's design: which likewise is elegantly expressed by Diomedes and Sarpedon in Homer:

——'Αλλ' εἴ τις μοι ἀνὴρ ἅμ' ἕποιτο καὶ ἄλλος,
Μᾶλλον θαλπωρὴ, καὶ θαρσαλεώτερον ἔσται.
Σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω, &c.[a]

If any second would accompany,
My hopes and courage would the greater be:
For when two join, the one may haply note
What th' other over-pass'd; or if he know 't,
His counsel would be weak, and his mind slow,
When he should execute what he does know.

And according as these means which we rely upon, have more or less power or certainty in them, they are foundations of a more regular or corrupt hope. Such are wealth, friends, wit, policy, power, or the like: all which can be causes only of a hope of probability, but not of certainty, because they are all means which are subject to miscarriage; and are also subject to the providence of God, who only can establish and give final security to our hopes; as being such an assistant, in whom there is neither weakness nor mutability, which should move him to disappoint us.

All other aids have two ill qualities in them: they have wings, and therefore can easily forsake us; and they have thorns, and therefore if we lean too hard on them, they may chance, instead of helping, to hurt us[b]. The best promises which earthly aids can make, are bounded by a double condition.

Εἰ δύναμαί τε, καὶ εἰ τετελεσμένον ἐστι.

If the thing lie within thy power to do,
And Divine Providence permits it too.

Here, then, we may discover corruption in this passion,

[a] Iliad. κ. 222, et μ. 410.
[b] 2 Chron. xxviii. 20, 21. Ezek. xxix. 6, 7.

when the mind, ready upon every present apprehension to play the prophet, in forecasting future events, shall, out of weak grounds, and too high a conceit of those means which it hath, so build unto itself peremptory imaginations for the future; as that thereby it is made in itself light and opinionative, and, upon occasion of disappointment, is to seek of that patience to sustain it, which, by a wise intermixture of fear and caution, might have been retained.

And as there is an error in the trust and affiance, so there may be in the use of those means. For though divine hope hath but one anchor to rest upon, and therefore hath but one manner of being produced; yet those lower hopes, of which I speak, do always depend upon the concurrence of divers means; and those likewise have their reference unto divers circumstances. And, therefore, those which have not the wisdom of combining their aids, and of fitting them unto casual occurrences, may, to no end, nourish in themselves imaginary and empty presumptions. And this is that which maketh all worldly hopes so full of lightness and uncertainty, 'Leves spes et certamina,' as the poet[e] calleth them; because it may fall out, that the neglect of but some one circumstance, the not timing or placing our actions right,—the not accommodating our means to the variety of occasions,—the miscarrying in some one compliment or ceremony,—the having of our mind either too light and voluble, or too fixed and constant, or too spread and wandering, or too narrow and contracted, or too credulous and facile, or too diffident and suspicious, or too peremptory, resolute, or hasty, or too slow, anxious, and discursive, or too witty and facetious, or too serious and morose; with infinite other the like weaknesses, (some whereof there is not any man quite freed from) may often, notwithstanding the good store of other aids, endanger and shipwreck the success of our endeavours. So that, in the prosecution of a hope, there is something alike industry to be used, as in the trial of mathematical conclusions; the mediums whereunto are so couched and dependent upon one another, that not diligently to observe every one of them, is to labour in vain, and to have all to do again.

[e] *Horat.*

A fourth cause of hope, may be goodness and facility of nature, whereby we find a disposition in ourselves of readiness to further any man's purposes and desires, and to expect the like from others[f]; for it is the observation of Aristotle[g] touching young men, "Sua ipsorum innocentia cæteros metiuntur;" their own goodness makes them credulous of the like in others. For as every man's prejudice loves to find his own will and opinion; so doth his charity, to find his own goodness in another man. They therefore, who are soft and facile to yield, are likewise to believe, and dare trust them whom they are willing to pleasure. And this indeed is the rule of nature, which makes a man's self the *pattern*, of what it makes its neighbour the *object*.

Now, from this facility of nature, proceeds a further cause of hope, to wit, faith and credulity, in relying on the promises which are made for the furtherance thereof. For promises are obligations; and men use to reckon their obligations in the inventory of their estate: so that the promises of an able friend, I esteem as part of my substance. And this is an immediate antecedent of hope, which, according as the authority whereon it relies, is more or less sufficient and constant, is likewise more or less evident and certain.

And in these two, the corruption chiefly is not to let the judgement come between them and our hopes.

For as He said of lovers, we may of hopes too, that oftentimes 'sibi somnia fingunt,' they build more upon imagination than reality. And then, if what Tacitus speaks in another sense, 'fingunt, creduntque,' if our faculty feign assistances, and our credulity rely upon them, there will issue no other than Ixion's hope, a cloud for Juno. And therefore Aristotle[h], out of an easiness to hope, collects, in young men, an easiness to be deceived: credulity very often meets with impostures. And he elsewhere[i] placeth credulous, modest, quiet, and friendly men, amongst those that are obnoxious to injuries and abuses: proud and abusive men making it one of their pleasures to delude and mislead the ingenuity of others; and, as once Apelles, to deceive the expectation of another with a curtain for a picture.

[f] Ἐλπὶς ἐκ πίστεως συνέστηκεν. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 2. c. 12. [g] Rhet. l. 2. [h] Rhet. l. 2. [i] Rhet. l. 1.

The last cause (which I shall but name) of hope, is wise confidence, or a happy mixture of boldness, constancy, and prudence together; the one, to put on upon enterprise; the other, to keep on, when difficulties unexpected do occur; and the third, to guide and manage ourselves amidst those difficulties: for, as He[k] said in studies, so we may in actions likewise, (when thus swayed and balanced) "Altiùs ibunt, qui ad summa nituntur:" the further we set our aims, the more ground we shall get: and then,

> ——— "Possunt quia posse videntur."
>
> When a man thinks, This he can do;
> By thinking, he gets power too.

And unto this doth the historian[l] attribute all the successes of Alexander's great victories, "Nihil aliud quam bene ausus vana contemnere;" his confidence, judging them feasible, did, by that means, get through them. And though it was venturous, yet, as the case might be, it was wise counsel which we find in the same historian[l]; "Audeamus quod credi non potest ausuros nos, eo ipso quod difficillimum videtur, facillimum erit: let us show our courage in adventuring on some difficult enterprise, which it might have been thought we would not have attempted, and then the very difficulty of it will make it the more easy:"—for our enemies will conclude, that our strength is more than they discover, when they see our attempts greater than they could suspect. Thus men teach children to dance in heavy shoes[m], that they may begin to conquer the difficulty in the learning of the art. And therefore the philosopher[n] telleth us, that θρασεῖς εὐέλπιδες, 'bold men are men of hope;'—for boldness suffers not a man to be wanting to himself. And there are two principles which encourage such men upon adventures; the one, "Audentes fortuna juvat[o];" that resolution is usually favoured with success;—or if it miss[p] of

[k] *Quint.* l. 1. in Procem. Magnæ indolis signum est sperare semper. *Flor.* l. 4. [l] *Liv.* l. 19. Liv. l. 25.—Τολμᾷν ἀνάγκη, κἂν τύχω, κὸν μὴ τύχω. *Eur.* Hec. 739. [m] Difficiliora debent esse quæ exercent; quo sit levius ipsum illud, in quod exercent. *Quint.* l. 11. c. 2. [n] *Arist.* Eth. l. 3. c. 7. [o] Æneid. 10. [p] *Ovid.* Met. l. 2. Tutius per plana, sed humilius et depressius iter: frequentior currentibus, quam reptantibus, lapsus: sed his non labentibus nulla, illis nonnulla laus, etiam si labantur. *Plin.* l. 9. ep. 26, 2.

that, 'Magnis tamen excidit ausis;' yet the honour of attempting a difficulty, is more than the discredit of miscarriage in it.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the effects of Hope, stability of mind, weariness, arising not out of weakness, impatience, suspicion, curiosity; but out of want, contention, and forth-putting of the mind. Patience under the want, distance, and difficulty of good desires, waiting upon aid expected.

The effects of hope [a] follow, which I will but name. The first is, to free the mind from all such anxieties, as arise out of the floating, instability, and fearfulness thereof. For, as the philosopher telleth us, fearful men are δυσέλπιδες, 'hard of hope:' and in this property, hope is well compared unto an anchor, because it keeps the mind in a firm and constant temper, without tottering and instability. For though there be but one hope, joined with certainty, as depending upon an immutable promise,—all other having ground of fear in them; yet this should be only a fear of caution, not of jealousy and distrust, because where there is distrust in the means, there is, for the most part, weakness in the use of them; and he who suspects the aid which he relies on, gives it just reason to fail and to neglect him. And therefore Aristotle hath set hope and confidence together, as was before noted,—Ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθόν τι θαῤῥαλέον ἐστι, a good hope is grounded on a belief, and always worketh some measure of affiance in the means unto it.

A second effect of hope is, to work some kind of distaste and weariness in our present condition; which, according as it is good or evil, doth qualify the hope from whence it ariseth: for there is a distaste that ariseth out of weakness, like that of Job [b]; "My soul is weary of my life; I am a burthen to myself." Another that ariseth out of want. That which ariseth upon weakness, is a fickle and inconstant mutability of the mind, whereby it desireth a continual change

[a] Philosophi quidam erant, qui à *spe* dicti sunt, *elpistici*; qui nihil esse pronunciarunt quod vitam magis contineret atque spes. Vid. *Plut.* Symp. l. 4. q. 4.
[b] Job x. 1. vii. 20.

of condition: which affection is wrought, either out of impatience of opposition; whence the mind, upon the first difficulty which it meets with, is affrighted and discouraged;—or out of a sharpness of apprehension, discovering insufficiency [c] in that wherein it desired content; or out of an error, and too high estimation fore-conceived, which, in the trial, disappointing our hopes, and not answering that opinion, begins to be neglected as weak and deceitful; or, lastly, out of curiosity and search, when we suppose, that those things which cannot, in their nature, may, at least, in their varieties or number, yield some content: and as sands, which are the smallest things asunder, yet being united grow great and heavy;—so these pleasures, which are alone light and worthless, may, by their multitude, bring weight and satisfaction with them. Although herein the mind is likely most of all to find Solomon's vanity, the union of things subordinate, and which have no cognation to each other, (which is the property of worldly delights) working rather distraction than tranquillity in the mind. This weariness then which springeth from the unstaidness and impotency of our affections, is not that which I make the effect of a proper hope; as being an opposite rather to true contentment of mind, a virtue established, and not overthrown by hope:—the weariness then which is wrought by the forecast and providence of a mind possessed with hope, is that which is grounded upon the knowledge and feeling of our emptiness and wants, which therefore we long to have removed; like that of David [d], "Wo is me, that I am constrained to dwell in Mesech." Whereupon followeth

The third effect of hope, which is an earnest contention of the mind, in the pursuit of that good which should perfect our natures, and supply our wants. And this desire St. Paul calleth 'Gemitus creaturæ,' the groaning of the creature; which is set down as a consequence of the 'earnest expectation of the creature.' And indeed there is not any passion, which doth so much employ, and so little violate reason, as this of hope doth, it being an exciting [e] passion,

[c] Spes inanes, quæ in medio spatio franguntur, et corruunt, et ante, in ipso cursu, obruuntur, quam portum conspicere possunt. *Cic.* de Orat. l. 3. [d] Psalm cxx. 5. [e] Ἐλπὶς παρὰ τὸ ἕλκω, ἡ ἕλκουσα ἡμᾶς. Etymolog.—Studium cum spe senescit. *Patercul.* l. 1.—Acuit industriam, cum spes injecta est, &c. *Cic.* ad

which moveth every principle to its proper and speedy operation for gaining that perfection, which the mind so earnestly breathes after, and the want whereof doth work such weakness in it.

The last effect of hope, is a contented repose and patience of the mind, resting itself in a quiet expectation of the things hoped for, and yet not exhibited. And this patience is threefold; a patience under the want, a patience under the distance, and a patience under the difficulties of our desired good; which holds especially in these hopes, (and those are almost all) which depend upon the will and disposition of another, whose pleasure it behoveth us, in matters which are not of debt and necessity, rather to attend, than by murmuring and discontent to provoke him, and disappoint ourselves.

Hasty therefore and running hopes are as improper in their nature, as they are commonly vain and empty in their success. He that believes, and must by faith depend upon external help, must not make haste; but be content to have his expectation regulated, not by his own greediness, but by another's will.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of the affection of Boldness, what it is, the causes of it, strong desires, strong hopes, aids, supplies, real, or in opinion. Despair and extremities, experience, ignorance, religion, innocency, impudence, shame, immunity from danger, dexterity of wit, strength of love, pride, or greatness of mind and abilities. The effects of it, execution of things advised, temerity, &c.

So little in love have I ever been with this affection of boldness, (as I find it managed by many, who make no other use of it, than children do of straw with which they stuff empty clothes, that they may look like men) as that when first I wrote this tractate, I passed it rather over as a vice, than an affection of the soul, and said nothing of it; and being no more friends with it now than I was then, I should

Her. l. 4.—Εἰ δὲ ἀφέλοις τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀγαθοῦ, ἀφαιρήσεις καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν παρόντων κακῶν. *Max. Tyr.* dissert. 33. p. 342.

have been contented to have left it out still; but that I would not have the treatise defective in such a member, whereof there may be so good and so ill use made, as experience showeth us there is of this. For as Plutarch [f] notes of Egypt, that it bringeth forth 'multa venena, et multa salubria,' many good things, and many bad; like those creatures, some parts whereof are poison, and others restorative;—so may we say of the men in whom this affection is predominant, that 'they are usually instruments either of much good, or of much evil to the places that nourish them;' as once Themistocles' [g] tutor said of him. The best mixture that I can call to mind of this passion, was in Hannibal, of whom the historian tells us [h], that 'he was marvellous bold to put upon dangers, and yet marvellous wise in managing of them;' his courage not working temerity, nor precipitating his resolutions; and his counsel not working slowness, nor retarding his courage.

Boldness then, or confidence, is (as the philosopher [i] describes it) a hope joined with fancy and opinion, that those things which are safe for us, are near at hand; and those which are hurtful, either are not at all, or are afar off, and cannot suddenly reach us. Or it is an affection whereby we neglect danger, for the procuring of some difficult and good thing, which we earnestly desire and hope for, in confidence to overcome and break through that danger. For confidence of victory is that which maketh a man boldly to prosecute the danger, which opposeth him in his hopes of good. So that two things [k] belong unto the formality of this passion; 1. Vehemency of hope; whatsoever strengtheneth that, causeth this, as power, experience, friends, nearness of aids, and the like. 2. Exclusion of fear; whatsoever removeth that, encreaseth this; as distance from danger, freeness from enemies, clearness from injuries, &c.

The object of this passion is twofold. The primary and principal object is some difficult work, under the relation of a needful medium, to the obtaining of a good, vehemently desired and hoped for. The secondary object, is some evil and danger, which, standing between our hope, and the good

[f] *Plut.* in Nicia. Πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ, πολλὰ δὲ λυγρά. *Homer.* [g] *Plut.* in Themistoc. [h] In Hannibale plurimum audaciæ ad capessenda pericula; plurimum consilii inter ipsa pericula erat. *Liv.* l. 21. [i] Rhet. l. 2. c. 5. [k] Vid. Aqu. 1, 2. qu. 45, art. 3.

for which we hope, is, by the vehemency of our hope, as it were, removed and despised in our eyes. Good earnestly desired, and evil confidently despised, are the things about which this affection is conversant.

The causes of this affection are so many the more, because it is apt to be excited by clean contrary reasons.

The fundamental and principal cause of it, is strength or desire, working vehemency of hope, and impatiency of resistance, or restraint from the thing desired. For lust, when it hath once conceived [l], will at last bring forth and finish, and rush forward to that after which it longeth; which the philosopher [m] calleth προπέτεια, and St. Peter, ἀνάχυσις, a pouring out of passion; and the prophet, 'a breaking forth [n],' and violent eruption, a rash and head-strong precipitancy, which [o], like a torrent, ventures upon any thing that withstands it. The philosopher [p] instanceth for this particular in adulterers, οἳ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν, who adventure on many bold attempts, for the satisfaction of their lust.

But because where there are strong desires, there may be weak hopes, and great fears, the one discouraging, the other deterring from the prosecution of them; therefore to the emboldening of those desires, other particular causes do usually concur. Some whereof I shall enquire after.

1. Then, strong hopes, and ready, present aids and supplies proper to the ends we would advance, are excellent means to generate boldness. Great aids [q], as the Cat's 'unum magnum,' or many aids, that if one fail, another may hold. As greatness of wealth, friends, power, strength; and these in a readiness, and near at hand, τὰ θαῤῥαλέα ἐγγὺς, as the philosopher [r] expresseth it: as the Trojans, being besieged, when Æneas with his army drew near, gathered courage above their fears. [s]

> ——— "Clamorem ad sidera tollunt
> Dardanidæ è muris: spes addita suscitat iras:
> Tela manu jaciunt."

[l] James i. 14, 15. [m] *Arist.* Eth. l. 7. c. 8. See my Treatise on the Sinfulness of Sin. [n] Hos. iv. 2. [o] Jer. vi. 7, viii. 6. [p] Eth. l. 3. c. 11. [q] Auxilia, magna, multa, vicina. [r] Rhet. l. 2. c. 5. [s] Æneid. 10.

They all climb'd up the walls; then, fill'd with joys,
Shouted as loud as if they meant the noise
Should wake the stars; hopes added, stirr'd up ire;
And their darts flew as swift as any fire.

And, in Scriptures [t], we are often quickened unto courage against the difficulties of our Christian warfare, by the greatness and nearness of the aids, and the reward which we hope for. Yea, so strong a power hath hope over the resolutions of men, that even the froth, and dream, and fancy of it in drunken men, maketh them, as the philosopher [u] noteth, marvellous venturous upon dangers, which reason and sobriety would have taught them to fear. Solomon [x] tells us of a drunkard lying on the top of a mast; and I have myself seen a drunken man climb to the top of a steeple: which boldness proceedeth in such men from weakness and wilfulness of self-conceit and opinion; for commonly that strength which a drunken man loseth in his reason, he gathers in his fancy; and as his judgement weakens, his opinion encreaseth; and we shall never find men more confident in their affirming, than when they know not what they affirm. [y]

Now upon this ground, that hope is the great quickener unto courage, it was, that Alexander used it as an argument to his soldiers against the Persians, when he saw them come into the field clothed so richly, that their arms were much rather a prey to the Greeks, than a defence [z] unto themselves. In which respect, Homer [a] thus desires Amphimachus,

Ὃς καὶ χρυσὸν ἔχων πόλεμόνδ' ἴεν, ηὔτε κούρη,
Νήπιος: οὐδέ τι οἱ τόγ' ἐπήρκεσε λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον.

In glist'ring gold, like a fair damsel clad
He came to fight. Vain man! why art so mad,
To think that iron is kept back by gold?
Thou bring'st the price, for which thyself art sold.

And yet, upon a contrary reason, I find one of the greatest and wisest commanders of the world, Julius Cæsar [b], re-

[t] 1 John iv. 4. Heb. x. 36, 37. James v. 8. Rev. xxii. 12. [u] Θαῤῥαλέοι οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι· εὐέλπιδες γάρ. Eth. l. 3. c. 11. [x] Prov. xxiii. 34. [y] Ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ ἀμαθεῖς. Eth. l. 7. c. 10. [z] Prædam verius quam hostem incruentus divisit. *Liv.* l. 9. [a] Iliad. β. 873.—*Plut.* lib. de Homero.—Quam minimum sit in corpore tuo spoliorum. Plures computant, quam oderunt. *Sen.* ep. 14. 8. [b] *Suet.* in Jul. 97.

quiring of his soldiers to carry gold about them, that the fear of losing that, might make them the more constant in their resolutions.

Contrary unto this we shall often observe, that despair and extremities do put men upon bold adventures. As no men fight more desperately than cowards, when they cannot fly; as the historian noteth of Cn. Piso [c], a confederate of Catiline, that by poverty he became desperate, and thereby emboldened unto that attempt, wherein he might either rise by the ruin of others, (having neither merit nor hope to rise by their favours) or at least not to be ruined without company. [d] As that which shakes a tree, doth often serve to settle and fasten it; so many times dangers and extremities do excite strength [e]: as in the height of a fever or phrensy, men show more strength and agility of body, than in their perfectest healths:—and as they say of beasts [f], they bite with more venom and indignation, when they are wounded and ready to die. And therefore Homer expresseth the dying of wounded enemies by biting of the ground; so utmost extremities of miseries make men put out the more boldness, either in revenge or new attempts, because they may be better, but they cannot be worse. [g] And it is a kind of impunity to be so low, as that a man hath not a condition to fall from.

"Moriensque recepit, Quas nollet victurus aquas." [h]

In a famine, a man will eat and drink that, which, in plenty, he could not have the courage to look on. And this cause of boldness is thus expressed by the poet, when he showeth how the youth of Troy, seeing their city burnt and sacked, grew unto a desperate resolution;

"Sic animis juvenum furor additus: inde, (lupi ceu
Raptores, atra in nebula, quos improba ventris

[c] Summæ audaciæ, egens, factiosus; quem ad perturbandam rempublicam inopia, ac mali mores stimulabant. *Sallust.* [d] *Plut.* in Numa. [e] Sæpe contemptus hostis cruentum certamen edidit. *Liv.* l. 2.—Spes desperatione quæsita. *Paterc.* l. 1.—Ignaviam necessitas acuit, et spei sæpe desperatio causa est. *Q. Curt.* l. 5.—Dant animum ad loquendum libere ultimæ miseriæ. *Liv.* l. 29. [f] Maxime mortiferi esse solent morsus morientium animantium. *Florus.*—*Jul. Capitol.* in Maximino. [g] Impunitatis genus est non habere pœnæ locum. *Sen.* [h] *Lucan.* Cum fortuna miserrima, tuta est; nam timor eventus deterioris abest. *Ovid.* de Pont. l. 2. Eleg. 2.

Exegit cæcos rabies, catulique relicti
Faucibus exspectant siccis,) per tela, per hostes,
Vadimus haud dubiam in mortem."

Thus youth did rage, despairing of their lives,
Like wolves of prey, whom extreme hunger drives
From their young thirsty whelps, through darkest storms:
Through darkest foes we rush on our own harms;
And being sure to die, dare that, which fear,
With hope of life, would force us to forbear.[i]

Another cause of boldness is experience, when a man hath often done a thing with success[k], often seen dangers and escaped them, as mariners at sea; found other men, upon as small hopes as he himself hath, to go through the like matters without doubt or hesitation. For examples do put life, hope, and emulation into men, as we noted before; and we are encouraged sometimes rather to err in good company[l], than to go right alone: and this argument Æneas used in the Poet:

"Vos et Scyllæam rabiem, penitusque sonantes
Accestis scopulos; vos et Cyclopia saxa
Experti; revocate animos, mœstumque timorem
Mittite"———

You by Charybdis and by Scylla sail'd,
Where waves through rocks did sound; nor hath prevail'd
'Gainst you that worser rock, the Cyclops' den:
Then cast off fears, and show yourselves brave men.

And as experience, so, on the contrary side, ignorance[m] is as usual a cause of confidence; as we see children will put their fingers in the fire, and play with serpents, as not acquainted with any hurt they can do them. We may too often meet with men like waters and vessels, which the shallower and emptier they be, do make the louder noise, and make use of other men's ignorance to gain boldness and credit to their own. To which purpose it is a grave expression of the poet[n],

[i] Æn. ii. Vid. *Veget.* de re militar. l. 3. c. 11.

[k] Διὰ τὸ πολλάκις πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι θαῤῥοῦσι. Eth. l. 3. c. 11.

[l] Vel error honestus est magnos duces sequentibus. *Quint.* l. 1. c. 6.

[m] Ἡμεῖς οἱ ἰδιῶται οὐ δεδοίκαμεν. *Laert.* in Arist. Et. l. 30. 8. et 10.—*Plin.* l. 4. ep. 7.—Quo, moriture, ruis, majoraque viribus audes? Fallit te incautum pietas tua. *Æn.* 10.—De audacia puerili, vid. Val. Max. l. 3. c. 1.

[n] *Eurip.* Hippol.

———Οἱ γὰρ ἐν σοφοῖς
Φαῦλοι, παρ' ὄχλῳ μουσικώτεροι λέγειν.

Those whom wise men know for dull,
With vulgar ears are wondrous musical.

And as flies are esteemed[o] very bold creatures, because they often return to the same place; so the boldness of these kind of speakers is usually discovered in vain and empty tautologies;—which is the reason why (as the orator[p] noteth) they are usually more copious than far learneder men; 'Quia doctis est electio et modus,' because able speakers use choice and judgement in what they produce.

Another cause of boldness in attempts may be religion[q], and a confidence of divine direction unto what we do. Jehu's pretence unto zeal, was that which caused him to march furiously. And in this case, as the historian speaks, 'Melius vatibus quam ducibus parent;' men are apter to be led by their prophets than by their captains. And we find[s] when God would encourage his people in their wars, he gave them signs and assurances for their faith to rely upon above their fears, that where reason saw cause of doubting, faith might see all defects supplied in God: so to Gideon, to Ahaz, to Hezekiah, and others. And the church[t] complains of the want of them in their times of calamity; "We see not our signs; neither is there amongst us any prophet, or any one that knoweth how long." When Joshua did fight, Moses[u] did pray; and Israel was more encouraged by the intercession of the one, than by the valour of the other. And the Philistines[x] were never more affrighted, than when Israel brought forth the ark of God against them. For as Ajax in the poet[y]

———Εἴ τις Θεῶν
Βλάπλει, φύγοι' ἂν ὁ κακὸς τὸν κρείσσονα.

——"If God will fight,
He can make weak men put the strong to flight."

And therefore Tolumnius the soothsayer, having received

[o] Iliad. ζ. 638. [p] *Quint.* [q] Rhet. l. 2. c. 5. *Qu. Curt.* l. 4. De impetu animorum divinitus excitato, vid. *Plut.* in Coriol. [s] Judges vi. 36. Isai. vii. 11, 12. 2 Kings xix. 29. 2 Sam. v. 24. [t] Psalm lxxiv. 9. [u] Exod. xvii. 11. [x] 1 Sam. iv. 7. 8. [y] *Sophocl.* Ajax. vid. Ezek. 21.

happy 'auguria,' doth thereupon grow to resolutions of courage.

> " 'Hoc erat, hoc votis' (inquit) 'quod sæpe petivi:
> Accipio, agnoscoque Deos: me, me duce, ferrum
> Corripite, O Rutuli.'" [z]
>
> This, this, is that which in my chiefest thought
> I still desir'd, and now find what I sought:
> The divine tokens I embrace and see;
> Come, soldiers, take your swords and follow me.

Unto this head of religion belongeth innocency, as a most excellent cause of boldness: for the righteous is bold as a lion [a], which careth not, though a multitude of shepherds come out against him. And the philosopher [b] telleth us, that they who have done no wrong unto others, are confident of success in their attempts; believing that they shall find no enemies, because they have provoked none. A notable example [c] whereof we have in M. Publius Furius, the Roman consul; who was so confident of his own integrity in publick administration, that being deputed by lot to govern the province of Spain, he chose the two bitterest enemies that he had in the city, to be coadjutors with him in that dispensation. Whereunto may be added the answer which Drusus gave to him who would have contrived his house for secrecy, when he told him, that 'he would wish his house were pervious and transparent, that privatest actions might be seen in publick.'

And as religion and innocency, so, on the other side, deboishness and desperateness of living, doth implant a marvellous boldness in the minds and faces of men, when they have no modesty or shame to restrain them. As we see in gypsies, parasites, jugglers, θαυματοποιοὶ, neurospastæ, and such like. And therefore such kind of men [d], both in Scripture and in other writings, are said to have faces of brass, and necks of iron; whorish and impudent foreheads that

[z] Æneid. 12.—Priscum populis de more Latinis Auspicium, quum bella parant mentesque deorum Explorant super eventu, &c. *Sil. Ital.* l. 5. [a] Prov. xxi. 21. Isai. xxxi. 4. Vid. Iliad. γ. 23. [b] Rhet. l. 2. c. 5. [c] *Val. Max.* l. 3. c. 7. Vid. haud dissimile exemplum Catonis. *Plut.* de util. ex hostib. capiend. [d] Κυνώπης apud Homerum. Jer. iii. 3. Isai. xli. 4. Ezek. xvi. 3.—Os ferreum, *Cic.* in Pisonem.—*Jul. Pollux.* l. 4. c. 28.—*Plut.* in Alcib.—Vid. Theophrast. περὶ ἀπονοίας.—*Arist.* Ethic. l. 3. c. 9.

cannot blush nor be ashamed; and these words, *ἀπόνοια, ἀναισχυνΐα, εὐτολμία,* we shall find for synonymous, and of equal signification; whereof the former signify despair, impudence; and the other, boldness.

Again, as impudence, so shame and fear of disgrace [e] is a great cause of boldness, in virtuous and honourable attempts: for there is no man of generous principles, but will much rather choose an honourable danger than a sordid safety, and adventure his person before he will shipwreck his honesty or good name; choosing ever to regulate his behaviour rather by a moral than a natural fear, to give an account of himself rather to those that love his virtues, than to those who love his fortunes. In one word, standing more in awe of men's hearts than of their hands, and shunning more a just reprehension than an unjust injury. And to this purpose it is gravely observed by the historian, that the dishonour which the Romans suffered 'ad Furcas Caudinas,' was that which procured their adversaries a bloody overthrow afterward, "Quia ignominia nec amicos parat nec inimicos tollit:" their saving of the lives of the Romans to bring ignominy upon them, being esteemed not a benefit, but a scorn. A very like example we have hereunto in the servants of David, abused and put to shame by Hanun [f] the son of Ammon. And thus the poet expresseth the courage of Entellus, revived by the fall, which he had from Dares:

> "At non tardatus casu, nec territus heros,
> Acrior ad pugnam redit, et vim suscitat ira:
> Tum pudor incendit vires et conscia virtus." [g]
>
> Entellus, not dismay'd, renews the fight
> With a more eager force; wrath doth excite
> The stouter courage; shame with valour met,
> Inflam'd his mind, and did his weapon whet.

Another cause of boldness, is immunity from danger, or at least a versatilousness and dexterity of wit to evade it, or shift through it. And therefore though cunning men dare not always second [h] their contrivances with execution, nor let

[e] *Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει.* [f] 2 Sam. x.—Mixtus dolor et pudor armat in hostes. [g] *Æneid.* 15.—Tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito. *Æneid.* l. 6.—*Arist.* Eth. l. 3. cap. 11. [h] Qui ad fraudem callidi sunt, non tantum audent, quantum excogitant. *Cic.* pro Cluentio.

their hand go in equipage with their wit, yet commonly men of vigorous fancies are so far in love with their own conceptions, that they will many times venture upon some hazards to bring them into act, trusting the same dexterity to bring them out of danger; which hath at first made them to adventure on it: as Darius [g] was wont to say of himself, that 'in a pinch and extremity of peril he was ever wisest:' and Sylla [h] gave the same judgement of himself, that 'he came off best in those businesses, which he was most suddenly put upon.' Which also I find observed in the character of our Henry the Seventh, (who hath had the felicity above all his predecessors, to have his lineaments drawn by the ablest pen that hath employed itself in our story) that 'his wit was ever sharpened by danger, and that he had a greater dexterity to evade, than providence to prevent them.'

Another cause of boldness, (as I have formerly noted on that passion) is strength of love [i]; as we see weak creatures, in defence of their young ones, will set upon those that are strong. And the tribune in A. Gellius [k], out of love either of his country, or of glory, did not only advise, but himself undertake the executing of a service, wherein he was beforehand certain to perish. And the same author [l] telleth us of Euclides, a disciple of Socrates, who ventured in a disguise, upon the evident danger of his life, to enjoy the discourses and counsels of his master.

Lastly, pride, greatness of mind, or parts, and opinion of merit, especially if it meet with discontentedness and conceits of being neglected, doth very often embolden men to great and new attempts: for it is a very hard thing, when great abilities and vast hopes meet together, to govern them with moderation; private ends being in that case very apt to engage a man's parts, and to take them off from public service unto particular advantage. And, therefore, I take it there is no temper of mind that will, with an evenness and uniformity of proceeding, or felicity of success, so well promote public and honourable ends, as height of abilities, with moderation of desires; because in that case a man

[g] *Plut.* Apoph. [h] *Plut.* in Sylla.—Consilium in arena. *Seneca.*—Φρόνει βεβὼς αὖ νῦν 'πὶ ξυροῦ τύχης. *Soph.* Antig. 1008. [i] Audacem faciebat amor. *Ovid.* Met. 4. [k] A. Gell. l. 3. c. 7. [l] A. Gell. l. 6. c. 8. Vile est corpus iis, qui magnam gloriam quærunt. *Liv.* l. 2.

can never stand in his own light, nor have any mist or obstacle between his eye and his end.

Now from this ground, I believe, did arise that maxim of some of the states of Greece, noted by Tully [m], and at large debated by the philosophers, 'Nemo de nobis unus excellat;' that they would not have one man to be notoriously eminent in abilities above the rest;—and thereupon instituted Ostracism, or an honourable banishment, as a restraint either to abate the excessive worth of eminent men; or to satisfy and assuage the envy, which others might conceive against them, who are apt to hate the virtues [n] which they can only admire: or lastly, to prevent the dangers, which greatness of parts, taking advantage of popularity and vulgar applause, might haply venture to bring upon things. Upon this ground the Ephesians expelled Hermodorus, and the Athenians Aristides, because he was too just for the rest of the people. As one voice in a concert, which is loud above the proportion of the rest, doth not adorn, but disturb the harmony; and therefore usually men of great parts, have lien either under envy or jealousy; men's minds, out of I know not what malignity, being apt to suspect that that will not be used unto good, which might be abused unto evil;—which Tacitus [o] noted to have been the quality of Domitian,—and Ammianus Marcellinus [p], of Constantius,—towards men of the greatest worth.

Now according to the difference of this affection in different men, so it worketh two different effects.

1. There is a happy and discreet boldness, which doth not anticipate, but second and attend the mature counsels of the mind, and doth first call out and stir up itself by wisdom, before it proceed unto action or execution; like the boldness of the lion [q], which is slow, but at last prospers in what it undertakes. For after counsel hath ripened resolutions, boldness is then the best instrument to accomplish them; and in that case, 'Quo minus timoris, minus ferme periculi,' as the historian [r] speaks: The less fears are, the less

[m] *Cic.* Tusc. Q. l. 5.—*Arist.* Polit. l. 3. c. 13.—*Plut.* in Alcib. et *Aristid.* ex Nicia. [n] Eandem virtutem et oderant et mirabantur, *Liv.* l. 5. [o] *Tacit.* vit. Agr. [p] *Ammian.* l. 15. [q] Οὐρῇ δὲ πλευράς τε καὶ ἰσχία ἀμφοΐέρωθεν Μαστίεται, ἕε δ' αὐτὸν ἐποΐρύνει μαχέσασθαι. Iliad. v. 171. φιλεῖ γὰρ ἀκνεῖν πρᾶγμ' ἀνὴρ πράσσων μέγα, *Sophoc.* Electr. [r] *Liv.* l. 22. Semper in præ-

also are their dangers; and the greater their confidence, the surer their success.

——Ἐς Τροίαν πειρώμενοι ἦνθον Ἀχαιοί. [s]

The Greeks by venturing did enjoy
Their ten years' wish, and gained Troy.

2. There is a hasty and rash boldness [t], which, beginning too speedily without counsel, doth usually end too cowardly, without courage: for rash men whom the philosophers call θρασύδειλοι [u], men made up of confidence and fear, are bold and boasting before a danger; but, in it, very timorous, or at least inconstant. Lions in peace, but harts in war; as Tertullian's [x] proverb hath it. [y] Like those of whom Livy and Florus tell us, that they were more than men in the onset, and less than women in the issue; melting away from their resolutions like snow.

And another ill property of the rashness of this passion is, that it will expose a man to more danger than the success which it aims at, can compensate: as he that fishes for a gudgeon with a golden hook: or as Ulysses, who went back to the Cyclops' den, to fetch his cap and girdle, which he had left behind him.

Another is, that it makes men overvalue themselves, and so undertake things too hard for them to endure or hold out in. Like Menelaus [z] in the Poet, who would venture to fight with Hector; or Aristoxenus [a] in Tully, who being a musician, would needs determine in questions of philosophy.

Lastly, it hath a property, as we say, to break the ice, and to give the first onset upon dangerous attempts, which is a thing of very perilous consequence, not only to the author, but many times to the public peace too; froward, exulcerated, and seditious spirits being too ready to follow what they dare not begin. [b]

lio iis maximum est periculum, qui maxime timent: audacia pro muro est. *Sallust.* Cat. [s] *Theoc.* Idyl. 15. [t] Malo te sapiens hostis metuat, quam stulti cives laudent: omnia audentem contemnet Hannibal. *Liv.* l. 22. [u] *Arist.* Eth. l. 3. c. 7. [x] Novi ego istos in pace leones, in prælio cervos. *Tertul.* de Coron. [y] *Liv.* l. 10. et l. 38. *Flor.* l. 2. c. 4. Temeritas, ubi primum impetum effudit, velut quædam animalia amisso aculeo, torpet. *Q. Curt.* l. 4. Cum ultimi discriminis tempus advenerit, in solicitudinem versa fiducia est, ib. c. 3. [z] *Plut.* in Cat.—Iliad. η. 97, 112. [a] *Tusc.* Q. l. 1. [b] Propere sequi, quæ piget inchoare. *Tacit.*—Magis eis auctor ad seditionem quam animus deerat. *Liv.* l. 26.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Passion of Fear: the causes of it: Impotency, obnoxiousness, suddenness, nearness, newness, conscience, ignorance of an evil.

The opposite passion to this of hope, is fear[a]; which, being an equivocal passion, and admitting of many different kinds, can scarce have any whole and simple definition to explain it. There is a virtuous fear, a fear of sin and shame: an intellectual fear of admiration, when the excellency of the object dazzleth our eye; a fear of reverence; an astonishing fear, by reason of the newness; and an oppressing fear, by reason of the nearness and unavoidableness of the evil feared. It is a grief, trouble, flight, aversation of some approaching evil apprehended, either as destructive, or as burthensome to our nature, and not easily resistible by our strength. For the qualification of the object thereof, because it is in all circumstances like that of hope, (save in the evil of it) I shall therefore forbear to touch it, and shall only in brief consider the dignities and defects thereof in its causes and effects.

Fear is an humbling and debasing passion, which always importeth some manner of servitude and subjection in whom it resideth. So then, as in the former passion of hope, I noted the fundamental cause thereof to be weakness and want; so likewise in this of fear, the root and first principle is weakness and subjection; whereof the one implies a disability in us to resist, the other a necessity to undergo, an evil.

Hence[b] it is that we fear the displeasure of great men; or the power of unjust men; or the competition of popular and plausible men; or the cunning of close and malicious men; or the revenge of provoked men; or the guilt of injurious men that have wronged us already: because, in all these cases, there is some notice of weakness and subjection in us. So that fear is, of all other, a naked passion: for as

[a] Vide *Laert.* in Zenon. l. 7. [b] Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

nakedness hath three evil properties; to disable for defence, to expose to injury, and, from both, to work shame in the consciousness of our dejected condition; so likewise fear hath three properties to make us impotent and obnoxious; and from both these to beget shame: for though his speech was true, 'Rubor est virtutis color,' that shame and virtue have the same colour, (which makes it seem a companion rather of perfection than of weakness) yet indeed it is rather a sign of a mind virtuously disposed in testifying the quick apprehensiveness of its own defects, than any adjunct of virtue itself. [c]

So then the roots of this passion are weakness and subjection both together. So that where either condition is wanting, there is not any proper ground of fear: and therefore we see, sundry times, strength takes off the yoke of obedience, not only in the civil government of men, but in the natural government of creatures by men, to whom, by the law of creation, they are all made subject: yet the strength of many of them hath taught them to forget their original subjection, and instead of fearing, to terrify man their lord; and whenever we tame any of them, and reduce them to their first condition, this is not so much an act of our dominion, whereby we awe them, as of our reason, whereby we deceive them; and we are beholden more therein to the working of our wit, than to the prerogative of our nature. And, usually, every thing which hath knowledge enough to measure its own abilities, the more it hath of strength, the less it hath of fear: that which Solomon makes the strongest, the apostle the fittest to expel fear, to wit, *Love*.

So likewise, on the other side, immunity from subjection in the midst of weakness removes fear. Of this we may give an instance in guilty persons, who notwithstanding their weakness, yet when once by the privilege of their sanctuary, or mercy of their judge, they are free from the obligation of the law, though not from the offence, their former fears do presently turn into joy and gratulations. And that is the reason why good men have such boldness, confidence, and courage, that they can bid defiance unto death; because,

[c] *Diogenes* apud *Laert.* l. 6. Ἅπας ἐρυθριῶν χρηστὸς εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ. *Menander.*

though they be not quite delivered from the corruption, yet they are from the curse and condemnation, of sin; though by reason of their weakness they are not delivered from the mouth, yet they are from the teeth and sting, of death; though not from the earth of the grave, yet from the hell of the grave; though not from sin, yet from the strength and malediction of sin. The law, our adversary, must be strong, as well as ourselves weak, if he look for fear.

The corruption then of this passion, as it dependeth upon these causes, is when it ariseth out of too base a conceit of our own, or too high of another's strength; the one, proceeding from an error of humility, in undervaluing ourselves; the other, from an error of judgement, or suspicion, in mistaking of others. There are some men, who as the Orator speaks of despairing wits, 'De viribus suis pessime merentur;' who are too unfaithful unto nature in a slight esteem of the abilities she hath given them, and deserve that weakness which they unjustly complain of. The sight of whose judgement is not unlike that of perspective glasses, the two ends whereof have a double representation: the one, fuller and nearer the truth,—the other, smaller and at a far greater distance: so it is with men of this temper, they look on themselves and others with a double prejudice; on themselves with a distrusting and despairing judgement, which presents every thing remote and small; on others with an overvaluing and admiring judgement, which contrariwise presents all perfections too perfect. And by this means between a self-dislike, and a too high estimation of others, truth ever falls to the ground, and for revenge of herself, leaves the party thus distempered, always timorous. For as error hath a property to produce and nourish any passion, according to the nature of the subject matter which it is conversant about,—so principally this present passion; because error itself is a kind of 'Formido intellectus,' a fear of the understanding; and it is no great wonder for one fear to beget another. And therefore when Christ would take away the fear of his disciples, he first removes their prejudice: "Fear not those that can kill the body only, and can do no more;" where the overflowing of their fears seems to have been grounded on the over-judging of an adverse

power. Thus much for the root and essential cause of fear: these which follow, are more casual and upon occasion.

Whereof the first may be the suddenness of an evil, when it seizeth upon us (as it were) in the dark: for all darkness is comfortless: and therefore the last terrible judgement is described unto us by the blackness and unexpectedness of it, by the darkness of night, and the suddenness of lightning. All unacquaintance[d] then and ignorance of an approaching evil, must needs work amazement and terror: as contrarily a foresight thereof[e] worketh patience to undergo, and boldness to encounter it: as[f] Tacitus speaks of Cæcina, "ambiguarum rerum sciens, eoque intrepidus;" that he was acquainted with difficulties, and therefore not fearful of them. And there is good reason for this; because, in a sudden daunt and onset of an unexpected evil, the spirits which were before orderly carried by their several due motions unto their natural works, are, upon this strange appearance and constant oppression of danger, so disordered, mixed, and stifled, that there is no power left either in the soul for counsel, or in the body for execution: for as it is in the wars of men, so of passions, those are more terrible, which are by way of invasion, than of battle, which set upon men unarmed and uncomposed, than those which find them prepared for resistance. And so the poet describes a lamentable overthrow by the suddenness of the one side, and the ignorance of the other:

> "Invadunt urbem, somno vinoque sepultam."
> They do invade a city all at rest,
> Which riot had with sleep and wine opprest.[g]

And this is one reason why men, inclinable to this passion, are commonly more fearful in the night than at other times: because then the imagination is presenting of objects not formerly thought on, when the spirits which should strengthen, are more retired, and reason less guarded.

And yet there are evils too, which, on the other side, more affright with their long expectation and train, than if

[d] Præ ceteris hostibus timentur repentini. *Ammian. Marc.* l. 28. [e] Mala prævisa fiunt leviora. *Cic.* Tusc. Q. l. 3. [f] Annal. l. 1. [g] Dum ea parte qua murus dirutus erat, stationes armatas opponunt, Quintius noctu ab ea parte, quæ minime suspecta erat, impetu facto, scalis cepit. *Liv.* l. 32.

they were more contracted and speedy. Some set upon us by stealth, affrighting us like lightning with a sudden blaze[h]: others with a train and pomp like a comet, which is ushered in with a stream of fire; and like thunder, which hurts not only with its danger, but with its noise: and therefore Aristotle reckoneth σημεῖα τῶν φοβερῶν, the signs of an approaching evil, amongst the objects of fear.

Another cause of fear may be the *nearness of an evil*, when we perceive it to be within the reach of us, and now ready to set upon us. For as it is with objects of sense, in a distance of place, so it is with the objects of passion, in a distance of time: remotion in either, the greater it is, the less present it makes the object; and by consequence, the weaker is the impression therefrom upon the faculty. And this reason Aristotle gives, why death, which elsewhere he makes the most terrible evil unto nature, doth not yet with the conceit thereof, by reason that it is apprehended at an indefinite and remote distance, work such terror and amazement; nor so stifle reason and the spirits, as objects far less in themselves injurious to nature, but yet presented with a determined nearness. And the reason is plain, because no evil hurts us by a simple apprehension of its nature, but of its union: and all propinquity is a degree of union: for although futurition be a necessary condition required in the object which must infer fear; yet all evil, the less it hath 'de futuro,' the more it hath 'de terribili;' which is the reason why that carnal security, which is opposed to the fear of God, is described in Scripture, by 'putting the evil day far from us;' viewing, as in a landscape and at a great distance, the terror of that day. And if here the atheist's argument be objected, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we shall die;" where the propinquity of ruin is made an inducement unto riot;—we must answer, that an atheist is herein both right and vain, in that he conceiveth annihilation, or never more to be, the best close of a wicked life; and therefore most earnestly (though most vainly) desireth that it may be the issue of his epicurism and sensuality. And here briefly the corruption of fear in this particular is, when it takes advantage by the approach of evil, to swell so high

[h] *Sen.* Ep. 14.

as to sink reason, and to grow bigger than the evil which it is afraid of:

> ———" Propiusque periclo
> It timor, et major Martis jam apparet imago." [i]
>
> There Fear gets closer than the thing it fears;
> War's image bigger than itself appears.

For as it is a sign of distemper in the body, when the unequal distribution of nourishment and humours causeth some parts to exceed their due proportion of greatness; so is it likewise in the faculties of the mind, when the inferior grow high and strong; if reason raise not itself to such a proportion, as still to maintain and manage its authority and government over them. But this is to be observed only of the rising and strength, not of the humility and descent, of reason: for though it be fit for the power of reason to keep itself up above rebellion, yet it is not necessary, that it should stoop and sink according to the lowness or sordidness of any passion. As in the body, though we would have parts increase alike; yet if one part by distemper grow weak, we require in the rest a fellow-feeling, not a fellow-languishing: yea, indeed in both cases, where the inferior part is weaker, it is the course of nature and art to fortify the higher; because in a superior there is required as well a power to quicken and raise that which droopeth, as to suppress and keep under that which rebelleth.

Another cause of fear may be *newness of evil:* [k] when it is such, wherewith neither the mind itself hath had any preceding encounter, whereby to judge of its own strength; nor any example of some other man's prosperous issue, to confirm its hopes in the like success. For, as before I noted out of the Philosopher [l], experience is instead of armour, and is a kind of fortitude, enabling both to judge and to bear troubles: for there are some things which he elegantly calleth τὰ κενὰ κινδύνων, empty dangers: Epictetus calleth[m] the

[i] Æneid. 8.—In bello plura et majora videntur timentibus: in metu et periculo cum creduntur facilius, tum finguntur impunius. *Cic.* de Divinat. l. 2. 58.
[k] Ne fama aut rem in majus extolleret, aut militum animos rerum novitate terreret. *Justin.* l. 14. Εκπληξις φοβὸς ἐκ φαντασίας ἀσυνήθους, ἢ ἐπ' ἀπροσδοκητῷ φαντασίᾳ. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 2. [l] Eth. l. 3. c. 7. [m] *Arrian. Epict.* l. 2. c. 1.

Μορμολύκεια καὶ Προσωπεῖα scarecrows, and vizards, which[m] children fear only out of ignorance: as soon as they are known, they cease to be terrible. As the log of timber which was cast into the pond, did with the first noise exceedingly affright the frogs; which afterwards, when it lay quietly, they securely swam about. And this ignorance and inexperience is the cause, that a man can set no bounds to his fear. I *grieve* for so much evil as hath befallen me, but I *fear* so much as may befal me; and the more strong and working my fancy, the greater my fear: because what I cannot measure by knowledge, I measure by imagination. The figments of fancy do usually exceed truth.[n]

And from this ignorance likewise it is, that timorous men are usually inquisitive, as the philosopher notes; and so the prophet[o] expresseth the fear of the Idumeans in war, "Watchman, what of the night? watchman, what of the night?" Fear usually doubleth the same questions[p], as grief doth the same complaints. Therefore men in an affright and amazement, look one another in the face[q]; one man's countenance, as it were, asking counsel of another. And once more, from hence grow the irresolutions of timorous men[r], because they know not what to do, nor which way to fly the things they fear: in which respect they are said to fly from an enemy 'seven ways[s],' as ever suspecting they are in the worst. 'Pavidis semper consilia in incerto,' they never can have fixed and composed counsels[t]: and it is the usual voice of men in their fears, 'I know not what to do; I know not which way to turn myself.' Trembling of heart, and failing of eyes[u], blindness and astonishment, ignorance and fear, do thus usually accompany each other. And therefore the stoicks[x] make ὄκνος and θόρυβος a sluggish affection of mind, whereby a man shrinks back, and declineth business, because of difficulty or danger which he observeth in it; and a tumultuary and distracted frame of

[m] Nam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia cæcis In tenebris metuunt; ita nos in luce timemus. *Lucr.* [n] *Plin.* l. 8. ep. 18. Vereor omnia; imaginor omnia; quæque natura metuentium est, ea maxime mihi, quæ maxime abominor, fingo, *Plin.* l. 6. ep. 4.—Vid. *Sen.* ep. 13.—Prob. sect. 14. q. 15. [o] Isai. xiii. 8. xxi. 11. [p] Jer. li. 31. [q] Gen. xlii. 1. [r] Μὴ εὑρίσκοντες λύσιν, ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρονται, πλανώμενοι ὑπ' ἀπορίας, *Schol.* in Soph. [s] Deut. xxviii. 25. [t] In magnis difficultatibus semper præsentia fugimus, tanquam maxime periculosa. *Plut.* in Mario. [u] Deut. xxviii. 28, 65. [x] *Laert.* in Zenon. lib. 7.

mind, not knowing which way to take,—to be amongst the kinds of this passion of fear. The poet, speaking of the Sabine virgins, whom the Roman youth snatched away, and took to them for wives, hath thus elegantly described this distraction of fear[y]:

"Ut fugiunt aquilas, timidissima turba, columbæ,
Utque fugit visos agna novella lupos;
Sic illæ timuere viros, sine lege ruentes.
Constitit in nulla, qui fuit ante, color.
Nam timor unus erat, facies non una timoris.
Pars laniat crines; pars sine mente sedet:
Altera mœsta silet; frustra vocat altera matrem:
Hæc queritur; stupet hæc; hæc manet; illa fugit."

As weak and fearful doves the eagle fly,
And tender lambs when they the wolf espy:
So the affrighted Sabine virgins run,
Pale and discoloured, Roman youth to shun.
Their fear was one, but fear had not one look.
Part here sit reav'd of sense; part there doth pluck
And tear their hairs; one silent mourns; another,
With a successless outcry, calls her mother:
One moans; the fright another doth amaze:
One flies for fear; for fear, another stays.

Now the reasons why newness of evil doth thus work fear, may be many. For first, all admiration is a kind of fear, it being the property of a man, not only to fear that which is against, but that also which is above, our nature,—either in regard of natural and civil dignity, which worketh a fear of reverence, as to parents, governors, masters; or in regard of moral excellency and excesses above the strength of the faculty, which worketh a fear of admiration. Now then it is the property of every thing that brings novelty with it, to work, more or less, some manner of admiration, which (as the honour[z] of this age's learning calls it) 'is a broken knowledge,' and commonly the first step which we make in each particular science: and therefore children[a] are most given to wonder, because every thing appeareth new unto them. Now then when any evil shall at once fright our

[y] *Ovid.* de Arte Amandi, l. 1. [z] Advancement of Learning. [a] Σοφὸς οὐδὲν θαυμάζει τῶν δοκούντων παραδόξων. *Laert.* in Zenon. l. 7.—*Plut.* de Aud. Ὁ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν. Metaph. l. 1. c. 2.

nature, and pose our understanding; the more our ignorance doth weaken our reason, the more doth it strengthen our passion.

Again; though such evils may, haply, be in themselves but slight, yet the very strangeness of them will work an opinion of their greatness. For as that of Seneca[b] is true, 'Magnitudinem rerum consuetudo subducit,' that use makes small esteem of great things; so it will follow on the contrary side, that novelty makes evil appear greater; as the way which a man is least acquainted with, seems the longest.[c] And therefore the Romans did use themselves unto their gladiatory fights and bloody spectacles, that acquaintance with wounds and blood might make them the less fear it in the wars.

And, lastly; such is the inbred cautelousness of nature in declining all noxious things, and such is the common suspicion of the mind, whereby out of a tendering of its own safety, it is willing to know every thing before it make experiment of any,—as that thereby it is made naturally fearful even of harmless and inoffensive things; (omnia tuta timens) much more then of those, which bring with them the noise and face of evil.

Now the corruption of this passion herein is, when it falleth too soon upon the object, and snatcheth it from the understanding before that hath duly weighed the nature of it; when, as Aristotle speaks of anger, that it runs away from reason with a half message; so the object shall be plucked away from the understanding with a half judgement. For when a man hath but a half and broken sight, like him in the gospel, he will be easily apt to judge men as big as trees, and to pass a false sentence upon any thing which he fears.

Another cause of fear, may be conscience of evil, and guiltiness of mind, which, like mud in water, the more it is stirred, doth the more foul and thicken: for "wickedness, when it is condemned of its own witness, is exceeding timorous; and being pressed with conscience, always forecasteth terrible things[d]:" and as the historian[e] speaketh of

[b] Nat. Quæst. l. 7. c. 1. [c] Jul. Capitol. in Maximo et Balbino.—Vide *Lipsii* Saturn. [d] Wisd. xvii. 11. [e] *Tacit.* Annal. lib. 6.

tyrants, so may we of any other wicked men, "Si recludantur mentes, posse aspici laniatus et ictus;" their minds with lust, cruelty, and unclean resolutions, being no less torn and made raw, than the body flayed with scourges. Every vicious man hath a double flight from God; a flight from the holiness, and a flight from the justice, of his will. Adam first eats, and next he hides: as soon as he hath transgressed the covenant, he expects the curse: and therefore we shall still observe that men are afraid of those whom they have injured. Alcibiades [f] having provoked the Athenians, was afraid to trust them; saying, "It is a foolish thing for a man when he may flee, to betray himself into their hands, from whom he cannot flee." And therefore they who would have us fear them, desire nothing more than to be privy to our guilts, and to know such crimes of us, as by detecting of which, they have it in their power to bring either infamy or loss upon us.

"Scire volunt secreta domus, atque inde timeri."[g]

Into our secret crimes they pry, that so
We may fear them, when they our vices know.

And therefore innocency is the best armour that any man can put on against other men's malice, or his own fears: for, "the righteous are bold as a lion [h]."

Other causes of fear might be here observed, which I shall but intimate. As we fear active and busy men [i]; because if they be provoked, they will stir and look about to revenge themselves.

We fear likewise delators, because they are inquisitive and pry into the secrets of others. Plutarch compares them unto cupping-glasses, which draw ever the worst humours of the body unto them, and to those gates through which none passed but condemned and piacular persons. We may liken them unto flies, which resort only to the raw and corrupt parts of the body; or if they light on a sound part, never leave blowing on it, till they dispose it to putrefaction. For this is all the comfort of malevolent persons, to make

f *Ælian.* Var. Hist. l. 13. c. 38. g *Juven.* Carus erit Verri qui Verrem tempore quo vult, Accusare potest, &c. h Prov. xxviii. 1. i Minus timebant Epaminondam, Διὰ φιλοσοφίαν, ὡς ἀπράγμονα. *Plutarch.*

others appear worse than they are, that they themselves, though they be the worst of men, may not appear so.

We fear also abusive and satirical wits, which make use of other men's names, as of whetstones, to sharpen themselves upon.

> " Omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas.—
> ' Fœnum habet in cornu, longe fuge ; dummodo risum
> Excutiat sibi, non hic cuiquam parcet amico :
> Et, quodcunque semel chartis illeverit, omnes
> Gestiet a furno redeuntes scire lacuque,
> Et pueros, et anus.' " [i]
>
> These all hate poets, fear to suffer scorn
> From those curs'd wits, which carry hay on horn.—
> ' Shun them ; they will not spare their dearest friend
> To make themselves sport : then what they have penn'd
> They 're big with, till old wives and boys, that go
> From ovens and from wash-pools, know it too.'—

Lastly, we fear close, cunning, and suppressed malice, which, like a skinned wound, doth rankle inwardly : crafty, insinuative, plausible men, that can shroud and palliate their revengeful purposes under pretexts of love. [k] I formerly noted of Tiberius, (and Ælius Spartianus observeth it of Antoninus Geta) that men were more afraid of his kindness than of his anger; because his use was to show much courtesy there, where he intended mischief. [l]

And Cæsar [m] was wont to say, that " he was not afraid of Antony and Dolabella, bold adversaries ; but of Brutus and Cassius, his pale and lean enemies ;" who were able to smother their passion, till they had fit opportunity to act it. The Italians (they say) have a proverb, wherein they promise " to take heed themselves of their enemy, but pray to God to deliver them from their friend." And this, as it is of all other the most dangerous, and the most unchristian, so it is the most unworthy and sordid disposition of mind, (I cannot find words bad enough to character it by) [n] which, at the same

[i] *Horat.* l. I. Sat. 4. 35. [k] Οἱ πρᾷοι καὶ πανοῦργοι· ἀδηλοι γάρ. *Arist.* Rhet. l. 2. [l] Fuit ejus immanitatis Antoninus, ut iis præcipue blandiretur, quos ad necem destinabat ; ut ejus magis blandimentum timeretur quam iracundia. *Spart.* in Geta. [m] *Plutarch.* in Cæsare.—Ira quæ tegitur, nocet. *Sen.* Med.—Psalm lxii. 4. lv. 21. x. 8, 9, 10. [n] Pessimum ini-

time, can both flatter and hate, and, with the same breath, praise a man, and undo him. And therefore the philosopher[o] telleth us, that a magnanimous man is φανερόμισος and φανερόφιλος, such a one as doth boldly profess as well his displeasure as his love, esteeming it timorousness to trifle and conceal his affections.

Of all Christ's enemies, Judas when he kissed him, the Herodians when they praised him, and the Devil when he confessed him, were the worst and ill-favouredst. A leprosy was ever uncleannest when it was whitest; and Satan is never more wicked or more ugly, than when he puts on Samuel's mantle. Hatred, when it flatters, is the most misshapen monster. Like those poisons which kill men with laughing; or like the Philistines' trespass-offering, mice and emeralds made of gold.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of the effects of Fear, suspicion, circumspection, superstition, betraying the succours of reason, Fear generative, reflecting, inward weakening the faculties of the mind, base suspicion, wise caution.

I PROCEED to consider some of the effects of this passion; whereof the first may be suspicion and credulity, which either other men's rumours, or our own working imagination frameth unto itself. Which effect of fear the historian[a] hath wisely observed, 'Retineri commeatus dum timet, credit;' what he feared, that he believed. And in another place[b], speaking of the strange relations which had been made of monsters, his judgement upon the report is, 'Visa, sive ex metu credita;' it was uncertain whether they had been really seen, or believed out of fear. For as timorous men are, by their own suspicion, ready to frame unto themselves new terrors, and to fear where no fear is; (which the poet hath observed,

"Quæ finxere timent."

micorum genus, laudantes. *Tac.*—Turpe est odisse quem laudes. *Sen.* de Ira, lib. 3. cap. 29. [o] *Arist.* Ethic. lib. 4. c. 8. Τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου. [a] *Tacit.* lib. 4. [b] Annal. lib. 2.

———They are afraid
Of fancies, which themselves have made.[c])

So are they ready likewise to believe the apparition of their own brain for real terrors: for Tacitus' speech is here likewise true, "Fingunt creduntque;" first, they feign, and then they believe.

Now the reason hereof may be [d], first, the general impression of nature; which, being subject unto infinite dangers, hath therefore given it a wisdom of providence and circumspection, to foresee those evils, which cannot, by dexterity, be so easily shifted off, as they may at a distance be prevented: so that we find, even in the most clear and undisturbed order of our operations toward any new thing, (though not apprehended as noxious and offensive to our nature) until it be better understood, a secret drawing back, and fear lest it should prove hurtful unto us; how much more then, when it is once prepossessed with passion?—For, as cloth, once died from its natural white, will take no other but a darker colour; so minds, once steeped in the bitter humours of this melancholick passion, will seldom admit of any, but more black and fearful conceits. [e] And from this suspicion of fear it is, that timorous men are usually cruel, when they gain any advantage; their jealousy teaching them to do that unto others, which they fear from them. [f]

A second reason may be, because, in fear, the mind of man is drawn to a nearer sense of its weakness, and to a more prejudicate apprehension of the adverse power. And therefore it is a true observation, "Pronæ ad religionem perculsæ semel mentes [g]," &c. Minds, once possessed with fearful conceits, are most forward in sacrifices, and religious ceremonies, to avert the evils which they expect. So that as Tacitus [h] on another occasion, speaks, 'Inclinatis ad credendum;' so I may say, 'Inclinatis ad timendum animis, loco ominum etiam Fortuna:' when the mind is once droop-

[c] Ἡμεῖς δὲ χωρὶς τῶν ἀναγκαίων κακῶν, Αὐτοὶ παρ' αὑτῶν ἕτερα προσπορίζομεν. *Menand.* [d] Quorum in alterius manu vita posita est, sæpius illud cogitant quid possit is, cujus in ditione sunt, quam quid debeat facere. *Cic.* pro Quinto. [e] De timore isto melancholico, vide quædam apud *Cæl. Rhodig.* l. 9. c. 26. [f] Quod de Constantio observavit *Ammian. Marcel.* l. 16; de Artaxerxe, *Plutarchus*; de Medea, *Euripid.* in Medea; de Domitiano, *Tacit.*—Quidam nunquam magis, quam cum erubuerunt, timendi sunt. *Senec.* Ep. 11. [g] *Tacit.* An. l. 1.—Vide *Plutarch.* de Superstit. Et lib. contra Epicur.—*Max. Tyrius* dissertat. 4.—*Clem. Alex.* Strom. lib. 7. p. 512. [h] Hist. lib. 2.

ing, things which before passed away as matters of course and casualty, are now drawn within the compass of presages and emphatical evils.

But here, by the way, we are to remember, that this credulity of fear is to be understood with respect to its own suspicion: otherwise, in regard of those strengthening helps which are given against it, it is ever incredulous:—"O thou of little faith, why dost thou fear?"

Now this effect of fear is generally in itself a corruption of it. For though I would have a man's dangers make him provident and solicitous in the forecasting future evils out of a sound and sober conjecture, according as are the likelihoods of their event, and not have him flatter himself in a careless security, nor divert his mind from such unwelcome and pensive thoughts; (like Vitellius in Tacitus, who in the near approach of his fatal ruin, was 'Trepidus, dein temulentus,' one hour fearful, and the next drunken, smothering in himself every thought of ensuing danger, and enduring nothing but 'jucundum et læsurum;' that which was pleasing, though harmful to him)—yet I would not have the mind tormented with ungrounded fancies, and preoccupate evils to be no further effected than in our brain: because hereby it is made soft and irresolute, tumultuary and confused, and both ways much indisposed and disabled for action.

Another ill effect of fear, is a dislike of whatever means reason presents for the freeing of us; whence issue inconstancy and continual change of resolutions, hating all counsels when they are present, and recalling them when they are too far past: which effect is elegantly described by the author of the Book of Wisdom, who saith, that "fear is a betraying of the succours which reason offereth;" a submitting of them to the false interpretations of a crooked and prejudicate suspicion; which, over-curiously discovering weakness in all means, and making use of none, doth thereby betray nature into the hands of danger. They [i] say of a certain fish, that it hath a sword, but it hath not a heart;—a perfect emblem of fear, which though you put into armour, yet you cannot give it courage. And [k] therefore, as He said,

[i] *Themistocles* apud *Plut.* Apoph. [k] *Chabrias* ib. et Orat. 2. de Fortit. Alex. *Aristid.* Οὐδέν ἐστιν οὔτε πύργος, οὔτε ναῦς, Ἔρημος ἀνδρῶν, &c. *Soph.* Oedip. Tyr. *Tac.* An. l. 3.—*Qu. Cur.*—Omnia tuta timent.—Non minus præsidium suum quam hostes metuerunt discrimine tanto. *Liv.* l.

an army of lions, led by a hart, would do less service, than an army of harts led by a lion; because in that case, fear would betray her own succours. And this I find a frequent observation, that 'Pavidis consilia in incerto;' fear ever dazzleth the eye, and blindeth the mind in all her counsels: and, 'Timor etiam auxilia reformidat;' it is afraid of the very succours that are offered. And therefore it is noted as a great mastery of Ulysses over his fears, that he could think and wisely advise what to do.

———"Nec talia passus Ulysses,
Oblitusque sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto.[l]

Although with fears oppress'd, yet he had not
The cares and thoughts of his own peace forgot.

Now the reason of this may be, First, because fear is a multiplying and generative passion, ever producing motions of its own nature. He who fears danger from another's power, will easily fear errors or impotency in his own aids: and it is [m] common with men to think themselves *unwise*, when they feel themselves *unhappy;* and this very thought that they are so, doth, I know not by what fascination, make them so. So that as a chased buck, when he flies from the dogs, doth many times fly into the net which was spread for him; so when our fears drive us from one mischief, they often hamper and entangle us in another.

Again, it is the property of fear, to make us ever reflect upon our own weakness, and (as I said) not only to present it, but to work it: as the sun, when it discloseth unto us the glorious lights of the one part, is commonly itself hid in the other part of the heavens; as contrarily, when it shineth on the earth, it hides the stars;—so it is in those two offices of reason, the transient and reflexive act, that whereby we look outward on others, or inward on ourselves, especially where there is passion to withdraw and pervert it; as the one is stronger, so commonly the other is weaker; which is true most of all in this passion of fear, wherein the more we see of dangers from outward oppositions, the less we see of in-

[l] Æneid. l. 3.

[m] Πρὸς τὰς τύχας ὀργὰς φρένας κεκτήμεθα. Iniquum, sed usu receptum, quod honesta consilia vel turpia, prout malè aut prosperè cedunt, ita vel probantur, vel reprehenduntur. *Plin.* l. 5. ep. 21.—*Arrian.* ep. l. 2. c. 1.

ward strength for resistance. Insomuch that great minds, when they meet with great dangers, are oftentimes staggered; as the poet intimates[n], when Ajax came forth to battle,

Τρῶας δὲ τρόμος αἰνὸς ὑπήλυθε γυῖα ἕκαστον,
Ἕκτορί τ' αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι πάτασσεν.

Fear had the other Trojans all opprest;
Yea, Hector's heart panted within his breast.

A third effect may be, a weakness of the faculties of the mind, and the spirits in the body; whereby the one is made unfit for search or counsel, the other, for service or execution. And hence (as Plutarch[o] noteth) it imports in the Greek, a binding or shutting up, and so withdrawing and indisposing the soul for action.

And such actions as fear forceth a man upon, are presumed to be so weak and unnatural, that it is a maxim in the law, "Per metum gesta pro non ratis habentur:" Those things which we do in fear, are void and invalid to bind, when the fear which forceth them, is removed.—And as it is in the civil state, so it is in the moral commonwealth of the soul; there are three principal ways to infer weakness, foreign incursions, intestine tumults, and an emptying of the parts; all which are to be seen in the extremity of fear. Where first, two things are to be granted, one concerning the body; and the other, the mind. The first is, that the spirits, being of the most strong, subtile, and quick motion, are the principal instruments of intercourse, either in negotiation to, or service from, reason. The other, that the mind, being of a spiritual and elevating nature, retains then the perfectest power of operation, when it least of all suffers the incursion of grosser passions: which yet I understand not of all manner of ministry and admixtion of appetite with reason, (as if the regular motions of inferior powers did not serve to sharpen the counsels of the higher) but only of invasion and tyranny.

Which granted, we may observe all the three former causes of weakness in an extremity of fear. For First, there is a confused and unserviceable mixture of passion and reason; the passion with too much courage and assault breaking in, and distracting the advices of reason, which is foreign

[n] Iliad. η. 215. [o] *Plut.* de Sup.

incursion; for though these two are not parts of a different regiment, yet they are of a different nation, (if I may so speak) the one belonging to the higher,—the other, to the lower part, or region, of the soul. Secondly, there is tumult and disorder amongst the spirits, which is civil dissension. Thirdly, there is a retiring of them to the principal castle or fort, the heart, whereby the outward quarters are left naked and ungarrisoned; which though it be a strengthening of the better, yet it is a weakening of the major part; and this answereth unto emptying or vacuity. By all which, both reason is made unfit to counsel, (all the conceits thereof being choaked and stifled with a disorderly throng of spirits and passions) and the body likewise is to be benumbed, that though our discourse were entire, yet it could not be there seconded with any successful service. And hence[p] are those many ill effects of fear upon the body, whiteness of hair, trembling, silence, thirst, paleness, horror, gnashing of teeth, emission of excrements: the outward parts being over-cooled, and the inward melted by the strength of the spirit retiring thither: which Homer[q] hath thus described, speaking of a coward:—

> His colour comes and goes; nor doth he sit
> Long in one place: he croucheth to his feet:
> His heart pants strong, and intercepts his breath;
> His teeth do gnash, with but the thoughts of death.
> Brave men are still the same, not much aghast,
> When the first brunt of their attempts is past.

Where, by the way, we may observe what Seneca also tells us,—that fear doth usually attend the beginnings of great enterprises, even in the worthiest men.[r] Which mindeth me of one more (and that a useful and profitable) effect of this passion; I mean, care, wisdom,[s] and caution, which ever proceeds from a moderate fear, which is a dictate of Nature. And, therefore, the weakest fishes swim together in shoals; and the weakest birds build in the smallest and outermost boughs, which are hardest to come unto. And we may ob-

[p] *Cæl. Rhodig.* l. 7. c. 47.—*Plut.* de Hom.—*Arist.* Prob. sect. 27. § 1, 2, 3.
[q] Iliad. N. 280. Colorem mutat Polypus, quia timidum animal. *Plut.* l. q. n. q. 19.
[r] *Arist.* Prob. 27. q. 3. Vid. *Sen.* de Ira, l. 2. c. 3.—*Plut.* in Arato.
[s] Βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ, *Arist.* Rhet. l. 2.—Vid. Pol. l. 5. c. 8. Φοβηθήσεσθαι τὸν

serve that Nature hath made the weakest [t] creatures swiftest, as the dove, thehare, the hart: and they say, that [u] the hare is very quick at hearing, and sleepeth with his eyes open, every way fitted to discover danger before it surprise him. For as in religion, a fear that is governed by the word of God,—so proportionably in morality, a fear grounded by the word of reason, is the principle of wisdom.[u] As security and supineness is the root of folly, which Tiberius replied to the petition of Hortalus, wherein he requested of the senate a contribution from the publick treasury, to recover the honour of his family, which now was sunk and began to wither: "Industry," saith he, "will languish, idleness will increase, if no man have fear or hope in himself, but all will securely expect a supply from others, in themselves lazy, and burdensome unto us."[x] And it is the judgement of Tacitus, upon one of the wisest policies which ever that emperor practised, I mean, his writing to the legions abroad, 'tanquam adepto principatu,' as if he were already emperor, when at home in the senate he used only modesty and refusals, that he did it out of fear;—so wise a counsellor was his passion unto him. And we find that some great commanders [y] have caused their scout-watches to be unarmed, that fear might make them the more vigilant. And therefore this passion is the instrument of discipline, seasoning the mind, as ground-colours do a table, to receive those beauties and perfections which are to be super-induced. [z]

σοφὸν οὐδαμῶς, εὐλαβηθήσεσθαι δε'. *Laert.* in Zen. [t] *Ælian.* de Anim. l. 8. c. 18. l. 4. c. 8. [u] *Plut.* Sympos. l. 4. q. 5. Homerus viros fortissimos semper in pugna describit armatos. Et Hannibal in tot pugnis nunquam vulneratus. *Plut.* in Pelopida, et in Marcello. [x] Languescet industria, intendetur socordia, si nullus ex se metus aut spes: securi omnes aliena subsidia expectabunt, sibi ignavi, nobis graves. Annal. l. 2. [y] *Paulus Æmil.* apud *Plut.* Apoph. l. 44. [z] Vid. *Clem. Alex.* Pædag. l. 1. c. 9. *Plin.* l. 6. ep. 17.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of that particular affection of Fear which is called Shame. What it is. Whom we thus fear. The ground of it, evil of turpitude, injustice, intemperance, sordidness, softness, pusillanimity, flattery, vain-glory, misfortune, ignorance, pragmaticalness, deformity, greatness of mind, unworthy correspondencies, &c. Shame, vicious and virtuous.

Besides this general consideration of the passion of Fear, there is one particular thereof, which calleth for some little observation, namely, shame,[a] which is 'a fear of just disgrace and reproof in the minds of those, whose good opinion we do or ought to value:' as he said in the poet,

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει.

Now those whom we thus fear, are wise men, (for[b] so Polydamas is said to look behind and before him) aged men, and all whose presence we reverence, as parents, rulers, counsellors, friends. Any whom we ourselves admire, or who admire us. We fear disgrace with those whom we admire, because their judgement of us is, in our own apprehension, a kind of touchstone, which if we cannot suffer the trial of, argues us to be but corrupt and uncurrent metal: and we fear it with those who admire us, because as every man is willing to see his face, when it is clean, in that glass which represents it fairest; so when it is foul, of all other he shunneth that most. In the former case, we are in danger to miss what we desired; in the other, we are in danger to shipwreck what we before enjoyed.

We are apt to be ashamed with our friends, because their opinion we value; and with our enemies, because theirs we fear: with our friends, because they are grieved; with our enemies, because they are delighted with that which shames us.

Again, we fear in this regard rigid and severe men, who

[a] Φόβος ἀδοξίας *Arist.* Eth. l. 1. c. 15. Λύπη τις καὶ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν. &c. *Arist.* Rhet. l. 2. c. 6. φόβος προσδοκία ψόγου. *Damasc.* de Orthod. fid. l. 2. c. 15. *Aul. Gell.* l. 9. c. 6. [b] Ὁ γὰρ οἷος ὄπιθε καὶ πρόσσω. Il Σ. 251.

are not ready to forgive, nor to put candid and charitable constructions upon what we do. Therefore when Cato[a] was present, (who was 'Vir rigidæ innocentiæ,' a stern and severe censor of the manners of men) none durst call for the obscene spectacles of their Floralia, being more awed by the authority of the man, than allured by the pleasures of the plays.

Likewise busy and garrulous men, because they enquire into our crimes; and having disclosed, do divulge them. For which cause we fear, in this case[b] the multitude; because an ill name is like an ill face, the broader it is drawn, and the more light it hath about it, it appears the more deformed. As a little gold beaten into thin leaves, a little water drawn into a thin steam and vapour, seems wider than it was at first; so even lesser crimes, being multiplied through the mouths of many, do grow into a spreading cloud, and obscure a man's name. For he is presumed to be void either of wisdom or modesty, that doth not fear many eyes. We fear innocent and virtuous men; their presence aweth us from liberty of sinning, and maketh us blush if they deprehend us in it; because examples have a proportionable authority over the heart of man, as laws have, which we do not trespass without fear. And therefore the philosopher[c] adviseth to live always so, as if some grave, and serious, and severe person were ever before us; to behave ourselves 'sub custode, et pædagogo,' as under the eye of a keeper; because such a man's conversation will either regulate ours, or disgrace it. Vicious men do the less fear one another, by how much they stand in need of mutual pardon: as we find Sertorius (if I forget not) giving those soldiers of the enemy's army their lives, who had but one eye, he being himself monopththalmos.[d]

Again; we fear envious and malevolent persons, because such look upon our actions with prejudice: and as Momus, when he could not find fault with the face in the picture of Venus, picked a quarrel at her slipper; so these men will

[a] *Liv.* l. 39.—*Val. Max.* l. 2. c. 10. Vid. etiam l. 4. c. 5. [b] Αἰδέομαι non Pompeium modo, sed Τρῶας καὶ Τρωάδας. *Cic.* ep. ad Attic. l. 7. ep. 1. [c] *Sen.* ep. 11, et 25. Cydias orator Atheniensis apud Aristotelem, Rhet. l. 2. c. 6. [d] Et Persæ adunco naso præditos in pretio habent, quod Cyrus talis esset. *Plut.* Apoph. *Aristid.* Orat. de Paraphthegmate.

ever have something, either in substance or circumstances of our actions, to misreport and expose to scandal.

Lastly; we fear those in this respect, whose company we shall be most used unto; because that leaves us not time wherein to forget our errors, or to fortify ourselves against them. It makes a man live ever under the sense of his guilt. In which respect, Cato major[d] was wont to say, that "a man should most of all reverence himself, because he is ever in his own sight and company."

The fundamental ground of this affection, is (Αδικία,) any evil that hath either guilt, or any kind of turpitude in it, or any signs or suspicions thereof, reflecting either on ourselves, or any of ours, whose reputation we are tender of. And thus the apostle telleth us, that all sin is the matter of shame, when it is revised with a right judgement; "What fruit had ye then in those things, whereof ye are now ashamed?" That which hath emptiness in the beginning, and death in the end, must needs have shame in the middle. But though all sin, with respect to God's eye and judgement, doth cause shame; yet, in the eye of men, those cause it most who have any notable and more odious turpitude adhering unto them; as either obscene, or subdolous and dishonest actions, when they are detected; forging of deeds, defacing records, counterfeiting of names or seals, suborning of witnesses, making use of ingenuous professions, as cloaks to palliate, and instruments to provoke, abusive and illiberal practices.

Such are all kind of sordid actions or behaviours, as gain raised out of despicable commodities, (as Vespasian[e] set a vectigal, or excise upon piss) and the philosopher tells us of some that made a gain of the dead.[f] Such are also the livings which by sordid ministers, panders, bawds, courtezans, parasites, jugglers, delators[h], cheaters, sharks, and shifting companions make unto themselves: such the poet's miser:

> ———"Populus me sibilat; at mihi plaudo
> Ipse domi, simul ac nummos contemplor in arca."[i]

[d] *Plut.* Apoph. [e] *Suet.* in Vesp. c. 23.—Vid. quædam apud Casaub. in Theo. περὶ ἀπονοίας. Vid. Orat. Bunduicæ apud Dion. l. 62. [f] Αἰσχροκερδία ἀναλευθερία. Vid. de ea Theophrast. [g] Vid. *Desid. Herald.* digres. l. 1. c. 21. [h] Vide *Plin.* Paneg.—*Tacit.* Annal. 4. [i] *Horat.* l. 1. Sat. 1.—Vide *Plaut.* Aulul. Act. 2.—*Theophrast.* περὶ μικρολογίας.

The people hiss me all abroad;
But I at home myself applaud,
When, in my coffer, I behold
That which none hiss at,—heaps of gold.

Many particular causes there are, which are apt to excite this affection, some whereof I shall briefly name; as,

First, sloth, and shrinking from such labour, which those that are better, older, weaker, more delicate than ourselves, do willingly undergo. Thus Menelaus in the Poet, seeing the Grecians as fearful to undertake a single combat with Hector, as they were ashamed to deny it, did thus upbraid their cowardice:

Ὤμοι, ἀπειλητῆρες, Ἀχαιΐδες, οὐκετ' Ἀχαιοί, &c.[i]

What! Grecian soldiers turn'd to Grecian dames,
That can digest so great, so many shames?
What! not a man of Greece (O foul disgrace!)
Dare meet or look proud Hector in the face?
Well, sit you down, inglorious, heartless men!
Turn'd to your first water and earth; yet then
I 'll take up arms; for Victory's last end
Doth not on our, but Divine, will depend.

In like manner Hector rebuketh the baseness of Paris in flying from Menelaus:

Οὐκ ἂν τοι χραίσμῃ κίθαρις, τά τε δῶρ' Ἀφροδίτης, &c.[k]

Trim warrior! tell me what thy lute can do,
What Venus' graces, comely hair, sweet hue,
When thou shalt wallow in the dust? Th' art far
Fitter to wear stone-coat than coat of war.

Again, any thing (μικροψυχία) which argueth pusillanimity, or littleness of mind, is a just ground of shame, as to recount courtesies and upbraid them; and therefore he said in Seneca, 'Non tanti est vixisse;' that his life was less worth than to be so valued to him, in daily exprobrations; and that his blood, with less trouble to him, might have been let out at his veins, than to be every day disordered, and called

[i] Iliad. η. 97.—O vere Phrygiæ, neque enim Phryges. *Æn.* 9. [k] Il. γ. 55. Λάϊνον χιτῶνα, vocat lapides, quibus adulter ex antiquo more obrui debuisset.

up into his face. To receive continual gifts [l], and be ever craving from our inferiors, burthensome to those who can less bear it.

Hereunto refer all light, ludicrous, and ridiculous behaviour; wherein if a grave or serious man be deprehended, it rendereth him suspected of a mind that can flag and lessen. And therefore Agesilaus [m], being so taken playing with his child, made his apology for it, and desired his friend "not to think light of him, till he had children of his own:" for love will teach greatness of mind to descend.

Also all sordid arts of (κολάκεια) flattery [n], which praiseth, imitateth, creepeth, changeth, complieth, transformeth itself to all shapes to get a living; and like crows, pulleth out men's eyes with praises, that it may after more securely make a prey of them. 'Fœdum crimen servitutis;' as the historian well calls it; a servile and filthy crime.

Any thing which argueth vanity and windiness of mind; as arrogance [o], and vainglorious ostentation, ascribing to ourselves things which belong not unto us, intruding into the learning, lands, achievements of other men; as he [p] who called all the ships in the harbour at Athens his own. "Labore alieno magnam partam gloriam verbis sæpe in se transmovet." Whereunto belong absurd and unusual affectations in words or fashions, mimical and fantastical gesticulations, frothy and superficial compliments, strange and exotick habits, which are usually the scum of light and unsettled minds, and ever expose them to contempt. Insomuch that Alexander himself escaped not the imputation of levity, when he followed the fashions of those countries, which he had subdued. [q]

Misfortune (ἀτυχία) and decay in the outward ornaments of life: for it is not in men's fortunes as in their monuments, wherein [r] ruin doth many times conciliate reverence.

[l] Quam inique comparatum est, ii qui minus habent, Ut semper aliquid addant ditioribus, *Terent.* Phorm. [m] *Plut.* Apoph. Lacon. [n] Vid. *Plut.* et *Theophrast.*—*Terent.* Eunuchum, Act 2. Scen. 2. Act. 1. Scen. 7.—Et *Plauti* Artotrogum in Milit. Glor. [o] Vid. *Theoph.* περὶ ἀλαζονείας. *Plaut.* Mil. Glor.—*Arist.* Eth. l. 4. c. 13. [p] *Val. Max.* l. 9. c. 15. [q] *Plut.* l. de Alex. fortuna. [r] Curios jam dimidios, humeroque minorem Corvinum, et Galbam auriculis nasoque carentem. *Juvenal.* 8. 4.

" Nil habet infelix paupertas durius in se,
Quàm quòd ridiculos homines facit"———

Unhappy poverty hath nothing worse,
Than that it maketh men ridiculous.

And therefore men of sunk and broken estates are ashamed to live there, where they have been formerly in credit and estimation: as Hecuba [p] complaining in the tragedy:

Ὅτῳ γὰρ ὤφθην εὐτυχοῦσ', αἰδώς μ' ἔχει,
Ἐν τῷδε πότμῳ τυγχάνουσ', ἵν' εἰμὶ νῦν, &c.

In this my broken and dejected case,
Pardon me, if I shame to show my face
To Polymestor; whose eyes once have seen
Me, a now spoiled captive, then a queen.

Again, ignorance and ineptitude in our own proper functions, and miscarriage in our arts [q] and professions, is an exprobration, either of indiligence or weakness. As want of proficiency in a student, of elocution in an orator, of military wisdom in a soldier, &c. And therefore a physician will seldom stay to see his patient buried: he usually departs before the sick man, because funerals are 'convicia medicorum.' Yet all ignorance is not matter of disgrace; for some things are below the enquiry or studies of some men. And therefore though Tully [r] tells us, that when Themistocles declined the lute, he was esteemed more ignorant than became a person of quality; yet it was a brave apology which he made for himself, that 'though he knew not to handle a lute, yet he knew to conquer a city.' And Gelo [s], when others, after a feast, sang to an instrument, called for his great horse, and did excellently manage that. And as it was a cautelous answer which Favorinus [t] gave touching Adrian the emperor, who had censured him in his own profession of grammar, that " he durst not be learneder than he who commanded thirty legions;"—so it was a truer answer which another artificer gave in the like case unto a prince, " God forbid, sir, that you should know things of so mean a quality, better than I, who owe my subsistence unto them [u]."

[p] *Eurip.* in Hec.—Magnum dolorem habet, unde cum honore decesseris, eodem cum ignominia reverti. *Cic.* pro L. Muræna. [q] Artium peccata artificibus pudori sunt, &c. *Sen.* ep. 97. [r] *Cic.* Tusc. l. 1. [s] *Plut.* Nec aliter Iphicrates apud Plutarch. [t] *Spartian.* in Adrian. [u] *Plutarch.*

And as ignorance in our own, so πολυπραγμοσύνη, intrusion and usurpation of other men's offices, is a ground of shame, especially if they be such as wherein we descend below the dignity of our places or professions [x]; as when men of liberal condition apply themselves unto the business of sordid persons. For every man is entrusted with the dignity of his place: he is to be not only the possessor, but the protector of it; which when he betrays, it doth justly revenge itself upon him with contempt and disgrace.

Again, any notorious external deformities [y], and 'dehonestamenta corporis,' especially if there be any thing of our own, either guilt or servility, in them. The Grecians, taking notice of the ill shape and worst conditions of Thersites [z], are said to look on him with derision and laughter, then when they had other occasions of sadness. And when Ulysses' companions were, by Circe, transformed into shape of swine, they wept, and were ashamed of their own deformities [a]. And the poet describeth Deiphobus, whom Menelaus had dismembered,

> ——— "Pavitantem et dira tegentem
> Supplicia." [b]
> Afraid of being known, careful to hide
> His mangled wounds, that they might not be spied.

And we find how careful men [c] were to cover any of these notes and prints of infamy, or servility, which persons either extremely vicious, or in bondage, were marked withal: for infamous or servile persons were wont so to be branded.

Many times greatness of mind is a cause of shame, either for something which such a man suffereth in himself, or in those that are near unto him. Such was that of the Romans, ad Furcas Caudinas; of which the historian [d] gives this observation: Their obstinate silence, eyes fastened to the earth, ears refusing all comfort, faces ashamed to behold the light, were certain evidences of a mind deeply resolved upon revenge.—And of Maximinus, of whom the historian [e] telleth

[x] Dignitas in indigno, ornamentum in luto. *Salv.* de Gub. lib. 4. [y] *Sidon. Apol.* 3. Ep. 13. [z] Iliad. β.—Vid. *Voss.* Rhet. par. 1. p. 78, 79. [a] Odyss. α. *Senec.* de Ira, l. 3. c. 17, 29. [b] Æneid. 6. [c] Vid. *Athenæum*, 16. *Val. Max.* l. 6. c. 8. sect. 7. *Suet.* Calig. c. 27. *Lips.* l. 2. Elect. c. 15. [d] Silentium obstinatum, fixi in terram oculi, surdæ ad omnia solatia aures, et pudor intuendæ lucis, ingentem molem irarum ex alto animi cientis indicia erant. *Liv.* l. 9. cap. 6. [e] *Capitol.* in Max.

us, that out of desire to conceal his ignoble birth, he slew all even the best of his friends, who were conscious unto it. So poverty, meeting with pride, doth often suffer conflicts with this passion of shame, when penury denies that, which luxury and pride demand.

———" Quid enim majore cachinno
Excipitur vulgi, quàm pauper Apicius ?[f]"

Who, without much irrision, can endure
To see a beggar a proud epicure?

Again, acquaintance and intimacy with infamous persons, is noted by the philosopher amongst the grounds of shame.[g] And therefore it was upbraided unto Plato, that Calippus, the murderer of his host, had been bred in his school; and to Socrates[h], that he was resorted unto by Alcibiades, a factious and turbulent citizen; and to Themistocles, that he held correspondence and intelligence with Pausanias, a traitor. And we find how fatal the favour of Sejanus[i], after his fall, was to many of his friends, that no wonder if every man, not only out of indignation, but out of fear too, cried out,

———" Nunquam, si quid mihi credis, amavi
Hunc hominem."[k]

Such being the impotent and immoderate passions of many men, to trample on the same persons in their calamity, whom in their greatness they almost adored; as he said,

Δρυὸς πεσούσης, πᾶς ἀνὴρ ξυλίζεται.

When the oak is fallen that stood,
Then ev'ry man will gather wood.

Lastly, not only things shameful in themselves, but such as are signs and intimations of them do usually beget this affection. As Æschines[l], in the Comedian, blushed, when he saw his father knock at the door of an infamous woman, because it was a token of a vicious intention. And therefore Cæsar[m] was wont to say, that "he would have those that belonged unto him, free, as well from suspicion as from crime;"—for we shall never find, that a man who is tender

[f] *Juvenal.* [g] *Pet. Victor.* in Artic. Rhet. l. 2. [h] *Plutarch.* l. de capiend. ex Hostib. utilitate. [i] *Tacit.* Annal. l. 5. c. 6. [k] *Juv.* Sat. 10. [l] *Teren.* Adelph. [m] *Suet.* in Cæsar.

of his conscience, will be prodigal of his credit; and he who is truly fearful of incurring censure from himself by the guilt of a crime, will, in some proportion, be fearful of incurring censure from others by the show and suspicion of it. For as a good conscience is a feast, to give a man a cheerful heart,—so a good name is an ointment, to give him a cheerful countenance.

There is a twofold shame, the one virtuous; as Diogenes [n] was wont to say, that "blushing was the colour of virtue." The other vicious; and that either out of cruelty, as Tacitus [o] and Seneca observe of Domitian, that he was never more to be feared than when he blushed; or else out of cowardice, when a man hath not strength enough of countenance to outface and withstand a vicious solicitation; as it was said of the men of Asia, that they had, out of tenderness of face, exposed themselves to much inconvenience, because they could not pronounce that one syllable, *No.* It was a better resolution, that of Xenophanes, who being provoked unto some vicious practice, confessed himself a coward at such a challenge, as not daring to do dishonestly.

I will conclude this matter with that excellent similitude wherewith Plutarch beginneth it, in that golden book of his touching the same argument; that "as thistles, though noxious things in themselves, are usually signs of an excellent ground wherein they grow; so shamefacedness, though many times a weakness and betrayer of the mind, is yet generally an argument of a soul ingenuously and virtuously disposed."

CHAP. XXX.

Of the affection of Anger. The distinctions of it. The fundamental causes thereof, Contempt. Three kinds of Contempt, disestimation, disappointment, calumny.

I NOW proceed to the last of the passions, Anger; whereof, though in itself a subject of a large discourse, yet being

[n] Τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ χρῶμα. Lib. 6. c. 2. n. 6.

[o] Sævus ille vultus, et rubor, quo se contra pudorem muniebat. *Tac.* Agric. Quidam nunquam magis, quam cum erubuerint, timendi sunt, quasi omnem verecundiam effuderint. Sylla tunc erat violentissimus, cum faciem ejus sanguis invaserat. *Sen.* Epist. 11. *Plut.* de vil. Pudore.

every where obvious, I shall not speak much. I intend not therefore distinctly to handle the several kinds of this passion, which Aristotle, in his Ethicks, hath given us, which are a sharp anger, and a hard and knotty anger.[a] And St. Paul, likewise hath given us three kinds of it, whereof the first I may call a close[b] and buried anger, which he names 'bitterness;'—the other a violent[c] burning anger, which he calls 'wrath;' and the last a desiring and pursuing anger, which seemeth to have its derivation from a word which signifies to desire, and therefore is defined by Aristotle[d] to be ὄρεξις, and by the Stoicks, ἐπιθυμία, words of 'prosecution and pursuit.' For these differ not essentially or formally amongst themselves, but only in diversity of degrees, and in order to the divers constitutions of the subject wherein they lodge, and of the habits wherewith they are joined.

In which respect, we might observe several other shapes of this affection. For there is the anger of a wasp[e], which is a hasty, pettish, and fretful anger, proceeding from a nature leavened and habituated with choler[f], which is presently stirred and provoked. And there is the anger of a lion[g], which is slow, but strong and severe; thus elegantly described by Homer[h]:

——Ὁ δὲ, πρῶτον μὲν ἀτίζων,
Ἔρχεται· ἀλλ' ὅτε κέν τις ἀρηϊθόων αἰζηῶν
Δουρὶ βάλῃ, ἑάλη τε χανὼν, περί τ' ἀφρὸς ὀδόντας
Γίγνεται, &c.

He first walks by with scorn; but when swift youth
Urge him with darts, then with devouring mouth
He turns again, and at his lips is seen
A boiling foam, while his stout heart within

[a] Eth. l. 4. [b] Ὀργὴ, θυμὸς, μῆνις, κότος. Vid. *Damas.* de Orthod. fid. l. 2. c. 16.—*Cæl. Rhod.* l. 12. c. 57. Est autem μῆνις memor ira; κότος, ira inveterata, plumbea, alta mente reposta, vindictæ occasionem tacite expectans: μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον, ὄφρα τελέσσῃ. Iliad. α. [c] Non vultu alienatus, non verbis commotior, adeo iram condiderat. *Tacit.* de Tiber. Annal l. 2. [d] Severus, commotione animi, stomachi choleram evomere solebat. *Ælius Lamprid.* in Severo. [e] Iliad. π. 259. Unde 'Crabrones irritare,' apud Plaut. Amphit. [f] Nunc in fermento tota est, ira turget mihi. *Plaut.* Casin. [g] Qui fremitu plerumque gementes, Nec capere irarum fluctus in pectore possunt. *Lucr.* l. 3. [h] Iliad. υ. 167.

Rouseth itself with groans:[i] and round about
His tail beating his sides and loins, calls out
And wak'neth proud revenge; thus stirr'd, he flies
Right on with red and fiery sparkling eyes
To kill, or to be kill'd——

There is, farther, a cowardly, verbal, and ridiculous anger, like that of whelps, which bark aloud, but run away from the thing which angers them; which spends itself only in storms of empty expressions, rather pleasing than punishing those whom they light on, and rendering the person that useth it, a very μορμολύκειον, or scarecrow, formidable to children, but to men ridiculous; like Geta in the Comedian,

"Ruerem, agerem, raperem, tunderem, prosternerem."[k]

There is a grave and serious anger, like that of Agamemnon; an insolent and boasting anger[l], like that of Achilles; a sullen and stubborn anger, like that of the[m] Roman army, disgracefully used by the Samnitians; a cruel[n] and raging anger, like that of Sulla, who, in an excess of fury, vomited up blood and died. And thus Saul is said to have 'breathed out threatenings,' and been 'exceeding mad' against the church.[o] A revengeful and impatient anger, as that of Cambyses[p], who being reproved by Praxaspes for his drunkenness, confuted the reproof with this act of cruelty,—he shot the son of his reprover through the heart, to prove the steadiness of his hand. An anger of indignation at the honour and prosperity of unworthy persons; as that of the Roman nobility[q], who seeing Cn. Flavius, a man of mean condition, advanced to the prætorship, threw away their golden rings, (the signs of their honour) to testify their just indignation. The poet[r] thus elegantly expresseth the like against Menas, made of a slave a freeman by Pompey.

Videsne, Sacram metiente te Viam
Cum bis ter ulnarum toga,

[i] Dolor excitat iras. *Æneid.* 2. Immanique oculos infecerat ira. *Claud.*—Multa in ira terribilia et ridicula. *Plut.* [k] *Terent.* Adelph. Act. 3. Scen. 2. [l] Iliad. α. [m] *Liv.* lib. 9. [n] *Val. Max.* l. 2. c. 3. [o] Acts ix. 1. xxvi. 11.—Ira spirat sanguinem. *Senec.* Thyest. Δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ῥίνας μένος. Καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ δριμεῖα χολὸ ποτὶ ῥινὶ κάθηται. *Theocrit.* Idyl. 1.—Ira cadat naso rugosaque sanna. *Pers.* Satir. 5. [p] *Herodot.* Thalia. [q] *Val. Max.* l. 9. c. 3. Sect. 3. *Plin.* lib. 33. cap. 1. [r] *Horat.* Epod. Od. 4.

Ut ora vertat huc et huc euntium
Liberrima indignatio?
Sectus flagellis hic Triumviralibus,
Præconis ad fastidium,
Arat Falerni mille fundi jugera,
Et Appiam mannis terit?"

When thou pacest up and down
In thy long gown,
Seest thou how the people fret
To see thee jet?
How with indignation bold,
They cannot hold
To see a man,—so lately plow'd
With scourges loud,
Until at length the weary crier
Began to tire,—
Dressing a thousand acres now
With horse and plough?

Lastly, an anger of emulation, or a displeasure against ourselves for coming short, by our negligence, of the perfection of other men, whom haply by industry we might have equalled. As Themistocles[r] professed, that the trophy of Militiades would not suffer him to sleep; and Cæsar wept[s], when he read the achievements of Alexander, as having not at his age done any memorable thing: and Thucydides[t] hearing Herodotus recite a history which he had written, brake forth into a strange passion of weeping; which the historian espying, thus comforted his father, You are a happy man to be the father of such a son, Ὃς ὀργῶσαν ἔχει τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα, who is carried with such a vehement affection unto learning.

But to pass over these particulars, I shall in the general content myself with a brief consideration of the causes and effects of this passion.

The fundamental and essential cause of anger, is contempt[u] from others, meeting with the love of ourselves. Whether it be disestimation and undervaluing of a man's

[r] *Plut.* Apophtheg. [s] *Plut.* in Cæsare. [t] *Suidas* in Thucydide.
[u] Despectus tibi sum, nec quis sim quæris, Alexi.—Ast ego quæ Divum incedo regina, Jovisque Et soror et conjux, una cum gente tot annos Bella gero; et quisquam numen Junonis adoret Præterea? *Æneid.* 1.

person, or disappointment of his purposes, or slandering his good name, or any other way of casting injury on him; for any of these particulars being impaired, (if by such on whom we may hope to receive revenge) do work not only anxiety and grief, (which is a motion of flight) but hope also and desire to ease itself, if not in the recovery of its own loss, yet in the comfort of another man's: for calamity (as the historian [x] speaks) is ever either querulous or malignant; "Cum suo malo torquetur, quiescit alieno:" when it feels itself wrung and pinched, it quickly proceeds, either by justice or revenge, to please itself in retaliation.

For the former of these, as it is the common property of man, with all other creatures, to love himself; so it is his particular desire also, being 'Animal sociale et politicum,' to be loved by others; because hereby that love of himself, which proceedeth from judgement and reason, is confirmed: for every man doth more willingly believe that, whereunto he hath farther authority to persuade him. And therefore though love be not sinisterly suspicious, nor too envious in interpreting a man's own, or a friend's actions and behaviour; yet that love, which is not blind and furious, will be ever ready to submit itself unto that opinion of stayed and indifferent judgements, because it is conscious to itself, how easily it may miscarry, if it rely upon its own censure, wherein reason, affection, and prejudice are mixed together.

Now then, when a man already strongly possessed with a love of his own or his friend's person or parts, shall find either of them by other slighted and despised, from whose joint respect he hoped for a confirmation of his judgement; therehence ariseth not only a grief [y] to see his expectation deceived, and his opinion undervalued; but withal a desire [z] to make known unto the persons, who thus contemn him, by some manner of face, or tongue, or hand, or heart, or head-revenge, (for all these may be the instruments of our anger)

[x] *Q. Curt.*—Καὶ μὴ δοκῶμεν, δρῶντες ἂν ἡδώμεθα, Οὐκ ἀντιτίσειν αὖθις ἂν λυπώμεθα. *Sophoc.* Ajax. 1105. Εἰ δὲ κακὸν εἴποις, τόχα κ' αὐτὸς μεῖζον ἀκούσαις. *Hesiod.* Ἔργ. l. ii. 339. Si mihi pergit quæ vult dicere, ea quæ non vult, audiet. *Terent.* Andr. [y] Ignescunt iræ: duris dolor ossibus ardet: *Æneid.* 9.—Affectus nunquam sine tormento sui violentus, quia dolorem, cum inferre vult, patitur, &c. *Val. Max.* l. 9. c. 3.—Dolor addidit iram. *Ovid.* Met. 12. [z] Spes addita suscitat iras. *Æneid.* 10.

that there is in him more courage, power, and worth, than deserves so to be neglected. Which passion, in a word, so long as it submits itself to the government of reason, is then always allowable and right, when it is grounded on the pride and insolency of others, who unjustly contemn us:—and then irregular and corrupt, when it proceeds from the root of pride and ambition in ourselves, which makes us greedy of more honour from others, than their judgements, or our own worth, suffers them to afford us.

To this branch of contempt may be referred forgetfulness of friends and acquaintance, whereby we upbraid them with obscurity and distance, as well from true worth, as from our affection. For 'Omnia quæ curant, meminerunt,' saith Tully; and Aristotle to the same purpose: Those things which we do respect, do not lie hid and out of our sight.

Next, hither may be referred all ungrateful[a] persons, who slight those favours, which they have received from other men's bounties; and, out of a swelling and height of stomach, cannot endure to acknowledge any obligations; but desire to receive benefits, as corrupt men take bribes in the dark, and behind their backs, that so neither others, nor (if it were possible) their own eyes might be witnesses unto it. For, as Tacitus speaks, 'Gratia oneri habetur;' such is the pride of some men, that they disdain to be overcome in any thing, though it be in kindness. And therefore, 'Ubi multum beneficia antevenere, pro gratia odium redditur,' saith the same author; when they find themselves overladen with love, the best requital which their high minds can afford, is hatred;—which cannot but work a double anger; an anger against ourselves and our own weakness in the choice of so unfit a subject for the placing of our benefits; and an anger at that contemptuous pride, which so basely entertained them.

Hither also we may refer those locked and close men, who even to their friends are so reserved, and keep every thing so secret, as if none were worthy, to whose judgement or trust they might commit themselves.

Hitherto likewise are referred acceptation of persons in equality of merit with unequal respect, negligence of out-

[a] Ejectum littore, egentem, Excepi, et regni demens in parte locavi: Amissam classem, socios à morte reduxi. Heu furiis incensa feror, &c. *Æneid.* 4.

ward ceremony and behaviour, and generally whatever else may work an opinion that we are undervalued.

The second branch of this first fundamental cause was an hindering of the projects and purposes of another; which is not only a privative, (as the former) but a positive and real injury, which includes that other, and adds unto it, as being not only a slighting, but an assault upon us; not an opinion only, but an expression of our weakness; a course so much the more likely to incense nature, and make it swell, by how much violence and opposition is more sensible in motion than in rest. So that these two former injuries, I think I may well compare to a bank and to a bridge, or some other stops to a river in his course; whereof the former doth confine the river, and not oppose it, as not hindering it in its direct and natural motion, (which it rather helpeth, by more uniting the parts) but only in a motion lateral and indirect, which Nature intended not: and therefore herein we see not any manifest fretting and noise, but only a secret swelling and rising of the water, which breaks not to outrage and violence: but the latter, resisting the natural course of the stream in its own channel, and standing directly across where the water should pass, makes it not only in time to overswell on all sides, but in the mean time works in it great tumult and noise.

"Spumeus, et fervens, et ab obice sævior ibit."

It foams, and boils, and, with a raging force,
Fights with all obstacles that stop its course.

So of these two degrees of contempt in anger, the former, as being only a confining and limiting contempt, which shuts up a man's worth within too narrow and strait a judgement, works indeed a secret swelling of the heart with indignation at the conceit of such disesteem; but this breaks not out into that clamour, (as St. Paul calls it) that noise of anger, as the other doth, which ariseth out of a direct opposition against our counsels or actions.

Unto which opposition may be reduced all manner of injurious proceedings, which tend to the prejudice and disap-

[b] Quem ego credo manibus, pedibusque obnixe omnia Facturum: magis id adeo, mihi ut incommodet, Quam &c. *Terent.* And. Act. 1 Scen. 1.

pointing of any man's end; whether it be by closeness and undermining, as cheats and cozenages in the preventing of lawful, or by other politic wisdom in hindering unlawful ends; or whether by open and professed opposition [b], as in matters of emulation, competition, commodity, and the like; or, lastly, whether it be such as takes notice, and discovers ends which desire to be undiscerned. And therefore Tacitus, reckoning the ambiguous and close speeches of the emperor Tiberius, says [c], that it was 'unicus Patrum metus, si intelligere viderentur;' the Senate feared nothing more, than to discover that they understood him; which is the same with his judgement after, 'eo acrius accepit recludi quæ premeret; nothing did more exasperate him, than to see those things taken notice of, which he desired to suppress and dissemble. Both which were true in Scaurus, one of the senators; who, adventuring to collect Tiberius's willingness of accepting the empire, in that he did not forbid, by his tribunitial authority, the relation thereof by the consuls, did thereby procure his utter and implacable hatred.

But, of all contempts, the last of the three is greatest; that, I mean, which immediately violates our reputation and good name, because it is a derivative and spreading injury, not only dishonouring a man in private and reserved opinion, but in the eyes and ears of the world, not only making him odious in his life, but in his memory. As there is in a man a double desire, the one of perfecting, the other of perpetuating himself; which two answer to that double honour of our creation, which we lost in our first father; the honour of integrity in goodness, and the honour of immunity from corruption; so there may be from the violation of these, sundry degrees of anger, or any other burthensome passion wrought in us. But when in injury we find them both assaulted, and not only our parts and persons, (which belong to our perfection) privily undervalued, but our name and memory (which belong to our preservation) tainted likewise; we cannot but be so much the more incensed, by how much perpetuity accumulates, either to weakness or perfection. But of this fundamental cause of anger, enough.

[c] Annal. 1.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of other causes of Anger: First, in regard of him that suffers wrong; excellency, weakness, strong desires, suspicion. Next, in regard of him who doth it; baseness, impudence, nearness, freedom of speech, contention, ability. The effect of Anger, the immutation of the body, impulsion of reason, expedition, precipitance. Rules for the moderating of this passion.

Those which follow, are more accidental; whereof some may be considered, 'ex parte patientis,' on the part of him that suffers; and some, 'ex parte inferentis injuriam,' on the part of him that doth the injury. Touching the patient or subject of an injury, there are three qualifications, which may make him more inclinable to anger, upon supposition of the fundamental cause, contempt: and the first of these is *excellency*[a], whether inward from nature, or accidental from fortune; for hereby men are made more jealous of their credit, and impatient of abuse, as well perceiving, that all injury implies some degree, both of impotency in the patient, and of excellency (at least conceited) in the agent. As Aristotle[b] speaks, ὑπερέχειν οἴονται ὑβρίζοντες, that injurious men are commonly highly conceited of their own excellency, which cannot well stand with the height and distance of that mind which is possessed with his own good opinion: and this cause the poet intimates in those words,

> ———" Manet alta mente repôstum
> Judicium Paridis, spretæque injuria formæ."[c]
>
> A deep and lasting discontent is bred,
> To see their beauties undervalued
> By a weak wanton judgement.

It wrought a deep indignation in the minds of Power and Wisdom, to see a weak and wanton judgement give beauty

[a] Ἀγανακτοῦσι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. *Arist.* Θυμὸς μέγας ἐστι Διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος. Iliad. α. [b] Rhet. l. 2. c. 2. [c] Æneid. l.

the precedence in their emulation. Which undervaluing of worth, how much it is able to possess a man with grief and fury, the one example of Ahithophel alone may discover; who, upon the rejection of his counsel, when he was too low to revenge himself on Absalom, executed his anger on his own neck.

The second qualification of the subject is *weakness* and defect, when the mind finds itself assaulted in those things, wherein it is most of all deficient: which Aristotle hath observed, when he tells us, that[d] sick men, poor men, and lovers, are commonly most subject to this passion; it being as great a pain, and a greater contempt to rub and provoke an old wound, than to make a new. That injury which proceeds against men of high and eminent quality, cannot possibly pierce so deep, as that which is exercised upon open and naked weakness: because the former proceeds only from strife and emulation; but the other, from insultation and pride: the one is only a disesteem: but the other, a contumely and exprobation: the one is a conflict of judgements; but the other, a conflict of passions, and therefore likely to be the greater. For a neglect of worth and good parts (unless, as sometimes it falleth out, it proceeds from baseness and ignorance) is an injury from worth also: but a neglect, and despising men already down, is an injury from stomach and height of mind, wherein the party offended cannot labour so much to clear itself from the imputation, as to revenge itself for it.

Another reason why weakness the better disposeth a man to anger, may be, because such men are most tender to feel an injury, most suspicious to fear it, and most interpreting to overjudge it. All which being circumstances of aggra-

[d] *Arist.* Rhet. l. 2.—*Plin.* Nat. Hist. l. 22. c. 24. Ἐντὶ δε πικρὸς, Καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ δριμεῖα χολὰ ποτὶ ῥινὶ κάθηται. De Pane fess. *Theocr.* Idyl. 1. 18.—Omnes, quibus res sunt minus secundæ, magis sunt, nescio quomodo Suspiciosi: ad contumeliam omnia accipiunt magis: Propter suam impotentiam, se semper credunt negligi. *Ter.* Adelph. Act. 4. Sc. 3.—Pueri inter se quàm pro levibus noxiis iras gerunt! Quapropter? quia enim qui eos gubernat animus, infirmum gerunt. *Id.* Hecyr. Act. 3. Sc. 1.—Minuti Semper et infirmi est animi exiguique voluptas Ultio. *Juven.* Sat. 13. Iracundiores sunt incolumibus languidi, fœminæ maribus, &c. *Amm. Mar.* l. 27. Vid. *Causin.* de Eloq. l. 8. c. 29.—*Plut.* Περὶ ὀργῆς.—Δύσοργος ἐν γήρᾳ βαρύς. *Sophoc.* Ajax, 1036.—*Sen.* de Ira, l. 2. c. 21.

vation to increase a wrong, are likewise good means to add degrees and heat unto our passion.

Lastly, to give a reason of both these two former causes together, it may be a disappointment and frustrating of expectation: for men of eminency and worth expect rather approbation and imitation, than contempt. And men weak and defective, expect compassion to cover, and not pride to mock, and so double their wounds: and both these are, in some sort, debts of nature, it being the law of reason to honour merit, as it is the law of mercy to cover nakedness; and for both, I am sure, it is the law of charity, as not to vaunt or be puffed up in ourselves, so neither to rejoice or think evil of another; and we may well conceive anger will be strong, when it thinks itself lawful.

Unto this particular of weakness, we may also reduce that which the grammarian hath observed on Virgil, "Plus irarum advenit, cum in manus non potest venire, cui irascimur; anger is increased, when it cannot reach the thing with which it is angry." And therefore the chaining up of wolves and mastiffs enrageth them, because it restraineth them; which the poet hath excellently described:

"Ac veluti pleno lupus insidiatus ovili,
Cum fremit ad caulas, ventos perpessus et imbres,
Nocte super media; tuti sub matribus agni
Balatum exercent; ille asper et improbus ira
Sævit in absentes; collecta fatigat edendi
Ex longo rabies, et siccæ sanguine fauces;
Haud aliter Rutulo, muros et castra tuenti,
Ignescunt iræ, et duris dolor ossibus ardet."[e]

As a fierce wolf, with winds, storms, midnight, wet,
When in close fold the secure lambs do bleat,
Barks at his absent prey with the more ire,
When rag'd and deceiv'd hunger doth him tire:
So Rutulus, seeing his foes all safe,
Doth vex and boil with the more burning chafe.

For it is a great torment to an enemy, when he can find no inlet nor advantage against him whom he hates[f].

Another cause of anger may be strong desires[g]; for always

[e] Æneid. 9. 59. [f] Vid. *Plut.* de capiend. ex host. utilitat. [g] Ὀξύχολοι οἱ ἐρῶντες. *Luci.*

the vaster and exacter our desires are, it is so much the harder for them to be pleased or satisfied. And therefore, as the philosopher [h] notes, luxurious men are usually transported with anger, because men love not to be stopped in their pleasures: and hence, as Plutarch [i] observes, men are usually most angry there, where their desires are most conversant, as the countryman with his bailiff, or as an epicure with his cook, or a lover with his corival, because all these cross men in that, which they most love. Now strength, when it is opposed, is collected and gathered into the more excess; as we see in winds or rivers, when they meet with any thing which crosseth their full passage.

The last qualification of the subject, whereby he is made more inclinable to this passion, is a suspicious, apprehensive, and interpreting fancy, ready to pick out injury where it cannot be justly found; and (that its anger may be employed) to frame occasions unto itself. And therefore it is wise advice of Seneca [k], "Non vis esse iracundus? ne sis curiosus." He which is too wise in his judgement of other men's errors, will be easily too foolish in the nourishing of his own passion: and it is commonly seen in matters of censure and suspicion, the more sight and reason goes out, the less useth to abide within. Nor is it hard for a man, if he be peremptorily possessed with this opinion, that he is a common subject of others' contempt, to find out, either in defects of nature, or rudeness of custom, habit, education, temper, humour, or the like, some probable ground or other for exception; which yet, when it is further inquired into, will prove rather strangeness than injury.

And this is generally a corruption of anger: first, because it is hereby oftentimes unjust, either in fastening itself there, where it was justly neglected; for we may ever observe, that suspicion proceeds from guilt, and none are more jealous of being neglected than those that deserve it: as it is observed of some reproachful speeches, which a senator was accused to utter against the honour of Tiberius; "Quia vera erant, dicta credebantur;" his suspicious mind was persuaded that they had been spoken, because he was conscious that they had been acted. And therefore (as was

[h] *Rhet.* l. 10. [i] De Ira lib. [k] *Sen.* de Ira, l. 3. c. 11.

before noted) it was the custom, under such men, to avoid all manner of curiosities and search into the things done by them, which might easily be subject unto sinister judgements, and rather to affect ignorance with security, than to be ruined with wisdom. And next it is corrupt, because it is rash and hasty, being led by a half judgement, the worst guide to a headlong and blind passion.

The next degree of causes is of those which qualify the agent, or him that worketh the injury; and there may be, amongst many other which cannot be reckoned, these general ones.

First, baseness, which works a double cause of anger: one for an injury of omission, in neglecting those respects which are required in men of mean and inferior rank towards their superiors: another, for a positive iniquity in the evil exercised against them: and, many times, the former alone is a cause of anger, without the latter: for this distance of persons doth quite alter the nature of our actions, insomuch that those demeanors, which are commendable and plausible toward our equals, are rude and irreverend towards those that are above us. And this is that which makes the wrath of God, in the Scripture, to be set out so terrible unto us, because of the infinite distance between the unmeasurable glory of the Maker of the World, and the baseness of sinners. And therefore the comparison which useth to be made for the defence of venial sins, that it is altogether unlikely that God, infinitely more merciful than men, should yet be offended at that which a man's neighbour would pardon him for, as a foolish angry word, or the stealing of a farthing, or the like, is without reason; because between man and man there is a community both in nature and weakness; and therefore,

> "Hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim,"
>
> Because we both our errors have,
> We pardon give, and pardon crave.

But it is an argument of infinite insolence in a vile creature, for feeding its own corruption and self-love in a matter of no value, to neglect one command of him, who by another is able to command him into hell, or into nothing.

The next quality in the injurer which may raise the pas-

sion, is impudence, either in words or carriage. And the reasons hereof may be.

First, because, as Aristotle observes, all impudence is joined with some contempt, which is the fundamental and essential cause of anger.

Secondly, because all impudence is bold, stiff, and contentious, which are all incitements to this passion. For as shame, being a degree of fear, works an acknowledgment of our own weakness, and therefore a submission to the power we have provoked, which (as Aristotle[1] observes) procureth, from beasts themselves, lenity and mercy; so impudence in all other things being contrary to it, must likewise produce a contrary effect.

Thirdly, those things which we impudently do, we do willingly likewise. And therefore we shall observe in the Scripture, how reigning sins, that is, those which are done with greediness of the appetite, and full consent of the will, are set forth by the names of 'stubbornness, rebellion, whorish forehead, brass, and iron.' Now nothing doth more aggravate a wrong than this, that it proceedeth from the will of man. And the reasons are,

First, because a man's power is in his will: but passions, and other blind agents, when they work ungoverned, are our imperfections, and not our power; and therefore the easier borne withal.

Secondly, to a plenary, spontaneous action, (such as I take most of impudence to be) there are required 'antecedenter,' deliberation, approbation, and assent; and 'consequenter,' resolution, perseverance, and constancy: all which, as they take away the two principal conditions required unto lenity, confession, and repentance, so likewise do they add much to the weight of an injury; because an action which is thus exercised, is a work of the whole man, and employs, as a perfect consent thereunto, so a perfect and complete enmity toward the person offended thereby. Whereas others are but the wrongs of some part, such as are those of the will, led by an ignorant,—or those of passion, led by a traduced, understanding; and they two not

[1] *Rhet.* l. 2. c. 3.—Corpora magnanimo satis est prostrasse leoni; Pugna suum finem, cum jacet hostis, habet. *Ov.* Trist. l. 3. El. 5.

of a part regular, but of an unjointed and paralytic part, which follows not the motion of a stayed reason: and, therefore, as they proceed from more disorder in ourselves, so do they work less in the party offended.

Another thing which may raise and nourish this passion, is any degree of near relation between the parties; whether it be natural by consanguinity, or moral by society, liberality, or any other friendship [m]. For as it is prodigious in the body natural to see one member wrong and provoke another; so in unions civil or moral, it is strangely offensive to make a divulsion. Therefore we are more angry for the neglect offered us by friends, or those of whom we have well deserved, than by enemies or [n] strangers. No wounds so deep as those we receive in the house of our friend.

And the reason why this difference between men nearly referring each to other, should work a greater anger between them, is, first, because herein we may find that, which before I observed as a furtherance to this passion,—disappointment, and frustrating of expectation: for in this case, we expect sympathy, and not division.—Secondly, because all anger is a kind of disjoining, or divulsion of things before joined: therefore, where is the greatest union, must needs be the strongest and most violent separation. As in the body, the divulsion of the soul is more horrible, than of an arm or some other member, because the one is an essential, the other only an integral union: and so it is with those who are by blood or friendship made one; as the dividing of them is more strange and violent, so doth it produce a stronger passion.

Another cause of this passion in respect of the injurer, may be a too great freedom, and indiscreet use of speech, especially if it be in way of correction and rebuke. For as Solomon's speech is true, 'Mollis responsio frangit iram,' a soft answer pacifies wrath; so on the contrary it is true likewise, 'Dura correptio unit iram,' that an harsh rebuke knits it. Anger is by nothing more nourished than by much speaking, though not in the party that speaketh; because speech is to anger, like tears to grief, a spending and vent-

[m] *Sen.* de Ira, l. 2. c. 31.

[n] Job xix. 19. Zach. xiii. 6. Psalm xli. 9. lv. 12.

ing of it; yet always in another, unto whom we minister further matter of offence. To which purpose is that speech of Syracides, "Strive not with a man that is full of tongue; and heap not wood upon his fire."

Another cause which I shall observe, is contention and difference, whether it be in opinions or inclinations; because this must needs be ever joined with some undervaluing of another man's choice and judgement; which if it be not seasoned with much sobriety, will easily induce a man to believe, that it proceeds not from zeal to truth, but from an humour of opposition; wherewith many men are so far possessed, that one must hardly dare to speak the truth in their company, for fear of endangering it and them. Like Chrysippus in Laertius, who used to boast, that "he often wanted opinions; but those once gotten, he never wanted arguments and sophisms to defend them."

The last cause which I shall note of this passion, is in him who offends us, his very abilities, when we see them neglected; for this provokes to more displeasure, than naked impotency. Weakness, when it miscarries, is the object of pity: but strength, when it miscarries, is the object of anger.

——— Οὐδ' ἂν ἔγωγε
Ἀνδρὶ μαχεσσαίμην, ὅστις ποτὲμοιο μεθείη,
Λυγρὸς ἐών· ὑμῖν δὲ νεμεσσῶμαι περὶ κῆρι.

I should not blame unworthy and base spirits,
To slug and shrink from battle: but for merits
So to forget themselves, for you to be
Unlike the men you are,—what man can see
Such weakness, and not wonder, chide, debate,
Till you yourselves do your own errors hate?[o]

Unto all these we might add some others, which the philosopher toucheth, as neglect of our calamities, or rejoicing at them, or divulging them, or bringing readily[p] the report of them unto us, receiving the report of them with pleasure. Or lastly, representing the signs, which may bring into mind the memory of any injury done us. As the Levite sent the

[o] Iliad. N. 117.

[p] Στέργει οὐδεὶς ἄγγελον κακῶν ἑπῶν. Vid. quæ de hac re habet nuncius, apud *Sophoc.* Antig.

parts of his abused concubine up and down unto the tribes of Israel, to move them unto indignation. So Antony [q], in the funeral oration upon Julius Cæsar, produced his robe, stained with the blood which Brutus and Cassius had shed, —to work a detestation of that fault in the people.

Now concerning all these causes together, (because it would be too tedious to gather particular circumstances of dignity and corruption from all of them) we are to conclude, that anger, as it ariseth from any of them, is then only regular and just, when it keeps these conditions.

1. First, That it still observe proportion and conformity to the rules of love: otherwise it is not 'Ira in delictum, but 'Ira in fratrem,' not against the crime, but the person of my brother. For we know the nature of this passion is to be transient, to go out from us on our brother, and reform him; not immanent to work upon ourselves and deform us: I mean by soiling the habit of charity, which ought always to remain inviolate.

2. Secondly, That it keep likewise due proportion unto judgement, and that unto a true judgement, and a whole judgement; otherwise it is not only to be angry with our brother, but which is farther, to be angry with him unadvisedly. Judgement, then, must be true first, that is, clear, settled, and untransported: and that likewise in two actions; in the act of interpretation, which reacheth unto the injury; and in the act of direction or government, which reacheth unto the passion.

3. And next it must be a whole judgement; and that in both the former. It must judge fully of the nature and circumstances of the injury, which ever receives its degrees of intention or remission, not from the matter of the act, but from some particular qualifications and circumstances joined thereunto.

Secondly, It must judge fully of the act of passion, not only in informing, *quod sit*, that reparation of ourselves is lawful; but *quomodo* too, in the manner and form how to undertake it. Because as passion [r], being without reason

[q] *Dion.* l. 44. [r] Ira de causa est iracundia de vitio. Μέγιστόν ἐστιν ὀργῆς φόρμακον λόγος. Dandum iræ spatium. *Liv.*—Ita Romani pueros à jurandi levitate cohibentes, prius domo exire jubebant, ut esset deliberandi spatium. Vid. *Plut.* Qu. Rom. qu. 28.

in itself, wants the tongue of judgement to inform it what to do: so, being blind, it wants the hand of judgement to lead it in the doing of it: and this I take to be the proper way of governing this passion. But that which was once prescribed by Athenodorus[s] the philosopher unto Augustus, to repeat over the alphabet between the passion and the revenge, is too boyish and slight, as diverting the mind from the occasion to some other trifle, which is only to cozen, and not to conquer our distemper. And therefore though it may for a time allay it, yet this is but as the cures of empiricks, which give present ease; but search not into the root, nor leave such a habit within, as shall in after-occasions limit the unruliness of such distempers; like those odours, which use to raise men out of a fit of the falling sickness, but do not at all cure them of the disease.

Now to speak a word or two of the effects of this passion; they are such as are wrought, either in ourselves or others. Concerning the former, they are either outward effects, which reach to our bodies; or inward, which reflect upon reason.

Those on the body, are 'clamour' (as Saint Paul calls it) in tongue, tumour and inflammation in the heart, fire in the eyes, and fierceness and paleness in the countenance, and a sensible alteration in the whole man. The use or deformity of all which, depend upon the subordination of passion unto reason, or dominion over it. For if it be governed and obedient, there is an excellent use of those alterations in the body, (which will not then be permitted to be excessive) namely, the testification of our just displeasure at an offence received, and the enlivening or sharpening of us, (if occasion require) to the prosecution of further lawful redress. For though I would not have a man in his passion suffer a metamorphosis, and turn his face into a torment, punishing himself as much with deformity, as his adversary with fear; yet neither can I like that close and dissembled, that politic and stomach anger, which cunningly shrouds itself under a calm and serene countenance; which being unnatural to this passion, (whose property it is, 'non insidiari, sed palàm

[s] Vid. *Plut.* περὶ ὀργῆς.

agere,' not to work by way of ambush and stratagem, but visibly) will quickly degenerate into malice and rancour.[t]

The inward effect of this passion is an excitation of reason, to judge of the wrong and means of redress; which is then regular, when it is done ministerially, and by way of service to the whole; but most corrupt and dangerous when it is done by prepossession, transporting, confounding, or any other way tainting of reason; which is to make it a party rather than a judge.

Ὃς ἐφῆκε ποτὲ σώφρονα καὶ χαλεπῆναι.

Which makes sometimes a wise man break
Into distempers wild and weak.

In which ill office there is not any passion more busy and fruitful than this of anger, by reason of its suddenness, and of its violence; both which are strong means to smother or divert reason; as we see in Tiberius himself, who, though a man of close and sad judgment, and of the most reserved passions, (insomuch as he lived in them, and nourished them a long time before either their working or discovery) yet when he was provoked by Agrippina to a more violent anger than usual, his passion, we see, for the time altered his nature: "Et veram occulti pectoris vocem elicuit, Num ideo læderetur, quia non regnaret?" He brake forth into words, strange and unusual from so close a disposition; to wit, 'whether she were wronged because she did not reign?'—which is Tacitus's observation upon the anger of that man.

The last effect is expedition and dexterity in executing those means, which reason judgeth needful for satisfying ourselves against the person that hath offended; wherein its assistance, while it is regular, is of excellent use in man's actions, because it makes bold[u] and resolute. But here one main corruption is to be avoided, precipitancy and impatience of delay, or attendance on the determination of right reason: which makes it commonly run away with an

[t] Vid. *Senec.* de Ira, l. 2, c. 35.—Vos quoque si mediâ speculum spectetis in ira, Cognoscat faciem vix satis ulla suam. *Ov.* de Arte Amandi, l. 3.—Vid. *Plutarch.*—Plumbeas iras gerunt, *Plaut.*—Eth. l. 7.

[u] Vires injicit ad pericula subeunda. *Eth.* l. 3. c. 18. Ψυχῆς σύμφυτον ὅπλον. Vid. *Cæl. Rhod.* l. 12. c. 53. l. 7.

half or a broken judgement. In which respect Aristotle, in his Ethicks, very elegantly compares it to a hasty servant, that goes away posting with half his errand; and to dogs, which, as soon as ever they hear a noise, bark presently, before they know whether it be a stranger at the door or no: so anger attends reason thus long, till it receive warrant for the justness of seeking redress; and then suddenly hastens away without any further listening to the rules of decorum and justice, which it should always observe in the prosecution thereof; lest, while it is too intent in his own right, it fall into that extreme which it pretendeth to revenge, the wronging of another.

There is not any passion which standeth more in need of moderation than this doth, both because it is one of the frequentest which we are troubled with, and the most unruly, as that which can overbear the rest, and, of all other, hath the least recourse to [x] reason, being hasty, impetuous, full of desires, grief, self-love, impatience, which spareth no [y] persons, friends or foe, no things, animate or [z] inanimate, when they fit not our fancy. And therefore [a] grammarians tell us, that it hath its name 'Ira' from 'Ire,' because a man in his anger usually goeth away from his reason; and as his anger slackens, he is said 'ad se redire,' to return again unto himself. And therefore those men in whom reason is most predominant, are least transported by this affection, and most often displeased with themselves for it. It was a strange commendation given to [b] Theodosius Junior, that never any man saw him angry.' And such a power had [c] Lycurgus over himself, that when an insolent young man had done him no less injury than the striking out of one of his eyes, by lenity and mansuetude he convinced and gained him. And Pericles [d], that great statesman and orator of Greece, being, all the day, reviled by an impure companion, commanded his servant at night to light him home unto his house. [e] Nothing more obvious than examples of this kind.

x Οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι, θυμῷ πλεῖστα εἰς ὀργὴν καθίστανται. *Thucyd.* l. 2.

y *Plut.* περὶ ὀργῆς. *Sen.* de Ira, l. 3. c. 28. et Ep. 18.

z Ipsum compedibus qui vinxerat Ennosigæum, *Juven.* Sat. 10.—*Plut.* de Ira.

a *Donat.* et *Cœl. Rhod.* l. 12. c. 53.

b *Socr.* l. 7. c. 22.

c *Plut.* in Lyc.

d *Plut.* in Peric.

e *Sen.* de Ira, l. 3. c. 12. et *Plut.* de sera num. vindicta.

That we may, therefore, so manage this passion as to be 'angry but not sin,' it will be requisite,

1. To let it have an eye upward; as Moses did, who never expressed any other anger that we read of, but zealous, and religious, when the injury directly aimed at God and his honour. It is very improbable, that any thing will move too fast upward.

2. To convert it inward[f] into a self-displicence and severity towards our own errors: for the more acquainted any man is with himself, the less matter he will find of anger with other men, as having so much both to do, and to blame, at home. Anger ever ariseth from the value which we set upon ourselves; which will ever then be most modest, when we take of it the fullest view.

3. Follow it not too close; join not too soon nor too hastily with it; though it may be used sometimes, it must never be encouraged, being over-bold and forward of itself. And therefore as many drugs must be prepared, before we may dare to use them; so we must take heed of despatching this affection without its due corrective. It must first be schooled[g], before it be employed; as men bridle their horses, before they ride them. It is not good drinking in muddy water, so soon as it is stirred; give it time to subside and settle.

4. Keep it not long; it is the spawn of malice and contention; and time will hatch it. It is a corroding thing, which will fret and stain the vessel, in which it is kept. Let not the sun go down upon it; it is ill being in the dark with so bad a leader. It may pass through the heart of a wise man; but it "*resteth* only in the bosom of fools."

5. Remove the occasions of it; withdraw fuel from so catching a flame. They say of turpentine, and some other like things, that 'they will draw and suck fire unto them.' Certainly, of all fire, there is none so ductile, so sequacious and obsequious, as this of wrath is. It was not ill done therefore of Cotys and Augustus, to cause those curious vessels to be broken of purpose, which, having been accidentally

[f] Sicut aquilæ et leones inter ambulandum ungues intro avertunt. Vid. *Plut.* de Curios.—*Sen.* de Ira, l. 2. c. 28.—Indignatio à nimio sui suspectu. *Sen.* de Ira, l. 3. c. 5.—*Sen.* l. 3. c. 12. [g] *Plut.* de Aud. Poetis.

broken, might have made a breach likewise upon the discretion of their owners. [h]

6. Give not an easy ear to reports, nor an easy entertainment to suspicions; be not greedy to know who or wherein another hath wronged thee. That which we are desirous to know, or apt to believe, we shall be the more ready to revenge. Curiosity and credulity are the handmaids unto passion. Alexander [i] would not see the woman, after whom he might have lusted: nor Cæsar [k] search Pompey's cabinet, lest he should find new matter of revenge; he chose rather to make a fire of them on his hearth, than in his heart. Injuries unknown do, many times, the less hurt: when I have found them, I then begin to feel them, and suffer more from mine own discovery, than from mine enemies' attempt.

7. Be candid in interpreting the things wherein thou sufferest. Many times the glass through which I look, makes that seem formidable,—and the wave, that crooked,—which, in itself, was beautiful and straight. Haply, thou art angry [l] with that which could not intend to hurt thee: thy book, thy pen, the stone at which thou stumblest, the wind or rain that beats upon thee: be angry again, but with thyself, who art either so bold, as to be angry with God, or so foolish, as to be angry with nothing. Thou art displeased at a childish or ignorant miscarriage: call it not injury, but imprudence; and then pity it. Thou art angry with counsel, reproof, discipline: why dost thou not as well break the glass, in which thy physician ministereth a potion unto thee? Be angry with thy sin; and thou wilt love him that takes it from thee. Is he that adviseth thee, thy superior? Thine anger is undutiful.—Is he thy friend? Thine anger is ungrateful.

8. Give injuries a new name; and that will work a new affection. In blind agents, call it 'chance;' in weak persons, 'infirmity;' in simple, 'ignorance;' in wise, 'counsels;' in superiors, 'discipline;' in equals, 'familiarity;' in inferiors, 'confidence.' Where there is no other construction to be made, do as Joseph and David did; call it 'providence;' and see what God says to thee by it. Get a mind

[h] *Plut.* Apoph.—*Sen.* de Ira, l. 3. c. 10.—*Cæl. Rhod.* l. 12. c. 52.—*Sen. de* Ira, l. 2. c. 22, 23, 24. [i] *Plut.* in Alex. et lib. de Curiosit. [k] *Dion. Cass.* l. 41. [l] *Sen.* de Ira, l. 3. c. 26.

conversant with high and noble things; the more heavenly, the less tempestuous. [m]

9. Be not idle, sluggish, luxurious. We are never more apt to be angry, than when we are sleepy or greedy. Weak resolutions and strong desires are sensible of the least exasperation; as an empty ship, of the smallest tempest.

Again, be not over-busy neither: That man can hardly be master of his passion, that is not master of his employments. A mind ever burdened, like a bow always bent, must needs grow impotent and weary, the fittest preparations to this distemper. When a man's business doth not poise, but press him, there will ever be something either undone or ill done, and so still matter of vexation. And therefore our minds, as our vessels, must be unloaded, if they would not have a tempest hurt them. [n]

Lastly, Wrestle not with that which pincheth thee. If it be strong, it will hurt; if cunning, it will hamper and entangle thee. He that strives with his burden, makes it heavier. That tempest breaks not the stalks of corn, which rends asunder the arms of an oak; the one yields, the other withstands it. An humble weakness is safer from injury, than a stubborn strength. [o]

I have now done with the passions of the mind; and briefly proceed to those honours and dignities of the soul of man, which belong unto it in a more abstracted condition.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of the original of the reasonable Soul, whether it be immediately created and infused, or derived by seminal traduction from the parents. Of the derivation of original Sin.

The dignity of man, in respect of his soul alone, may be gathered from a consideration either of the whole, or of the parts thereof. Concerning the whole, we shall consider two

[m] Minimas rerum discordia turbat: Pacem summa tenent. *Lucan.* Vid. *Sen.* l. 4. c. 33. *Sen.* de Ira, l. 2. c. 25, 26. [n] *Plutarch.* περ ὀργῆς. *Sen.* l. 3. c. 6. *Sen.* de Ira, l. 3. c. 16. [o] Χειμάῤῥοις ὅσα Δένδρων πείκει, κλῶνας ὡς ἐκσώζεται, Τὰ δ' ἀντιτείνοντ' αὐτόπρεμν' ἀπόλλυται. *Soph.* Antig. 725.—*Plut.* Sympos. l. 4. q. 2.

things; its original, and its nature. Concerning the original of the soul, divers men have diversely thought: for, to let pass the opinion of Seleucus [a], who affirmed that it was educed out of the earth; and that of Origen [b] and the Platonists, who say that the souls of men were long ago created, and after detruded into the body as into a prison; there are three opinions touching this question. The first, of those who affirm the traduction of the soul by generation:—some of which so affirm, because they judged it a corporeal substance, as did Tertullian:[c]—others, because they believed that one spirit might as easily proceed from another, as one fire or light be kindled by another: as Apollinarius [d], Nemesius, and divers in the western churches, as Saint Jerome witnesseth.—The second, of those who deny the natural traduction, and say that the soul is by creation infused into bodies, organized and pre-disposed to receive them; of which opinion amongst the ancients were Saint Jerome [e], Hilary [f], Ambrose [g], Lactantius [h], Theodoret [i], Æneas Gazeus [k], and of the modern writers the major part.—The third is of those who do 'hæsitare,' stick between both, and dare affirm nothing certain on either side; which is the moderation of Saint Austin [l] and Gregory the Great [m], who affirm that this is a question incomprehensible, and unsolvible in this life. Now the only reason which caused Saint Austin herein to hesitate, seemeth to have been the difficulty of traducing original sin from the parents to the children. 'For,' saith the, (writing unto Saint Jerome, touching the creation of the soul) 'if this opinion do not oppugn that most fundamental faith of original sin, let it then be mine; but if it do oppugn it, let it not be thine.'

Now since that opinion which denieth the traduction, seemeth most agreeable to the spiritual substance of the soul,

[a] *Philostr.* de Hæres. Seleuci, &c. [b] *Justinian.* Tract. ad Medinam, contra Orig.—*Hieron.* Epist. ad Marcell. et Anapsychiam.—*Theophyl. Alex.* Ep. Pasc. 2.—*Anastat. Sinaita* Anagog. contemp. lib. 11. [c] *Aug.* de Hæres. 86. Ep. 157. de Gen. ad lit. l. 10. c. 25. *Tertul.* de Anima, c. 5, 6, 7, 22, 25, 27. [d] *Hieron.* Epist. ad Marcellinum. *Nemesius* de natura hominis, l. 2.—Luciferian. apud *Aug.* Hæres. 81. [e] *Hieron.* ep. ad Pam. contra Joan. Hieros. [f] *Hil.* de Trin. l. 10. [g] *Ambros.* de Noah et Arca, c. 4. [h] *Lactant.* de op. Hom. c. 9. [i] *Theod.* de curand. Græc. affect. Ser. 4. [k] *Æneas Gaz.* in suo Theophrasto. [l] *Aug.* ep. 7. 28, 157. et Retract. l. 1. c. 1. de Gen. ad lit. 13. et de Anima. [m] *Greg.* l. 7. ep. 53.

I shall here produce some few reasons for the creation, and solve an argument or two alleged for the traduction of the soul, reserving notwithstanding unto myself and others, the liberty and modesty of Saint Austin's hesitation, which also I find allowed by the Holy Ghost himself. [n]

Two things there are of certainty in this point: 1. That the soul is not any corporeal mass or substance, measurable by quantity, or capable of substantial augmentation. 2. That the traduction of one thing out of another, doth connotate these two things: That the thing traduced doth derive being from the other, as from its original principle; and that this derivation be not any other manner of way, but 'ratione seminali, et per modum decisionis,' by a seminal way, and the decision, separation, or effluxion of substance from the other: which things being laid, the arguments against traduction are these.

First, The testimonies of Holy Scripture, calling God the 'Father of Spirits,' as our natural parent the 'father of our bodies.' (*Job* xxxiii. 4. *Eccles.* xii. 7. *Isai.* lvii. 16. *Numb.* xvi. 22. xxvii. 16. *Heb.* xii. 9. *Zach.* xii. 1) Which though they do not, according to the judgement of Saint Austin, conclude the point by infallible consequence, yet do they much favour the probability of this opinion.

2. To have being by traduction, is, when the soul of the child is derived from the soul of the parent, by the means of seed: but the seed of the parent cannot reach the generation of the soul, both because the one is a corporeal, the other a spiritual substance, incapable of augmentation or detriment. Now that which is spiritual, cannot be produced out of that which is corporeal; neither can any seed be discinded or issue out from the soul, being 'substantia simplex, et impartibilis,' a substance simple, and indivisible.

3. That which is separable from the body, and can subsist and work without it, doth not depend in its being or making upon it: for if, by the generation of the body, the soul be generated,—by the corruption of the body it would be corrupted: for every thing that is generable, is corruptible; but the soul can subsist and work without the body: therefore it doth not from corporeal generation derive its being.

[n] Eccles. xi. 5.

4. If the soul be seminally traduced, it must be either from the body or from the soul of the parents: not from the body; for it is impossible for that which is not a body, to be made out of that which is a body,—no cause being able to produce an effect out of its own sphere, and more noble than itself: not from the soul, because that being a spiritual and impartible substance, can therefore have nothing severed from it, by way of substantial seed, unto the constitution of another soul.

5. If there be nothing taken from the parents, of which the soul is formed, then it is not traduced by natural generation: but there is nothing taken from the parents, by which the soul is formed: for then in all abortions and miscarrying conceptions, the seed of the soul would perish; and, by consequence, the soul itself would be corruptible, as having its original from corruptible seed. These, and divers other the like arguments, are used to confirm the doctrine touching the creation of the reasonable soul. Unto which may be added the judgement and testimony of some of the forecited fathers. St. Jerome [o] telleth us that the original of the soul in mankind is not as in other living creatures, since, as our Saviour speaketh, 'the Father worketh hitherto.' And the prophet Isaiah telleth, that "he formeth the spirit of man within him, and frameth the hearts of all men;" as it is in the Psalms. And so Lactantius, (whom I wonder to find numbered amongst the authors that affirm the traduction of the soul, by Ruffinus, and the author of the Dialogue amongst the works of Jerome). "It may be questioned," (saith he) "whether the soul be generated out of the father, mother, or both. Neither of all three is true, because the seed of the soul is not put into the body by either, or both of these. A body may be born out of their bodies, because something may be out of both contributed; but a soul cannot be born out of their souls, inasmuch as from so spiritual a substance nothing can issue forth or be severed for that use."—So also Saint Hilary [p]; "The soul of man is the work of God; the generation of the flesh is always of the flesh." And again, "It is inbred and an impressed belief in all, that our souls

[o] *Hier.* ad Pammach. et in l. 32. Eccles. 12. contr. Ruffinum, l. 2. c. 1. 2. et Dialog. de Orig. Anim. inter opera ejus, Tom. 8. [p] *Hilar.* de Trin. l. 10. et in Ps. 62.

have a divine original." And in like manner Theodoret: "God" (saith he) "frameth the bodies of living creatures out of the bodies subsisting before; but the soul, not of all creatures, but of men only, he worketh ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, out of nothing that had been before."

Against this doctrine [q] of the soul's original, the principal argument is drawn from the consideration of original sin, and the propagation thereof, which alone was that which troubled and staggered St. Austin [r] in this point. For if the soul be not naturally traduced, how should original sin be derived from Adam unto it? And if it were not in the loins of Adam, then neither did it sin in his loins; whereas the apostle expressly telleth us, that "by one man sin came into the world, and that in one all have sinned;" and that not only by imputative participation, but by natural propagation, deriving an inherent habitual pollution, which cleaveth inseparably to the soul of every man that entereth into the world, and is the fruit of Adam's loins.

Unto which argument, to omit the different resolutions of other men touching the pollution of the soul by the immediate contract of the flesh, and the parents' attinging the ultimate disposition of the body,—upon which naturally followeth the union of the soul, (God being pleased to work ordinarily according to the exigence of second causes, and not suffering any of them to be in vain for want of that concurrence which he, in the virtue of a first and supreme cause, is to contribute unto them) I shall set down what I conceive to be the truth in this point.

First then, it is most certain [s], that God did not implant original sin, nor take away original righteousness from man; but man, by his prevarication and fall, did cast it away, and contract sin, and so derive a defiled nature to his posterity. For as Macarius [t] excellently speaketh, "Adam, having transgressed, did lose the pure possession of his nature."

Secondly, Original injustice, as it is a sin by the default and contraction of man, so it is also a punishment by the ordination and disposition of divine justice. [u] It was man's sin to cast away the image of God; but it is God's just judge-

[q] *Athenag.* de Resur. *Gennad.* de Eccles. dog. c. 13. [r] *Aug. ep.* 23.
[s] *Aug.* de Civit. Dei, l. 13. c. 14. [t] *Macar.* Hom. 12. [u] *Aug.* contr. Jul. l. 5. c. 3.

ment (as he hath the free dispensation of his own gifts) not to restore it again in such manner as first he gave it unto that nature, which had so rejected and trampled on it.

Thirdly, In this original sin, there are two things considerable; the privation of that righteousness, which ought to be in us; and the lust or habitual concupiscence, which carrieth nature unto inordinate motions. The privation and want of original justice is meritoriously from Adam, who did voluntarily deprave and reject that original rectitude, which was put into him; which therefore God, out of his most righteous and free disposition, is pleased not to restore unto his nature in his posterity again. In the habitual lust are considerable these two things, ἀταξία, the sinful 'disorder' of it,—and ἀντιμισθία, the 'punishment' of sin by it. Consider it as a punishment of Adam's first prevarication; and so, though it be not efficiently from God, yet it falls under the order of his justice, who did most righteously forsake Adam, after his wilful fall, and leave him in the hand of his own counsel, to transmit unto us that seminary of sin which himself had contracted.

But if we consider it as 'a sin,' we then say that the immediate and proper cause of it, is lapsed nature, whole and entire, by generation and seminal traduction derived upon us. But the remoter cause is that, from which we receive and derive this nature. *Nature*, I say, first *fallen;* for, unto nature innocent, belonged original righteousness, and not original sin.

2. Nature derived by ordinary generation as the fruit of the loins, and of the womb. For though Christ had our nature, yet he had not our sin.

3. Nature whole and entire. For neither part (as some conceive) is the total spring and fountain of this sin. For it is improbable, that any stain should be transfused from the body to the soul, as from the foul vessel to the clean water put into it;—the body itself being not solely and alone in itself corrupt and sinful; else, all abortions and miscarrying conceptions should be subject to damnation. Nothing is the seat of sin, which cannot be the seat of death, the wages of sin

Original sin therefore, most probably, seemeth to rise by emanation, partial in the parts, total in the whole; from

man's nature as guilty, forsaken, and accursed by God for the sin of Adam:—and from the parts not considered absolutely in themselves, but by virtue of their concurrence and union, whereby both make up one compounded nature. Though then the soul be a partial subject or seat of original sin; yet we have not our sin and our soul from one author; because sin follows not the part, but the nature whole and entire. And though we have not from our parents 'totum naturæ,' yet we have 'totam naturam;' we have our whole nature, though not every part of our nature. Even as whole Christ was the son of Mary, who therefore by virtue of the communication of properties in Christ, is justly called Θεοτόκος, 'the mother of God,' against the Nestorians in the council of Chalcedon;—though, in regard of his divine nature, he was without beginning: and the reason is, because the integrity of nature ariseth from the union of the two parts together, which is perfected by generation; so then we say that Adam is the original, and meritorious cause; our next parents, the instrumental and immediate cause of this sin in us, not by way of physical emission or transmigration of sin from them to us, but by secret contagion, as Saint Austin [u] speaks. For having, in the manner aforesaid, from Adam by our parents received a nature, most justly forsaken by God, and lying under the guilt and cause of the first prevarication,—from this nature thus derived, as guilty and accursed, doth immediately and intimately flow habitual pollution. So then habitual concupiscence is from Adam alone, meritoriously, by reason of his first prevarication:—from Adam, by the mediation of our parents seminally by natural generation;—and from nature generated not as nature, but as in Adam guilty, forsaken and accursed, by secret and ineffable resultancy and emanation. This is that which I conceive of this great difficulty, not unmindful in the mean time of that speech of Saint Austin [x], that "there is nothing more certain to be known, and yet nothing more secret to be understood than original sin." For other arguments to prove the traduction of the soul, they are not of such moment; and therefore I pass them by, and proceed to the consideration of the soul in its nature.

[u] Contra Julian. l. 5. c. 14.

[x] Nihil peccato originali ad prædicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius. *Aug.* de morb. Eccles. cap. 22.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Image of God in the reasonable Soul, in regard of its simplicity and spirituality.

Concerning the dignity of the soul in its nature and essence [a], reason hath adventured thus far, to confess that the soul of man is, in some sort, a spark and beam of divine brightness. And a greater and far more infallible oracle hath warranted, that it was breathed into him by God himself, and was made after his 'image and likeness;' not substantially, as if there were [b] a real emanation and traduction of the soul out of God; which were blasphemous and impious to conceive;—but only by way of resemblance, and imitation of God's properties in man's original created nature, which is more notable in him than in the other parts of the world. There is indeed, in all God's works, some kind of image, and lineaments, and footsteps of his glory. [c]

"Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum, &c."

For all the tracts of earth, of sea, and sky,
Are filled with Divine immensity.

The whole world is a great book [d], wherein we read the praise, glory, power, and infiniteness of him that made it: but man is, after a more peculiar manner, called Εἰκὼν and Δόξα, 'the image and glory of God.' The greater world is only God's workmanship, wherein is represented the wisdom

[a] *Macrob.* de Somnio Scip. p. 1. c. 14.—Divinæ particula auræ.—'Απόσπασμα Θεοῦ, *Phil.* [b] Vid. contra hanc impietatem decretum concil. Bracar. cap. 5. [c] Μετοχὴ τῆς θείας ἐλλάμψεως, *Damasc.* de Orth. fid. l. 2. c. 12.—Igneus est ollis vigor et cœlestis origo. [d] Βίβλος Θεοῦ. *Orig.* apud Euseb. de præpar. Evan. l. 6. c. 11.—Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum, *Ov.* Met. 1.—In aliis creaturis est similitudo Dei, tantum per modum vestigii; in sola rationali creatura, per modum imaginis. Vid. *Aquin.* par. 1. qu. 93. art. 6. Σημειωθὲν καὶ τυπωθὲν σφραγίδι Θεοῦ. *Philo* apud Euseb. de præpar. Evan. l. 7. c. 18.—Ποίημα Θεοῦ λογικὸν, κατ' εἰκόνα γινόμενον τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν. *Greg. Nyssen.* Ser. 1. in verba illa 'Faciamus hominem,' &c.--Θεῖον ὁ νοῦς. *Arist.* Ethic. l. 10. c. 7.—Deorum cognatione tenetur. *Cic.* de Div. l. 1. et l. de Amicit.—*Porphyr.* apud Euseb. de præp. Eva. l. 11. c. 28.

and power of God, as in a building the art and cunning of the workman: but man (in the original purity of nature) is besides that, a wax, wherein was more notably impressed by that divine spirit, (whose work it is to seal) a spiritual resemblance of his own goodness and sanctity.—Again, the greater world was never other than an orator to set forth the power and praises of God: but he made the soul of man, in the beginning, as it were, his 'oracle,' wherein he fastened a perfect knowledge of his law and will; from the very glimpses and corrupted relicks of which knowledge of his law, some have been bold to call men συγγενεῖς Θεοῦ, 'the kindred of God.' And Seneca, 'Liber animus et Diis cognatus;' which is the same with that of Aratus, cited by Saint Paul, Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμεν, 'for we are his offspring.' Yea, Euripides, (as Tully in his[e] Tusculans observes) was bold to call the soul of man by the name of 'God:' and Seneca will venture so far too; "Quid aliud vocas animum quàm Deum in humano corpore hospitantem?" But to forbear such boldness, as, (it may be,) one of the originals of heathen idolatry, certain it is, that there are (as Tully many times divinely observes) sundry similitudes between God and the mind of man. There are indeed some attributes of God, not only incommunicable, but absolutely inimitable, and unshadowable by any excellency in man's soul; as immensity, infiniteness, omnipotency, omniscience, immutability, impassibility, and the like: but whatsoever spiritual and rational perfections the power and bounty of God conferred upon the soul in its first creation, are, all of them, so many shadows and representations of the like, but most infinite perfections in him.

The properties then and attributes of God, wherein this image chiefly consists, are first these three: spirituality with the two immediate consequents thereof, simplicity, and immortality, in which the soul hath partaken without any after-corruption or depravation.[f] Concerning the former, it were vast and needless to confute those sundry opinions[g] of

[e] Lib. 1.—*Clem. Alex.* in fine l. 4. Stromat.—Ipse etiam Cic. in Somnio Scipion.—*Sen.* ep. 31. et 11. [f] Vid. *Aug.* de Gen. ad lit. l. 6. c. 12.—*Ambr.* Hexam. l. 6. c. 8.—*Tertul.* lib. 2. contra Marcion. cap. 5. 9. 16.—*Clem. Alex.* in Protrep. p. 30.—*Basil.* Hexam. Homil. 10. [g] Vid. *Theodor.* Serm. 5. de natura Hom. et

ancient philosophers, concerning the substance of the soul; many whereof Tully, in the first of his Tusculans, hath reported, and Aristotle confuted in his first 'de Anima.' Some conceived it to be blood, others the brain, some fire, others air: some, that it consists in harmony and number; and the philosopher Dicæarchus, that it was nothing at all but the body, disposed and fitted for the works of life. But to let these pass as unworthy of refutation, and to proceed to the truth of the first property.

There are sundry natural reasons to prove the[h] spirituality of the soul; as first, the manner of its working, which is immaterial; by conceiving objects, as universal, or otherwise purified from all grossness of matter, by the abstraction of the active understanding, whereby they are made in some sort proportional to the nature of the intellect passive, into which the species are impressed.

Secondly, its independence on the body, in that manner of working; for though the operations of the soul require the concurrence of the common sense and imagination, yet that is by way only of conveyance from the object, not by way of assistance to the elicit and immediate act. They only present the species, they do not qualify perception. 'Phantasmata' are only 'objecta operationis;' not 'instrumenta operandi;' the objects, not the instruments, of the soul's working. The act of understanding is immediately from the soul, without any the least concurrence of the body thereunto; although the things whereon that act is fixed and conversant, require, in this estate, bodily organs to represent them unto the soul; as light doth not at all concur to the act of seeing, which solely and totally floweth from the visible faculty, but only serves as an extrinsecal assistance for qualification of the 'medium' and object that must be seen. And this reason Aristotle hath used to prove, that the understanding, which is principally true of the whole soul, is not mixed with any body, but hath a nature altogether diverse therefrom; because it hath no bodily organ,

Nemes. c. 2.—*Sen.*—*Nyssen.* lib. de Anim.—*Plutarch.* de placitis Philos. l. 4. c. 2.—*Tertul.* de Anim.—*Sen.* Nat. Qu. l. 7. c. 2. [h] Vid. *Nemes.* de Anim. c. 2.—*Claudian. Mamertum* de statu Animæ, l. 2.—*Plotin.* apud Euseb. de præparat. Evang. l. 11. c. 21.—*Damas.* de Orthod. fide, l. 2. c. 12.—*Plutarch.* l. de placitis Philosoph. l. 4. c. 2, 3.—*Aug.* lib. de quantitate Animæ.

as all bodily powers have, by which it is enabled to the proper acts that belong unto it. And hereon is grounded another reason of his, to prove the soul immaterial, because it depends not on the body in its operations, but educeth them immediately from within itself; as is more manifest in the reflection of the soul upon its own nature, being an operation (as he expressly speaketh) "separable therefrom;" the soul being not only 'actus informans,' a form informing, for the actuating of a body, and constitution of a compound substance, but 'actus subsistens' too, a form subsisting; and that 'per se,' without any necessary dependence upon matter. It is an act, which worketh as well in the body, as whereby the body worketh.

Another reason of Aristotle in the same place, is, the difference between material and immaterial power. "For" (saith he) "all bodily cognoscitive faculties do suffer offence and damage from the too great excellency of their object; as the eye from the brightness of the sun, the ear from the violence of a sound, the touch from extremity of heat or cold, and the like." But the understanding, on the contrary side, is perfected by the worthiest contemplations, and the better enabled for lower enquiries. And therefore Aristotle, in his Ethicks, placeth the most complete happiness of a man, in those heavenly intuitions of the mind, which are fastened on the divinest and most remote objects; which in religion is nothing else, but a fruition of that beatifical vision, (which, as far as nature goes, is called the 'contemplation of the first cause') and an eternal satiating the soul with beholding the nature, essence, and glory of God.

Another reason may be drawn from the condition of the understanding's objects, which have so much the greater conformity to the soul, by how much the more they are divine and abstracted. "Hoc habet animus argumentum suæ divinitatis," (saith Seneca) "quod illum divina delectant:" this argument of its divineness hath the mind of man, that it is delighted with divine things. For if the soul were corporeal, it could not possibly reach to the knowledge of any, but material substances, and those that were of its own nature: otherwise, we might as well see angels with our eyes, as understand any thing of them in our minds. And the ground of this reason is, that axiom in philosophy, that

" all reception is 'ad modum recipientis,' according to the proportion and capacity of the receiver." And that the objects which are spiritual and divine, have greatest proportion to the soul of man, is evident in his understanding and his will; both which are, in regard of truth or good, unsatisfiable by any material or worldly objects; the one never resting in enquiry, till it attain the perfect knowledge; the other never replenished in desire, till it be admitted unto the perfect possession of the most divine and spiritual good; to wit, of Him who is the first of causes, and the last of ends.

From this attribute of spirituality [i] flows immediately the next of *simplicity*, unity, or actuality: for matter is the root of all perfect composition, every compound consisting of two essential parts, matter and form. I exclude not from the soul all manner of composition; for it is proper to God only to be absolutely and perfectly simple: but I exclude all essential composition, in respect whereof the soul is merely actual: and so I understand that of Tully, " Nihil est animis admixtum, nihil concretum; nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex." [k]

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of the Soul's Immortality, proved by its simplicity, independence, agreement of nations in acknowledging God and duties due unto him, dignity above other Creatures, power of understanding things immortal, unsatiableness by objects mortal, freeness from all causes of corruption.

And from this simplicity follows, by a necessary and unavoidable consequence, the third property spoken of, Immortality: [a] it being absolutely impossible (as Tully excellently observes, and it is the argument of Jul. Scaliger on this very occasion) for any simple and uncompounded nature

[i] *Aristot.* de Animal. l. 3. c. 6.

[k] Tuscul. Q. l. 1. et l. de Senect.

[a] Vid. *Plut.* lib. de placit. Philosoph. 4. c. 7. quæ ex Seneca in unum collegit *Diony. Gothfrid.* in locis ex ipso Theologicis, titul. de Animo.—*Cic.* Tusc. Q. lib. 1. Cato major, sive de Senect. et de Amicit.—Istam materiam fuse tractarunt *Aug.* Tom. 1. *Euseb.* de præpar. Evang. l. 11. ex Platone. *Porphyr.* &c. *Nemes.* *Æneas Gazeus* in Bed. Era. *Contaren.* et alii.

to be subject to death and corruption: for (saith Tully) "Interitus est discessus et secretio ac direptus earum partium, quæ conjunctione aliqua tenebantur:" It is a separation and (as it were) a divulsion of parts before united each to other. So that where there is no union [b], there can be no separation, and by consequence no death nor mortality.

Another reason may be the same, which was alleged for the spirituality of the soul; namely, independence in operation, and therefore consequently in being, upon the body. And that independence is manifest. First, because the acts of the soul are educed immediately in itself, without the intercedence of any organ, whereby sensitive faculties work. Secondly, because the soul can perceive, and have the knowledge of truth of universals, of itself, of angels, of God; can assent, discourse, abstract, censure, invent, contrive, and the like; none of which actions could any ways be produced by the intrinsecal concurrence of any material faculty. Thirdly, because in raptures and ecstasies, the soul is (as it were) drawn up above and from the body, though not from informing it, yet certainly from borrowing from it any assistance to the producing of its operation. All which prove, that the soul is separable from the body in its nature; and therefore that it is not corrupt and mortal as the body.

Another reason may be taken from the universal agreement [c] of all nations in the earth in religion, and the worship of some Deity; which cannot but be raised out of a hope, and secret resolution, that that God whom they worshiped, would reward their piety, if not here, yet in another life. "Nulla gens adeo extra leges est projecta, ut non aliquos Deos credat," saith Seneca; whence those fictions of the poets touching Elysium and fields of happiness, for men of honest and well-ordered lives; and places of torment for those, that do any way neglect the bonds of their religion.

> "Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
> Supplicia expendunt."

[b] Nihil potest perdere esse, quod non perdit actum per quem est. Istæ autem formæ [viz. Simplices] non possunt perdere actum, per quem sunt, quia sibi ipsis sunt actus. Nihil autem potest seipsum perdere. *Contaren.* lib. 1. de Immort. Animæ. [c] Cum de animarum æternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum, aut timentium inferos aut colentium. *Senec.* ep. 117.

Therefore they exercised are with pain,
And punishment of former crimes sustain.

For in this life it is many times in all places seen, that those which have given themselves most liberty in contempt of God's laws, and have suffered themselves to be carried by the swing of their own rebellious passions, unto all injurious, ambitious, unruly practices,—have commonly raised themselves and their fortunes more than others, who, out of tenderness and fear, have followed no courses but those which are allowed them. And yet these men who suffer so many indignities out of regard to religion, do still observe their duties, and in the midst of all contempt and reproach, fly into the bosom of their God; and, as Lucretius himself, that arch-atheist, confesseth of them,‖

" ——Multò in rebus acerbis,
Acrius advertunt animos ad religionem."

Their hearts in greatest bitterness of mind,
Unto religion are the more inclin'd.

Their very terrors and troubles make them more zealous in acknowledging some Deity and in the worship of it. Hic pietatis honos? Would not this easily have melted their religion into nothing, and quite diverted their minds from so fruitless a severity, had they not had a strong and indelible persuasion fastened in their souls, that a state would come, wherein both their patience should be rewarded, and the insolence of their adversaries repaid with the just vengeance they had deserved?

As for that atheistical conceit, that religion is only grounded on policy, and maintained by princes for the better tranquillity and settledness of their states, making it to be only 'imperii vinculum,' a bond of government, that the commonweal might not suffer from the fury of minds secure from all religion; it is a fancy no less absurd, than it is impious. For that which hath not only been observed, and honoured by those who have scarce had any form of a civil regiment amongst them, but even generally assented unto by the opinions and practices of the whole world,—is not a law of policy, and civil institution, but an inbred and secret law of nature, dictated by the consciences of men, and assented unto, without and above any human impositions. Nor else

is it possible for legal institutions, and the closest and most intricate conveyances of human policy so much to entangle the hearts of men, (of themselves inclinable to liberty) nor to fetter their consciences, as thereby only to bring them to a regular conformity unto all government for fear of such a God, to whose infiniteness, power, and majesty, they assent by none but a civil tradition. It must be a visible character of a Deity acknowledged in the soul, an irresistible principle in nature, and the secret witness of the heart of man, that must constrain it unto those sundry religious ceremonies, (observed among all nations) wherein, even in places of idolatry, were some so irksome and repugnant to nature, and others so void of reason, as that nothing but a firm and deep assurance of a divine judgement, and of their own immortality, could ever have imposed them upon their consciences. And besides this consent of men unto religion in general, we find it also unto this one part hereof touching the soul's immortality. All the wisest and best reputed philosophers for learning and stayedness of life, and besides them, even barbarians, infidels, and savage people have discerned it. "Adeo nescio quomodo inhæret in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium futurorum," saith Tully :[d] The soul hath a kind of presage of a future world:—and therefore he saith, that "it is in man's body a tenant, 'tanquam in domo aliena,' as in another's house: and is only in heaven as a Lord, 'tanquam in domo sua,' as in its own."

Though in the former of these, the ignorance of the resurrection made him err touching the future condition of the body, wherein indeed consists a main dignity of man above other creatures. And this opinion it is which (he saith) was the ground of all that care men had for posterity, to sow and plant common wealths, to ordain laws, to establish forms of government, to erect foundations and societies, to hazard their blood for the good of their country; all which could not have been done with such freedom of spirit, and prodigality of life, unless there were withal a conceit, that the good thereof would, some way or other, redound to the contentment of the authors themselves after this life: for it was a speech, savouring of infinite atheism,

[d] Tusc. Qu. l. 1.

Ἐμοῦ θανόντος, γαῖα μιχθήτω πυρί.

When I am dead and in mine urn,
What care I, though the world burn?

Now although against this present reason drawn from the consent of men, (which yet heathens[e] themselves have used) it may be alleged, that there hath been a consent likewise of some, that the soul is nothing else but the eucrasy or good temperature of the body, and that it is therefore subject to those maladies, distempers, age, sickness, and at last death, which the body is; as among the rest Lucretius takes much pains to prove; yet the truth is, that is 'Votum magis quam judicium,' never any firm opinion, grounded on judgement and reason; but rather a desire of the heart, and a persuasion of the will, enticing the understanding so to determine. For the conscience of lewd epicures and sensual minds, being sometimes frighted with the flashes and apprehensions of immortality, which oftentimes pursues them, and obtrudes itself upon them against their wills, shining like lightning through the chinks and crevices (as I may so speak) of their souls, which are of set purpose closed against all such light,—sets the reason on work to invent arguments for the contrary side; that so their staggering and fearful impiety may be something emboldened, and the eye of their conscience blinded, and the mouth muffled from breathing forth those secret clamours and shrieks of fear. The denial then of the immortality of the soul is rather a wish than an opinion; a corruption of the heart and will, than any natural affection of the understanding, which cannot but, out of the footsteps and relicks of those first sacred impressions, acknowledge a spiritual resemblance in the soul of man unto some supreme Deity, whom the conscience, in all its enormities, doth displease. And therefore it is observed[f], that the mind of an atheist is continually wavering and unsatisfied, never able so to smother the inbred consciousness of its immortality, as not to have continual suggestions of fear and scruple. Wheresoever there is an impious heart, there is always a shivering judgement.

Another reason of the soul's immortality, may be drawn

[e] *Cic.* Tusc. Qu. l. 1.—*Sen.* ep. 117.

[f] *Bacon's* Essay on Atheism.

from the dignity and pre-eminence of man above other creatures: for he is made lord over them, and they were ordained to be serviceable to him, and ministers for his contentments; which dignity cannot possibly stand with the mortality of the soul. For should not many other creatures far exceed man in the durance of their being? and even in their times of living together, how subject to weakness [g], sickness, languishing, cares, fears, jealousies, discontents, and all other miseries of mind and body, is the whole nature of man, of all which other creatures feel the least disturbance! Are not men here, beyond the rest, the very proper subjects and receptacles [h] of misery? Is not our heart made the natural centre of fears and sorrows,—and our minds, as it were, hives to entertain numberless swarms of stinging and thorny cares? Are we not vassals and slaves to many distempered passions? Have not our very contents their terror, and our peace disturbance? Are not all our comforts, wherewith we strive to glut and stuff ourselves here, the glorious vanities, and golden delusions, and cozenages of the world? And how miserable must their miseries be, whose very happiness is unhappy! And for reason, what comfort could we find in it, when it would always be presenting unto us the consideration of an eternal loss of all our contentments, and still affright us with the dark and hideous conceit of annihilation? Mortality and corruption make unreasonableness a privilege; and in this case the beasts would be so much the more happy than man, by how much the less they know their own wretchedness. An atheist would be in this life happier than he is, if he could bring himself to have as little reason as he hath religion.

Another reason may be taken from the nature of man's reasonable faculties. To every power in man, as God hath assigned a peculiar operation, so likewise hath he given it objects of equal extent thereunto, which are therefore able to accomplish its natural desires, whereby it fasteneth on them. And for this cause, from the nature of the objects,

g Οὐ μὲν γάρ τί ϖου ἐστὶν ὀϊζυρώτερον ἀνδρός. Iliad. P'. 446. h Diogenes vocare solebat Τρισανθρώπους ἀντὶ τοῦ τρισαθλίους. *Laert.* l. 6.—Πᾶς ἄνθρωπός ἐστι συμφορή. Solon ad Crœsum.—Vid. *Theod.* ser. 5. de Natura Hom. et *Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 3. p. 316, 317. Edit. Heins.

we easily rise to know the nature both of the faculties and essence: for from the essence flows naturally the faculty; from the faculty is naturally educed the operation, which requires naturally objects proportional, convenient, satisfactory, and of equal extent. Where therefore no mortal object bears full convenience, nor is able to satiate and quiet the faculty, there it, and the essence, from which it flows, are immortal. Now we see sensitive powers find, in this life, full satisfaction, as the sight from all the variety of colours, the ear of sounds, and the like: only the reasonable parts, the understanding and the will, can never be replenished in this state of mortality.[i] Have they as great and wide contentments, as the whole frame of nature can here afford them; still their pursuits are restless, still they find an absence and want of something which they cannot find. 'Orbis Alexandro angustus:'—in this case, every man is like Alexander.

This world wherein we now converse, is too strait and empty to fill the vastness, and limit the desires of the soul of man. Only the sight and possession of God, the most infinite good, can satisfy our understandings and our wills. For both these faculties, (as all others, 'in suo genere') aim at 'summum.' The understanding is carried 'ad summum verum,' to the first of truths; the will, 'ad summum bonum,' to the last of ends: and therefore He only, which is the First and Last, can satisfy these two searching and unquiet faculties.

"Hi motus animorum atque hæc certamina."

These are the motions, this the strife
Of souls aspiring unto life.

All the knowledge we heap up here, serves only as a mirror wherein to view our ignorance; and we have only light enough to discover that we are in the dark. And indeed, were there no estate wherein knowledge should receive a perfection, and be thoroughly proportioned to the heart of man; the labour of getting the knowledge we have, and the vexation for the want of what we have not, and the grief of parting so

[i] Fecisti nos ad te; et irrequietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te. *Aug.* Conf. l. 1. c. 1.—Vid. ib. l. 4. c. 10, 12. de Trinit. l. 13. c. 8.—Omnis mihi copia, quæ Deus meus non est, egestas est. Conf. l. 13. c. 8.—Vide etiam de Civ. Dei, l. 8. c. 18. l. 11. c. 13. l. 12. c. 1.

soon with it, would render the vexation of it far greater than the content.

"Hoc est quod palles? cur quis non prandeat, hoc est?"

Is this the fruit for which we fast,
And by pale studies sooner waste?

Do we toil and sweat, and even melt ourselves away, for that, which we sooner forsake than find? Do we deny ourselves the contentments and satisfactions most agreeable to our corporeal condition, being without hope of accomplishing our wishes in another estate? Is it natural for gaining of knowledge to hasten unto that, whereby we lose both it and ourselves? and to labour for such a purchase, which, like lightning, is at once begun and ended; yea, indeed sooner lost than gotten? Certainly were man not conscious of his own immortality, there could be no stronger inducement to sottishness, luxury, riot, sensuality, and all other unbridled practices. It is registered for the impiety of atheists, "Let us eat, and drink; for to-morrow we shall die."

Another reason may be framed after the same manner, as was that to prove the spirituality of the soul from the manner of its operation. And it is grounded on those two ordinary axioms in philosophy, that "every thing is received according to the quality of the receiver;" and that "every thing hath the same manner of essence, as it hath of operation." Now the soul of man can easily receive impressions and conceits of immortality, and discourse thereupon: therefore also it is, in its own essence and nature, immortal. We see, even between things merely corporeal, as the object, and the sensitive organ, how small a disproportion works incapacity. Much more must it be found in so great a difference, as would be between immortality of objects and corruption of the soul that worketh on them. We cannot picture an angel or spirit, nor make any immaterial stamp in a piece of wax; since a corporeal substance is capable of none but corporeal impressions. And therefore we see, that even amongst bodies, the more pure and subtile they are, the more are they exempted from the perception of the quickest and most spiritual sense, the sight. Now the mind of man in understanding, is but as wax to the seal, or as a table and picture to an object which it represents: which is the ground of that para-

dox in Aristotle, that in understanding, the soul is (as it were) made the object that is understood. Because, as the wax, after it is stamped, is, in some sort, the very seal itself that stamped in it, namely, representative, by way of image and resemblance; so the soul, in receiving the species of any object, is made the picture and image of the thing itself. Now the understanding, being able to apprehend immortality (yea indeed apprehending every corporeal substance, as if it were immortal, I mean by purging it from all gross and material corruptible qualities) must, therefore, needs of itself be of an immortal nature. And from the latter of these two principles, which I speak of, namely, that the quality of the being may be gathered from the nature of the operation, Aristotle infers the separability and independence of the understanding on the body, in the third 'de Anima' aforenamed: for the soul, being able to work without the concurrence of any bodily organ to the very act itself (as was before showed) must needs also be able to subsist by its own nature, without the concurrence of any matter to sustain it. And therefore he saith in the same place, that "the understanding is separable, uncompounded, impassible;" all arguments of immortality. Other reasons are produced for the proof hereof, taken from the causes of corruption, which is wrought, either by contraries, working and eating out nature; or by defect of the preserving cause, as light is decayed by absence of the sun; or thirdly, by corruption of the subject whereon it depends. None whereof can be verified in the soul. For First, how can any thing be contrary to the soul, which receiveth perfection from all things? for 'Intellectus omnia intelligit,' saith Aristotle, yea, wherein all contraries are reconciled and put off their opposition. For (as a great man[k] excellently speaketh) those things which destroy one another in the world, maintain and perfect one another in the mind; one being a means for the clearer apprehension of the other. Secondly, God, who is the only efficient of the soul (being else in itself simple, and indivisible, and therefore not capable of death, but only of annihilation) doth never fail; and hath himself promised never to bring it unto nothing. And lastly, the soul depends not, as do other forms, either

[k] *Mornay* of Christian Religion, Ch. 14.

in operation or being, on the body, being not only 'Actus informans,' but 'subsistens' too, and so capable of being or existing by itself alone.

CHAP. XXXV.

Of the honour of human bodies by creation, by resurrection; of the endowments of glorified bodies.

And now, that this particular of immortality may further redound both to the honour and comfort of man, I must fall upon a short digression touching man's body[a]; wherein I intend not to meddle with the question, 'How man's body may be said to be made after the image of God,' which sure is not any otherwise than as it is a sanctified, and shall be a blessed vessel: but not as some have conceited, as if it were, in creation, 'Imago Christi futuri, nec Dei opus tantum, sed et pignus;' as if Christ had been the pattern of our honour, and not we of his infirmity:—since the Scripture saith, "He was made like unto us in all things," and that he assumed our nature; but never that we *were*, but that we *shall be*, like unto him;—not, I say, to meddle with this, I will only briefly consider the dignity thereof in the particular of immortality, both in the first structure, and in the last resurrection of it: the 'creation' of our bodies, and the 'redemption of our bodies,' as the apostle calls it: what immunity was at first given, and what honour shall at last be restored to it. In which latter sense it shall certainly be 'secundum imaginem,' after his image, who was 'Primitiæ,' the first-fruits, of them that rise: that as in his humiliation, his glory was hid in our mortality, so in our exaltation our mortality shall be swallowed up of his glory.

And for the first estate of man's body, we conclude in a word, that it was partly mortal, and partly immortal; *Mortal*, in regard of possibility of dying, because it was affected with the mutual action and passion of corruptible elements: for which reason it stood in need of reparation and recovery

[a] Vid. *Cæl. Rhod.* l. 2. c. 9, 10, 11. *Aug.* de Gen. ad lit. l. 6. c. 12, &c. Platonica sententia Carcer, Apostolica Templum. *Tert.* de Anim.-*Tert.* de Carne Christi.—Vid. *Aug.* l. 7. de Trin. c. 6.

of itself by food, as being still 'corpus animale,' and not 'spirituale,' as St. Paul distinguisheth; a natural, but not a spiritual body. [b] But it was *immortal*, that is, exempted from the law of death, and dissolution of the elements, in virtue of God's covenant with man, upon condition of his obedience. It was mortal, 'conditione corporis,' by the condition of a body; but immortal, 'beneficio conditoris,' by the benefit of its creation: else God had planted in the soul such natural desires of a body wherein to work, as could not be naturally attained; for the soul did naturally desire to remain still in the body. In the natural body of Adam there was no 'sin;' and therefore no 'death,' which is the 'wages of sin.'

I come now to the redemption of our bodies already performed 'in pignore et in primitiis,' in our head, and in some few of his members, Enoch, Elias, and (as is probable) in those dead bodies which arose to testify the divine power of our crucified Saviour; and shall be totally accomplished at that 'day of redemption,' as the same apostle [c] calls the last day; that day of a full and final redemption, "when Death, the last enemy, shall be overcome." And well may it be [d] called 'a day of redemption,' not only in regard of the creature, which yet groaneth under the malediction and tyranny of sinful man: nor yet only in respect of man's soul; which, though it be before admitted unto the purchased possession of the glorifying vision, and lives no more by faith alone, but by sight, shall yet then receive a more abundant fulness thereof, as being the day of the manifestation and plenary discovery both of the punishing glory of God in the wicked, and of his merciful and admirable glory in the saints: but also, and (as I think) most especially in respect of the body. For there is, by virtue of that omnipotent sacrifice, a double kind of redemption wrought for us; the one vindicative, giving us immunity from all spiritual dangers, delivering us from the tyranny of our enemies, from the severity, justice, and curse of the law; which is commonly, in the New [e] Testament, called simply, λύτρωσις, and ἀπολύτρωσις, a deliverance

[b] *Aug.* de Gen. ad lit. l. 6. c. 25.—De Civ. Dei, l. 13. c. 9.—Vide quæ fuse et erudite disserit *Geor. Zeeman.* tract. de Imag. Dei, c. 8. sect. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. [c] Eph. iv. 30. [d] Luke xxi. 28. [e] Luke i. 68. Heb. ix. 12. Luke xxi. 28. Rom. viii. 23. Eph. i. 7.

from evil:—the other purchasing, or munificent, by not only freeing us from our own wretchedness, but farther conferring upon us a positive and a glorious honour, which St. John[f] calls ἐξουσία, a power, privilege, prerogative, and title unto all the glorious promises of immortality: which likewise St. Paul calls[g] ἀπολύτρωσις τῆς περιποιήσεως, the 'redemption of a purchased possession,' and a 'redemption unto the adoption of sons.' —Now then, the last day is not totally and perfectly a day of redemption unto our souls in either of these senses; since they are in this life delivered from the malediction of the law, from the wrath of the judge, from the tyranny of the enemy, from the reign of sin; and by death freed not only from the dominion, but from the possession or assault of the enemy; not only from the kingdom, but from the body of sin; and are withal in good part possessed of that bliss, which they shall more fully enjoy at the last. But our bodies, though, before that great day, they partake much of the benefits of redemption, as being here sanctified vessels, freed from the authority und power of the devil, world, flesh, and from the curse of death too, wherein they part not only with life, but with sin; yet, after all this, do they want some part of either redemption, as namely, to be raised and delivered from that dishonour and corruption, which the last enemy hath brought upon them, and to be admitted into those mansions, and invested with that glory, whereby they shall be totally possessed of their redemption. In a word, the soul is, in its separation, fully delivered from all enemies, which is the first,—and, in a great measure, enjoyeth the vision of God, which is the second,—part or degree of man's redemption. But the body is not, till its resurrection, either quite freed from its enemy, or at all possessed of its glory; I mean in itself, though it be in its head, who is 'Primitiæ et pignus resurrectionis,' the first-fruits and earnest of our conquest over death.

Touching the dignity of our bodies, though there be more comfort to be had in the expectation, than curiosity in the enquiry after it, yet what is usually granted, I shall briefly set down. And first, it shall be raised a whole, entire, and perfect body, with all the parts best fitted to be receptacles

[f] John i. 12. [g] Ephes. i. 14.

of glory; freed from all either the usherers in, or attendants and followers on the grave, age, infirmity, sickness, corruption, ignominy, and dishonour: and shall rise a true, whole, strong, and honourable body. For though every part of the body shall not have those peculiar uses which here they have, since they neither "eat nor drink, marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God;" yet shall not any part be lost; "Licet enim officiis liberentur, judiciis retinentur[h];" though they are freed from their temporal service, for which they were here ordained, yet must they be reserved for receiving their judgement, whether it be unto glory, or unto dishonour.

The second dignity[i] is that change and alteration of our body from a natural to a spiritual body: whereby is not meant any transubstantiation from a corporeal to a spiritual substance: for our bodies shall, after the resurrection, be conformable unto Christ's body, which, though glorious, was not yet a spirit, but had flesh and bone as we have. Nor is it to be understood of a thin, aerial, invisible body, (as some have collected) since Christ saith of his body, after he was risen, "Videte, Palpate." Wheresoever it is, it hath both its quantity, and all sensible qualities of a body glorified with it. It is a strong argument, that it is not there, where it is not sensible: and therefore the doctrines of ubiquity, and transubstantiation, as they give Christ more than he is pleased to own, an immensity of body,—so do they spoil him of that, which he hath been pleased, for our sakes, to assume, extension, compacture, massiness, visibility, and other the like sensible properties; which cannot stand with that pretended miracle, whereby they make Christ's body, (even now a creature, and like unto ours in substance, though not in qualities of corruptibility, infirmity, ignominy, animality,) to be truly invested with the very immediate properties of the Deity. True indeed it is, that the body of Christ (as having been a sacrifice and oblation for sin) hath an efficacy and operation in all parts of the world: it worketh in heaven with God the Father, by intercession; in earth, and that in all ages, and in all places among men, by justification and comfort; in hell, amongst the devils and damned, by the trembling and fears of a condemning and convicting faith.

[h] *Tert.* [i] Vid. *Aug.* de Civ. Dei, l. 13. c. 20. et 23. et Ep. 145.

But operation requireth only a presence of virtue, not of substance. For, doth not the sun work wonderful effects in the bowels of the earth, itself notwithstanding being a fixed planet in the heaven? And why should not the Sun of Righteousness work as much at the like distance, as the sun of nature? Why should he not be as powerful absent, as he was, hoped? or, why should the not-presence of his body make that ineffectual now, which the not-existing could not, before his incarnation? Why should we mistrust the eyes of Stephen, that saw him in heaven at such a distance of place; when Abraham could see him in his own bowels, through so great a distance of time?

That speech then, that the body shall be a spiritual body, is not to be understood in either of those former senses: but it is to be understood first of the more immediate union, and full inhabitation of the virtue and vigour of God's spirit in our bodies, quickening and for ever sustaining them without any assistance of natural or animal qualities, for the repairing and augmenting of them in recompense of that, which, by labour and infirmity, and the natural opposition of the elements, and the continual effluvia and evaporation of the more thin and subtile parts, is daily diminished. Secondly, it shall be so called in regard of its obedience and total subjection to the Spirit of God, without any manner of reluctance and dislike. Thirdly, in respect of those spiritual qualities, those prerogatives of the flesh, with which it shall be adorned; which are,

First, a shining and glorious light, wherewithal it shall be clothed as with a garment: for "the just shall shine as the sun in the firmament." Now, this shall be wrought, first, by virtue of that communion, which we have with Christ our head, whose body, even in its mortality, did shine like the sun, and had his clothes white as light. And secondly, by diffusion and redundancy from our soul upon our body, which by the beatifical vision, filled with a spiritual and inconceivable brightness, shall work upon the body, as on a subject made thoroughly obedient to its power unto the production of alike qualities.[k]

The second spiritual property shall be impassibility, not

[k] De mirâ vi animæ in corpus, vid. *Cœl. Rhod.* l. 11. c. 15, 16.

in respect of perfective, but in respect of annoying, disquieting, or destructive passion. There shall not be any war in the members, any fighting and mutual languishing of the elements; but they shall be sustained in their full strength by virtue of communion with Christ, of the inhabitation of the Spirit, of the dominion of the glorified soul. There shall be no need of rest, or sleep, or meat, all which are here requisite for the supply of our infirmities and daily defects, and are only the comforts of pilgrimage, not the blessedness of possession. For although Christ, after his resurrection, did eat before his disciples, yet this was none otherwise done, than that other, the retaining of his wounds, which was only for our sakes; that our faith, touching the truth of his body, might not be without these visible and inferior witnesses, by which he was pleased to make his very glorified flesh a proportioned object to our frail sense and faith: that so we might thence learn confidently to rely for ourselves, as well on the benefit of his exaltation, as of his humility. Or it was done (as St. Austin[1] speaks) "Non ex necessitate, sed ex potestate:" as the sun is said to draw and suck up standing waters, "Non pabuli egestate, sed virtutis magnitudine," not to nourish, but to manifest its virtue.

Thirdly, the body shall be a strong and beautiful body, thoroughly able to minister unto the soul any service, wherein it shall employ it; and shall be no longer, as it is now, the clog and luggage thereof. It shall likewise be free from all blemish and deformity[m] (which ever ariseth out of the distemper and discord of the elements,—as it is by good probability conjectured,) reduced unto a full, comely, and convenient stature, even in those, who were in their death contemptible, infants, lame, dismembered, or any other way dishonoured with the miseries of corruption. "Naturæ, non injuriæ, reddimur," we shall be restored to our nature, but not to our shame: the dust shall still retain and bury our dishonour, and it shall be one part of our glory to be made fit for it.

[1] De Civ. Dei, l. 15. [m] Ita nihil periturum de corpore, ut nihil deforme maneat in corpore. Vid. *Aug.* Enchirid. c. 91. et de Civ. Dei, l. 22. cap. 19, 20.—*Tertul.* de Resur.—Vitia detrahentur, natura servabitur. *Aug.* de Civ. Dei, l. 22. c. 22.

The last quality of our bodies which I shall observe, is a perfect subtilty and agility, best befitting their service for the soul in all speedy motion; which surely shall be there so much the more requisite, than here on earth, by how much heaven is a more ample and spacious country. And thus while the body is made an attendant on the soul's glory, it is likewise a partaker of it. Unto these, add the sweet harmony of the affections, the exact and exquisite operation of the senses; the bodily communion and fellowship of the saints, and above all, the eternal corporeal vision of that most sacred body whence all ours derive their degrees of honour, whose presence were, truly and without any hyperbole, able to make hell itself a place of glory: how much more that country, and those mansions, where the soul likewise shall be swallowed up with the immediate vision and fruition of divine glory. Our souls are not here noble enough to conceive what our bodies shall be there.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Of that part of God's image in the soul, which answereth to his power, wisdom, knowledge, holiness. Of man's dominion over other creatures. Of his love to knowledge. What remainders we retain of original justice.

The other properties or attributes of God, of which man's soul beareth an image and dark resemblance, are those, which, according to our apprehension, seem not so intrinsecal and essential as the former. And they are such, as may be either generally collected from the manifestation of his works, or more particularly from his word. These, which refer unto his works, are his power in making and ruling them; his wisdom in ordering and preserving them; his knowledge in the contemplation of them: and of these it pleased him at the first to bestow some few degrees upon man's soul.

Concerning the attribute of power, most certain it is, that those great parts of God's workmanship, creation, and redemption, are incommunicably belonging unto him, as his own prerogative royal: insomuch, that it were desperate blasphemy to assume unto ourselves the least resemblance

of them. Yet in many other proceedings of God's works, there is some analogy and resemblance in the works of men. For first, what are all the motions and courses of Nature, but the ordinary works of God? All forms and intrinsecal motive principles, are indeed but his instruments; for "by him we live, and move, and have our being." And of all other works, man's only imitate Nature: as Aristotle observes of the works of Art, which peculiarly belong unto man; all other creatures being carried by that natural instinct, which is intrinsecally belonging to their condition, without any manner of art or variety. The resemblances of Nature in the works of Art are chiefly seen in these two proportions: First, as Nature doth nothing in vain, but in all her works aims at some end, the perfection, or the ornament, or the conservation of the universe; (for those are the three ends of Nature, subordinate to the main, which is the glory of the Maker) so likewise are the works of Art all directed by the understanding to some one of those ends; either to the perfection of men; such are all those, which inform the understanding, and govern the life;—or to his conversation, as those directed to the furthering of his welfare, and repairing the decays, or sheltering the weaknesses of Nature;—or lastly to his ornament, such are those elegancies of art, and curiosities of inventions, which, though not necessary to his being, yet are special instruments of his delight, either sensitive or intellectual.

The second resemblance, is between the manner and progress of their works: for as the method of Nature is to proceed 'ab imperfectioribus ad perfectiora,' and 'per determinata media ad suum finem;' so Art likewise (as is plain in those which are manual) by certain fixed rules, which alter not, proceeds to the producing of a more perfect effect, from more rough and unformed beginnings, by the help of instruments appropriated to particular services. But this, because it limits man's dignity, as well as commends it, I forbear to speak of. Though even herein also we do seem to imitate God, who, in his great work of creation, did proceed both by succession of time, and degrees of perfection: only it is *necessity* in us, which was in him his *will.*

To come, therefore, nearer, it is observable, that, in the first act of God's power, in the making and framing of the

world, there was nothing here below created properly, immediately, and totally, but the chaos and mass, or the earth without form and void; out of the obedience whereof, his power did further educe and extract those wonderful, various, and beauteous forms, which do evidently set forth unto the soul of man, the glory and majesty of him that made them. By a small resemblance of this manner of working, man also, in those works of art, peculiar to him from other creatures, doth, 'ex potentia obedientiali,' (as the schools call it) out of the obedience and subjection of any proposed mass, produce, 'Non per naturam, sed per imperium,' not out of the nature of the subject, but by the command of reason,—sundry forms of art, full of decency and beauty.

And for government, I mean subordinate, and by derivation or indulgence,— it is manifest, that all creatures, inhabiting the world with him, were subdued unto man; and next unto the glory of the great Maker, were ordained for his service and benefit. [n] And therefore, whenever we find any of them hurtful and rebellious, we cannot but remember, that the occasion thereof was our own disloyalty: they do but revenge their great Master's wrong, and, out of a faithful care and jealousy to preserve his honour, renounce their fidelity and obedience to a traitor. [o] And indeed, how can we look to have our dominion entire over beasts and inferior creatures, when by continual enormities we make ourselves as one of them?

This dominion of man over the creatures, showeth itself in several things: in the admirable skill that man hath to use the creatures unto rational and artificial ends, which no other creatures can do: as the fire is an instrument to the smith, the founder, the chymist, to every artificer: the wind and water ordered to grind corn, to carry up and down vessels: stones and timber, to make goodly frames of building. There is not the meanest of creatures, whereof the reason of man hath not found out some needful use, tending

[n] Vid. *Tertul.* de Resurrect. 6. 26.—*Ambros.* Hexam. l. 6. c. 6.—*Nyssen.* Orat. 1. in 'Faciamus Hominem,' &c. *Aug.* de Gen. ad lit. lib. 3. c. 20.—*Damas.* de Orthod. Fd. lib. 2. cap. 30. [o] Sanctius his animal, mentisque capacius altæ, Deerat adhuc, et quod dominari in cætera posset: Natus homo est. *Ov.* M. 1. Quia per peccatum homo deseruit eum, sub quo esse debuit; subditus est eis, supra quæ esse debuit. *Aug.* Tract. 8. in Johan.

either unto life, or health, or pleasure, or ease, or facility of operation, or some one or other end for the service of man.

In the fear that even now God hath placed in many great and strong creatures towards man, so that one child is able to drive a whole herd of them before him. In the skill [p], which man hath to tame and subdue fierce creatures, which otherwise might annoy him; and to make use even of vipers and poisonous creatures unto wholesome ends. In the power [q] which he hath to instruct docile creatures, as the elephant, the dog, the horse, the bird, to obey the dictates, and to imitate the expressions of human reason. In the strange instinct that God hath put into some hurtful creatures to fear man, as the serpent; into others, to come abroad at such times only when man stayeth in; and "when the sun ariseth for man to go forth unto his work, then they lie down in their dens." [r]

The grounds of this dominion are, 1. The original grant and deed of gift, made by God unto man, both in the creation of the world unto Adam, and in the reparation of it unto Noah: unto both whom, God brought the creatures, and delivered them into their custody and disposition. [s]

2. The order of Nature, which dictateth this law unto the creatures,—that the more imperfect and ignorant should be regulated by those, which are most wise and perfect: else power, let loose from wisdom, would presently fill the face of Nature with confusion and disorder.

3. The providence of God, implanting a notable instinct of awfulness, obedience, docility, serviceableness in the creatures towards man; and of wisdom and sagacity in man for the use of them.

4. The general end of God's glory: for the other creatures cannot actively and intentionally direct their faculties or virtues unto God, as having no knowledge of him: but man, having God's glory for his own end, is able, in the use of all the creatures (which God made for himself) to contemplate the various wisdom, power, goodness, providence of God, and to direct them all to the setting forth of his glory.

This dominion standeth first, in a solemn delivery, and

[p] Vid. *Plin.* lib. 8. c. 8, 9, &c. James iii. 7. [q] *Plin.* l. 8. c. 3. [r] Psalm cxxiv. 20, 23. [s] Gen. i. 28, ix. 2.

seisin, and possession given by God unto man, when the creatures were, either by the ministry of angels, or some other act of manuduction, brought unto Adam, and put into his hands, and received names from him[t], in token of his special authority over them, to command them by their names. As the subjects of a Prince do, in a more solemn manner, present their homage and fealties before him, at his inauguration.

Secondly, in a plenary power over them, and that twofold; a power to awe, and subdue them to his government: "Let the fear of you, and the dread of you, be upon all living creatures on the earth," &c. And a power to use them; their natures for contemplation and delight; their abilities, sagacities, strength, swiftness, sympathies, antipathies, unto such ends whereunto they should be serviceable; their lives and substance to aliment, indument, ornament; or any other use, when man's necessity should require it.

And this power of man over the creatures, was most general, reaching to those with whom he had least society, the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of heaven. Most easy both by reason of the instinct which God put into the creatures to fear and serve man; and of the wisdom, which he put into man, to discern the natures and fitness of several creatures for several services, and accordingly to apply them. Most equal and just, without sin, tyranny, oppression, violence, under which the creature now groaneth, and is made 'subject unto vanity,' as the apostle speaketh.

This part of God's image in man, is, by his fall, much weakened, as we may observe by the rebellion and insurrection of the creatures against him: so that though, by wisdom, he tame many creatures, yet he cannot, with his brow and countenance, awe them as he could at first. We find the stars fighting against one; the sun and moon, against another; the earth, against Korah; the sea, against Pharaoh; the fire, against Ahaziah; the lions, against Samaria; the quails, against Israel; the ass refusing the service, and rebuking the madness of Balaam. The loss and diminution of this power is notably seen in this, that man's authority is perished, or much abated, over the greatest, and over the

[t] Dominantis enim est nomina imponere. Vid. *A. Gell.* l. 17. c. ult.—*Cic.* ad Att. l. 4. ep. 14. l. 7. ep. 8.—*Suet.* in Octav. c. 101.—Vid. *Casaub.* in Baron. Exercit. 13. Sect. 13.—*Briss.* de Form. lib. 7.

smallest of creatures[u]: the one with power and strength affright him; the other with nimbleness, or with number, escape him: the one an exprobration of his weakness; the other, of his vileness. And therefore when God plagued Egypt, he did it not by lions and tigers, but by locusts, and frogs, and lice, the weakest and basest creatures: so he resisted the pride of Pharaoh; so he consumed the pride of Herod; making base things to vindicate his glory, and weak things to execute his justice upon the pride of those, who thought themselves great enough to rob him of his glory, and to outface his justice.

But though this dominion be, by sin, diminished, yet it is not extinguished, but in part *continued*, and in part *renewed* unto us; *continued* by the general providence of God, whereby he is pleased to preserve things in that course of subordination wherein first he made them,—and, like a gracious prince, to continue unto man the use of his creatures, even then when he is prisoner unto his justice. *Renewed*, by the promise and grant made again unto Noah. And there is a double promise under which we may enjoy the creatures: the one a moral promise made unto industry; as, "The diligent hand maketh rich;" and, "He that ploweth his land, shall have plenty of corn." The other an evangelical promise, made unto piety and faith in Christ, whereby is given unto Christian men both a freer use of the creatures than the Jews had, and a purer use than the wicked have: for, "Unto the clean, all things are clean."

And this grant of God doth sometimes show itself extraordinarily, as in the obedience of the crows to Elijah; the viper, to Paul; the lions, to Daniel; the whale, to Jonah; the fire, to the three children; and the trembling and fear of wild beasts, towards many of the martyrs.[x] Always ordinarily, in ordering and dispensing the course of Nature so, as that human society may be preserved, both by power, in subduing the creatures which he must use; and by wisdom, in escaping the creatures which he doth fear.

Now for the second attribute[y], wisdom, there is also a remainder of the image thereof in man. For albeit the fall and

[u] Observatum Perer. ex Hugone, in Gen. 1. 26. Ignis Polycarpum non tetigit. *Euseb.* l. 4. c. 14. vii. 30. Col. iii. 10. Gen. ii. 19, 23.

[x] *Euseb.* l. 8. c. 17.—

[y] Gen. 1. ult. Eccles.

corruption of [z] Nature hath darkened his eyes, so that he is inclined to work confusedly, or to walk as in a maze, without method or order,—as in a storm, the guider of a vessel is oftentimes to seek of his art, and forced to yield to the wind and waves; yet certain it is, that, in the mind of man, there still remains a pilot, or light of Nature, many principles of practical prudence, whereby (though for their faintings, a man does often miscarry, and walk awry) the course of our actions may be directed with success, and issue unto civil and honest ends. And this is evident not only by the continual practice of grave and wise men in all states, times, and nations, but also by those sundry learned and judicious precepts, which historians, politicians, and philosophers have, by their natural reason and observation, framed for the compassing of a man's just ends, and also for prevention and disappointment of such inconveniencies as may hinder them.

Lastly, for the attribute of knowledge: it was doubtless after a most eminent manner, at first, infused into the heart of man, when he was able, by intuition of the creatures, to give unto them all names, according to their several properties and nature; and in them to show himself, as well a philosopher as a lord: "He filled them," saith Siracides, "with the knowledge of understanding." And herein, if we will believe Aristotle [a], the soul is most nearly like unto God, whose infinite delight is the eternal knowledge and contemplation of himself, and his works. "Hereby," saith he, "the soul of man is made most beloved of God; and his mind, which is allied unto God, is itself divine, and of all other parts of man most divine." And this made the serpent use that insinuation only, as most likely to prevail, for compassing that cursed and miserable project of man's ruin. By means of which fall, though man blinded his understanding, and robbed himself of this, as of all other blessed habits, I mean, of those excellent degrees thereof which he then enjoyed; yet still the desire remains vast and impatient, and the pursuit so violent, that it proves often prejudicial to the estate both of the body and mind. So that it is as true now as ever, that man is, by nature, a curious and enquiring creature,—of an active and restless spirit, which is

[z] John i. 5. Eph. iv. 17, 18. Rom. iii. 13. Col. i. 21. Prov. xxii. 15.
[a] Ethic. l. 10.

never quiet, except in motion; winding itself into all the paths of Nature, and continually traversing the world of knowledge. There are two main desires naturally stamped in each creature, a desire of perfecting, and a desire of perpetuating himself. Of these, Aristotle[b] attributeth in the highest degree the latter unto each living creature, when he saith, that "of all the works of living creatures, the most natural is to generate the like;" and his reason is, Ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ Θείου μετέχωσιν, ᾗ δύνανται, "Because here by that immortality" (the principal end, as he there supposeth, of all natural agents) "which, in their own individuals, they cannot obtain, they procure, by deriving their nature unto a continued offspring and succession."—But (though in regard of life it hold true of all) man notwithstanding is to be exempted from the universality of this assertion. And of himself, that other desire of perfection, which is principally the desire of knowledge, (for that is one of the principal advancements of the soul) should not only, in a positive sense, as Aristotle hath determined, in the entrance to his Metaphysicks, but in a superlative degree be verified, that he is, by nature, desirous of knowledge. This being the principal thing (to use Aristotle's own reason) whereby man doth τοῦ Θείου μετέχειν, partake of divinity; as I observed before, out of Aristotle himself. And the reason of the difference between man and other creatures in this particular, is,—First, because man hath not such necessary use of that former desire, as others have, in regard of his own immortality; which takes away the necessity of propagation to sustain his nature. And secondly, because knowledge, the perfection of the soul, is to man (as I may so speak) a kind of generation, being of sufficiency to exempt the person endued therewith, from all injury of time, and making him to survive and outlive his own mortality. So that when the body hath surrendered unto each region of the world those elements and principles whereof it was composed, and hath not so much as dust and cinders left to testify that being which once it had; then doth the name lie wrapped in the monuments of knowledge, beyond the reach of fate and corruption.

The attributes of God, which are manifested more espe-

[b] Lib. 2. de Anim. cap. 4.

cially in his word, though sundry, yet (as far forth as they had ever any image in man) may be comprised in this more general one of *holiness*:—whereby I understand that absolute and infinite goodness of his nature, which is, in him, most perfect, pure, and eternal. Of which, though man, according to that measure as it was unto him communicated, was, in his great fall, utterly robbed and spoiled, as not being able in any thing to resemble it, or to retain any the least prints of those pure and divine impressions of original righteousness; yet still there remains, even in depraved and polluted Nature, some shadows thereof: there is still the 'opus operatum' in many actions of morality, though the obliquity of the heart, and ignorance of the true end, whither it should be directed, take away the goodness and the sanctity thereof. The top and highest pitch of nature, toucheth the hem and lowest of grace. We have in us the testimonies, though not the goodness, of our first estate; the ruins of a temple to be lamented,—though not the holy places thereof, to be inhabited. It is true indeed, those great endowments of the most severe and illightened heathen, were indeed but glorious miseries and withered virtues, in that they proceeded from a depraved nature, and aimed at sinister and false ends: yet withal, both the corruption of them proves their precedent loss, (which also the heathen themselves espied, in their distinction of ages into golden and iron times) and likewise the pursuit and practice of them, (though weak, imperfect, corrupt) imply manifestly, that there was much more an original aspiring of Nature in her perfection to be like her Maker in an absolute and universal purity. Now, in this rectitude and perfect regularity of the soul in this divine habit of original justice, did man most eminently bear the image and signature of God on him. And therefore notwithstanding we continue still immortal, spiritual, reasonable; yet we are said to have defaced that image in us, by our hereditary pollution. And he always recovereth most part thereof, who, in the greatest measure, repaireth the ruins, and vindicateth the lapses of his decayed estate, unto that prime original purity wherein he was created.

These are the dignities of the soul, considered wholly in itself; in all which, it far surmounts the greatest perfections, which the body, or any faculty thereof, is endowed withal.

And yet such is the preposterous and unnatural baseness of many men, that they are content to make their souls vassals to their own servant. How do they force their understandings, which, in their own worthiest objects, those deep and divine contemplations, are as drowsy as Endymion, to spend and waste themselves in proud, luxurious, vanishing inventions! How do they enthral that supreme and architectonical power in man's little world, his will to the tyranny of slavish appetite, and sensual desires; as if they served here but as cooks to dress their own bodies for the worms! Strange it is, that man, conscious to himself of immortality, and of a heroical and heavenly complexion, that hath received such immediate impressions of God, and is the very model of all Nature's perfections,—should so much degrade himself, as to doat only on that part, which is the vassal and slave of death. If there were no other mischief which sin did the soul, but to debase it, even that were argument sufficient for noble spirits to have it in detestation. For, "man, being in honour, and which understandeth not, is like the beasts that perish."

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of the faculty of understanding. Its operations outward upon the object; inward upon the will. Of knowledge; what it is; the natural desire and love of it. Apprehension, judgement, retention, requisite unto right knowledge. Several kinds of knowledge. The original knowledge given unto man in his creation. The benefits of knowledge. Of ignorance, natural, voluntary, penal. Of curiosity. Of opinion; the causes of it. Disproportion between the object and the faculty, and an acute versatileness of conceits. The benefit of modest hesitancy.

Now it follows to speak of the parts or principal powers of the soul, which are the understanding and the will. Concerning the understanding, the dignity thereof, though it may partly be perceived in the latitude and excellent variety of its objects, being the whole world of things, (for 'ens' and 'intelligibile' are reciprocal, 'et omnia intelligit,' saith Aris-

totle [a] of the understanding) yet principally it proceeds from the operations of it, both 'ad extra,' in respect of the objects; and 'ad intra,' in respect of the will. The one is a contemplative, the other a more practick office, whereby the speculations of the former are accommodated unto any either moral or civil actions. Those which respect the objects, are either passive or active operations. *Passive* I call those first perceptions and apprehensions of the soul, whereby it receiveth the simple species of some object, from immediate impression thereof by the ministry of the sense; as when I understand one object to be a man, another a tree, by administration and assistance of the eye, which presents the species of either.

Another sort of passive operations, (that is, of such as are grounded on impressions received from objects) are mixed operations of compounding, dividing, collecting, concluding, which we call discourse. Of all which, to speak according to their logical nature, would be impertinent. Their excellency chiefly stands in the end whereunto they move and serve, which is knowledge; of which I shall therefore here speak a few things.

Knowledge [b] is the assimilation of the understanding unto the things which it understandeth, by those intelligible species which do irradiate it, and put the power of it into act. For as the beams of the sun, shining on a glass, do there work the image of the sun; so the species and resemblances of things, being conveyed on the understanding, do there work their own image. In which respect the philosopher saith [c], that 'the intellect becometh all things, by being capable of proper impressions from them.' As in a painter's table, we call that a face, a hand, a foot, a tree, which is the lively image and representation of such things unto the eyes.

There is not any desire more noble, nor more natural unto a man, (who hath not, like Saul, hid himself amongst the stuff, and lost himself in the low and perishing provisions for lust) than is this desire of knowledge; nature dictating to every creature to be more intent upon its specifical than upon its generical perfection. And hence it is, that though

[a] *Arist.* de Anim. l. 3. [b] *Aquin.* par. 1. q. 14. a. 2. [c] *Arist.* de Anim. l. 3. c. 4. et 5.

man be the perfectest [d] of all creatures, yet many do excel him in sensitive perfection; some, in exquisiteness of sight; others, of hearing; others, of taste, touch, and smell; others, of swiftness and of strength: Nature thereby teaching us to imitate her in perfecting and supplying of our desires, not to terminate them there, where when we have made the best provision we can, many beasts will surpass us; but to direct our diligence most to the improving of our own specifical and rational perfection, to wit, our understandings. Other faculties are tired, and will be apt to nauseate, and surfeit on their objects: but knowledge, as knowledge, doth never either burden or cloy the mind, no more than a covetous man is wearied with growing rich. And therefore the philosopher [e] telleth us, that knowledge is the 'rest of the understanding,' wherein it taketh delight as a thing in its natural place.

And so great is this delight, that men have ventured on much trouble to procure it, as Pythagoras [f], Plato, Democritus, travelled into remote countries to gather knowledge, as Solomon sent to Ophir for gold. And as it makes adventurous to undertake troubles, so it helps men to bear them. A true lover of knowledge will hardly be over-borne with any ordinary distress, if it do not violate and restrain his particular appetite. If he may enjoy the delights of learning, he will be very moderately affected with his other restraints. Archimedes [g] was not sensible of the loss of Syracuse, being wholly intent upon a mathematical demonstration. And Demetrius Phalereus deceived the calamity of his banishment, by the sweetness of his studies. A man is never afflicted to the quick, but when he is punished in his most delightful affections; of all which, the most predominant in rational men is this of knowledge.

And therefore as the first creature God formed was 'light,' (to show, that all his works were made in wisdom, that they might set forth and manifest his glory) so the first motion

[d] Vid. *Plin.* lib. 7. in Procem. et *Lactant.* de Opifi. Dei, c. 2, 3. Et *Cæl. Rhod.* l. 2. c. 9. [e] Τὸ γὰρ ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐπίστασθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λεγόμεθα. *Arist.* Physic.—Ἕξις ἐπιστημονική. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 2.—Τὸ πέρας τῆς γνώσεως ἡ ἀνάπαυσις. *Clem. Alex.* Præd. l. 1. c. 6. [f] Vid. *Valer. Max.* l. 8. c. 7.—*Theod.* Ser. de fide.—*Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 1. p. 222, 223. [g] *Cicero*, de Finibus, l. 5.

of Adam after his creation, was towards knowledge. By his exercise of knowledge, he showed God's image in him; and by the ambition after more, he lost it: as no man sins easier, than in the thing which he best loves. And for this cause we may observe, that Christ's frequentest miracles were showed in opening the eyes of the blind, and the ears of the deaf and dumb: — his mercies, being perfect, extended themselves on those faculties, which are the chief instruments of knowledge in men which they most love.

And this love of knowledge[h] is seen evidently in this, that men had rather have sober calamities, than mad pleasures; and more freely choose clear intellectuals with misery, than disturbed, with mirth. Many men better content themselves with but a crazy body, for the fruition of their studies, than to purchase a better health at so great a price as the loss of learning.

But the principal excellency of knowledge is this, that it guideth the soul to God; and so doth all kind of right knowledge in divers respects. For first, there is scarce any science properly so called, which hath not its arcana to pose and amaze the understanding, as well as its more easy conclusions to satisfy it. Such as are in philosophy, those occult sympathies and antipathies, of which natural reason can render no account at all; which, overcoming the utmost vigour of human disquisition, must needs enforce us to believe, that there is an admirable wisdom that disposeth, and an infinite knowledge that comprehendeth, those secrets which we are not able to fathom.

Again, since the knowledge of things is either of their beings, or of their properties and operations; and Nature abhorreth the motion of proceeding[i] 'ad infinitum;' in either of these, necessary it is, that the mind of man[k], tracing the footsteps of natural things, must, by the act of logical resolution, at last arise to Him who is the fountain of all being, the first of all causes, the supreme over all movers, in whom

[h] Malunt homines mente lamentari, quam lætari in amentia. *Aug.* Civ. Dei, l. 11. c. 27. [i] Ἡ φύσις φεύγει τὸ ἄπειρον. *Arist.* de Gener. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.—Οὐδὲν εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν, ἀλλὰ στήσεταί που, καὶ ἔσταί τι ὃ πρώτως αἴτιον ἔσται τοῦ κινεῖσθαι. *Arist.* Phys. l. 7. c. 2. Text. 3. [k] Vid. *Justin. Martyr.* Quæst. Græc. qu. 3.—*Tert.* Apol. c. 17, 18. De Resur. c. 12. contra Marcion. l. 1. c. 17, 18. *Basil.* Hexam. Hom. 1. *Aug.* Conf. l. 10. c. 6. *Irenæus* l. 2. c. 9. *Theoph.* ad Autol. l. 1.

all the rest have their beings and motions founded. And this the Lord in the prophet hath delivered unto us, "I will hear the heavens, and the heavens shall hear the earth, and the earth the corn and wine, and they Jezreel."—Jezreel cannot subsist without corn and wine; she cries to them to help it: these cannot help without the earth to produce them; they cry to that to be fruitful: the earth can bring forth nothing of itself without influence, benignity, and comfortable showers from the heavens; it cries to them for aid:[l] the heavens cannot give rain nor warmth of themselves, without Him who is the father of rain, and the fountain of motion. So that here are three notable things to be observed: the connexion and concatenation of all second causes one to another: the co-operation of them together for the good of the church: and the subordination of them all to God, unto whom, at length, the mere accurate enquiry into them doth manuduct us. And this subordination standeth in four things. 1. All things are subordinate unto God in being[m]: he only hath being 'per essentiam,' by absolute and original essence; all other things, 'per participationem,' by derivation and dependance on him. 2. In conservation:[n] for God doth not make his creatures, as a carpenter doth his house, which can after stand by itself alone; but having our very being from him, that being cannot be or continue without his supportance; as light in the house dependeth, both in being and in continuance, upon the sun. 3. In regard[o] of gubernation and providence; for all things are by his wisdom guided unto the ends of his glory. And even those creatures which fly out of the order of his precepts, do fall into the order of his providence. Lastly, in regard of operation;[p] for 'In him we live, and move;' he worketh our works for us: second causes cannot put forth any causality, till he be pleased to concur with them.

Again, since we find, that all other creatures have, answerable to the instincts and appetitions which Nature hath grafted in them, proportionable objects of equal latitude in

[l] Hos. ii. 21, 22. [m] Jer. xiv. 22. Job xxviii. 24, 37. Vid. *Plut.* lib. de Fato. Exod. iii. 14. Isai. xl. 17. Acts xvii. 28. Rom. xi. 36. 1 Cor. viii. 6. Col. i. 16, 17. [n] Neh. ix. 6. Job xii. 10. Psalm civ. 29. Isai. xl. 24. [o] Mark x. 29. Prov. xvi. 4. Gen. xlviii. 28. Acts iv. 27, 28. [p] Acts xvii. 28. Isai. xxvi. 12. Job x. 8. Psalm cxxxix. 15, 16. 1 Cor. xii. 6. Isai. i. 5.

goodness to the faculties which are carried unto them; it must needs be reasonable, that that be not wanting to the excellentest of creatures, which all the rest do enjoy. Since then the supreme appetite of the reasonable soul is knowledge, and amongst all the creatures, there was never yet found any able to fill and satisfy this desire, but that still there is both room for more knowledge, and enquiry after it; and besides, all the knowledge of them is accompanied with unquietness and labour, (as the beast first stirs the mud in the water with his feet, before he drinks it with his mouth) —from hence it infallibly followeth, that from these lesser objects, the soul be carried at the last to God, the adequate and [k] ultimate end and object of all our desires: as Noah's dove was carried back to the ark, when she found no place for the sole of her foot to rest on.

Again; when we see things which have no knowledge, work so regularly towards an end, as if they knew all the way they were to go; we must needs conclude, they are guided by a mighty wisdom and knowledge without them: as when an arrow flieth directly to the mark, I am sure it was the hand of a skilful archer that directed it.

Unto the perfection of knowledge, after due and proper representation of objects in themselves, or in their causes, effects, principles, unto the mind; there are, in the subject, three things requisite:—

First, clearness of apprehension [l], to receive the right and distinct notion of the things represented, as the clearness of a glass serveth for the admission of a more exact image of the face that looks upon it; whereas if it be soiled or dimmed, it rendereth either none, or an imperfect shape.

Secondly, solidity of judgement to try and weigh the particulars which we apprehend; that, out of them, we may sever for our use the precious from the vile. For knowledge lies in things, as gold in a mine, or as corn in the straw; when by diligent enquiry after it, we have digged it up, and threshed it out, we must then bring it to the fire and fan, to give it us purified from dross and levity. And this in specu-

[k] Vid. *Aug.* Confes. l. 1. c. 1. et l. 4. c. 10, 12, et l. 13. c. 8. de Trin. l. 8. c. 3. D. *Field*, of the Church, l. 1. c. 1. *Hook*. Eccles. Pol. l. 1. sect. 11. [l] Representatio rerum: judicium de rebus representatis. *Aquin.* 22. qu. 27. 3. Art. 21.

lation answereth unto the general virtue of practical prudence in morality; whereby we weigh the several mediums unto the true ends of life, and accordingly select and prosecute the best.

Thirdly, fidelity of retention [m]; for he is not likely to grow rich, who puts up his treasures, as the prophet speaks, into a bag with holes. [n] For as Nature hath given to the bodies of men, for the furtherance of corporal strength and nutriment, a retentive power to clasp and hold fast that which preserveth it, until a thorough concoction be wrought; so proportionably is the faculty of memory given to reason, as a means to consolidate and enrich it. And fluxes, as in the body, so in the mind too, are ever arguments and authors of weakness. Whence it comes to pass, that in matter of learning, many of us are fain to be day-labourers, and to live from hand to mouth, being not able to lay up any thing. And therefore in the choice of fit persons to breed up unto learning, we should take a like course as wise architects do in choice of fit timber for building: they choose first the straightest, and that which hath fewest flaws in it; which, in the mind, answereth unto clearness and evenness of apprehension. For a clear mind, like straight and smooth timber, will work easiest. Next, they take the heart and strongest substance, and cut out the sap, because that is best able to bear the weight that shall be laid upon it: and this answers unto maturity and firmness of judgement. Lastly, they do not take sallow, or willow, or birch, and such other materials as are quickly apt to putrefy and wear away; but such timber as is lasting and retentive of its nature, as oak and elm, which may make the superstruction of the nature of the foundation, strong and lasting. And this answereth to that excellent faculty of the mind, a rational memory. From which one particular (I think more than any other) do arise those vast differences of felicity and infelicity in the minds of men, addicted to the search of knowledge. Strange was the unhappiness of Calvisius Sabinus [o] in Seneca, who, being at vast charges in matters of learning, was not yet able to retain fast the names of Achilles or Ulysses. But, as his para-

[m] Musæ itaque dictæ Jovis et Mnemosynes filiæ. *Cal. Rhod.* l. 11. c. 10.
[n] Hag. ii. 6. [o] *Senec.* ep. 27. Vid. etiam *Cal. Rhod.* l. 1. c. 10.

site was wont deridingly to advise him, wanted a grammatical attendant [p] to gather up the fragments which his memory let fall. And Curio [q], the orator in Tully, was wont, when he had proposed three things in an oration, to forget some one or other of them, or to add a fourth. Yea, Messala Corvinus [r] forgot his own name, as Pliny telleth us. And as wonderful, on the other side, hath been the felicity of some others. [s] Seneca, the father, could repeat two thousand words together in their order. Cyrus and Themistocles could call all their soldiers by their names [t], (by which one art of courtesy Otho aspired unto the empire [u];) Adrian could read a book which he never saw before, and after recite it by memory: and of the Emperor [x] Julian it is said, that he had drunk 'totum memoriæ dolium,' the whole vessel of memory. To say nothing of Simonides [y], and Apollonius Tyaneus, who, in their old age, the one at 80, the other at 100 years old, were very famous for the exquisiteness of their memories; nor of Cineas, Charmadas, Portius Latro, and divers others, who have been admired for this happy quality. [z] Now unto this felicity doth conduce a methodical and orderly disposition of mind, to digest and lay up things in their proper places. It was easier for Cyrus to remember men in an army than in a throng. And hence hath proceeded the art of memory, invented, as Pliny tells us, by Simonides, and perfected by Metrodorus Scepsius, consisting in the committing of several heads of matter unto distinct places; whereof Quintilian discourseth in his Oratory Institutions.

Of knowledge there are several sorts, according to several considerations, with respect to the ends of it: some is speculative, for the improving of the mind, as physical, metaphysical, and mathematical knowledge:—others practical, for fashioning and guiding the manners and conditions of men, as ethical, political, historical, military knowledge:—some mixed of both, as theological knowledge, consisting in

[p] Ut grammaticos haberet Analectas. [q] *Cicero* in Bruto et in Oratore. [r] *Plin.* l. 7. c. 24. [s] *Sen.* Controvers. lib. 1. in Prolog. [t] *Plin.* l. 7. c. 24. *Quint.* lib. 11. cap. 2. *Val. Max.* l. 8. cap. 7. sect. 15. [u] *Alex.* ab *Alex.* l. 6. c. 18. [x] *Æli. Spartian.* in Adriano. [y] *Ammian. Marcel.* lib. 16.—*Plin.* Supra.—*Suidas* in Apoll. *Voss.* Instit. Orat. l. 6. c. 6. sect. 2. [z] De quibus mentio apud Plinium et M. Senecam et Quintil. ut supra.

the speculation of divine verities, and in the direction of divine duties:—some instrumental, being only subservient unto others as grammatical, rhetorical, dialectical learning. In regard of order, some superior, others subalternate; as musick to arithmetick, opticks to geometry. In regard of their original, some ingrafted, as the supreme principles of verity, and implanted notions of morality, which is called the 'Law of Nature,' and 'written in the heart of all men.' (*Rom.* ii. 14, 15) Others, acquired, and by search and industry laboured out of those principles, and the others which are taught us: others revealed, and divinely manifested to the faith of men, whereof the supreme principles are these two: 1. That God in his authority is infallible, who neither can be deceived, nor can deceive. 2. That the things, delivered in holy Scriptures, are the dictates and truths, which that infallible authority hath delivered unto the church to be believed; and therefore that every supernatural truth, there plainly set down 'in terminis,' is an unquestionable principle; and every thing, by evident consequence and deduction from thence derived, is therefore an undoubted conclusion in theological and divine knowledge. In regard of the manner of acquiring, some is experimental, a knowledge of particulars; and some habitual, a general knowledge growing out of the reason of particulars: and those acquired either by invention from a man's industry, or by auscultation and attendance unto those that teach us. In regard of objects, some supreme, as the knowledge of principles and prime verities, which have their light in themselves, and are known by evidence of their own terms. Others derived and deduced by argumentation from those principles, which is the knowledge of conclusions. In regard of perfection, intuitive knowledge, as that of angels, whereby they know things by the view; and discursive, as that of men, whereby we know things by ratiocination. In regard of order and method: synthetical, when we proceed in knowledge by a way of composition from the causes to the effects; and analytical, when we rise up from effects unto their causes, in a way of resolution.

With this noble endowment of knowledge[a], was the hu-

[a] De ista materia fusius disputant *Scholastici* ad l. 2. dist. 23. et ad part. 1. *Tho. Aquin.* 94. et *Perer.* in Gen. ii. 19, 20. l. 5. disput. 1. de Amplitud. et Excellent. Scient Adami.

man nature greatly adorned in its first creation; so far forth as the necessity of a happy and honourable life, of the worship and communion with God, of the dominion and government over the creatures, of the acquaintance with himself, and of the instruction of his posterity, did require knowledge in him. For we may not think that God, who made man in a perfect stature of body, did give him but an infant stature of mind. God made all things exceeding good, and perfect; and therefore the perfection, naturally belonging unto the soul of man, was doubtless given unto it in its first creation. He made man right and straight; and the rectitude of the mind is in knowledge and light: and therefore the apostle telleth us, that "our renovation in knowledge is after the image of him that created us." (*Col.* iii. 10) Without knowledge, he could not have given fit names, and suitable to the natures of all the creatures, which, for that purpose, were brought unto him: he could not have awed and governed so various and so strong creatures, to preserve peace, order, and beauty amongst them: he could not have given such an account of the substance and original of Eve, of the end of her creation, to be the 'mother of all living men,' as he did. Experimental knowledge he had not, but by the exercise of his original light upon particular objects, as they should occur. Knowledge of future events he had not; it being not natural, nor investigable by inbred light, but prophetical; and therefore not seen, till revealed. Secret knowledge of the thoughts of men, or of the counsels of God, he could not have; because "secret things belong unto the Lord." But so much light of divine knowledge as should fit him to have communion with God, and to serve him, and obtain a blessed life; so much of moral knowledge as should fit him to converse in love as a neighbour, in wisdom as a father, with other men; so much of natural knowledge as should dispose him for the admiring of God's glory, and for the governing of other creatures, over which he had received dominion;—so much we may not, without notable injury to the perfection of God's workmanship, and to the beauty and rectitude of our first parent, deny to have been conferred upon our nature in him. The benefits of which singular ornament of knowledge are exceeding great; hereby

we recover a 'largeness of heart,' for which Solomon is commended; (1 *Kings* iv. 29) able to despatch many businesses [b], to digest and order multitudes of motions, to have minds seasoned with generous and noble resolutions; for that disposition is by the philosopher called μεγαλοψυχία, 'greatness of mind.' Hereby we are brought to a just contempt of sordid and wormy affections [c]. It is darkness which makes men grope, and pore, and look only on the things before them; as the apostle intimates, 2 *Pet.* i. 9. Illightened minds see a greater lustre in knowledge, than in the fine gold. (*Prov.* iii. 14, 15) The excellency of evangelical knowledge made St. Paul esteem every thing in the world besides, as 'dung.' (*Phil.* iii. 8) As the light of the sun swallows up all the petty light of the stars, so the more noble and spacious the knowledge of men's minds is, the more doth it dictate unto them the contempt of those various and vulgar delights, which bewitch the fancies of ignorant men. It disposeth men for mutual communion, and helpful society; for without knowledge, every man is 'feræ naturæ,' like birds of prey, that fly always alone. Neither is it possible for a man to be sociable, or a member of any publick body, any farther than he hath a proportion and measure of knowledge: since human society standeth in the communicating of mutual notions unto one another. Two men that are deaf, and dumb, and blind, destitute of all the faculties of gaining or deriving knowledge, may be together; but they cannot be said to have society one with another. To conclude, hereby we are brought nearer unto God, to admire him for his wisdom and power; to adore him for his greatness and majesty; to desire him, and work towards the fruition of him, for his light and glory; because, in the vision of him, consisteth the beatitude of man.

This knowledge is corrupted four manner of ways. First, by the contempt of it, in Ignorance. Secondly, by the luxuriousness and wantonness of it, in Curiosity. Thirdly, by the defect and uncertainty of it, in Opinion. Fourthly, by contradiction and opposition unto it, in Error.

There is a threefold ignorance, wherewith the mind of man may be blinded and defaced. The one is a natural

[b] Quod *Plinio* et aliis observatum de Cæsare, et *Ælio Spartian.* de Adriano.
[c] Vid. *Aqu.* 226. qu. 188. Art. 6. in C.

ignorance, which, of divine things[d], so far forth as those things are spiritual, is in all men, by nature: for the 'natural man' neither receiveth with acceptation, nor with demonstration 'discerneth' the things of the Spirit of God; and the reason the apostle gives, because "they are spiritually discerned." For as the eye is fitted to discern light by the innate property of light and cognation which it hath thereunto, without which, the eye could no more perceive objects of light, than it can of sounds; so the mind cannot otherwise receive spiritual objects, than as it hath a similitude to those objects in a spiritual disposition itself: whence that expression of St. John, "We shall be like unto him, for we shall see him as he is."[e] Spiritual things do exceed the weakness of reason[f], because they are above it, and so cannot be discerned; and they do oppose the corruption of reason, because they are against it, and so cannot be received.

There is likewise in many men much natural ignorance[g], even in moral and natural things. For as in the fall of man our spirituals were lost, so were our naturals weakened too; as we find in the great dulness of many men in matters of learning, insomuch that some have not been able to learn the names of the first letters or elements.[h]

Again, there is a voluntary ignorance, (of which we have before spoken) whereby men do wilfully close their eyes against knowledge, and refuse it: and of this there may be a double ground. The one guilt, in knowledge that pertaineth to the conscience; when a man chooseth rather not to know his duty, than, by the knowledge of it, to have his conscience disquieted with exprobrations of contemning it. The other out of sluggishness, and apprehensions of difficulty in the obtaining of knowledge; when, of two evils, undergoing of labour, or forfeiting of learning, a man esteemeth this the lesser.

Thirdly, there is a penal ignorance[i]; of which I shall not

[d] Deum scire nemo potest, nisi Deo docente. Vid. *Iren.* l. 4. c. 14. *Hilar.* de Trin. l. 1. et 5. [e] In tantum videbimus, in quantum similes erimus. [f] *Aug.* Ep. 6. Ubi ad profunditatem sacramentorum perventum est, omnis Platonicorum caligavit subtilitas. *Cypr.* Sp. Sanct.—*Aug.* de Prædest. c. 8. et de Doct. Christiana, l. 2. c. 6. [g] Vid. *Hier.* advers. Jovin. l. 2. [h] *Cæl. Rhod.* l. 1. c. 10. [i] Matth. xiii. 13. Acts xxviii. 26, 27. Rom. i. 28.

speak, because it differeth not from the voluntary ignorance of spiritual things, save only in the relation that it hath to the justice of God thereby provoked; who sometimes leaveth such men to their blindness, that the thing which, with respect to their own choice of it, is a pleasure, with respect unto God's justice, may be a plague and a punishment unto them. Thus the intellectual faculty is corrupted in many men by ignorance.

In others it is abused by curiosity [k], which may well be called the 'pride and the wantonness' of knowledge; because it looketh after high things, that are above us; and after hidden things, that are denied us. And I may well put these two together, 'pride and luxury' of learning: for I believe we shall seldom find the pride of knowledge more predominant, than there where it ariseth out of the curious and conjectural enquiries of wit, and not out of scientifical and demonstrative grounds. And I find the apostle joining them together, when he telleth us of some, who "intruded themselves into things which they had not seen, and were vainly puffed up by a fleshly mind." And he himself complaineth of others, who were 'proud,' and languished about needless questions; as it is ever a sign of a sick and ill-affected stomach to quarrel with usual and wholesome meat, and to long for and linger after delicacies, which we cannot reach to. When manna will not go down without quails, you may be sure the stomach is cloyed, and wants physick to purge it. I will not here add more of this point, having lately touched it on a fitter occasion. [l]

A third corruption of this faculty in regard of knowledge, is in the fluctuating, wavering, and uncertainty of assents; when the understanding is left floating, and, as it were, in 'æquilibrio,' that it cannot tell which way to incline, or what resolutions to grow unto: and this is that which, in oppo-

2 Thes. ii. 10, 11.—Ne intelligerent, meritum fuit delictorum, *Tert.* Apol. c. 21. contra Marc. l. 3. c. 6. *Cypr.* l. 1. Ep. 3. Percussi sunt cæcitate, ut nec intelligant delicta, nec plangant. Indignantis Dei major hæc ira. *Cypr.* de lapsis.—Vid. *Aug.* Qu. 14. ex Mat. et fuse contr. Jul. l. 5. [k] *Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 1. statim ab initio.—*Iren.* l. 5. c. 28. Vid. quædam contr. hunc scientiæ pruritum apud *Tertul.* de Anim. c. 1. cont. Marc. l. 1. c. 1.—*Aug.* ep. 29, 56, 78, et 57. Conf. l. 11. c. 12. de Gen. ad lit. l. 2. c. 9, et l. 10. c. 23. [l] In my Sermon, of the Peace of the Church, p. 24—26. *Aug.* 22. Qu. 1. Art. 4. C.

sition to science, is called 'opinion:' for science is ever 'cum certitudine,' with evidence and unquestionable consequence of conclusions from necessary principles: but opinion is 'cum formidine oppositi,' with a fear lest the contrary of what we assent unto should be true; and so it importeth a tender, doubtful, and infirm conclusion.

The causes of opinion I conceive to be principally two; the first is a disproportion between the understanding and the object, when the object is either too bright and excellent, or too dark and base: the one dazzles the power, the other affects it not. Things too divine and abstracted, are to the understanding, 'Tanquam lumen ad vespertilionem,' as light unto a bat, which rather astonish than inform: and things too material and immersed, are like a mist unto the eye, which rather hinder than affect it. And therefore, though whatsoever hath truth in it, be the object of the understanding, yet the co-existence of the soul with the body, in this present estate, restrains and limits the latitude of the object,—and requires in it, not only the bare nature of truth, but such a qualification thereof, as may make it fit for representation and impression by the conveyance of the sense. So that as in the true perception of the eye, (especially of those 'vespertiliones,' to which Aristotle hath compared the understanding, in this estate of subsistence with the body) there is required a mixture of contraries in the air; it must not be too light, lest it weaken and too much disgregate or spread the sense; nor yet too dark, lest it contract and lock it up; but there must be a kind of middle temper, clearness of the medium for conveyance, and yet some degree of darkness for qualification of the object;—even so also the objects of man's understanding must participate of the two contraries, abstraction and materiality. Abstraction first, in proportion to the nature of the understanding, which is spiritual. And materiality too, in respect of the sense, on which the understanding depends in this estate, as on the medium of conveyance, and that is corporal. So that wherever there is difficulty and uncertainty of operation in the understanding, there is a double defect and disproportion; first, to the power, whose operations are restrained and limited for the most, by the body: and then

in the object, which hath not a sufficient mixture of those two qualities, which should proportion it to the power. This is plain by a familiar similitude: an aged man is not able to read a small print without the assistance of spectacles, to make the letters, by a refraction, seem greater. Where, first, we may descry an imperfection in the organ: for if his eyes were as clear and well-disposed as a young man's, he would be able, by his natural power, without art, to receive the species of small letters. And next, there is an imperfection and deficiency in the letters: for if they had the same magnitude and fitness in themselves, which they seem to have by refraction through the glass, the weakness of his power might, haply, have sufficient strength to receive them without those helps. So that always the uncertainty of opinion, is grounded on the insufficiency of the understanding to receive an object, and on the disproportion of the object to the nature of the understanding.

The next cause of opinion and uncertainty in assents, may be acuteness and subtilty of wit, when men, out of ability, like Carneades [m], do discourse probably on either side; and poising their judgements between an equal weight of arguments, are forced to suspend their assents, and so either to continue unresolved and equally inclinable unto either part; or else, if to avoid neutrality, they make choice of something to aver, (and that is properly opinion) yet it is rather an inclination than an assertion, as being accompanied with fear, floating, and inconstancy.

And this indeed, although it be in itself a defect of learning, yet considering the state of man, and strict condition of perfecting the understanding by continual enquiry (man being bound in this also to recover that measure of his first fulness, which is attainable in this corrupted estate by sweat of brain, by labour and degrees, 'paulatim extundere artes,') I say, in these considerations, irresolution in judgement (so it be not universal in all conclusions, for that argues more weakness than choice of conceit; not particular, in things of

[m] Nullam unquam in disputationibus rem defendit, quam non probarit; nullam oppugnavit, quam non everterit. *Cic.* de Orat. lib. 2.—Non minoribus viribus contra justitiam dicitur disseruisse, quam pridie pro justitia dixerat. *Quint.* de Carnead. l. 12. c. 1.—*Plin.* l. 7. c. 30.

faith and salvation, which is not modesty but infidelity [n]) is both commendable and useful: commendable, because it prevents a heretical temper, which is ever peremptory [o] and pertinacious. And both argues learning and modesty in the softness of judgement, which will not suffer itself to be captivated, either to its own conceits, or unto such unforcible reasons, in which it is able to descry weakness. And this is that which Pliny commends in his friend, Titus Ariston [p], whose hesitancy and slowness of resolution in matter of learning, proceeded not from any emptiness or unfurniture, but 'ex diversitate rationum, quas acri magnoque judicio ab origine causisque primis repetit, discernit, expendit:' out of a learned cautelousness of judgement, which made him so long suspend his assent, till he had weighed the several repugnances of reasons, and by that means found out some truth whereon to settle his conceit. For (as the same Pliny [q] elsewhere out of Thucydides observes) it is rawness and deficiency of learning that makes bold and peremptory; λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει. Demurs and fearfulness of resolution, are commonly the companions of more able wits. And for the use of doubtings; first, they lessen the number of heresies, which are (as I said) always obstinate; and next, it gives occasion of farther enquiry after the truth, to those, who shall find themselves best qualified for that service. But heresy, coming under the shape of science, with shows of certainty, evidence, and resolution, (especially if the inducements be quick and subtile) doth rather settle the understanding, and possess it with false assents, than yield occasion of deeper search, unless it meet with a more piercing judgement, which can through confidence descry weakness. For questionless the errors of great men, generally honoured for their learning, when they are once wrapped up in the boldness of assertions, do either, by possessing the judgement with prejudice of the author, make it also subscribe to the error; or if a more impartial eye see insufficiency in the ground, the authority of the man frights and deters from the opposing of his conceit. Whereas, when

[n] Vid. quæ adversus Scepticos disputat Aristocles apud Euseb. de Præpar. Evang. l. 14. c. 18. [o] Ad quamcunque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delapsi, ad eam tanquam ad saxum, adhærescunt, &c. Acad. Q. l. 4. [p] *Plin.* l. 1. ep. 22. [q] Lib. 4. ep. 7.

men's assents are opposed with a modest confession of distrust and uncertainty, the understanding is incited both to enquire after the reasons of diffidence, as also to find out means for a more settled confirmation, and clearing of the truth.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Of Errors: the causes thereof: the abuse of principles, falsifying them, or transferring the truth of them out of their own bounds. Affectation of singularity and novel courses. Credulity and thraldom of judgement unto others. How antiquity is to be honoured. Affectation to particular objects corrupteth judgement. Curiosity in searching things secret.

The other main corruption of knowledge was *error*, whereby I understand a peremptory and habitual assent, firmly, and without wavering, fixed upon some falsehood under the show of truth. It is Aristotle's assertion in his Ethicks, that 'one man may conceive himself as certain of his error, as another man of his knowledge;' and this indeed is so much the more dangerous aberration from knowledge, by how much it seems most nearly to resemble it.

If we enquire after the prime fundamental cause, the gate by which error came first into the world, Siracides will tell us in a word, that "error and darkness had their beginning together with sinners:" and the reason is, because sin, being a partition-wall, and a separation of man from God, who is 'Pater Luminum,' the father and fountain of all knowledge, and whose perfection man did at first, one principal way, by knowledge resemble,—cannot choose but bring with it darkness and confusion into the soul. But I shall enquire rather after the more immediate and secondary causes; some whereof, amongst sundry others, I take to be these:

1. A first and most special one is *the abuse of principles:* for the understanding must have ever something to rest itself upon; and from the conformity of other things thereunto, to gather the certainty and evidence of its assents. For it is the nature of man's mind, since it had at first itself a beginning, to abhor all manner of infinity, à parte-ante, (I mean

in ascending and resolution) as well of sciences and conclusions, as of entities and natures, as I before noted. And therefore as the understanding is not quieted in philosophical enquiries about created things, till it have, according to their several differences, ranged them severally within the compass of some finite line, and subordinated the inferiors of every kind, 'sub uno summo genere,' under one chief; and rests not in the resolution of effects into their causes, till it come to 'aliquid primum' in time, in motion, in place, in causality, and essential dependance;—so likewise it is in knowledge and truth, notwithstanding 'à parte-post,' downward, our pursuits of them seem infinite and unlimited, by reason of our own infiniteness and æviternity that way; yet upward, in the resolving of truth into its causes and originals, the understanding is altogether impatient of proceeding 'in infinitum,' and never rests till it finds a 'non ultra,' an utmost link in the chain of any science; and such a prime, universal, unquestionable, unprovable truth, from whence all inferior collections are fundamentally raised; and this is the truth of principles: which if it be traduced and made crooked by the wrestings of any private conceit, mis-shapes all conclusions that are derived from it. For if the foundation be weak, the whole edifice totters: if the root and fountain be bitter, all the branches and streams have their proportionable corruptions.

Now the abuse of principles, is either by falsifying and casting absurd glosses upon them within their own limits; as when philosophical errors are falsely grounded upon philosophical axioms, which is 'error consequentiæ,' or 'illationis,' an error in the consequence of one from the other: or else by transferring the truth of them beyond their own bounds, into the territories (as I may so speak) of another science, making them to encroach and to uphold conclusions contrary to the nature of their subject; which is 'error dependentiæ,' or 'subordinationis,' an error in the dependance of one or the other. For the former, it hath been always either the subtilty or modesty of error, to shroud itself under truth; and, that it might make its fancies the more plausible, to fasten them upon undeniable grounds, and by a strange kind of chymistry, to extract darkness out of light. 'Fraus

sibi in parvis,' said Fabius Maximus, in Livy [a], upon another occasion: I will alter it thus, "Error sibi in parvis fidem præstruit, ut cum mercede magna fallat." [b] Unreasonable and groundless fancies always shelter themselves under a plausible pretence of truth, and ostentation of reason: as Praxiteles [c] the painter drew the picture of Venus by the face of his minion Cratina, that so, by an honourable pretext, he might procure adoration to a harlot. Thus as Plato [d] is said, when he inveighed chiefly against orators, most of all to have played the orator; (making a sword of eloquence to wound itself) so they, on the contrary, never more wrong knowledge, than when they promise to promote it most. It was the custom of that Scipio, honoured afterwards by the name of his Punic conquest, always before he set upon any business, (as Livy [e] reports of him) to enter the Capitol alone, pretending thereby a consultation with the Gods, about the justness, issue, and success of his intended designs; and then, "Apud multitudinem, pleraque, velut mente divinitus monita, agebat;" he bore the multitude in hand, that whatsoever exploits he persuaded them to attempt, had all the approbation and unerring judgement of their Deities. What were the ends of this man, whether an ambitious hope of fastening an opinion of his own divineness in the midst of the people, or a happy and politick imposture, the better to press those people (always more inclinable to the persuasion of superstition than reason) to a free execution of his designs,—it is not here necessary to enquire. Sure I am, even in matters of greatest consequence, there have never been wanting the like impostors, who boldly pretend unto truth, when they cunningly oppose it; as Jacob, in Esau's clothes, robbed Esau of the blessing; or as the ivy, which when it embraceth the oak, doth withal weaken and consume it. And this is a very preposterous and perverse method, first, to entertain corrupt conceits, and then to wrest [f] and hale principles to the

[a] *Liv.* l. 28. [b] Ex his eam impugnat, ex quibus constat. *Tert.* de Bapt. c. 2.—Vid. de Præscr. c. 36, 39. Sententias proprias communibus argumentationibus muniant: de Anim. c. 2. Inde sumentes præsidia, quo pugnant. c. 50. Omnia adversus veritatem, de ipsa veritate constructa sunt. Apol. c. 47. [c] *Clem. Alex.* in Protreptic. [d] *Cic.* Orat. l. 1. In irridendis oratoribus orator summus. [e] Liv. l. 26. Nec aliter Numa simulans sibi cum dea Egeria nocturnos congressus esse, apud eundem. l. 1.—Vide *Val. Max.* l. 1. c. 2.—*Plut.* in Numa. [f] Scripturarum esse volumus, quæ nostra

countenancing and protecting of them :—it being in the errors of the mind, as in the distempers of the palate, usual with men to find their own relish in every thing they read.

Concerning the other abuse, it is an often observation of Aristotle, that principles and conclusions must be within the sphere of the same science; and that a man of learning ought always to be faithful unto his own subject, and make no excursions from it into another science. And therefore he saith, that 'it is an equal absurdity for a mathematician (whose conclusions ought to be peremptory, and grounded on principles of infallible evidence) only to ground them on rhetorical probabilities,—as it were for a rhetorician, whose arguments should be more plausible and insinuative, to leave all unsaid that might reasonably be spoken, except it may be proved by demonstrative principles.' This leaping 'à genere ad genus,' and confounding [g] the dependencies of truth, by transferring principles unto sciences, which they belong not unto, hath been ever prejudicial to knowledge: an error hath thereby easily crept upon the weakest apprehensions, while men have examined the conclusions of one science by the principles of another. As when religion, which should subdue and captivate, is made to stoop and bow to reason; and when those assents which should be grounded upon faith, and not on mere human disquisition, shall be admitted according to the conformity which they have with nature, and no further. And hence it is, that so many of the philosophers denied those two main doctrines, of the creation and resurrection [h], (although, in some of them, the very sight of nature reacheth to the acknowledgment of the former of those) because they repugned those main principles of nature, (which are indeed naturally true, and no further) that "ex nihilo nihil fit," nothing can be made of nothing. And "à privatione ad habitum non datur

sunt. *Aug.* Vid. quæ adversus hanc curiositatis lasciviam passim occurrunt apud *Tert.* Apol. c. 46, 47.—Contra Hermog. c. 1.—De Prescr. c. 17, 38, 39, 40.—De Resurrect. c. 40.—De fug. in persec. c. 6.—De Pudic. c 26.—Simplicitatem sermonis Ecclesiastici id volunt significare, quod ipsi sentiunt. *Epiph.* ad Joan. Hieros.—*Justin. Mart.* ad Zenam.—*Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 7. p. 5. 45.—*D. Aug.* contr. Pelag. et Cœlest. l. 1. c. 46. De Gratia Christi. [g] Πάσης ταλάνης καὶ ψευδοξίας αἴτιον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακρίνειν, &c. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. 6. [h] Viderint qui Stoicum, et Platonicum, et dialecticum Christianismum protulerunt, *Tert.* de Præscr. c. 7.

egressus ;" that there is no regress from a total privation to the habit lost. And this reason was evidently implied in that answer, which was given by him, who knew the root of all error, unto the obstinate opposers of the resurrection, "Erratis, nescientes Scripturas atque potentiam Dei :" where are intimated two main principles of that mystery of the resurrection, the 'word' and the 'power of God ;' the latter commanding our assent, that it may be ; that other, our assurance that it will be. So that wherever there is an ignorance of these two, and we go about to examine this or any other mystery, rather by a disputing than an obeying reason, the immediate consequence of such peremptory and preposterous course, is error and depravation of the understanding. Pythagoras and his scholars [k], out of a strong conceit that they had of the efficacy of music, or numbers, examining all the passages of nature by the principles thereof, fell into that monstrous error, that number was the first and most essential element in the constitution of all creatures. Thus as men which see through a coloured glass, have all objects, how different soever, represented in the same colour; so they, examining all conclusions by principles forestalled for that purpose, think every thing, of what nature soever, to be died in the colour of their own conceits, and to carry some proportion unto those principles: like Antipheron, Orites, and others in Aristotle [l], who did confidently affirm every thing for real, which their imagination fancied to itself. But Tully hath prettily reprehended this abuse, in that satirical reprehension which he gives to Aristoxenus the musician, who needs, out of the principles of his art, would conceit the soul of man to consist of harmony ; "Hæc magistro concedat Aristoteli : canere ipse doceat ;" let him leave these things to Aristotle, and content himself with teaching men how to sing ;—intimating thereby the absurdity of drawing any science beyond its own bounds.

[i] *Cic.* lib. de Universo. *Plat.* in Timæo.—*Eus.* de Præpar. Evan. l. 11. c. 29.—*Theod.* Ser. 4.—*Clem. Alex.* Strom. l. 5. Quin et Resurrectionem philosophis notam (sed ex Hebræorum doctrina) affirmat *Eus.* l. 11. c. 33, 36. *Tert.* de Resurrect. Car. c. 1.—Nescio an huc etiam pertineant illa, *Sen.* Qu. l. 3. c. 20.

[k] *Plut.* de Placit. Philos. l. 1. c. 3. *Laert.* in Pyth. *Quint.* Instit. l. 10. c. 10.

[l] Lib. de Memor. et Reminisc. c. 1. Τὰ φαντάσματα ἔλεγον, ὡς γινόμενα, καὶ ὡς μνημονεύοντες.

2. Another cause of error may be *affectation of singularity*, and a disdain of being but an accession unto other men's inventions, or of tracing their steps; when men shall rather desire to walk in the ways of their own making, than in the beaten paths which have been trodden before them; to be guilty of their own invented errors, than content with a derived and imputed learning; and had rather be accounted the purchasers of heresy, than the heirs of truth: "Quasi nihil fuisset rectum, quod primum est; melius existimant quicquid est aliud;" as Quintilian spake elegantly on another occasion; as if nothing had been right which had been said before, they esteem every thing therefore better, because new.

3. Another cause may be the other extreme, (for a man may lose his way, as well by inclining too much to the right hand as to the left) I mean *a too credulous prejudice and opinion of authority*[m]; when we bow our judgements not so much to the nature of things, as to the learning of men. "Et credere, quam scire, videtur reverentius;" we rather believe, than know what we assent unto. 'Tis indeed a wrong to the labours of learned men, to read them always with a cavilling and sceptical mind; and to doubt of every thing, is to get resolution in nothing. But yet withal, our credulity must not be peremptory, but with reservation. We may not captivate and resign our judgements into another man's hand. Belief, without evidence of reason, must be only there absolute, where the authority is unquestionable; and where it is impossible to err, there only it is impious to distrust. As for men's assertions, "Quibus possibile est subesse falsum,"—what he said of friendship, "Sic ama, tanquam osurus," love with that wisdom, as to remember you may be provoked to the contrary,—is more warrantable and advantageous in knowledge; "Sic crede tanquam dissensurus," so to believe, as to be ready, when cause requires, to dissent. It is a too much straitening of a man's own understanding[n], to enthral it unto any; or to esteem the dissent from some particular authorities, presumption and self-conceit. Nor indeed is there any thing which hath bred more distempers

[m] Non tam autoritas in disputando, quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt, &c. *Cic.* de Nat. Deor. l. 1. [n] Vid. *Aug.* ep. 6. lib. de Unit. Eccles. c. 19.—Contra Crescon. Gram. l. 2. c. 32. et ep. 111.—*Cypr.* l. 2. ep. 3. ad Cæcilium.

in the body of learning, than factions and sidings; when as Seneca said of Cato, that "he would rather esteem drunkenness a virtue, than Cato vicious;" so Peripateticks and Platonists, Scotists and Thomists, and the rest (if I may adventure so to call them) of 'those learned idolaters,' in deifying the notions of mortal men, shall rather count error truth, than their great masters erroneous. But yet I would not be so understood, as if I left every man to the unbridled reins of his own fancy, or to a presumptuous dependance only on his own judgement, with contempt or neglect of others: but I consider a double estate of the learned, inchoation and progress. And though in this latter there be requisite a discerning judgement, and liberty of dissent, yet for the other, Aristotle's speech is true, "Oportet discentem credere," beginners must believe. [o] For as in the generation of man, he receiveth his first life and nourishment from one womb, and after takes only those things which are by the nurse or mother given to him; but when he is grown unto strength and years, he then receiveth nourishment, not from milk only, but from all variety of meats, and with the freedom of his own choice or delight; so in the generation of knowledge, the first knitting of the joints and members of it into one body, is best effected by the authority and learning of some able teacher; (though even of his tutors, Cato [p], being a child, was wont to require a reason) but being grown thereby to some stature and maturity, not to give it the liberty of its own judgement, were to confine it still to its nurse or cradle. I speak not this therefore to the dishonour of Aristotle, or any other, from whose learning, much of ours, as from fountains, hath been derived: antiquity is ever venerable, and justly challengeth honour, reverence, and admiration; and I shall ever acknowledge the worthy commendation which hath been given Aristotle by a learned [q] man, that "he hath almost discovered more of Nature's mysteries in the whole body of philosophy, than the whole series of ages since hath in any particular member thereof." And therefore he, and all the rest of those worthy founders of learning, do well deserve some credit, as well to their autho-

[o] Vid. *Theod.* Ser. 1. de fide et Platon. apud Euseb. l. 12. c. 1. [p] *Plut.* l. de aud. Poetis. Vid. *Sen.* ep. 64. [q] *Hook.* l. 1. sect. 6.

rity, as to their matter. But yet notwithstanding there is difference between reverence and superstition; we may assent unto them as ancients, but not as oracles[r]: they may have our minds easy and inclinable,—they may not have them captivated and fettered to their opinions. As I will not distrust all which without manifest proof they deliver, where I can not convince them of error, so likewise will I suspend my belief upon probability of their mistakes; and where I find express reason of dissenting, I will rather speak truth with my mistress Nature, than maintain an error with my master Aristotle. As there may be friendship[s], so there may honour, with diversity of opinions; nor are we bound therefore to deify men, because we reverence them. "Plura sæpe peccantur, dum demiremur, quam dum[t] offendimus;" we wrong our ancestors more by admiring than opposing them in their errors; and our opinion of them is foul, and without honour, if we think they had rather have us followers of them, than of truth.[u] And we may in this case justly answer them, as the young man, in Plutarch, did his father, when he commanded him to do an unjust thing; "I would do that which you would have me, though not that which you bid me:" for good men are ever willing to have truth preferred above them. Aristotle's[x] commendation of his middle-aged man, should be our rule of our assent to him, and all the rest of those first planters of knowledge: we ought neither to overprize all their writings by an absolute credulity, because they, being men, and subject to error, may make us thereby liable to delusion. Neither ought we to undervalue them; because being great men, and so well deserving of all posterity, they may challenge from us an easiness of assent unto their authority alone; (if it be only without, and not against reason) as Tully professed in a matter so agreeable to the nature of man's soul, as immortality: "Ut rationem nullam Plato afferret, ipsa autoritate me frangeret;" though Plato had given no reason for it, yet his authority should have swayed assent:—I say, not slavish, but with reservation, and with a purpose always to be swayed

[r] "Απαντας μὲν οὖν ἴσως τοὺς παλαιοὺς αἰδεῖσθαι μὲν δίκαιον· φρίττειν δὲ οὐκ ἄξιον. *Arist.* Orat. l. de Rhet. [s] Ἀμφοῖν ὄντοιν φίλοιν, ὅσιον πρωτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. *Arist.* Eth. l. 1. c. 4. [t] Tacit. [u] Veritas nec mea est, nec illius, aut illius. *Aug.* Conf. l. 11. c. 25. [x] *Rhet.* l. 2.

by truth, more than by the thousand years of Plato and Aristotle.

4. Another cause of error, may be *a fastening too great an affectation on some particular objects* [y], which maketh the mind conceive in them some excellencies, which Nature never bestowed on them: as if Truth were the handmaid to Passion, or, chameleon-like, could alter itself to the temper of our desires. Every thing must be unquestionable and authentical, when we have once affected it. And from this root, it is probable, did spring those various opinions about the utmost good of man's nature, (which amounted to the number of two hundred and eighty-eight, as was long ago observed by [z] Varro) which could not but be out of every particular philosopher's conceit, carrying him to the approbation of some particular object, most pleasing and satisfactory to the corruption of his own crooked nature: so that every man sought happiness, not where it was to be found, but in himself; measuring it by the rule of his own distempered and entangled judgement, whence could not possibly but issue many monstrous errors, according as the minds of men were any way transported with the false delight, either of pleasure, profit, pomp, promotion, fame, liberty, or any other worldly and sensual objects. In which particular of theirs, I observe a preposterous and unnatural course, like that of the atheist in his opinion of the soul and Deity: for whereas in Nature and right method, the determinations of the understanding concerning happiness should precede the pursuit of the will, they, on the contrary side, first love their error, and then they prove it: as the affection of an atheist leads him first to a desire and wish that there were no God, (because he conceiveth it would go far better with him in the end, than otherwise it is like to do) and then this desire allures the understanding to dictate reasons and inducements, that may persuade to the belief thereof: and so what was at first but a wish, is at last become an opinion: "Quod nimis volumus, facile credimus," we easily believe what we willingly desire. And the reason is, because every man, (though by nature he

[y] Αἱ ἀκροάσεις κατὰ τὰ ἔθη συμβαίνουσιν. *Arist.* Met. l. Immoderata est omnis susceptarum voluntatum pertinacia, &c. Vid. *Hil.* Init. l. 16. de Trinit.
[z] Vid. *Aug.* de Civ. Dei, l. 1. 9. c. 1.

love sin) yet he is altogether impatient of any check or conviction thereof, either from others or himself: and therefore be his errors never so palpable, his affections never so distempered, his mind never so depraved and averse from the rules of reason,—he will, notwithstanding, easily persuade himself to think he is in the right course; and make his judgement as absurd in defending, as his will and affections are in embracing vicious suggestions. "Vitia nostra, quia amamus, defendimus." When once our minds are, by the violence and insinuation of affection, transported into any crooked course, reason will freely resign itself to be perverted; and the discourse of the understanding will quickly be drawn to the maintaining of either. So easy it is for men to dispute, when they have once made themselves obey.

And another reason hereof is, because as in a body distempered and affected in any part, especially those vital ones, which diffuse their virtue into the whole, the weakness spreads, and overruns all the other, though remotest from it; so likewise the violent motion of partial and unruly appetites,—which do any ways miscarry by the delusion of objects, which they fasten upon,—immediately derive themselves upon the higher parts of man's soul, out of the natural harmony and consent which they desire to have amongst themselves: but especially do they labour to win over the judgement unto their side, and there-hence to get unto themselves warrant and approbation. For as where the understanding is regular, the chief dominion thereof is over-affection: (and therefore we see always, that men of the most stayed and even judgements, have the most unresisted power in the government of passions) so, on the other side, when the affections are strongly inclined to any, either enormous motion in morality, or object in nature, the first faculty whereon they strive to transfer their prejudice is the Reason: since without the assent and approbation thereof, they cannot enjoy it with such freedom from distractions and fears, as if they were warranted thereto by the sophistry and disputes thereof. Thus, as it is usual with men of deceitful palates (as before I touched) to receive in every thing they taste, the same disagreeing relish, wherewith their mouth is at that time distempered; so it is with men's minds, prepossessed with any particular fancy. "Intus existens prohibet

alienum." They cannot see it in its own proper colours, but according as their conceits are any way distempered and transported by the violence of their affection. And hence in natural philosophy sprang that opinion of Aristoxenus the musician, (which I spake of before) that the soul of man consisted in harmony, and in an apt concord, "Velut in cantu et fidibus," between the parts: and Tully intimates the reason I spake of, very prettily, "Hic ab artificio suo non recessit," this man knew not how to leave his own art. And more expressly of the same in another place, "Ita delectatus suis cantibus, ut etiam ad animum transferre conetur;" he was so affected with musick, that he transferred it upon the soul.

5. Another reason (which I conceive) of corruption of the understanding by error, is *curiosity*, and pushing it forward to the search of things, clasped up and reserved from its enquiry. It is the natural disease of mankind, to desire the knowledge of nothing more than what is least attainable. "Ita natura comparatum est" (saith Pliny) "ut proximorum incuriosi longinqua sectemur; adeo omnium rerum cupido languescit, cum facilis occasio est:" it is the vanity of man, as well in knowledge as in other things, to esteem that which is *far-fetched* (as we say) and dear bought, most precious; as if danger and rarity were the only argument of worth. The enquiry after the state of spirits and separated souls, the hierarchies of angels, and (which is more) the secret counsels of God, with other the like hidden mysteries, do so wholly possess the minds of some men, that they disappoint themselves of more profitable enquiries; and so become not only hurtful, in regard of their own vanity and fruitfulness, but also in that they hinder more wholesome and useful learnings. And yet ignorance is of so opposite a nature unto man's soul, that though it be holy, it pleaseth not; if there be but evil (the worst of all objects) unknown, the devil persuades Adam to make it by sinning, than not to know it.

But we are to remember, that in many things, our searching and bold speculations must be content with the silencing, more than satisfying reason; "Sic natura jubet, sic opus est mundo;" thus God will have it; thus Nature requires it. We owe unto Nature's works, as well our wonder as our enquiry; and, in many things, it behoves us more to magnify

than to search. There are, as in the countries of the world,—so, in the travels of men's wits, as well 'præcipitia,' as 'viæ,' as well gulfs and quicksands, as common seas. He that will be climbing too high, or sailing too far, is likely, in the end, to gain no other knowledge, but only what it is to have a shipwreck, and to suffer ruin. Man is of a mixed nature, partly heavenly, partly mortal and earthly: and therefore as to be of a creeping and wormy disposition, to crawl on the ground, to raise the soul unto no higher contemplations than base and worldly, is an argument of a degenerous nature; so to spurn and disdain these lower enquiries as unworthy our thoughts, to soar after inscrutable secrets; to unlock and break open the closet of Nature; and to measure, by our shallow apprehensions, the deep and impenetrable counsels of heaven, which we should, with a holy, fearful, and astonished ignorance only adore,—is too bold and arrogant sacrilege; and hath much of that pride in it, by which the angels fell: for "Ero similis Altissimo," I will be like the Most High, was (as is believed) the devil's first sin: "Eritis tanquam Dei," ye shall be like unto God, was, I am sure, his first temptation: justly punished, both in the author and obeyer, with darkness; in the one, with the darkness of Tophet; in the other, with the darkness of error.[a]

CHAP. XXXIX.

The Actions of the understanding, invention, wit, judgement: Of invention, distrust, prejudice, immaturity: Of tradition, by speech, writing: Of the dignities and corruption of speech.

Hitherto of the more passive operation of the understanding, which I called reception or knowledge of objects. Now follow the more active, which consist more in the action of reason, than in its apprehension; and they are the actions of invention, of wit, and of judgement. The former

[a] *Aug.* de Gen. ad lit. l. 11. c. 14.—Et lib. de Vera Relig. c. 13.—De Civ. Dei, l. 12. c. 6.—*Hier.* ep. 44. ad Anton. de Modestia, et in c. 14. Isaiæ.—*Greg.* Moral. l. 14. c. 17.—*Damasc.* de Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 4.

of these hath two principal parts; the discovering of truth; and the communicating of it. The former only is properly invention; the other a consequent thereof, tradition; but both much making to the honour of the faculty. For the former, I shall forbear any large discourse touching the particular dignities thereof, as being a thing so manifestly seen in contemplations, practices, despatches in the maintaining of societies, erecting of laws, government of life; and generally, whatsoever enterprise a man fastens upon, this one faculty it is, that hath been the mother of so many arts, so great beauty and ornament amongst men, which out of one world of things have raised another of learning.

The corruptions then (which I conceive) of this part of invention, are,

First, a despair and distrust of a man's own abilities: for as confidence and self-opinion is a main cause of error; so diffidence and fear is on the other side a wrong to Nature, in abusing those faculties which she gave for enquiry, with sloth and dulness. "Multis rebus inest magnitudo" (says Seneca) "non ex natura sua, sed ex debilitate nostra:" and so likewise, "Multis rebus inest difficultas, non ex natura sua, sed ex opinione nostra:" many things seem hard and involved, not because they are so, but because our suspicion so misconceives them. Thus as, in an affected and ill-disposed body, every light weakness is more felt than a more violent distemper, where the constitution is stronger; so with fearful and despairing wits, every enquiry is estimated, not according to the nature of the object, but according to the disopinion and slender conceit which they have of their own abilities, "Non calcant spinas, sed habent." It were but ridiculous for a blind man to complain of dark weather, when the fault is not in the air, but in the eye.

Another prejudice to this faculty, is that which I observed before on another occasion, an over-reverend opinion of those who have gone before us. For when men shall so magnify the gifts of others, that they slight and neglect their own;—when, out of a prejudicate conceit that the ancients have sufficiently perfected the body of more serious learning, they shall exercise their wits (capable of greater employments) in degenerate and unuseful studies; knowledge must needs be hindered from attaining that maturity, to which by

their own inventions it might be raised. Thus as it falls out among men of thriftless minds in their fortunes, "Divitiarum abundantia inter causas paupertatis est:" their profuseness out of their present store, with a negligence to recover and new make their estates, draws them quickly beyond their fortunes;—or, as it was in the like case amongst the Romans in those times of publick luxury, and effeminateness, the valour of their ancestors procuring unto them large wealth, and securing them from foreign hostility, did also, by the means of that wealth and ease, soften and melt their valour, so that their weakness was principally occasioned by the invincible spirit of their predecessors;—so it is in the matter of learning; when we spend our time only in the legacies that our fathers have left us, and never seek to improve it by our own inventions,—the large measure of knowledge which we receive from them, is by our preposterous use made an occasion of a large measure of ignorance in other enquiries, wherein their labours offer greater assistance than discouragement. There was not, I persuade myself, among the ancients themselves, a greater means of disclosing so large a measure of truth, than the freedom of their own opinions. For notwithstanding this liberty was often the occasion of many prodigious births, yet this disadvantage was countervailed with many fruitful and goodly issues; all which might, haply, have been undiscovered, had men laboured only in traditions, and contented themselves with learning upon trust. And those more errors, being still examined, were less pernicious than fewer believed. And even of them I make no question, but there hath been good use made by those that have enquired into truth. For, first, there are very few errors, that have not, some way or other, truth annexed unto them, which haply, might not otherwise have been observed. It is an error in that man, that shall presume of gold hid in his land, to dig and turn it up for no other end, but to find his imaginary treasure; yet that stirring and softening of the ground is a means to make it the more fertile. Lastly, this use may be made even of errors, when discovered in the enquiry after truth,—that they let us know what it is not: and it is speedier to come to a positive conclusion by a negative knowledge, than a naked ignorance:

as he is sooner likely to find out a place who knows which is not the way, than he that only knows not the way.

The last cause of disability in the invention may be immaturity and unfurniture, for want of acquainting a man's self with the body of learning: for learning is a tree or body, which, in one continued frame, brancheth itself into sundry members. So that there is not only in the object of the will, which is the good of things, but in the object of the understanding also, which is their truth, a certain mutual concatenation, whereby every part hath some reference unto the other: insomuch that, in the handling of particular sciences, there are often such occurrences, as do necessarily require an insight into other learnings. So that of Tully [a] is generally true, "Difficile est pauca esse ei nota, cui non sint aut pleraque aut omnia:" all that address themselves either to the invention of arts not known, or to the polishing of such as are already found out, must ground their endeavours on the experiments and knowledge of sundry kinds of learning.

For the other part of invention, which I call tradition, communication, or diffusion; I comprehend it within that perfection peculiar to man from all other creatures, oration, or speech: wherein I consider a double ministerial reference, the one to the eye, the other to the ear; that is 'vox scripta,' a visible voice; this, 'vox viva,' an audible voice. To which purpose Scaliger acutely, "Est quidem recitator, liber loquens: liber, recitator mutus." The dignities which this particular confers on man, and wherein it gives him a pre-eminence above other creatures, are taken from the ends or offices thereof: for the worth of every serviceable or ministerial instrument is to be gathered from the regularity of its function, whereunto it is naturally instituted.

The end whereunto living and organical speech [b] was principally ordained, is to maintain mutual society amongst men, incorporated into one body: and therefore Tully well calls it, "Humanæ societatis vinculum," the ligament and sinew, whereby the body of human conversation is compacted and knit into one.

It would be a long and large labour to speak of the honour which God hath bestowed upon our nature in this noble gift

[a] Tusc. Q. l. 12. [b] *Arist.* Polit. l. 1. c. 2.

of speech, making our tongue, ἄγγελον λόγων, as the poet[c] calleth it, the messenger of reason; and, as it were, the pen of the mind, which clotheth our conceits with characters, and makes them obvious unto others. I shall not engage myself on so great an argument, which hath already filled the volumes of so many learned men, who have written some rhetorical, others moral, institutions and precepts touching speech. I shall therefore content myself with but naming some few particulars, by consideration whereof we may acknowledge the bounty of God, and excellency of our nature, which is attended on by so noble a servant.

1. For the dignity hereof, it appears in this, that whereas, in other less considerable perfections, other creatures have an exquisiteness above man; yet, in this, man excelleth all other inferior creatures[d], in that he is able to communicate the notions of reason, clothed in sensible characters, unto others of his own kind. For though some melancholy men have believed, that elephants, and birds, and other creatures, have a language whereby they discourse with one another; yet we know, that those narrow and poor voices which Nature hath bestowed on them, proceed only from the impression of fancy, and sensitive appetite to serve themselves, but not to improve one another. And therefore speech is called λόγος, by the name of *reason*, because it attendeth only upon reason. And as, by this, the soul of man differeth in excellency from all other creatures, so in two things, amongst many others, (both subservient unto reason) doth his body excel them too: first, in the uprightness[e] of his stature, whereby he is made to look up to heaven; and from his countenance, to let shine forth the impression of that light which dwelleth within him; for the face is the window of the soul:

> " Pronaque cum spectent animalia cætera terram,
> Os homini sublime dedit; cœlumque tueri
> Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus."
>
> Whilst other creatures downward fix their sight,
> Bending to earth an earthly appetite;

[c] *Eurip.* [d] Vid. *Aug.* lib. Quæst. ex Vet. Testam. q. 3. [e] Ὀρθὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστι μόνον τῶν ζώων, διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι θείαν. *Arist.* de part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.—Vid. *Laurent.* Anatom. l. 1. c. 2, 4. *Perer.* in Gen. 2, 7. disp. de Præstantia Hum. Cor. q. 1.

To man he gave a lofty face, might look
Up to the heav'n; and, in that spacious book,
So full of shining characters, descry
Why he was made, and whither he should fly.

Next, in the faculty of speech [f], which is the gate of the soul, through which she passeth, and the interpreters of the conceits of cogitations of the mind, as the philosopher speaks: the uses whereof are to convey and communicate the conceptions of the mind, (and by that means to preserve human society) to derive knowledge, and to maintain mutual love and supplies, to multiply our delights, to mitigate and unload our sorrows; but above all, to honour God, and to edify one another; in which respect our tongue is called 'our glory.' (*Psalm* xvi. 2. *Acts* ii. 26.)

The force and power of speech [g] upon the minds of men, is almost beyond its power to express, how suddenly it can inflame, excite, allay, comfort, mollify, transport, and carry captive the affections of men. Cæsar, with one word, quiets the commotion of an army; Menenius Agrippa, with one apologue, the sedition of a people; Flavianus, the bishop of Antioch, with one oration, the fury of an emperor; Anaximenes, with one artifice, the indignation of Alexander; Abigail, with one supplication, the revenge of David; Pericles and Pisistratus, even then when they spake against the people's liberty, overruled them by their eloquence to believe and embrace what they spake, and by their tongue effected that willingly, which their sword could hardly have extorted. Pericles and Nicias are said to have still pursued the same ends, and yet with clear different success; the one in advancing the same business, pleased; the other exasperated the people, and that upon no other reason but this, the one had the art of persuasion, which the other wanted.

Ἀγλωσσία δὲ πολλάκις ληφθεὶς ἀνὴρ
Δίκαια λέξας, ἧσσον εὐγλώσσου φέρει.—

[f] *Quint.* Instit. l. 2. c. 16. *Cæl. Rhodig.* l. 16. c. 13. Σύμβολα τῶν παθημάτων. *Arist.* de Inter. c. 1.—*Greg. Nyss.* de Hom. Opificio, cap. 9. [g] Πειθὼ τύραννος ἀνθρώποις μόνον. *Euripid.* Hec.—*Sueton.* in Cæs. cap. 73.—*Luc.* l. 1.—Πολλά τοι σμικροὶ λόγοι Ἔσφηλαν ἤδη, καὶ κατώρθωσαν βροτούς. *Sophoc.* Elec. 418. *Chrysost.* Ἀνδριάντων κ. Vid. *Causin.* de Eloq. l. 1. c. 4.—*Val. Max.* l. 8. c. 9. *Plut.* de Præc. Gerend. Reip.

Νῦνδ' εὐρόοισι στόμασι τἀληθέστατα
Κλέπτουσιν, ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν ἃ χρὴ δοκεῖν.

One spake the right with a slow tongue,
Another fluently spake wrong;
He lost, this stole, the cause; and got
To make you think, what you think not.

And this power of speech over the minds of men, is, by the poet[h], in that known passage of his, thus elegantly described,

——" Magno in populo cum sæpe coorta est
Seditio, sævitque animis ignobile vulgus,
Jamque faces et saxa volant; furor arma ministrat;—
Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si fortè virum quem
Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus astant:
Ille regit dictis animos, et pectora mulcet."

When in the multitude seditions grow,
And ulcerated minds do overflow
With swelling ire; when stones and firebrands fly,
(As rage doth ev'ry where weapons supply)
Then if some aged man, in honour held
For piety and prudence, stand to wield
And moderate this tumult; straightways all
Rise up with silent rev'rence, and let fall
Their angry clamours: his grave words do sway
Their minds, and all their discontents allay.

The virtues[i] of speech (whereby it worketh with such force upon the mind) are many, which therefore I will but name: some *grammatical*, as property, and fitness, and congruity, without solecisms and barbarousness; some *rhetorical*, as choice, purity, brevity, perspicuity, gravity, pleasantness, vigour, moderate acrimony and vehemency; some *logical*, as method, order, distribution, demonstration, invention, definition, argumentation, refutation. A right digesting of all the aids of speech; as wit, learning, proverbs, apologues, emblems, histories, laws, causes and effects, and all the heads or places which assist us in invention. Some *moral*, as gravity, truth, seriousness, integrity, authority. When words receive weight from manners, and a man's

[h] *Virg.* Æneid. 1. [i] Vid. *Voss.* Orat. Institut. l. 4.—*Causin.* de Eloq. l. 2. *Quint.* l. 1. c. 5. et passim alibi. Σαφήνεια, συντομία, πρέπον, κατασκευή. *Laert.* in Zen. l. 7.

speech is better believed for his life than for his learning: when it appears[k], that they arise 'e sulco pectoris,' and have their foundation in virtue, and not in fancy. For as a man receiveth the self-same wine with pleasure in a pure and clean vessel, which he loathes to put into his mouth from one that is foul and soiled; so the self-same speech, adorned with the piety of one man, and disgraced with the pravity of another, will be very apt accordingly to be received, either with delight or loathing.

——Λόγος γὰρ ἔκ τ' ἀδοξούντων ἰὼν,
Κἀκ τῶν δοκούντων, αὐτὸς οὐ ταυτὸν σθένει.

A speech from base men, and men of respect,
Though 't be the same, works not the same effect.[l]

And therefore the Spartan[m] princes, when they heard from a man of a disallowed and suspected life and opinion what they approved, they required another man of reputation to propose it; that the prejudice of the person might not procure a rejection of his judgement. For we are apt to nauseate at very good meat, when we know that an ill cook did dress it. And therefore it is a very true character which Tully and Quintilian[n] give of a right orator, that he must be "vir bonus, dicendi peritus," as well a good man as a good speaker: otherwise, though he may speak with admirable wit, to the fancy of his hearers, he will have but little power over their affections. Like a fire made of green wood, which is fed with it as it is fuel, but quenched as it is green.

Lastly, some are *civil*, in causes deliberative or judicial; as wisdom, pertinency and fitness to the nature and exigence of the end or matter whereupon we speak. For, in that case, we are apt to ponder and measure what we say, by the end whereunto we say it, and so to fit it to all the circumstances[o] incident thereunto. Paul, amongst the philosophers, disputed with them from the inscription of their altar, from the authority of their poets, and from confessed maxims of reason;—by these degrees convincing them of idolatry, and leading them to repentance: but amongst the

[k] Vid. *A. Gell.* l. 1. c. 15. Aud. P.—*A. Gell.* l. 16. c. 13.
[l] *Eurip.* Hecub. 295.
[m] *Plut.* l. de
[n] *Quint.* l. 12. c. 1.
[o] Οὐ πρὸς ἰατροῦ σοφοῦ Θροεῖν ἐπῳδὰς πρὸς τομῶντι πήματι, *Soph.* Ajax. 582.

Jews, he disputed out of scripture. With Felix, that looked for money, he disputed of righteousness and judgement to come; but amongst the Pharisees and Sadducees, of the resurrection, that a dissension amongst themselves might procure a party for him. It is not wisdom for a man in misery, to speak with a high style [p], or a man in dignity with a creeping. The same speech may be excellent in an umbratile exercitation, which would be too pedantical, and smelling of the lamp, in a matter of serious and weighty debate: and that may be dainty meat, in one place, for the fancy, which, in another, would be too thin for the conscience. Nature hath guarded and compassed in the tongue with the lips, like a folding gate,—and with the teeth [q], like a double hedge,—that we might be admonished to weigh and ponder our words, before we produce them.

These are the principal virtues. And in opposition unto these, we may easily collect the principal corruptions of this faculty, which I will content myself with but naming.

The vices in grammar are solecisms, barbarisms, obsoleteness, impropriety, incongruity of speech. In rhetorick, sordidness, tediousness, obscurity, flatness of conceit, arguteness, and 'minutiæ,' gaudiness, wordiness, and empty ostentation: In morals, the vices may be comprised under these two generals, "multiloquium," and "turpiloquium," garrulous [r] and rotten cummunion. Lastly, in civil respects, levity, and impertinency; like the advices of Thersites, Ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε, many, and to little purpose.

But besides all these, there is one thing which seemeth to be the most proper corrupter of this ornament of speech, and that is a *lie*. For as every thing is then most regular, when it retains the purity of its first office and institution; so, on the other side, it is most depraved, when it deviates from that service, whereunto it was principally ordained. Thus a picture, though it be never so much in the frame abused, cracked, spotted, or made any other way unvalu-

[p] Μηδὲν μέγ' εἴπῃς· οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἵν' εἶ κακοῦ; *Soph.* Aj. 387. [q] Petulantiæ verborum coercendæ vallum esse oppositum dentium, &c. *A. Gell.* l. 1. c. 15.

[r] Vid. *Plut.* de Garrul. et *Theophrast. Clem. Alex.* Pædag. l. 2. c. 7.—*Stuck.* Conviv. l. 4. c. 17. et 19.—*Cœl. Rhod.* l. 7. c. 26. De Turpiloquio.--*Clem. Alex.* Pædag. l. 2. c. 9. Ejus species quam plurimæ extra institutum nostrum: ut blasphemia, perjuria, maledicta, scommata, dicteria, obscœnitates, &c.

able; yet if the resemblance which it bears, be express and lively, we still call it a true picture: whereas if that be a false and deceitful resemblance (be all other adventitious ornaments never so exquisite) we still account it false and corrupt:—so it is with the speech of man, which though of never so great weakness and insufficiency in other respects, yet if it retain that one property of shaping itself to the conceits of the mind, and make level and proportionable the words with the thoughts, it may still be said to be (though not good), yet, in some respect, a regular speech,—in that it is conformable to the first institution. But be all other excellencies never so great, yet if it be a false image of our intentions, Nature is diverted from her prime end, and the faculty quite depraved, as forsaking its original office. And indeed, other moral duties of the tongue do necessarily presuppose this adequation and conformity to the thoughts, which I spake of; without which, they are but hypocrisy, and come within the compass of the noted corruption, a lie; for every hypocrite is a liar. I confess there are sins of speech greater than a lie, in the intension and degrees of their own guilt: but herein is the difference, the tongue may in it (whether morally or religiously considered) bear a double irregularity, wherein it differs from other powers.

First, it may be unconformable to the law of right reason, as in all manner of vicious and unsavoury speeches. And the corruption which hereby it incurs, is common to it with other faculties: as the disproportion between evil thoughts, and reason dictating the contrary, worketh corruption in the thoughts.

And then, secondly, it may be disproportioned to the conceits of the mind, in proposing them otherwise than they are inwardly meant, and this is properly a lie; which I therefore call the principal corruption of speech, not (as I said) because I conceive in it a greater measure of heinousness and guilt than in any other speeches, (because all guilt follows the inconformity and remotion from the law of God and reason; and therein other speeches, as blasphemy and sedition, may have a greater measure of wickedness) but because, in a lie, I find both the forenamed irregularities; it being a speech not only uneven to the conceits of the mind, but repugnant also to the will of God, and the law of Nature.

The next kind of active operations were those of *wit*; the use whereof is so much the more excellent, by how much the wrestings and abuse of it is the more dangerous. I shall sufficiently declare the worth of it, by showing what it is: for I take not wit in that common acceptation, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of conceit, whether in style or conference, which, like rotten wood in the dark, have more shine than substance; whose use and ornament are like themselves, swift and vanishing, at once both admired and forgotten. But I understand a settled, constant, and habitual sufficiency of the understanding, whereby it is enabled in any kind of learning, theory or practice, both to sharpness in search, subtilty in expression, and despatch in execution. As for that other kind seen in panegyricks, declamatory discourses, epigrams, and other the like sudden issues of the brain, they are feats only, and sleights, not duties and ministeries of the wit, which serve rather for ostentation and use; and are only the remission of the mind, and unbending of the thoughts for more severe knowledge: as walking for recreation is rather exercise than travel, although, by the violence of the motion, or length of the way, there may ensue sweat and weariness.

Now for the corrupters of the wit, though there be divers, yet none so immediate and certain as itself, if alone. For wit, though it be swift, yet it is often blind; and therefore the faster it hastens in error, the more dangerous it is to itself. And hence it is, that as learning was never more bound to any than those men, who have been eminent in this faculty, if they swayed it by moderation and prudence; so none have been more pernicious and violent oppugners of truth, than men best furnished with acuteness, when they turned the use of it to the strengthening of their own fancies, and not submitted it to judgement and examination. As the fattest soils in Greece caused the greatest troubles, and the beauty of Helena the ruin of Troy. Wit, like wine, is a good remedy against the poison of the mind; but being itself poisoned, it doth kill the sooner. There ought to be, for the right disposition of our inventions, a mutual reference and service between wit and judgement. It is a vexation of mind, to discern what is right and profitable, and have no enablement to attain it; and that is judgement

without wit. And to have a felicity of compassing an end, and a working and restless fancy, without direction to fasten it on a fit object,—is the only course to multiply error, and to be still in motion, not as in a path, but as in a maze or circle, where is continual toil, without any proficience or gain of way; and this is wit without judgement. They ought therefore, I say, to be mutual coadjutors each to other. Wit is the spur to stir up and quicken the understanding; and judgement is the bridle to sway and moderate wit. Wit is the hand and foot for execution and motion; but judgment is the eye for examination and direction. Lastly, wit is the sail and oar to further the progress in an enquiry; but judgement is the ballast to poise, and the steer to guide the course to its intended end.

Now the manner of the judgement's operation in directing, either our practice or contemplation, is by a discourse of the mind, whereby it reduceth them to certain grounds and principles, whereunto they ought chiefly to be conformable. And from hence is that reason which Quintilian observes, why shallow and floating wits seem oftentimes more fluent, than men of greater sufficiency: For, saith he, those other admit of every sudden flash or conceit, without any examination; but 'apud sapientes est electio et modus;' they first weigh things before they utter them.

The main corruption of judgement in this office, is prejudice and prepossession. The duty of judgement is to discern between obliquities and right actions, and to reduce all to the law of reason. And therefore it is true in this, as in the course of public judgements,—that respect of persons or things, blinds the eyes, and maketh the understanding to determine according to affection, and not according to truth: though indeed some passions there are, which rather hoodwink than distemper or hurt the judgement; so that the false determination thereof cannot be well called a mistake, but a lie: of which kind, flattery is the principal, when the affections of hope and fear debase a man, and cause him to dissemble his own opinion.

CHAP. XL.

Of the actions of the understanding upon the will, with respect to the end and means. The power of the understanding over the will, not commanding, but directing the object of the will to be good and convenient. Corrupt will looks only at good present. Two acts of the understanding, knowledge and consideration. It must also be possible, and with respect to happiness immortal. Ignorance and weakness in the understanding, in proposing the right means to the last end.

HITHERTO of the actions of the understanding, "ad extra," in regard of an object. Those "ad intra," in regard of the will, wherein the understanding is a minister or counsellor to it, are either to furnish it with an end, whereon to fasten its desires; or to direct it in the means conducible to that end. For the will alone is a blind faculty; and therefore as it cannot see the right good it ought to affect, without the assistance of an informing power,—so neither can it see the right way it ought to take for procuring that good, without the direction of a conducting power. As it hath not judgement to discover an end, so neither hath it discourse to judge of the right means, whereby that may be attained. So that all the acts of the will necessarily presuppose some precedent guiding acts in the understanding, whereby they are proportioned to the rules of right reason. This operation of the understanding is usually by the school-men called "Imperium," or "Mandatum," a mandate, or command; because it is a precept, to which the will ought to be obedient. For the rules of living and doing well are the statutes (as it were) and dictates of right reason. But yet it may not hence be concluded, that the understanding hath any superiority, in regard of dominion, over the will, though it have priority in regard of operation. The power of the understanding over the will, is only a regulating and directing; it is no constraining or compulsive power. For the will always is "Domina suorum actuum," the mistress of her own operations: for, "Intellectus non imperat, sed solum-

modo significat voluntatem imperantis:" it doth only intimate unto the will the pleasure and law of God; some seeds whereof remain in the nature of man. The precepts then of right reason are not therefore commands, because they are proposed by way of mandate: but therefore they are in that manner proposed, because they are by reason apprehended to be the commands of a divine superior power; and therefore in the breach of any such dictates, we are not said properly to offend our understanding, but to sin against our law-giver. As in civil policy, the offences of men are not against inferior officers, but against the sovereign power, which is the fountain of law, and under whose authority all subordinate magistrates have their proportion of government. Besides, "Ejus est imperare, cujus est punire." For law and punishment being relatives, and mutually connotating each the other,—it must necessarily follow, that from that power only can be an imposition of law, from which may be an infliction of punishment.

Now the conditions, under which the understanding is both to apprehend and propose any, either end or means convenient to the nature of the will, and of sufficiency to move it, are, that they have in them goodness, possibility, and in the end (if we speak of an utmost one) immortality too. Every true object of any power, is that which bears such a perfect relation of convenience and fitness thereunto, that it is able to accomplish all its desires. Now since "malum" is "destructivum," all evil is destructive; it is impossible that, by itself, without a counterfeit and adulterate face, should ever have any attractive power over the desires of the will. And on the other side, since "Omne bonum" is "perfectivum," since good is perfective, and apt to bring real satisfaction along with it, most certainly would it be desired by the will, were it not, that our understandings are clouded and carried away with some crooked misapprehensions, and the will itself corrupted in its own inclinations.

But yet though all men's faculties are so depraved, that he is not able, as he ought, to will any divine and perfect good; yet so much he retains of his perfection, as that he cannot possibly desire any thing, which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable and destructive to its nature; since

all natural agents aim still at their own perfection. And therefore impossible it is, that either good should be refused without any apprehension of disconvenience, or evil pursued without any appearance of congruity or satisfaction. That it may appear therefore how the understanding doth always propose those objects, as good to the will, which are notwithstanding not only in their own nature, but in the apprehension of the understanding itself, known to be evil;—and on the contrary, why it doth propose good objects, contrary to its own knowledge, as evil;—we may distinguish two opposite conditions in good and evil: for first, all evil of sin, though it have disconvenience to man's nature, as it is destructive; yet on the other side it hath agreement thereunto, as it is crooked and corrupt: as continual drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an hydropick body, though most disconvenient to its present welfare. Now then, as no man, possessed with that disease, desires drink for this end, because he would die, though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his death, but only to give satisfaction to his present appetite; so neither doth man follow exorbitant and crooked courses, only that he may thereby come to destruction, (though he is not ignorant of that issue) but only to give way to the propension of his depraved nature. In the same manner likewise goodness, though it have the most absolute convenience to man, as it is perfective, and in respect of his final advancement thereby; yet it hath as great a disconvenience towards man's corrupt faculties, as it is a straight rule to square them by, and in respect of its rectitude. As light, though it be, in its own property, the perfection of the eye, yet to distempered eyes it works more trouble than delight; because, as in philosophy, "Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis;" so, "Quicquid appetitur, appetitur ad modum appetentis." So that if the appetite itself be, by inherent pollution, depraved and evil,—it cannot but desire every thing, that bears proportion and conformity[a] to its own distemper. And this I take to be the main reason, why men, of corrupt and irregular desires, oftentimes fasten delight on those objects which they know

[a] Ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ. *Arist.* Eth. l. 3. c. 7.

to be evil, and are quite averse from those, which yet they assent unto as good.

To which I may add another, namely, the resolution of a corrupt will, to yield unto itself all present satisfaction, and not suffer itself to be swayed with the pre-occupation of a future estate: insomuch that the small content which man's nature receiveth from the actual fruition of some instant conceited good, prevails more to draw on appetite, than the fearful expectation of ensuing misery can to deter from it. And the present irksomeness of pious duties hath more power to divert the corrupt mind from them, than the fore-conceit of eternal bliss can have to allure the mind unto a delight in them. Hence then it appears, what I understand by that first condition, wherewith reason is to propose any end or means to the will, that it may be desired; namely, "sub ratione boni," under the condition of good, not always true and moral, but it is sometimes so apprehended by a depraved understanding, "sub conceptu convenientiæ," as it bears conformity to the present crooked estate of man's will: a depraved understanding, I say, and not always properly and precisely a darkened understanding; depraved by neglect and inconsiderateness, not darkened by ignorance and blindness. For there may be an irregular will, with a judgement rightly informed by truth; otherwise there could not be any offence of presumption and knowledge. We are therefore to consider, that there is in a well-stayed reason, a double act in the directing of the will; the one respecteth the nature and quality of the object, the other more peculiarly the circumstance of time; the one is properly knowledge,—the other circumspection, arising out of meditation, and more close pressing of the object, which is known as good to the will, against insinuations of sensitive desires, which aim only at the fruition of pleasure present. First, the understanding proposeth to the will felicity, as an absolute and eternal good, which cannot but be desired. Next, it proposeth means for the attaining of it; namely, the practice of those precepts, which are revealed unto us, as necessary for purchasing the end desired. The will, being, besides its corruption, transported by the sensitive appetite, finds great irksomeness in those means; a restraint of all those present joys, delights, satisfactions, which it constantly pursues: it

perceiveth that great trouble is to be expected,—many prejudices and difficulties to be grappled with, a severe hand to be held over passions,—a narrow restraint to be observed towards mutinous and rebellious eruptions of the mind, fewer enablements for advancing our fortunes, and infinite other the like bars of present contentment, which withdraw the will, and make it renounce courses so severe and disagreeble to the liberty it desires. Hereupon comes the second act of understanding, efficacy and weight of consideration, whereby it compares the circumstances of that difficulty of good to the will, in regard of the small time they shall continue, with the consequent and unspeakable good, that will in the end ensue therefrom,—and also with the insufferable torments that follow the vileness of present pleasures: whence the will is made more inclinable (by the assistance of greater power than its own) to go along rather through thorns with virtue, than, with adulterate and painted pleasure, to dance towards ruin.

Now of these two, the defect of the former, works, properly, a blinded understanding: but the defect of the latter, namely, an insufficiency and inefficacy of pondering the circumstances, and pressing the endless consequence of good or evil, works properly a depraved understanding, in regard of practical or applicative direction. As a man, walking in some deep contemplation by a ditch, though his eyes be open to see a present danger before him, yet may haply fall into it, not out of blindness, but out of inconsiderateness, as not fixing his own conceit thereon, but being wholly possessed with other thoughts;—in like manner, the understanding, being taken up by the imposture of these affections, with the conceit of present good, or present ill in any object, and thereby being diverted from a serious enquiry after the true rectitude and obliquity thereof, suffers the will fearfully to plunge itself in danger and misery.

Another condition, under which an end or means is to be proposed by the will, is "sub ratione possibilis," as a good possible. For if once the understanding discover impossibility in any object, the will cannot fasten any desire upon it; since all appetite is only terminated by that, which can replenish and satiate the power. Now all satisfaction is by fruition: all fruition necessarily presupposeth a possibility

of acquiring; so that where this is taken away, the will is left hopeless, and therefore desireless. And therefore we see, that the nearer any thing comes to impossibility, the more adverse is the will of most men from it; as is plain in those things that are perplexed and difficult to attain. And if here the wish of him in the poet be objected,

> " O mihi præteritos referat si Jupiter annos,"
>
> O that Jove would to me restore
> The years that I have liv'd before;

it may be answered, that this was a wish only, and not a will; since that which a man willeth, he doth really endeavour to obtain.

The last condition (which is restrained only to the utmost end of man's desire) is, that it be proposed " sub ratione immortalis," as an immortal good. The endlessness of happiness is that only, which maketh it a perfect end. For the mind of man naturally is carried to an immortality of being, and therefore also consequently to an immortality of happiness; it being a necessary desire of all natural agents, to attain a perfection proportionate to the measure of their continuance. So then, man's end must not be only good, but for ever good, totally and eternally; not only a fulness of joy in the nature of it, but a fulness of perpetuity in the continuance;—most perfect in proportion to the spirituality, most infinite in proportion to the immortality, of man's soul. The frailty and languishing of any good, and a foresight of the loss thereof, with the ablest minds, doth much weaken the desire of it; and the reason is, because providence and forecast is a certain companion of the human nature; and he which is most a man, is most careful to contrive the advancement of his future estate. It is bestial, to fasten only upon present good; this being a main difference between the understanding and the sensual appetite, that this respecteth only the present joy that is at hand; but that being secretly conscious of its own immortality, fastens itself upon the remotest times; yea, outruns all time, and suffers itself to be ever swallowed up with the meditation and providence of an endless happiness. And therefore the reason that [b] Aristotle

[b] Eth. l. 1.

brings against his master's ideas, argues an understanding less divine in this particular, than Plato's was, when he saith, "That eternity doth no more perfect the nature of good, than continuance doth the nature of white." For though it be true, that it is not any essential part of goodness in itself, yet it is a necessary and principal condition to make goodness happiness, that is an adequate object to man's desires. There is not, then, the same proportion between eternity and good, as there is between continuance and white: for continuance is altogether extrinsecal and irrelative in respect of white; but the happiness of man hath an intrinsecal connection with immortality: because man's utmost and adequate good must be proportioned to the nature of his mind: (for that is no perfect good, that doth not every way replenish, and leave nothing behind it that may be desired) so that man himself being endless, can have no end able to limit his desires, but an infinite and immortal good, which he may enjoy without any anxiety for after-provision. I dare say, there is not an atheist in the world, who hath in his life bebeasted himself, by setting his desires only on transitory and perishable goods, that would not, on his death-bed, count it the best bargain he ever made, to change souls with one of those, whose diligence in providing for a future happiness, he hath often, in his beastly sensuality, impiously derided.

Now of these two directions of the understanding to the will, in desiring the end or means, the corruption is, for the most part, more gross and palpable in assistance to the means, than in discovery of the end; and far oftener fails the will herein, than in proposing an object to fix its desires upon. For we may continually observe, how a world of men agree all, in opinions and wishes, about the same supreme and immortal happiness, the Beatifical Vision. Every Balaam fastens on that; and yet their means unto it are so jarring and opposite, that a looker-on would conceive it impossible, that there should be any agreement in an end, where there is such notable discord in the ways to it. The reason which I conceive of this difference, is, the several proportion which the true end and the true means thereunto bear unto the will of man. For it is observable, that there is but one general hindrance or error about the right end, namely, the ignorance thereof. For being once truly delivered to the

understanding, it carries such a proportion to the nature of the will (being a most perfect fulfilling of all its wishes) that it is impossible not to desire it: but the disproportion between men, and the right means of a true end, is far greater. For there is not only error in the speculation of them, but reluctance in other practick faculties, proceeding from their general corruption in this estate, and nailing the affection on the present delight of sensual objects. First, for the understanding, I observe therein a double hindrance concerning these means, *ignorance*, and *weakness*; the[c] one respects the examination of them; the other, their presentation or enforcement upon the will. For the former of these, there seems to be an equal difficulty between the end and the means, as proceeding, in both, from the same root. But in this very convenience there is a great difference; for the ignorance of the end is far more preventable (considering the helps we have to know it) than of the means. Not but that there are as powerful directions for the knowledge of the means, as of the end; but because they are, in their number, many, and, in their nature, repugnant to man's corrupt mind; there is therefore more weariness, and, by consequence, more difficulty in the enquiry after them, than after the end, because that is in itself but one; and besides, bears with it (under the general notion of happiness such an absolute conformity to man's nature, as admits of no refusal or opposition: insomuch that many that know heaven to be the end of their desires, know yet scarce one foot of the way thither.

Now besides this ignorance, when the knowledge of the means is gotten, there are many prejudices to be expected before a free exercise of them. For (as Aristotle observes) amongst all the conditions required to a moral practice, knowledge hath the least sway; it hath the lowest place in virtue, though the highest in learning.

There is, secondly, in the understanding, *weakness*, whereby it oftentimes connives at the irregular motion of the will, and withdraws it from examining, with a piercing and fixed eye, with an impartial and bribeless judgement, with efficacy and weight of meditation, the several passages of all our actions, with all the present and consequent inconveniences

[c] Ignorantia et Difficultas. *Aug.*

of crooked courses. It were a vast labour to run over all the oppositions, which virtuous means, leading to a happy end, do always find in the several faculties of man; how the will itself is stubborn and froward; the passions rebellious, and impatient of suppression; the senses and sensitive appetite thwart and wayward, creeping always, like those under-celestial orbs, into another motion, quite contrary to that which the "primum mobile," illightened reason, should confer upon them. Sufficient it is, that there is a disproportion between the means of happiness, and the general nature of corrupt man. For all goodness is generally adjoined with rectitude and straightness, in that it is a rule to direct our life: and therefore a good man is called an 'upright' man, one that is every where 'even and straight.' To which Aristotle perhaps had an eye, when he called his happy man "a four-square man," which is every where smooth, stable, and like himself. But now on the other side, man's nature in this state of corruption, is a distorted and crooked nature; and therefore altogether unconformable to the goodness, which should, as a cannon, direct it to the true and principal end it aimeth at. And this is the reason, why so many men are impatient of the close and narrow passage of honesty. For crooked and reeling movers necessarily require more liberty of way, more broad courses to exercise themselves in: as we see in natural bodies, a crooked thing will not be held within so narrow bounds, as that which is straight.

CHAP. XLI.

Of the conscience; its offices of direction, conviction, comfort, watchfulness, memory, impartiality. Of conscience, ignorant, superstitious, licentious, sleeping, frightful, tempestuous.

There remains yet one higher and diviner act of the practical understanding, of most absolute power in man, and that is *conscience;* which is not any distinct faculty of the soul, but only a compounded act of reason, consisting in argumentation; or a practick syllogism, inferring always some applicative and personal conclusion, accusing or excusing.

The dignities whereof are to be gathered from the offices of it, and from the properties of it.

The main offices are three, *direction*, *conviction*, *consolation*; whereof the two last always presuppose the first, with a contrary qualification of breach and observance.

The *direction* of conscience consists in a simple discourse, or (as I may so speak) in a direct way of understanding, gathering moral or divine conclusions from a presupposed habit of principles, either from the relicks of our original knowledge naturally impressed, or by concurrence of religion and theological precepts, spiritually inspired into the practick judgement or hearts of men. The observance of which conclusions it imposeth upon all executive powers, which each particular conclusion doth most immediately concern, upon pain of hazarding our own inward peace, with that sweet repose and security of mind which follows it; and also (as the heathens themselves have observed) upon fear of incurring the displeasure of that God, concerning whom, the very light of Nature hath revealed thus much, that as his penetrating and searching eye is able to read our most retired thoughts; so his impartial and most unpreventable justice hath thunder and fire in store for the rebellious against this faculty, which he hath made to be, as it were, his officer and herald in all men's hearts.

The two latter of those offices consist in a reflection of that former discourse upon men's actions; and according as is discovered in them, either an observance or neglect of those imposed duties, the heat of that reflection is either comfortable or scorching. Now of these two, that of *conviction* is nothing else but a performance of that equivocal killing promise, made by the serpent unto our seduced parents; I mean, an opening of their eyes, to know with desperate sorrow the good they had irrecoverably foregone; and with fear, shame, and horror, the evil which they plunged themselves and their whole posterity into. This one act it is, which hath so often confuted that opinion of Aristotle, touching death, "That it is of all things most terrible," in that it hath pursued many so far, as that it hath forced them to leap out of themselves, and to prefer the terror of death, and darkness of the grave, before the grisly face of a convicting conscience.

The chief dignity hereof consisteth in *consolation*, whereby

it diffuseth into the whole man, from a secret assurance of divine favour, (for nothing can thoroughly calm the conscience but that) a sweet tranquillity, silent peace, settled stayedness, and, which is highest of all, a ravishing contemplation, and (as it were) pre-fruition of bliss and immortality.

The properties of the conscience (whereby I understand the ministeries, which it never fails to execute in man) are, as I conceive, principally three, *watchfulness*, *memory*, *impartiality*. It keeps always sentinel in a man's soul; and, like a register, records all our good and ill actions. Though the darkness of the night may hide us from others, and the darkness of the mind seem to hide us from ourselves; yet still hath conscience an eye to look in secret on whatsoever we do, whether in regard of ignorance or hardness. Though in many men it sleep in regard of motion, yet it never sleeps in regard of observation and notice: it may be hard and seared, it can never be blind. That writing in it which seems invisible and illegible, like letters written with the juice of lemon, when it is brought to the fire of God's judgements, will be most clear. And for the next, (if we observe it) there is nothing so much fastened in the memory, as that which conscience writes: all her censures are written with indelible characters, never to be blotted out. All or most of our knowledge forsakes us in our death; wit, acuteness, variety of language, habits of sciences; our arts, policies, inventions, all have their period and fate: only those things which conscience imprinteth, shall be so far from finding any thing in death to obliterate and raze them out, that they shall be thereby much more manifest, whether they be impressions of peace or horror. The testimonies of comfort (if true) are fastened in the heart with such a hand, as will never suffer them finally to be taken out: and if they be accusatory and condemning, the heart is so hard, and they so deep, that there is no way to get them out, but by breaking or melting the table they are written in: that only course can be taken to make conscience forget.

Then, thirdly, it is a most bribeless worker; it never knows how to make a false report of any of our ways. It is (if I may so speak) God's historian, that writes not annals, but journals; the words, deeds, cogitations of hours and mo-

ments. Never was there so absolute a compiler of lives as conscience. It never comes with any prejudice or acceptation of persons, but dares speak true as well of a monarch, as of a slave, Nero the Emperor shall feel as great a fire burning in his breast, as he dare wrap the poor Christians in, to light him to his lust. There is scarce one part in man but may be seduced, save his conscience. Sense oftentimes conceives things which are not: appetite and imagination can transport the will, and themselves both may be drawn by persuasion contrary to their own propensions: this only deals faithfully with him, whose witness it is, though it be to the confusion of itself, and him in whom it lodgeth. It may, I know, err sometimes, and mistake; but it can never by any insinuation be bribed to contradict its own judgement, and register white for black.

The corruption of conscience arises principally from two extremes; the one occasioned by ignorance, the other by sin:—for I oppose these two here, as concurring to the corruption of conscience after a different manner. The one is, when the want of due knowledge draws the conscience to sinister determinations, either in practice or forbearance: the other, when evil habits and actions defile the conscience. Now both these contain under them sundry degrees of corruption.

From ignorance, first comes a fettered and restrained conscience; fearfully binding itself to some particular acts, without sufficient grounds. Next, a licentious and indulging conscience; giving freedom to itself in such courses, as whereunto it hath no warrant upon unacquainting itself from either.

Then from the other root there comes, first, a dead, secure, and sleeping conscience, by common and accustomary sin. A pale, sweating, and affrighted conscience, by atheistical and unnatural sins.

> ———" Tum frigida mens est
> Criminibus; tacita sudant præcordia culpa."
>
> The guilt, which from unseen pollution springs,
> Cold sweating horror on their bosom brings.

A desperate, tempestuous, and ravening conscience, from blasphemous and open sins. Not but that any of these may

come from any sin; but that the quality of some sins doth, for the most part, carry with it some particular dispositions and kinds of a distempered conscience. But because all these, as also this whole discourse, pertains to a higher science, I shall here forbear to speak more of it.

CHAP. XLII.

Of the will; its appetite, with the proper and chief objects thereof, good. Of superstition and idolatry. Of its liberty in the electing of means to an end. Of its dominion coactive and persuasive. Of fate, astrology, satanical suggestions. Of the manner of the will's operation. Motives to it. Acts of it. The conclusion.

I PROCEED to the last faculty of man's soul, his *will*, which doth alone govern, moderate, and overrule all his actions. The dignity whereof consisteth in three peculiar perfections; appetite, liberty, domination. The former respecteth an end; the two latter, the means thereunto conducing. The desires are fixed on some good [a], thoroughly proportionate to the wideness of the heart: then the liberty of the will, grounded on the direction of the judgement, makes choice of such means as are most proper for the attaining of that [b] good. And lastly, the dominion employs all inferior faculties for the speedy execution of those means.

Sundry ends there are, which may be desired upon particular and conditional occasions: but the true, ultimate, utmost, and absolute good is God. All other ends are ministering and subordinate; he only is κυριώτατον, and ἀρχιτεκτονικὸν, as Aristotle [c] calls his felicity, the supreme and overruling end, the fountain of all other goods; from the remote participation of whose perfections, all other receive that scantling of satisfaction and proportion, which they bear unto man's will. And therefore some philosophers have simply called him "Bonum," et "Bonum Superessentiale," the only self-sustaining and self-depending good, that is only able thoroughly to satiate and replenish the unlimited desires of the soul of man.

[a] *Arist.* Eth. l. 1. c. 11. [b] Lib. 3. c. 3. [c] Eth. l. 1. c. 2.

The corruptions of the desires fastened on him, are the two extremes of excess and defect. The extremes of excess are superstition and idolatry; a worshipping of false Gods, or a false worshipping of the True. Both proceed from the confused mixture of original blindness with the relicks of natural knowledge. This latter giveth us a sight in the thesis and general, that a God there is to be desired: but touching the hypothesis,—who that God is, with the circumstances and manner of his worship,—Nature leaveth the soul, by occasion of the latter, in a maze of darkness, and unavoidable doubting and uncertainty. So that Nature gives light enough to discover the necessity of a duty, but not to clear the means of execution: light enough to enjoin a walking; but the way, being a narrow way, is on every side hedged up from her view. The other extreme of defect, is either atheism in not acknowledging, or ignorance in not seeing, that God whom we ought to serve and desire. Both which (if affected and involuntary, as usually they are) proceed either from guilt, or a consciousness of fearful crimes, which make men study to flatter their distracted spirits, in the persuasion that no Judge sees them; or else from a sensuality, and a desire and purpose to give indulgence to themselves in their evil courses; thinking, like that foolish bird, that there is no fowler to catch, no snare to entrap them, if their eyes be but sealed up, and their heads thrust into the hedge of their own darkness. Though herein both the atheist discovers divinity, and the ignorant person knowledge, enough to convince their own consciences, and condemn themselves.

The dignity [d] of man's will in regard of liberty, consisteth in the freedom which it hath to choose or reject means, ordained for the compassing some proposed end, according as the understanding shall find them more or less conducible for the attainment of it. It is, I say, a choosing of means; for election (as Aristotle [e] determines) is never of the end. We do not choose, but necessarily desire, to be happy, the matter of our happiness being proposed without appearance of present inconveniency; because every thing is naturally prone to its own perfection, where there are no intervenient discommodities to affright it. And yet neither is the free-

[d] Ἐλευθέρα ἐξουσία αὐτοπραγίας. *Zen.* apud. Laert. l. 6. Unde Stoici Sapientes 'Reges' appellabant. *Ib.*

[e] Eth. l. 3. c. 1.

dom of the will any whit impaired by such a necessity. For as we say in divine attributes, that God hath a perfect power, though he cannot sin; so we may conclude of the will, it shall, in the state of glory, (for then only shall our utmost good be chosen, without any shadow of disconvenience) have perfect liberty; notwithstanding it shall never be able to will an absence from the vision of God, since the liberty of such a desire would be no liberty, but imperfection and unnaturalness. Now of all other perfections, this hath, in respect of the utmost end, been quite depraved, being now in corruption, without the assistance of spiritual or new infused grace, thoroughly disenabled from seeking means which may truly lead to the fruition of God, and utterly captivated and enthralled to the tyranny of sin. So that this liberty is left inviolate only in natural, moral, and in civil actions; concerning which, there is a law in Nature, even the relicks and indelible foot-prints of man's first innocency, which moderates the elections of the will for its own and others' temporal good.

The dominion and supreme command of the will is only over those powers, to the production of whose operations it doth, by its immediate authority, concur, as an absolute efficient, or at least, as a moving agent. It reacheth not therefore so far as to the command of the vegetative power: for we cannot command our stomachs to digest, or our bodies to grow; because the vegetative faculties were instituted, not for the proper service of reason, but of Nature. Neither reacheth it to a universal command of the senses, but only by the mediation of another faculty, over which it hath more sovereign power: as it can hinder seeing, not immediately, but by the locomotive power, by closing the eyes. And the same is true of the inward senses: for the memory and imagination often fasten upon objects, which the desire of the will is should not be any way represented unto those powers. So likewise in the sensitive appetite, when once objects, belonging thereunto, creep upon the fancy,—irregular motions oftentimes violently resist the will, and the law of the members carrieth men captive from the law of the mind. Lastly, the will hath no dominion absolute and sovereign over those apprehensions of the understanding, which depend on necessary and demonstrative principles: it can

require it, not to discourse about such objects and divert it; but it cannot make it assent unto them contrary to the evidence of truth demonstrated. Briefly then, the dominion of the will is partly mandatory, and partly persuasive; the one is absolute, working on mere passive and obedient faculties; the other, more conditional, and upon supposition of regularity or subjection in the inferior powers. For the will hath both an economical government[f] in respect of the body, and the moving organs thereof, as over servants; and it hath a politick or civil government towards the understanding, affection, and sensitive appetite, as subjects; with which, by reason of their often rebellions, it happeneth to have sundry conflicts and troubles; as princes from their seditious and rebellious subjects. So that the corruption of this power in the will, is either tyranny in itself, or usurpation in another; an *abuse* of it, and a *restraint* of it. The *abuse*, when the will absolutely gainsays the counsels, laws, and directions of the understanding, which is wrought by the allection, enticing, and insinuation of the sensitive appetite, secretly winning over the will to the approbation of those courses, which are most delightful to sense. For since the Fall, the sweet harmony and subordination of sense to reason, and of reason to God, is broken; and the highest faculties of the soul become themselves sensual and carnal. And the *restraint*, when the will is desirous to obey the dictates of reason, or of grace; and lust, by her tyranny, overbears the soul, and leads it captive to the law of sin; so that a man cannot do the things which he would. As a bird, whose wings are besmeared and entangled with some viscous slime, though he offer to fly, yet falleth down again.

Now touching the corruption of the will in regard of desire, liberty, and dominion, there have been heretofore some who ascribed them to natural and divine causes, and so make the will to be corrupted only "ab extrinseco," and that necessarily. The stoicks, they framed a supreme swaying power, inevitably binding it, as all other agents, to such particular actions, by an eternal secret connexion and flux of causes, which they call fate.[g] Astrologers understanding by

[f] *Arist.* Pol. l. 1. c. 5. [g] *Laert.* in Zen. *Plut.* de Placit. Philos. l. 1. c. 27, 28. *Sen.* ep. 96. *A. Gell.* l. 6. c. 2.

fate nothing but the uniform and unchangeable working of those beautiful bodies, the heavenly orbs, and their influences upon inferiors, annexed unto them a binding power necessarily, though secretly overruling the practices of men. Enquire the reason why one man lives conformably to the law of God and Nature, another breaks out into exorbitant courses;

> "Anne aliud quàm———
> Sidus, et occulti miranda potentia fati?"
>
> What is it else, but star's malignity,
> And wondrous pow'r of secret destiny?

It is not to be denied, but that the heavens, having strong and powerful operations on all sublunary and corporeal substances, may, in altering the humours of the body, have, by the mediation thereof, some kind of influence (if it may be so called) upon the manners; but to ascribe unto them any dominion, is as much repugnant to philosophy, as it is to piety.[h] For by binding the actions of man's will to such a law of destiny, and making them inevitably to depend upon planets, houses, constellations, conjunctions, &c. we do not only impiously take away the guilt of sin, in that we make all men's lapses to be wrought, without a free principle in himself, (and so derogate from the justice of God, in punishing that, whereunto we were, by order of his creatures, unavoidably determined) not only rob God of his mercy, in ascribing those virtuous dispositions of the mind (which are his immediate breathings into man) unto the happy aspect of the heavens; but withal we deny to the soul both natural motion and spirituality. Natural motion first, since that always flows from an inward principle, that is essential to the mover, (which, in the will, must needs be free and voluntary) and not from violence or impression, made by some extrinsecal worker. And then spirituality likewise, since the heavens being corporal agents, can therefore extend the dominion of their influence no farther than our bodily substances.

Others there have been yet more impious, which seek to

[h] Vid. *Euseb. Cæsariens.* de Præparat. Evang. l. 6. et *Max. Tyrium*, disser. 3. *Plut.* advers. Stoico. *Tert.* Apol. c. 1. et ibi notas Herald. *Aug.* de Civ. Dei, l. 5. c. 1, 7, 8.

fasten all[i] the corruptions of their wills on something above the heavens, even the eternal foreknowledge and the providence of God: as if my foreknowledge, that on the morrow the sun will rise, or that such men as these shall one day be brought to a severe doom, were the cause-working necessity of the next day, or the last judgement. It is true indeed, God's prescience implies a necessity of our working after that manner, as he foreknows; but this is "necessitas" only "infallibilitatis," in regard of his undeceivable knowledge, which ever foresees things as they will certainly come to pass, by the free or natural workings of the agents whence they proceed. It is not "necessitas coactionis," or "determinationis," whereby the will of man is without any other disposition or propensity in itself, enforced, or unspontaneously determined to the producing of such effects. The actions of God's will or knowledge within himself, do sweetly consist with the native liberty of man's will: he can effect all his purposes by the genuine and proper agency of second causes, and is never necessitated to violate or alter the manner of our working for the effecting of his own. And for providence[k], notwithstanding there be "providentia permissiva," whereby God hath determined to suffer and permit men to sin: and moreover a disposing providence, in ordering all things in the world unto his own glorious ends; yet we may not presume to think, that God doth determine, or actuate, impel, and overrule, the wills of men to evil. It is true indeed, that nothing is done which God, in all respects, doth will shall not be done with the secret will of his good pleasure, (for who can withstand his will?) and that his purposes are advanced by all the operations of the creature: but yet he doth not so work his will out of men's, as thereby to constrain and take away theirs; for indeed, the constraint of a liberal and free faculty, is, as it were, the extinction thereof. This were an argument of weakness: as if he were not able to bring his own ends about, but by chaining and fettering his oppugners from exercising the

[i] Ἐξ ἡμέρων γάρ φασι κάκ' ἔμμεναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ Σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλιῇσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν. *Homer.* Odyss. i. 33.

[k] *Aug.* de Civ. Dei, l. 11. c. 17, 18. l. 14. c. 26. Lib. de Contin. 6. de Corrept. et Grat. c. 10. Ep. 120. cap. 2. de Gen. contr. Manich. l. 2. c. 28. De Gen. ad lit. l. 11. c. 4. De Trin. l. 3. c. 4. Octoginta trium que, q. 21.

freedom[l] which he first gave them; nor do his own will, but by taking away his own gifts. But herein is rather magnified the power of his providence, and the great wisdom of his power,—that notwithstanding every man worketh according to the inclination of his own heart, and that even rebelliously against him; yet out of so many different, so repugnant, so contrary intents, he is able to raise his own glory; (the end,[m] whether we will or no, of all our actions) and even when his will is most resisted, most powerful to fulfil it. For as sundry times God's revealed will is broken, even by those whose greatest desires and endeavours are to keep it; so always his secret will is performed, even by the free and self-moving operations of those, who set themselves stubbornly to oppose it. There is not then any supreme destiny extrinsecally moving, or necessarily binding any inferiors to particular actions; but there is only a Divine Providence, which can, as out of the concurrences of differing and casual causes, (which we call Fortune) so likewise out of the intrinseal operation of all inferior agents (which we call Nature) produce one main and supreme end, without straining or violating the proper motions of any.

Lastly, many men are apt, in this case, to father their sins upon the motions of Satan, as if he brought the necessity of sinning upon them; and, as St. Paul[n] said in faith, "Not I, but sin in me;" so they in hypocrisy, "Not I, but evil motions cast into me." And because the devil is in a special manner called[o] the Tempter, such men therefore think to persuade themselves, that their evil cometh not from any willingness in themselves, but from the violence of the enemy's power, malice, and policy. It is true indeed, that the devil hath a strong operation on the will of corrupt men.

First, because of the subtilty of his substance, whereby he can wind himself and his suggestions most inwardly into the affections and understanding.

Secondly, because of the height of his natural understanding and policy, whereby he is able to transfigure himself into an angel of light, and so to method and contrive

[l] Vid. *Euseb.* de Præparat. Evang. l. 6. c. 6. [m] *Cyril. Alex.* contra Jul. l. 4. Hinc etiam quod faciunt contra voluntatem Dei, non impletur nisi voluntas Dei. *Aug.* de Præd. Sanct. l. 1. c. 16. [n] Rom. vii. 17. [o] Matth. iv. 3.

his devices, that they shall not miss of the best advantage to make them speed.

Thirdly, because of the vastness of his experience, whereby he is the better enabled to use such plots, as have formerly had the best success.

Fourthly, because of his manner of working, grounded on all these, which is violent and furious for the strength; and therefore he is called a 'Strong [p] Man,' a 'Roaring [q] Lion,' a 'Red [r] Dragon:' and deep for the subtilty of it; and therefore his working is called a [s] 'Mystery of Iniquity,' and 'deceivableness [t] of iniquity.' Which is seen, First, in his accommodating himself to our particular humours and natures, and so following the tide of our own affections. Secondly, by fitting his temptations according to our vocations and personal employments, by changing, or mixing, or suspending, or pressing, or any other the like qualifying of his suggestions, according as he shall find agreeable to all other circumstances. But yet we do not find, in any of these, any violation of man's will, nor restraint of his obedience, but rather the arts that are used to the inveigling of it. The workings then of evil angels, are all by imposture and deceit towards good men; and in respect of evil men, they are but as those of a prince over his subjects, or of a lord over his slaves and captives; which may well stand with the freedom of man's will. And therefore his temptations are, in some places, called [u] the 'Methods,' in others [x] the 'Devices,' in others [y] the 'Snares' of Satan; all words of circumvention, and presuppose the working of our own wills. Though then Satan have, in a notable manner, the name of Tempter belonging unto him, yet we are told in another place, that "every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own concupiscence, and enticed." So that the devil hath never an effectual temptation (such a one as carries and overcomes the will) but it is always joined with an inward [z] temptation of our own, proceeding from the deceitfulness of our own lusts. So that in this case every man may say to himself, as

[p] Luke xi. 21. [q] 1 Pet. v. 8. [r] Rev. xii. 3. [s] 2 Thess. ii. 7. [t] Heb. iii. 13. Rom. vii. 11. [u] Ephes. vi. 11. [x] 2 Cor. ii. 11. [y] 2 Tim. ii. 26. [z] James i. 14. Vitii autor Diaboli decipientis calliditas, et Hominis consentientis voluntas: *Aug.* de Peccat. Orat. l. 2. c. 17.

Apollodorus[a], in Plutarch, dreamed of himself, when he thought he was boiled alive in a vessel, and his heart cried out unto him, 'I am the cause of all this misery to myself.'

Many more things might be here added touching this faculty, which I will but name. As first, for the manner of its operations; in some cases, it worketh naturally and necessarily, as in its inclination unto good, in the whole latitude and general apprehension thereof; for it cannot will any thing under the general and formal notion of evil. In others, voluntarily from itself,[b] and with a distinct view and knowledge of an end whereunto it worketh. In others, freely, with a liberty to one thing or another, with a power to elicit, or to suspend and suppress, its own operation. In all, spontaneously, without violence and compulsion: for though, in some respects, the will be not free from necessity, yet it is in all free from coaction. And therefore, though ignorance and fear may take away the complete voluntariness of an action proceeding from the will, (because, without such fear or ignorance, it would not have been done; as when a man casteth his goods into the sea, to escape a shipwreck; and when Oedipus slew Laius his father, not knowing him so to be) yet they can never force the will to do that out of violence, which is not represented under some notion of good thereunto.

Secondly, for the motives of the will; they are first natural and internal. Amongst which, the understanding is the principal, which doth pass judgement upon the goodness and convenience of the object of the will, and according to the greater and lesser excellency thereof, represents it to the will, with either a mandatory, or a monitory, or a permissive sentence. The will likewise doth move itself. For by an antecedent willing of the end, she setteth herself on work to will the means, requisite unto the obtaining of that end.

And the sensitive appetite doth indirectly move it too, by suppressing, or bewitching and enticing, the judgement to put some colour and appearance of good upon sensual things. And then, as the sun seemeth red through a red glass; so such as a man's own affection is, such will the end seem unto him to be; as the philosopher speaks.[b]

[a] Lib. de Sera Numinis Vindict. [b] Eth. l. 3. c. 1.

Next supernaturally, God moveth the wills of men, not only in regard of the matter of the motion, for 'In him we live, and move, and have our being;' but in regard of the rectitude and goodness of it in actions supernatural, both by the manifestation of heavenly light, ('They shall be all taught of God') and by the infusion and impression of spiritual grace, preventing, assisting, enabling us both to will and to do of his own pleasure.

Lastly, for the acts of the will; they are such as respect either the end, or the means for attaining of it. The acts respecting the end, are these three. 1. A loving and desiring of it, in regard of its beauty and goodness. 2. A serious intention and purpose to prosecute it, in regard of its distance from us. 3. A fruition or enjoying of it, which standeth in two things; in assecution or possession, whereby we are actually joined unto it; and in delectation or rest, whereby we take special pleasure in it.

The acts of the will respecting the means, are these: 1. An act of using or employing the practical judgement, an application and exercising of it to consult and debate the proper means conducible unto the end. Which consultation having passed, and, by the practical judgement, a representation being made of the means discovered,—there next followeth an embracing of those means, and inclining towards them with a double act; the one an act of consent, whereby we approve the means dictated as proper and possible; the other an act of election, whereby, according to the different weight of reasons, we adhere unto one medium more than unto another, either as more proper, or as more feasible. Thirdly, because the means do not bring us unto the end by being chosen, but by being executed. Hereupon followeth another act of mandate to all the faculties, interested in the execution of those means, to apply and put forth their forces with vigour and constancy, till the end be, at the last, by due execution of those means, attained and enjoyed.

Now whereas the philosopher[e] doth often distribute the things belonging unto the soul into affections, faculties, and habits; (for the faculties are moved by the passions, and the passions are regulated and managed by the habits; the

[e] Eth. l. 2. c. 6. Idem, l. 2. c. 2.

habits procured for facility and constancy of action, and the actions directed to the obtaining of an end) this method of the philosopher would now lead us to speak further:

First, of the habits of the reasonable soul; and they are either rational only, and in the mind, as the habits of wisdom, of principles, of conclusions, of art and prudence; or besides that virtuous and vicious, conversant about good or evil moral. Which are, first, the habits of practical principles, called Synteresis; and next, the habits of particular virtues, whereby the will is inclined and facilitated unto well-doing. Unto the felicity of all which, are required these four conditions.

1. Justice and rectitude, disposing the will to render unto God, unto ourselves, and unto all others, that which is theirs, and which, of right, we owe unto them.

2. Prudence, discovering that, which is in this manner right, judging of it, and directing unto it.

3. Fortitude, enabling the will firmly to persist in her virtuous purposes, according to the instructions of practical prudence; notwithstanding the labour it must undergo, the delays it must sustain before it can obtain the end, and the difficulties, impediments, discouragements, it shall meet withal.

4. Temperance, suppressing and subduing those sensual appetites, which would stagger, interrupt, divert us from these constant resolutions.

Next, because all habits, as I said, are directed to the facility and determining of actions, we should be thereby led on to the consideration of human actions, fortuitous, violent, natural, voluntary, involuntary, mixed; as also to the grounds of the goodness or illness of actions, taken, First, from the rule of them, unto which they are to conform. Secondly, from the principles of them, from whence they are to proceed; to wit, knowledge and faith to see, will to purpose, love to do, subjection to obey, strength to finish and fulfil, what virtue leads us unto. Thirdly, from the manner and measure of their perfection. And lastly, from the ends unto which they should be directed; by which considerations we should be led to take a view of the right end and ultimate felicity, unto which all these actions should lead

and carry us; not as the causes of it, but as the way and antecedents unto it.

But these pertaining to a nobler science, and being without the limits of the subject which I proposed to speak of, I shall follow Pliny's counsel, and look back to the title of my book; which having (as well as my weakness was able) endeavoured to go through, it now calls upon me to go no farther.

A

SERMON

PREACHED IN THE CATHEDRAL CHURCH OF NORWICH,

AT THE

FUNERAL

OF THE

RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN GOD,

EDWARD, LORD BISHOP OF NORWICH,

WHO DEPARTED THIS LIFE JULY 28, 1676.

BY B. RIVELEY,

ONE OF HIS LORDSHIP'S CHAPLAINS, AND PREACHER IN THE SAID CITY.

"Of whom the World was not worthy."—Heb. xi. 38.

A

SERMON

Preached in the Cathedral Church of Norwich, at the Funeral of the Right Reverend Father in God,

EDWARD, LORD BISHOP of NORWICH, &c.

JOB xxx. 23.

For I know that thou wilt bring me to death, and to the house appointed for all living.

No book of scripture better furnished with funeral texts than this of Job; and no funeral could better deserve a text out of Job than this; being the funeral of a man fearing God, and eschewing evil; a man perfect and upright in his generation; a man patient, and holding fast his integrity to the last. But intending his just encomium at the end of my sermon, I shall say no more of him now.

The words are doubly considerable to us, in their dependent, and in their abstracted sense.

That they have a coherence, easily appears by the illative particle, *for*, by which they are tacked to somewhat said afore: but to spend any of my time in giving you the various conjectures of expositors about their connexion, would be hugely unjustifiable, knowing my own mind of not handling them at all under this consideration; only this may be (*obiter*) observable to us, that Job was at present in sad case.[a] The days of affliction had taken hold upon him, he was diseased in body, and restless through pain and sickness, (as out of the foregoing verses may be learned) and he thought this a fit season wherein to contemplate human frailty, and to consider his own dying. He knew, no man, at best, was

[a] Ver. 16, 17, 18.

far distant from a grave, or could entertain hopes of living always; much less could he do so, that was at the brink of that place already; it was an easy and short remove, he knew, for God to send him from his weary pallet and sick bed, to his long and last home. And possibly this was the argument of his patience, that in all likelihood he had but a little while longer to endure. He was sure (if nothing else could) his own mortality at last would give him a *quietus est:* the grave is a period as to all earthly comforts, so to all worldly crosses and perturbations; and to this period Job knew all must come, and himself among the rest: 'For I know thou wilt bring,' &c.

But it is the entire abstract and sense of the words that I would come to, and I take them to contain in them a right comfortable, profitable, and practical notion of man's mortality in general, and of thine and mine in particular. 'I (know) thou wilt bring (me) to death, and to the (house) appointed,' &c.

It is the speech of a Job, that was not only a good man himself, but an exemplar of such, and so referred to in the New Testament [b]; and therefore when he saith, 'I know'—'tis as much as if he had said, "I would have others to know it too—'That God will bring them (every mother's child of them) to death, and to the house,' &c."

Let us then carefully observe what the holy man professes to know here, and how; and thence draw rules and documents for our own present instruction and regulation of future practice. As

I. He knows the grave, under the metaphor of a house, (that is) he hath a comfortable notion of that sad, solitary, dark, silent place; for doubtless that is it he means by the 'house of all living.' The allegory is the very same, chap. xvii. 13. 'If I wait, the grave is mine house.' [c]

From whence we may know thus much too—That it is in the power of religion, and the grace of God, to frame in a man's mind most comfortable and amiable ideas even of dying, and being laid in the grave; things otherwise most formidable and terrifying.

He that says here—'I know that I shall die,' had said be-

[b] James v. 11. [c] Job xvii. 13.

fore—'I know that my Redeemer liveth.'[e] Job was a Christian by anticipation, and embraced the promises afar off; as the holy men of the Old Testament are said to do, *Heb.* xi. 13. His fearlessness and hope in his own death, sprung from his faith in Christ's resurrection; and whoever they be that can plead a title to that victory of Jesus (as well à posteriori, as à priori; 'for he is the same to-day, that he was yesterday'[f]) have a sufficient foundation for the like courage and comfort in and about dying that he had.

Without a Christ, I cannot excuse any one from looking upon death as a ghastly thing, the king of terrors, the greatest of temporal evils, the dissolution of nature, the revenge of the law for sin; but there is a reverse of this prospect in the Gospel, and by the virtue of Christ's religion. Here you may behold the Son of God as the great lover of souls, and captain of their salvation, marching out of his glorious tent into the enemies' country, on purpose 'to deliver them that through fear of death, were all their life-time subject to bondage.'[g] Yea, here you may behold him setting his foot upon the neck of this Goliath, and disarming him of all his weapons, as St. Paul represents him.[h] Yea, here you may see him an actual triumpher, and mighty conqueror, girt with a golden girdle, and the keys of death and hell hanging at it, as in St. John's vision.[i] Now 'death is abolished,' (so the apostle speaks[k],) (that is) as to its deadliness, poison, ugliness, enmity. Now the serpent's sting is pulled out, it can but lick and glide, it cannot pierce and wound; like a worm, it can only feed on the dusty part and baser mould, but the precious soul is out of its reach. Now hell is dismounted from behind him that sate on the pale horse;[l] and though he may chance to look big, and threaten still, yet he cannot kill and damn at the old rate. Yea, death is now not only disabled, but reconciled; treacle is extracted out of this viper; honey is found in this lion's carcass; the devil's cudgel is beaten to his own head; what he designed for mischief, is overruled into an instrumentality for the greatest good; and whom he had set on work to be the world's butcher, proves the Christian priest to send up his soul a sa-

[e] Job xix. 25. [f] Hebr. xiii. 8. [g] Hebr. ii. 15. [h] 1 Cor. xv. 55, 56. [i] Rev. i. 13, 18. [k] 2 Tim. i. 10. [l] Rev. vi. 8.

crifice to God, and to preserve his body awhile in the ashes below. By the admirable grace of the Redeemer, of the most shunned foe, is made a kind friend; of a grisly worm, a familiar confident; an amiable ruddiness is put into death's pale cheeks, since the effusion of Christ's blood; by his being made a curse, death becomes a blessing; that which was the punishment of vice, proves the security of virtue; which was the instrument of justice, the token of mercy; which was the dissolution of nature, the completion of grace. Now death is no longer the saints' loss,[m] but their gain; it turns to great account; it is put into their inventory among their riches, 'Death is yours.'[n] It is no longer the grim serjeant of their judge, but their humble servant, their officious black and slave to hold by the hangings on their clay wall, till their princely spirit enters the presence-chamber of the great king. The grave is no longer their prison, but their house, their resting-place from their labours, their hiding-place from the storm, yea, it is *janua vitæ*, *porta cæli*, their only passage into the eternal state of bliss and glory.

This is the victory of Christ. This is the effect of Christianity, it doth not quite kill death, but it makes that death shall not kill us:[o] it does not cause us not to die, but it certainly keeps us from being damned: it will not prevent our coming to a grave, but it will mightily cheer us in our passage thither, and so embalm us when we come there, that not a hair of our heads shall everlastingly perish.

O sirs! let us be able to know death and a grave after this comfortable rate, not foolishly to presume with Agag, but groundedly to hope with holy souls, 'that the bitterness of death is past.'[p] Let us approve ourselves living members of the great conquering head Jesus Christ, and so his victory will be our victory; 'we shall be conquerors too through him that loves us; and death shall have no more dominion over us,'[q] than it had over him. Let us endeavour a hearty and universal performance of the conditions and terms of the New Covenant, which are repentance from dead works, and faith in Jesus Christ, that we may thereby assure to ourselves the said promises and privileges of the same covenant. This

[m] Phil. i. 21. [n] 1 Cor. iii. 21. [o] There is a killing with death threatened, Rev. ii. 23. [p] 1 Sam. xv. 32. [q] Rom. viii. 37.

way the saints of God have always come by their courage against, and their comfort in, a dying hour.—This hath carried them to their graves, with the same unconcernedness wherewith they pass to their beds every night. This made a holy David not afraid to 'pass through the valley of the shadow of death.'[r] This made a holy Job to claim kindred of the worms and rottenness—'I have said to corruption, Thou art my father: and to the worm, Thou art my mother, and my sister:'[s]—and to speak as familiarly of his going to the grave, as if he were a-going to his home—'I know thou wilt bring me to the house appointed for all living.'

So much for the first sort of notion which Job here professes to have of his own mortality, viz. comfortable and cheering. Pass we to the next kind of notion thereof, which is reflexive and applicatory—'I know thou wilt bring (me) to death, and to,' &c.

II. Job not only has a general notion of death, as the way of all flesh, and of the grave, as the house of all living, but he has a particular notion of both, referring the case to himself. He knows, that as none can, no more can he put in plea or bar against his coming to the dust, and being ere long a tenant in that dreary habitation, yet common repository of the grave.

From whence we may please to know thus much too, viz.

That good and holy men are not only convinced, and knowing of other folks dying, but particularly of their own.

To know that all must die, is a lesson that few are ignorant of; he is a very dullard that is not come so far. This Nature teaches, law obliges to, common experience and observations ratify and confirm.

There were but two, that we read of, Enoch and Elijah, (and they upon extraordinary privilege, not for ordinary example) that balked the grave in their passage to the other world. All others have laid their heads down upon a green turf, and dwelt with worms, and such like creatures, of an equivocal production (the sons and daughters of their own flesh and bones), in a house of dirt and rottenness.

And there is a *must* for this—as that wise Tekoite said, 'We *must* needs die;'[t] there is necessity for it thus far;

[r] Psalm xxiii. 4. [s] Job xvii. 14. [t] 2 Sam. xiv. 14.

from the original law of our nature, and from the consequential law of our sin: so that if God and nature can hold us to conditions, we must needs die.

I. Supposing man innocent, he was yet mortal in his nature; he was an excellent creature as he came out of God's hands, but yet but a creature: it was never put into his nature, that if he fell, he should not break: he was a mixture of heat and cold, of dryness and moisture, composed of corruptible qualities and materials: only there was a possibility of not dying through the Divine favour, and the Almighty's supportation. He grew upon an immortal root (there was his security); but cut off from that, by his own degeneracy, he soon withered, and showed what he was.

II. In which lapsed condition, if you further consider him, death is made his doom (as it was his nature before); and as to the stroke of it, there is now no remedy; though as to the sting of it there be. 'It is appointed for men once to die;'[u] it is now statute-law, and has been executed through all ages, and will be so to the end of the world: 'Your fathers, where are they? and the prophets, do they live for ever?'[x] that is, in this world. Where is Abraham, the father of the faithful, and David, the man after God's own heart; and Lazarus, the friend of Christ? The Patriarchs and Apostles, men of all sorts, under both economies of the Old and New Testament, have long since tasted death. If ever there had been any dispensation from dying, (I suppose) Christ would have brought it along with him, but I find no such thing in the whole Gospel charter. It is said, 'There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus;'[y] but it is not said, There is no death. Just as God dealt by the serpents in the wilderness, so did Christ with sin and death in the Gospel-state: he did not presently destroy all the serpents, but took care, that whoever was stung with them, should be healed. No more did Christ make sin to be no sin, or death to be no death, but he provided pardon and salvation, balm and cure in his own blood: he did not keep men altogether from dying, because he could do his redeeming-work better without it; for it is more to the honour of his grace, to make man live in death, and in despite of it, than to continue a

[u] Hebr. ix. 17. [x] Zach. i. 5. [y] Rom. viii. 1.

bare natural life unto him; and thus does our Saviour, not slaying this our enemy outright, but making him to drag his chariot, and to subserve some nobler end.

However, death is death still, sin or Christ, at least in the physical notion of it, if not altogether in the moral. Dust must turn to dust, man must pass into his first principles. This curious frame of the body must be dissolved. The original sentence thus far stands irrepealable: the sinner must die, and we are none of us sinless: and though some of us may be better than others, yet no man's grace or virtue (no more than his youth, or wit, or beauty, or strength, or wealth, or greatness) can excuse him from dying. This courtesy indeed it may do him—that he shall but die (as the poor lepers at the gates of Samaria.)[z] He shall not die over and over, the first and the second death: but yet die he must; still the grave is the landing-place of all living, but Christ has taken order, that in hell none shall come but hypocrites and unbelievers.

But what need I wade further into this general notion of mortality? Every body's knowledge is nobody's knowledge; the more common the speculation, the less reflected on and considered. It is the virtue only of some men, to lay the end of all men to heart.[a] Job was one of this high proficiency, in the school of the grave—'I know (says he to God) thou wilt bring *me* to death, and the way that all go, I shall follow:' this is right profitable knowledge—knowledge with application, and such should ours be.

This is the Christian philosophy, to argue from the common condition of man, to my own particular concern.

To count myself as much a mortal, when I am well, and in health, as when I am under the immediate stroke of death, by sickness, or some acute and deadly disease. To be able to approximate and appropriate never so far distant danger, and to see the evil day a great way off, through all the periods of time, that are filled up with never so much wealth, honour, and temporal prosperity, and to number my days, when they have few or no nights in them—I mean when they are all glorying, and sun-shine; and to balance my actions, resolutions, and affections, in, about, and towards the

[z] 2 Kings vii. 4. [a] Eccles. vii. 2.

world, and its enjoyments, with such present meditations and thoughts as these—

Am I not of the order of God's creatures here below? brother to the worms, sister to the dust? Is not my breath in my nostrils, where there is room for it to go out, and possibility for it never to return? May not God this night take me away from these things? Be I never so great, may I not, by and by, instead of mine honour, be laid under men's feet? instead of my purple and scarlet, be clothed with rottenness, (as Job speaks,) and instead of my delicacies and luxuries, become myself worm's-meat? Is not the time a-coming apace, when, of all my rich silks and naperies, I shall have nothing left me but my winding-sheet? of all my houses and lands, nothing but the length of my grave?

I confess this is hard, ordinarily for men to be made to think otherwise of their condition, than they at present find and feel. It is difficult while they are in life and health, in youth and blood, in prosperity and affluence, to cast their thoughts into such a mould as this. Men are loath to fright away their pleasures with a death's-head, and they are ready to conceit foolishly, that an application of death to themselves, after this rate, is a kind of presage, and ominous invitation of it, and will make it come sooner than it otherwise would; (a mistake like that of some superstitious persons, who forbear making their wills, for fear of thereby hastening their ends). But the vast spiritual profit of this course will recompense its uneasiness to the flesh; and I dare assure those that conscientiously use it, that they will thereby make their lives much the better, but not a whit the shorter.

And therefore I shall hence exhort you all, to study to attain this Christian sagacity, and to know death and the grave, beyond the theory; when you see death in other folks brows and visages, feel it at the same time in your own pulses and bowels. Apply all lectures, notices, and monitions of mortality, wherever you meet with them, unto yourselves, and, for God's sake, let not this be lost.

Let not one funeral procession be a matter only of custom and formality to you; and when you see a friend or a neighbour laid in his grave, do not only shake your head, and say, 'This is it we must all come to,' but lay the providence to

your heart, go home, and set your whole house in order, and always remember (for aught you can tell to the contrary) your own turn may be next: there is not a corpse goes to the dust, but we should have the wit and the grace (as in a broken glass) to see our own faces there.

III. But I proceed to the third and last observable out of the words. Job knew other men died, and he himself should die, so as to be the better for that his knowledge.

That common rule in divinity (that words of knowledge in scripture-phrase, do connotate both affections and actions, suitable to that knowledge) is here of use.

When the holy man says here 'I know,' it is as much as if he had said, 'I so know I shall die, and be buried as well as others, that I will take care to live accordingly. It is not only my observation that others die, and my opinion that I myself shall die, but it is my resolution to practise according to both. It is the knowledge of my heart and will, as well as of my head and understanding.'

If these words be not meant thus, there is little or no great matter in them for a Job to speak; but if they be, we may know thus much from them again:

That it is a chief part of a man's wisdom to know death practically: to know it for his good, to do him good, and to make him good.

Job knew it thus, and he seems here to boast kindly of it, not barely to profess it, 'I *know* thou wilt bring me,' &c.

It is true, I must die,[b] that any one may say: but that will not satisfy a wise, holy man; he enquires further, 'Am I fit to die? Is my work done? Have I got oil in my lamp to meet the bridegroom withal? Is my peace made with God? Are my accounts ready? Have I laid up a good foundation against the time to come, that I may lay hold on eternal life, when I let go my hold on this life?'[c]

A man's knowing to such purposes as these, that he shall die, viz. to put him upon such enquiries, and upon endeavours consequent upon such enquiries, is a great degree of spiritual wisdom and religion:

As may appear by the natural effects of it, which are two great ones, viz.

[b] Job v. 27. [c] 1 Tim. vi. 19.

1. To make a man live more holily,

2. To make a man die more hopefully, than otherwise he would.

I. It will make him live better in several particulars, as,

1. It will not let him sin in quiet. A Christian, considerate of his latter end, cannot commit sin at the rate of other men: no temptations can be offered him, but it will beget such questions as these: 'Is it fit for a dying man to enterprise? Can I appear before God with such a thing laid to my charge? Am I going (I know not how soon) to give up my accounts, and shall I run upon a new score? Perhaps this may be the last act of my life, and shall I conclude so ill? Shall I let my sun set in a cloud? Shall I kill myself with death? Shall I arm my enemy with a fresh sting? Shall I commit those things, which if they hasten not my end, will certainly make it more uneasy by reflection upon them?'

2. It will repress in a man the rankness and wildness of sinful lusts and affections, such as ambition, covetousness, and all licentious practice. It will watch him tame and sober, and make religious precepts and counsels dwell deep in the soul, and take impression. Thus the Cynick taught the Macedonian prince how to get greater victories over himself, than over others, by carrying him to his father's tomb. And I have heard of a great debauchee that was mightily changed by this holy artifice of a dying friend, who, to the bequest of a ring with a death's head, annexed this condition, 'That he should constantly wear it, and one hour in a day, for seven days together, look, and think upon it.' This is St. Paul's [d] argument, 'The time is short; let them that have wives, be as if they had none: and they that rejoice, as if they rejoiced not: and they that use this world, as not abusing it: for the fashion of this world passeth away.' And it is St. Peter's [e] too—'I beseech you, as pilgrims and strangers, abstain from fleshly lusts.' That must needs be a lewd, ungovernable intemperance, that will be drunk out of a skull, and revel it in a charnel-house.

3. It will quicken a man to the duties of religion; make him more frugal of his time; hold him closer to his τὸ ἔργον,

[d] 2 Cor. vii. 29, 30, 31. [e] 1 Pet. ii. 11.

the great errand of his life, and keep him watchful against neglects and errors. What St. Peter[f] writes to the scattered Christians, ('I will put you in remembrance, knowing that shortly I must put off this tabernacle') is the constant language of a man knowing after this example of Job in my text. I will do all the good, and receive all the good I can, knowing that I have not long to live. I will make as sure, and as quick work as I can for my soul, since I have so little security in the earthly house of this tabernacle. Scripture measures our life-time by a day, and death is called a 'night.' Now we all know day-time is working-time; in allusion to which our Saviour says of himself, 'I must work the works of him that sent me, while it is day: the night cometh when no man can work.'[g]

And just thus the wise Christian takes his measures too. His knowledge of his much work to do, and his little time to do it in, will not suffer him to lose any opportunity, lest he should be benighted in his work; but, whatsoever his hand finds to do, he does it with all his might, knowing 'there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in the grave, whither he is a-going.'[h]

No better way to keep fire alive, than in its own ashes; and if there be any sparks of reason or religion in our souls, any sense of God and our duty, nothing will[i] ἀναζωπυρεῖν, stir and blow them up, and kindle from them religious affections, and pious performances, better than this knowledge and consideration of our own mortality.

Lastly, This will make a man die more comfortably, as well as live better. This is a way to make death no bugbear, by being acquainted with it in our life-time; to prevent the killing eye of this basilisk, by seeing it, before it sees us; to make the ending of a natural, animal life, to be the beginning of a divine, eternal life, by dying before we die, that is, in a believing prospect of it, and provision for it.

This I take to be the great governing virtue, and mistress of morals, called Prudence, which is nothing else but Providence under a contracted name, and all other wisdom and knowledge must vail unto it. I find two of the best and greatest men in the Bible, aspiring and suspiring after this

[f] 2 Peter i. 13. [g] John ix. 4. [h] Eccles. ix. 10. [i] 2 Tim. i. 6.

knowledge, bending all their endeavours and prayers for the attainment of it.

David prays thus: 'Lord, make me to know my end, and the measure of my days what it is: that I may know how frail I am.'[k] It is not to be understood as if he desired to know, in a literal sense, what year or day his life should end, but in a spiritual sense, how he should end it well any day of the year, or any hour of the day. Doubtless he was a man given to pious meditation, and his thoughts had been in the dust before now, but he could not bring his heart and will to that practical knowledge of his own frailty which he desired; and therefore he turns to God, 'Lord, make me,' &c.

Moses, another great man, and skilled in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, prays thus: 'Lord, teach me to number my days, that I may apply my heart unto wisdom.'[l] He had been numbering his own,[m] and all other men's days a little before, and he could tell no further than three or four score years; but what was this towards the application of his heart to wisdom? We need but little arithmetick to number our days, but we need a great deal of grace to number them, so as to be the wiser and the better for it. Even a Moses prays for this. Pray we therefore for the wisdom of these holy men, and for the knowledge of a Job—'That we may know (as he did) God will bring us to death, and to the house appointed for all living.'

All this while I have discoursed you as at a common funeral; now let me offer somewhat more properly calculated for this meridian and occasion, viz. the funeral of Dr. Edward Reynolds, late Lord Bishop of this diocess.

What I have hitherto said, concerned you in your general capacity as mortal men, and citizens of the world; but now I have a few words to you, as citizens of Norwich, as members of this diocess, and as surviving pupils of this holy and reverend father; whose soul is with God, but his body still with us—once hugely useful, yet by and by to be laid up in the common repository of the grave, as a useless piece of clay.

It is a great (though no sudden) change you have lived to see—the mitre and the crosier both laid in the dust—your

[k] Psalm xxxix. 4. [l] Psalm xc. 12. [m] Ver. 10.

master Elijah taken from your head to-day—a great man fallen in Israel. Death has played a mighty prize, and triumphed over learning and authority, and sweet nature and goodness, and great experience and wisdom, and an honourable age, at one blow. God has smote our shepherd, and we are left for present as a scattered flock. What shall we do now? Why, you have done well already, in your sad and solemn procession to this place, to condole your loss, to bring this your true friend part of his journey towards his long home. Once angels disdained not to carry a poor Lazarus towards his eternal rest; and therefore the best of you being but Lazars of sin and misery, have done nothing beyond your duty, in paying those your last respects to your departing angel. He had your prayers while he lived, and he deserves as well your tears now he is dead. And herein most of all you have reason to sorrow (as the Ephesian elders did for St. Paul), that you shall see his face no more, you shall feel his hand no more, you shall hear his voice no more. But is this all you can afford? to hear a sermon at the funeral, or sprinkle a tear upon the herse of so eminent a servant of Christ and of your souls? Have you nothing but a little rosemary and bays wherewith to perfume? nothing but a few briny drops wherein to preserve so excellent a memory? Shall this great light go out as a glow-worm at the hedge-bottom, with no greater noise than you can make with your eyes? I hope not so; but rather that you will remember him that had once the rule over you, and has often spoken to you the Word of God, that you will follow his faith, acknowledge the gifts and graces of God that were in him, and the good that has been done to you by him—that you will transcribe his excellent pattern into your lives, dress by his glass, and walk in the light of his fires. In a word, I hope that you will hear him, and love him, and reverence him, and obey him, as long as he preaches to you: and then I am sure you cannot cease to do so now, for, dead as well as living, he is still a preaching bishop. His coffin is his pulpit, his grave is his temple: and he still teaches you, though he says never a word, viz. by his pious and most instructive example left unto the world, by his fair character and good report easily and deservedly obtainable from others concerning him. Now he is in heaven, he lives in his good name upon earth,

as when he was upon earth, he lived by his good heart in heaven. Death has but done us a courtesy by breaking the box, to make the precious ointment of his fame to have a more fragrant and diffusive savour.

What St. Paul in his famous funeral oration for departed Saints, *Hebr.* xi. says of Abel, perfectly agrees to him; he has 'obtained witness that he was righteous; and being dead, yet speaketh;' that is, not with his own lips, (too cold and stiff (God knows), though priest's, yea. bishop's lips, either to preserve, or to derive knowledge) but by the lips of others that knew him, and can bear faithful testimony to his virtues and memory. Among whom I have the happiness to be able to profess myself one, though of all others most unfit, most unworthy to be the encomiast of so great a person—'Vir nec tacendus nec dicendus'—A man of whom I cannot be silent, without detriment to the church, and dishonour to God; and yet a man of whom I cannot speak without loss to his merit, and diminution to his worth. O then for another Elisha to follow this our going Elijah with his due acclamation and eulogy, 'My father, my father, the chariots of Israel, and the horsemen thereof.'

O now for one of his own order and spirit, and measures of learning and grace, to write and tell his story. But since this is rather our wish, than our attainment, I see no remedy, but you must be content with an echo for a voice, with a rude draught for a fair effigies, only with this additional promise from your deficient orator, that what he wants in skill, he will make up in faithfulness; neither flattering him he speaks of, nor fearing them he speaks to, though there should chance to be among them some of that peevish and ill humour, as to make a scruple to commend the dead though never so deserving, but none at all to calumniate the living.

Concerning this our deceased and justly to be commemorated Lord and Father, I shall dare to recommend thus much as true to succeeding generations, viz. That he was a person in whom all was generally good, (allowing for human frailties) and many things were excellent, and exceeding remarkable. Of which only materials I shall compose his following character. As for other ornamentals and additionals,

'Et genus et proavos et quæ non fecimus ipsi'.

I shall lightly pass them by. To tell you of his birth-place, of his gentile extraction, of his liberal education, of his advantageous institution, of his gradual promotions and employments in the university, in the country, in the city, in the church—to tell you of the several great ranks wherein this great light did both shine and burn—to tell you how he passed the state of his childhood, the course of his studies in his youth, and how he arrived at the episcopal chair and dignity in his old age:—these being things wherein I am not so fully informed as it is fit I should be ere I relate them to others, and whereof he himself, being of a singular modesty and humility, was not wont to speak, and whence we can receive but little benefit though expressed,—I say, being such things, I shall choose not to be more particular in them. The pearl needs no art, it is beautiful enough in its own lustre. It is not painting the prophet's sepulchre that I intend, but describing the prophet himself, that you may know in him you had a prophet of the Lord amongst you, and neither the dust of his feet while alive, nor the dust of his grave while dead, may be used as a testimony against you unawares.

First, then, He was universally good. That is, proportionably fitted and qualified to all his capacities, both as a man, as a Christian, as a minister, and as a bishop.

I. He was a good man. Nature had befriended him much in his constitution, he was of a most sweet and obliging temper, of great candour, meekness, and ingenuity; he had a comely countenance, a gentle disposition, a pleasantness of conversation. There was no monstrosity in his body, nor inversion of Nature's order in his soul; reason sat as a queen there, and passion and appetite were as handmaids in their natural places and measures. There were no brutish lusts, no unreasonable desires, no furious transports to be found in him; he neither eagerly sought any dignity, nor declined any capacity of doing good. But

II. He was a good Christian. Revelation was a great mistress with him, and he was a great adorer, as well as practiser of the will of God. Religion sanctified his reason, and grace his nature; and of all accomplishments, he counted it his glory to be a disciple of Christ. The fear of the Lord was to him the top of his wisdom. He put on the Lord Jesus

Christ in all his integral parts, and endeavoured that his ways might be found perfect before God. He was none of the lame and cripple Christians of these days, that hope to go to heaven with one wooden leg. He was careful to maintain good works (I speak it knowingly) as the necessary fruits of Christian faith, and such works as are due to men, as well as those that have a more immediate respect to God. To honour his king, to speak well of his superiors, to be obedient to laws in church and state, to govern his tongue, to love his neighbours, and to take the worst enemies he had in the world, into the number; this was his religion: it was a piece of his conscience to do these things, as well as to preach, and to pray, and to frequent the worship of God.

III. He was a good minister of the Gospel. For this he had a great name, all his undignified time; and when he came to the high-place, he did not make an end of prophesying, as (it is said) Saul did.[n] He was a true labourer in the word and doctrine. He was not only the light, but the salt of all the places he came in. He did much good in that his office: and received the seal of his ministry, in the sober and grateful acknowledgements of a great many. He was built and framed on purpose (as it were) to be an instructor and curate of souls: for he was sober and wise, able to solve difficulties, to determine cases, to quiet consciences. He was an interpreter, one of a thousand. Another Apollos, mighty in the scriptures. He always sought to find out acceptable words, and upright, even words of truth. He was of a sedate mind, of a tender compassionate spirit, heartily desirous of men's eternal good; and not only his industry, but his delights ran out that way, viz. how to bring it about.

The throne of grace, his study, and the pulpit had the most of his time divided among them. In all probability he contracted his fatal diseases of the stone and strangury, with his sedentary studies, and vast labours in the priestly function: yet to his dying day, preaching was his desirable work. 'Prælucendo peribat,' might be his motto; for he wore out with use, and not with rust.

IV. He was a good bishop. And now I am come to that only part of his commendation, that ever was denied him.

[n] 1 Sam. x. 13.

There are two sorts of people, and they differ among themselves *toto cœlo*, that can hardly allow him to have been a good bishop: the one sort think him not good, because a bishop at all, making those terms, *good*, and *bishop*, inconsistent; but these are absurd and unreasonable men, and their tongues are no slander, and I trouble myself no further with them. The other cannot afford him to be good in his capacity, because he was not so much a bishop, as they would have had him; that is to say, because he would not drive their pace; he would not govern by their rules, not execute censures at their heights, nor interpret canons in their sense. Phœbus must let Phaeton have the reins, and then the chariot shall be better managed. David must give place to Absalom, and then there shall be no lack of justice. If there be any here of this kidney, that love thus to be pecking at the little mote (not only in their brother's, but) in their father's eye, I would desire them first to cast out the great beam that is in their own eye, prejudice and envy, pride and pragmaticalness, despising of government, and speaking evil of dignities; and then, when they have done this, they will be better able to discern of a good bishop, by St. Paul's canons, and the Church's; the best rules that I know of, whereby to judge of such a one.

And first let us lay our prelate to the apostolical standard in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus [o]. It is cautioned there, that a bishop must be blameless, (that is) free from scandal; the husband of one wife; moderate in all his actions, as it is opposed to distemper and giddiness, (so I find Dr. Hammond upon the place, rendering the word Σώφρονα,) that he must be attending on his offices; of grave, venerable aspect and behaviour; apt to receive strangers, and a lover of good men.

That he must be no hector, nor tavern-haunter; no user of unjust arts for gain, no *boutefeu* or incendiary; no smiter with hand or tongue; no upstart or novice, but a veteran soldier, in the faith of Christ. He must be apt to teach, and have learning sufficient for communication to an order of men; he must have clean hands, fit to lay upon all heads; he must have great wisdom, to deal out portions to every

[o] 1 Tim. iii. 2, 3, &c. Tit. vii. 8, 9.

child and servant in God's house; and in his own house too, there must be his godly example, and prudent influence. In a word, he must be one of a good report within, and without, able to stop the mouths of all gainsayers, by sound doctrine, and a sober, righteous, and godly conversation.

Now in the judgement of charity, you ought to be persuaded, that your deceased bishop is already come off at Christ's bar, according to this rule: and shall he not then much more do so at your petty sessions?

But I know your evasion, it is the Church's canons and laws you would have your ecclesiastical governor to stand and fall by; and so he shall: if you will but leave your singular dogmatical commentaries at home, and be so candid, as, if you can find no fault, to make none. What truer juridication would you have of wise and good government, than from its natural and proper effects? And for that matter I dare appeal to your own observation, whether in any other diocess of the kingdom (cæteris paribus) there be to be found a more sober, regular, and loyal clergy, a more conformable people, more decent, and well repaired churches, and a greater alteration both of the judgements and manners of men, since the late times of anarchy and confusion (which is especially visible in the matter of the Sacrament) than in this diocess. Resolve this into its true reason, and continue malevolent to the memory of him that is gone, if you can.

I have oft heard him express his desires, that the Church's rules might be strictly observed by himself, and those about him, and wherein there was a wilful failure, you nor I cannot tell: unless you will pertinaciously insist on the omission of the seasons of visitation and confirmation, which (yet you all know) are offices he did discharge when he was able to travel; and when he was not—that should (one would think) serve as a sufficient excuse unto reasonable men. But what need I say more? now I think on it; the length of his government is the only argument against it. I tell you, to sit sixteen years in the chair is a great fault; and if it was true which one said of any long-liver, ('Miraculi instar, vitæ iter, si longum' sine offensione percurrere,) that it was half a miracle, if such a one should live without offence: how much more is it likely to be true of men in high places, especially

churchmen, who have an inseparable envy attending upon them!

Therefore I pass from the bells and pomegranates, on the skirts of his clothing, to the glittering jewels of Aaron's breast-plate—from his goodness to his excellencies, which may be thus reckoned: his learning, writing, preaching, living.

1. He was an excellent scholar: he had a great stock of natural parts, and endowments, to which he added an indefatigable industry, and God gave a plentiful benediction. What Melancthon was used to say—that himself was a logician, Pomeranius a grammarian, Justus Jonas an orator, but Luther was all—might be in a fuller way applied to this person we are speaking on. There are few kinds of literature, but he was a Mystes in them. His skill in the Greek tongue got him his fellowship in Merton College in Oxford, in Sir Henry Savile's time; and what a rare humanist he was, and how well versed in the polite parts of learning, his juvenile piece upon the Passions abundantly testifies.

2. And indeed he was an admirable writer, for wit, judgement and fancy, of all which there seems to be a curious mixture in his books; maugre that observation of a great virtuoso, that there is required a several complexion for them.

3. Moreover, he was a great divine, and in his time a most celebrated preacher. For his divinity, I need only to say, He was a true continuer of the name of Reynolds, in the church of England; and for his sermons, they have run the gauntlet through the universities, inns of court, and city. They have met with the approbation, both of the prince, and his people: scholars, gentlemen, and citizens—all ranks of men, have given their honourable testimony to them.

In sum, I may reckon him among those happy men Caius Plinius speaks of ('Quibus Deorum munere datum est aut facere scribenda, aut scribere legenda') that either do things worthy of writing, or write things worthy of reading; for he has done both. He was a man of God, thoroughly furnished to every good word and work; he had the art of saving souls, and the skill of making sermons, if ever any had.

4. But above all, I must not forget the virtues, and graces, wherein he did excel; for he was as good a liver, as he was

either a preacher or a writer. All his other good qualities were adorned—and both his greener and riper years were seasoned, with the piety of a saint; his youth was not observed to be stained with the vices of that age; and when the Church brought him her mitre, God had crowned his head before, according to that of Solomon, 'The hoary head is a crown of glory, if it be found in the way of righteousness.'[p]

But more particularly his humility, meekness, patience, charity, are remarkable unto us.

1. He was clothed with humility, as the apostle Peter exhorts;[q] yea, it was his upper garment, and covered all the rest of his accomplishments. He had mean thoughts of himself, and was content that others should have so too; and though his face shone, yet he would not know it. There was no leaven of pride, or ill humour, or surliness, or ambition in him; no difficulty of access, nor affectation of distance; if you had but the face of a gentleman, or the habit of a clergyman, all ceremony must be laid aside in order to converse. Doubtless he was a great judge of learning, and yet the most candid auditor of sermons in the world. He was never heard to censure any body, though he himself has not been spared. In this virtue he was a true Nazianzen, ὑψηλὸς ἔργοις, ταπεινὸς φρονήματι· high in place and merit, but lowly in mind and disposition.

2. Neither was there wanting to him the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, whereby he became a true copy of the grand exemplar and bishop of our souls, Christ Jesus, whose word is, 'Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly.'[r] It is a usual saying among some, 'Such a thing would vex a saint:' but truly what would vex, or ruffle, or discompose this holy man, was a hard matter to determine. It is scarce remembered that ever he was seen in a passion. For forty-nine years together (wherein he and his consort lived in married state) not many words, worthy of the denomination of angry, have been observed to drop from him.

And now that this might not be put purely upon the account of natural temper, or voidness of gall (as some late enquirers into his body did observe from that part), it would be considered, whether he that understood the passions of the soul so well as to write so learnedly on them as he did,

[p] Prov. xvi. 31. [q] 1 Pet. v. 5. [r] Matth. xi. 29.

could not also have practically shown their force and vigour upon occasion, if there had not been a superiour principle, and sway of the religion of Christ within him? This I can assure you, he had his share both of injuries from men, and of afflictions from God, and he was sensible of them; but always with the preservation of his religious integrity, and the exercise of meekness towards men, and of patience towards God.

3. And now I am fallen upon that virtue too, I may truly say that in him Patience had her perfect work. In this he seemed to exceed the great pattern of my text; though towards the latter end of his life, his days were like Job's, days of pain; and his nights like his too, nights of weariness, yet he never was heard to say to God, 'O that it would please God to destroy me, that he would let loose his hand, and cut me off; my soul chooseth strangling, and death, rather than life.'[s] He knew that by patience he was as well to wait, as to endure; and that he was to honour the sovereign of his life and death as well by tarrying his leisure, as by bearing his hand. His repeated prayer to Heaven was, that in his utmost extremities he might not be provoked to speak dishonourably of God; and when, through some fierce exacerbation of his disease, he was constrained to make some noise and outcry, he would presently subjoin, 'Though he did roar, yet he did not murmur.' Every fit he was wont to call a storm; and in the intermission he would smile and discourse, and pray, as if he were providing his tackling against the next assault. His patience was of the right stamp, not stoical, and sullen, but purely Christian, and grounded upon right principles. By the grace of the Gospel, his soul was set above the miseries his flesh lay under; and, Moses like, 'he endured, as seeing him that is invisible.'[t] He knew with holy Job in my text, that God would bring him to death at last, and so give him a writ of ease; and with the same holy man elsewhere he knew also, that his Redeemer lived, and would be his exceeding great reward.

4. Furthermore, as the complement of all the rest, there was in this worthy prelate a generous and extensive love. He was come to the top of St. Peter's climax,[u] 'brotherly kindness, and charity.' No man could say his prayers with a

[s] Job vi. 9. vii. 15. [t] Heb. xi. 27. [u] 2 Pet. i. 7.

better spirit, for he was full of love, and empty of wrath and rancour. He could give and forgive both at the same rate, *toties quoties*, that is, as oft as there was need. He was not like that bishop I have somewhere read of, that would part with his blessing, but not with his money: for his pardon and his pence passed from him to those that stood in need, with equal freedom and cheerfulness. His universal charity in reference to the persons and souls of men was so conspicuous, that the world could not deny it, but was forced to miscall it, 'compliance.' All the doubt may be concerning his charity to the poor and needy, with reference to their outward estates; because the excellency of this virtue lies in the secrecy of its practice, according to the great Master's rules, whereof (as near as he could) he was a strict observer.[a] He was for giving of alms, but not with a trumpet. He was for laying up his treasure in heaven, with Him that sees in secret and rewards openly, and not in the eyes and ears and tongues of men; chests that have neither locks nor keys to secure what is put into them. He was not for damming up his waters quite, till death should break the bank, and cause them run down at last with a greater noise and torrent of ostentation; but he was for their silent, pure, and uninterrupted motion in a constant, though narrower channel, into broken pitchers, and empty vessels. Daily and hourly were the emanations of his charity, while he lived; but most of them running like streams, under ground, till he was dead. Many were the gifts he scattered to the bringing up of poor children to school; to the maintenance of poor scholars in the University; to the supportation and encouragement of ancient foundations of piety and learning; to the relief of visited places in his diocess, in the time of the great plague; to the supply of the wants of poor ministers' widows; to the augmentation of small vicarages in his gift, not very much less than 300*l.* per annum, being upon the King's letter by him settled to that use. And if to these you add the several shares that Southampton, the place in which he entered the world; Merton College in Oxford, the place of his first preferment; Northampton, the place of his first ministerial employment; Norwich, the place in which he

[a] Matth. vi. 1, 2, 3, 4.

departed the world; I say, if to the foregoing accounts you add the several shares which these places have had of his bounty, you cannot want a sufficient evidence of his being rich in good works, and abundantly charitable: nor can any hereafter doubt of it, excepting such as looked upon his revenues with an ill eye, and so could not look upon his disbursements with a good one.

Thus far, it appears, he was an extraordinary person in his life; and now that he might no less appear so in his death, we may observe that therein God was pleased to do him an extraordinary kindness, and make that which used to be to others a part of the punishment of their sin, to be to him a part of his excellent reward. The great Augustus's wish was his enjoyment, an εὐθανασία, a civil and well-natured death. The last sand in the hour-glass falls not with less difficulty than he expired with. There were no noises, groans, convulsions, cramps, distortion of the looks, staring with the eyes, gnashing with the teeth, in the last scene of his life. His passive fortitude had been abundantly tried before, and his active graces demonstrated; and therefore the less need of either now. His meek soul glided from him in a fine, imperceptible vehicle; and he died much after the rate of the Rabbins' talk concerning Moses—*osculo oris Dei*, as it were with a kiss of God's mouth. In sum, the description of old Enoch's life and death fits him well, 'He walked with God, and he was not: for God took him.'[y]

By this time I have finished a plain monument unto the memory of a good and excellent person, our present deceased diocesan: now to rail it in, and make it the more intemerate and inviolable to the most audacious hands, I shall beseech you lastly to consider, This was the man that bore the heat of the day for us: this was he that came to us in our gore and rubbish; this was he that entered our Augæan stable in its filth, and reduced it to that degree of cleanliness wherein you now find it: this was he that carried us through the wilderness, and has brought us to the brink of Jordan: Norwich was his Nebo; to this mount he came, and here he died. And I shall beseech you also to join in this prayer:

That the spirit of the God of Elijah may be doubled upon

[y] Gen. v. 24.

Elisha; that a Joshua may arise unto us after this our Moses; one that may perfect God's work upon us; one that may carry us over the river; one that may conquer the Canaanite for us; one that may see us settled in the promised and long expected land, viz. in uniformity of practice, in peace of mind, and in prosperity of condition.

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